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Abstract 
Tax agents have important roles in tax systems as both advocates for their 
clients and intermediaries for the tax authorities. The roles of tax agents are 
becoming more challenging with the changes in the tax landscape, such as with the 
implementation of the self-assessment systems (SAS) which transfers more 
responsibility to taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations and who in turn, 
rely on tax agents to comply with the tax laws. This study examined some selected 
factors in understanding the tax agents’ tax compliance behaviour by extending the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour, by including two additional factors namely, ethical 
sensitivity and culture.  
Conducted in the tax jurisdictions of Malaysia and New Zealand, this study 
is comparative in nature. To understand the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents 
in this study, a mixed-method approach, combining surveys and semi-structured 
telephone interviews, was used. In Malaysia, the survey data were collected using a 
mail survey from a sample of tax agents in public practice whose names were listed 
on the website of the Malaysian Inland Revenue Board. Online surveys were used 
to collect responses from a sample of members of the New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (NZICA) whose names were listed as public practitioners 
on NZICA’s website. Descriptive statistics and Partial Least Squares (PLS), a 
structural equation modeling (SEM) technique, were used to describe and analyze 
the quantitative data. Transcribing, coding, finding the relevant themes and 
member checking were used to analyze the qualitative data of the study. 
xvii 
 
Basically, the results indicate some similarities and some differences 
between tax agents’ compliance behaviour in Malaysia and New Zealand. 
Consistent with findings from prior studies, the results suggest that attitude towards 
intention to comply with the tax law was the most influential factor in explaining 
tax agents’ compliance behaviour to tax law in Malaysia and New Zealand in both 
scenarios of overstating tax expenses and understating income examined in the 
study. This was followed by ethical sensitivity, which was measured using Rest’s 
(1986) Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES), as the second influential factor in tax 
agents’ compliance behaviour to tax law. Mixed findings were recorded for culture 
which was measured using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions and 
perceived behavioural control. No support, however, was found for subjective 
norms in the study.  
The findings from the survey were elaborated further in the interviews. The 
interviews with seventeen tax agents in Malaysia and fourteen tax agents from New 
Zealand provide some interesting findings.  While the results of the survey indicate 
that attitude was found to be the most important factor in tax agents’ tax 
compliance behaviour, the interview findings clarified how tax agents understand 
attitude. For instance, attitude was interpreted as not only complying with the 
professional code of ethics, but also, fear towards being penalized, audited and 
interestingly, fear towards obtaining a bad reputation among the public and peers.  
Overall, the findings suggest that noneconomic factors, such as attitudes 
and ethical sensitivity, can explain the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in 
the study. Some economic factors identified for example, amount of risk involved, 
the trade-off between costs and benefits, and the probability of being penalized, 
xviii 
 
from the interviews could also potentially explain the tax compliance behaviour of  
the tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand who participated in the study.  
The findings contribute to the theoretical and practical aspects of 
understanding the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in two different 
countries. In a response to the calls for more cross-cultural research, this study 
reveals some similarities and differences in the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand which may be helpful in improving our 
understanding of the ethical decision making of tax agents. The findings from the 
study also provide some insights into the ethical behaviour of tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand which may be useful for professional bodies and 
regulators.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the overall thesis. The first section of this chapter 
presents the background of the study, including the roles of tax agents, the 
justification for conducting the study in the context of Malaysia and New Zealand, 
a brief discussion on some selected variables used in the study, an overview of the 
taxation systems in Malaysia and New Zealand and an overview of accounting 
professions in Malaysia and New Zealand. The remaining part of the chapter 
explains the research gap, the objectives of the study, research questions, research 
methods, significance of the research and the thesis organization. The chapter ends 
with a summary.   
1.1 Background   
In a modern world, tax systems may perform various functions for a 
government. The tax system may be used not only for collecting revenue but also 
as a mechanism to enforce policies, such as encouraging certain activities and 
discouraging others (Alley & James, 2006). As a result, non-compliance influences 
not only the amount of revenue being collected, but also affects the implementation 
of the government policies. Tax compliance issue becomes more critical when the 
main source of government funding comes significantly from the tax system and 
the amount of tax collected relies on a self-assessment system (SAS) which 
requires voluntary compliance. Since non-compliance with the tax law has a 
2 
 
number of consequences, a way to combat the problem of non-compliance is by 
understanding the factors concerning why people comply or do not comply with 
the tax law. Tax compliance studies, therefore, provide a platform for 
understanding tax compliance issues, which explains why research in tax 
compliance (and non-compliance) has always been an area worthy of exploration.  
The concept of what constitutes tax compliance itself needs to be clarified 
before delving into the issues of tax compliance. A few definitions of tax 
compliance have been suggested from previous studies, such as: voluntary 
compliance with the letter and the spirit of the tax law (Alley & James, 2006); 
timely voluntary payment of the difference between the actual tax due and the 
amount reported to the tax authority (Andreoni et al., 1998); and the timely filing 
of tax returns accurately according to the law and settling any tax owed without 
further enforcement (Singh, 2003).  While all these definitions have contributed to 
understanding tax compliance, this thesis uses a more comprehensive definition 
commonly accepted in explaining tax compliance (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001) as 
provided by Roth et al. (1989, p.2) which is: 
“The taxpayer files all required returns at the proper time and that 
the returns accurately report all liability in accordance with the 
Internal Revenue Code, regulations and court decisions applicable 
at the time the return is filed”. 
The above definition suggests that the central tenets in tax compliance are 
voluntary compliance and timely payment according to the tax law. In reality, 
however, it is challenging to apply the above definition of tax compliance, for what 
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is considered to be an acceptable level of complying with the tax law by the tax 
authority is subjective and varies, as evidenced in the judgments of the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand such as the cases of Penny & Hooper v CIR in New Zealand 
tax practice (Elliffe, 2011; Sawyer, 2009). Elliffe (2011, p. 466) further argues that 
the judgments of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in the above mentioned 
case imply that “… an aggressive tax avoidance transaction may converge into 
criminal tax evasion”. Kirchler (2007) argues that in most countries, tax avoidance 
is considered legal because it is regarded as an attempt to take advantage of the 
loopholes in the tax system. However, tax evasion, according to Kirchler (2007), is 
illegal since it has the intention to breach the tax law. Hence, it is important for 
taxpayers to understand the boundaries between tax avoidance and tax evasion to 
prevent unnecessary tax litigation on that point or any other circumstances imposed 
by the tax authority as a result of not complying with the tax law. In this case, the 
role of tax agents is important to assist their clients in determining these 
boundaries, despite a view by accountants that while tax evasion is illegal, tax 
avoidance is not, and the latter is expected as a form of tax planning (Ayers & 
Ghosh, 1999). 
Tax compliance is also translated as taxpayers’ willingness to comply with 
the tax laws and non-compliance is associated with violating the tax laws whether 
or not it is intentional (Kirchler, 2007). Therefore, tax compliance (and non-
compliance) behaviour is the outcome of ethical and unethical decision making 
process (Singh, 2003). While it is possible to differentiate between ethics and 
morality in discussing ethical (and unethical) behaviour, the terms ethics and 
morality are normally used interchangeably (Crane and Matten, 2007). The word 
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ethics comes from the word ethos in Greek which means “customary” or 
“conventional” (Jardins, 2011). Ethics is defined as a set of moral conduct that 
differentiates between what is right and what is wrong. It is normally referred as 
normative ethics: what we ought to do or should do (Beauchamp, Bowie & Arnold, 
2009).  Morality has similar meanings which can be referred to how we should live 
which involves looking into principles and rules that help us to decide what we 
should do (Jardins, 2011).  
With regard to the application of the word ‘ethics’ in taxation, Doyle, 
Hughes and Glaister (2009) suggest that ‘ethics’ refer to what we ought to do or 
should do (normative ethics). Doyle et al. (2009) further suggest that the concept of 
ethics in taxation now goes beyond exercising normative ethics, whether or not 
people in the tax system such as taxpayers and tax agents act as what they should 
do, but also questioning themselves whether or not there is any possibility that the 
tax authorities will challenge their tax decision. Consistent with the opinion of 
Crane and Matten (2007), the words ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. In addition, the use of the term ‘ethical decision 
making’ throughout this thesis does not conclusively imply that all decisions being 
made by tax agents are ethical.  
Past studies indicate there is no one definition or terminology to refer to the 
person who is hired to handle other people’s tax and, as a result, various 
terminologies such as: ‘tax practitioner’ (Dubin et al., 1992; Tan, 1999); ‘tax 
preparer’ (Klepper et al., 1991); ‘tax professionals’ (Kahle & White, 2004); and 
‘tax agent’ (Mohd Isa, 2012), have been applied to suit the context of the respective 
studies. Tan and Sawyer (2003), for instance, utilise multiple terms, such as ‘tax 
5 
 
professionals’, ‘tax preparer’, ‘tax agents’, ‘tax advisors’ and ‘tax practitioners’ 
interchangeably in their study, reflecting the variety of terminology in the 
literature. In the context of this thesis, the term ‘tax agents’ is used throughout the 
thesis to ensure consistency.  Tax agents in this study also include tax staff 
employed by the tax agents’ firms.  
1.1.1 The important roles of tax agents in tax compliance 
 Notwithstanding the various special areas in accounting, such as audit, tax, 
management and financial accounting, the moral reasoning of accountants is 
significantly indifferent to their job tasks (Emerson et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the 
roles of tax agents are perhaps different from other accounting professionals. For 
instance, while auditors are expected to be independent and perceived to be 
independent, tax agents, on the other hand, have to act as advocates for their clients 
(Tomasic & Pentony, 1991; Tan & Sawyer, 2003) while at the same time remain 
objective in their professional conduct.  Concurrently, tax agents are also taxpayers 
themselves and are expected to act as an intermediary in a tax system.  
The Code of Ethics for Tax Agents published by the Malaysian Inland 
Revenue Board (MIRB), for instance, states that since tax agents represent their 
clients they have to provide the best possible services to their clients. Furthermore, 
while safeguarding the interests of their clients, they also have to support the 
interests of the government and the country (Malaysian Inland Revenue Board, 
2012). In New Zealand, the Inland Revenue Department (NZIRD) perceives its 
relationship with tax agents as being collaborative or even a partnership (Burton & 
Dabner, 2009). In addition, there are Muslim tax agents in Malaysia, who also act 
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as amil1 (Malaysian Association of Tax Accountants, 2013). The various roles 
could lead to a challenging situation for tax agents, due to the conflict of interests 
that may arise from performing these roles.   
Past studies in tax compliance suggest that due to the expertise held by tax 
agents, taxpayers rely on tax agents to handle their tax matters. In New Zealand, 
Tan (1999) provides evidence that small business owners are prone to agree more 
rather than disagree with the advice given by their tax agents, which emphasizes 
the importance of tax agents in a tax system. In her study, filing accurate tax 
returns and avoiding serious penalties are the two most important reasons why tax 
agents are engaged. A recent finding by Mohd Isa (2012), using corporate 
taxpayers in Malaysia, indicates that many corporate taxpayers rely heavily on tax 
agents who not only handle their tax compliance matters, but also tax planning as 
well. 
In Australia, Sakurai and Braithwaite (2003) demonstrate that the majority 
of respondents in their studies engaged tax agents. Similar to Sakurai and 
Braithwaite (2003), a recent finding by Devos (2012) in Australia indicates that 
there is a significant relationship between individual taxpayers’ compliance with 
the need to engage tax agents. Devos (2012) also found three main reasons tax 
agents were hired which were due to the complexity of the Australian tax system, 
                                                                
1 Amil is the representative appointed by the Islamic authority to collect zakah; they can be 
individuals or organizations. Zakah is the Islamic tithe which in Malaysia is managed by the Islamic 
Council of the respective states. This is because, in Malaysia, religious matters are governed by the 
State Governments. The conventional and the Islamic economic systems in certain sectors in the 
Malaysian economy are run in parallel. For instance, the conventional banking and financial 
systems operate side by side with the Islamic banking and financial systems. Similarly, 
conventional insurance runs in parallel with the takaful (Islamic insurance), and the taxation system 
with the zakah system.     
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legally reduce the amount of tax payable and fear of making mistakes. Dubin et al. 
(1992) and Blumenthal and Christian (2004), for instance, suggest that the increase 
in audit enforcement results in more taxpayers seeking the advice of tax agents. 
Similar to the findings of Mohd Isa (2012) among corporate taxpayers in Malaysia 
who engaged tax agents for the purpose of obtaining tax updates, Hasseldine et al. 
(2012) also suggest an intermediary role of tax advisers in the United Kingdom as a 
broker of knowledge between the taxpayers and the tax authority.  
The roles of tax agents in a tax system, to a certain extent, exert an 
influence on the compliance process (Andreoni et al., 1998).  In a series of 
interviews with tax agents in Australia, Tomasic and Pentony (1991) found that tax 
agents act as intermediaries between the Australian Tax Office (ATO) and 
taxpayers, and have an influence on the level of taxpayers’ compliance with the tax 
laws. Erard (1993) suggests that the use of tax agents increases the level of 
compliance. Doyle et al. (2009) argue that tax agents are influential in determining 
the amount of tax that will be paid by their clients. Marshall et al. (1998) suggest 
that the role of tax agents also includes representing their clients when negotiating 
with the tax authority, and is not restricted to the preparation of income tax returns.  
The reason for hiring tax agents, according to Kirchler (2007), is not 
primarily motivated by the desire to avoid paying taxes, but more importantly the 
intention to report correctly in a complex tax environment. Tax agents are engaged 
to assist their clients in various tax matters, such as minimizing the problems of 
being audited, tax savings, risk management, reducing tax compliance costs, 
submitting accurate tax returns, and resolving uncertainties (Hite et al., 2003; Tan 
& Sawyer, 2003; Tan, 2006). It is also suggested that depending on the complexity 
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of the tax law, tax agents play dual roles, known as the “enforcer/ambiguity-
exploiter effect” (Klepper et al., 1991, p. 228). As a result of their expert 
knowledge, which may lead to strategies to reduce penalties, tax agents will favour 
aggressive tax positions in ambiguous tax situations, and become the enforcer of 
the tax law in situations when the tax law is unambiguous (Klepper & Nagin, 1989; 
Spilker et al., 1999; Hite et al., 2003).  
A brief review of the roles of tax agents in this section suggests that tax 
agents have important roles in tax compliance, as advocates for their clients and 
intermediaries to the government.  Therefore, it is worthy to explore the factors that 
influence them in their decision making.  
1.1.2 The setting of the study: Malaysia and New Zealand   
The increase in cross-border commerce suggests that there is a need for tax 
researchers to undertake cross-cultural studies to enhance the knowledge and 
understanding of tax compliance issues internationally (Attwell & Sawyer, 2001; 
Richardson & Sawyer, 2001; Hite et al., 2003; Singh, 2003, Yong, 2011).. In a tax 
context for instance, different cultures may allow for different incentives and 
opportunities for tax compliance and non-compliance (Chau & Leung, 2009). 
Responding to these recommendations, this study is cross-cultural in nature, 
conducted in the tax settings of Malaysia and New Zealand.  
It is always a concern for researchers conducting cross-cultural study that 
the comparison between two cultures becomes a comparison of apples and oranges 
(Hofstede, 1998). However, studies in cross-cultural context could be in the form 
of finding similarities, differences or both (Hofstede, 2001; Matsumoto & Juang, 
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2008). This is then translated into the approach being used to understand the 
influence of culture, either from inside perspective  (emic) , or outside perspective  
(etic) , or both, and also to be consistent with Hofstede (1980), matched samples 
are used in both cultures. Notwithstanding that, in real life, finding matched 
samples in every aspect is not realistic due to the time and cost constraints. 
Therefore, matched samples in certain aspect such as using similar population of 
samples, for instance in this study tax agents in public practice is considered as 
acceptable. Malaysia and New Zealand were chosen for this study for the following 
reasons.  
First, both Malaysia and New Zealand are multi-ethnic countries. In 
Malaysia, the latest population and housing Census in 2010 indicates that the 
Bumiputera2 forms the majority of the population with 67 percent, followed by the 
Chinese ethnics of 25 percent, Indian ethnics of 7 percent and others of 1 percent 
(Department of Statistics of Malaysia, 2010). As for New Zealand, based on the 
latest 2006 Census, European New Zealanders represents the majority of the 
population with 62 percent. This is followed by Maori ethnics of 13 percent, 
‘Others’ of 10 percent, Asian ethnics of 8 percent, Pacific ethnics of 6 percent and 
Middle Eastern, Latin American and African ethnics (MELAA) of 1 percent 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2012).  
The differences of ethnicities between these two countries possibly reflect 
the differences in their national cultures as postulated by Hofstede (1980). For 
instance, despite Malaysia being a multi-ethnic country, in general the Malaysian 
                                                                
2 The natives Malay, Iban, Kadazan and Dusun. 
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societies practise Asian values which formed their culture (Mohd Iskandar & 
Pourjalali, 2000; Kennedy, 2002). On the other hand, due to the dominance of 
European descendants in New Zealand, the culture of New Zealand society in 
general reflects more the cultures of the Anglo-Celtic (Brooking, 2004) or Anglo-
Saxon (Kennedy, 2012).3 Considering the differences in their cultures, it would be 
worthwhile to examine the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand since prior studies for instance, Richardson (2008) and Bame-Aldred 
et al. (2013) suggest that culture has important influence in tax compliance 
behaviour.  
Secondly, Malaysia and New Zealand share a number of similar 
characteristics. For instance, as former British colonies, both Malaysia and New 
Zealand have experienced the British administration system and inherited British 
accounting practices. Their accounting professions are also patterned after the 
United Kingdom model (Gernon & Meek, 2001).4 In terms of tax systems, both 
Malaysia and New Zealand utilise a self-assessment system (SAS), although New 
Zealand is more advanced in its implementation compared to Malaysia.  
Thirdly, in both countries, there is evidence that taxpayers rely on tax 
agents to handle their tax matters. For instance, a recent study by Mohd Isa (2012) 
in Malaysia found that around 80 percent of corporate taxpayers engaged tax 
agents to handle their tax matters. Mohd Isa (2012) also reported that, in 2009, 
                                                                
3 However, this does not suggest that the influence of other cultures in New Zealand should be taken 
for granted. Yong (2011) for instance, found that different ethnics in New Zealand have different 
cultures of tax compliance behaviour.  
4 The United Kingdom accounting model for instance adopts the fair presentation or full disclosure 
model (Gernon & Meek, 2001).  
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around 91 percent of the corporate taxpayers in Malaysia engaged tax agents to 
liaise with their tax matters. This is followed by around 19 percent of all 
individuals without business income, and about 4 percent of all individuals with 
business income, as illustrated in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1 The use of tax agents in Malaysia in 2009 
Type of taxpayers Number of 
taxpayers 
Number of tax 
agents 
Percentage 
Company 177,200 162,226 91.5 
Individual without business 
income 
586,624 112,496 19.2 
Individual with business income 1,957,245 83,267 4.3 
 
Source: Adapted from Mohd Isa (2012, p. 100). 
In New Zealand, statistics provided by the NZIRD indicates that, there is an 
increasing number of tax agents engaged by taxpayers from 2001 to 2011, as 
illustrated in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2 Number of clients of tax agents from 2001 to 2011 in New Zealand 
Years Number of clients 
engaged tax agents 
(,000) 
Years Number of clients 
engaged tax agents 
(,000) 
2001 1,307.7 2007 1,732.4 
2002 1,362.6 2008 1,814 
2003 1,421.8 2009 2,145.6 
2004 1,496.2 2010 2,270 
2005 1,578.4 2011 2,320.8 
2006 1,657.1   
 
Source: New Zealand Inland Revenue Department (2012). 
The aforesaid discussion suggests that Malaysia and New Zealand have 
both similarities and differences. Since cross-cultural studies can be conducted to 
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find similarities, differences or both, using Malaysia and New Zealand as the 
setting for the study may provide interesting insights into further understanding a 
number of tax compliance issues.    
1.1.3 Some selected variables used in the study to understand tax compliance 
behaviour of tax agents  
Tax compliance behaviour is a complex research area and is not possible to 
be explained only by a single factor (McKerchar, 2010). However, incorporating 
all possible factors in a single study would be very challenging due to the wide area 
of research in tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, this study attempts to 
understand the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand using some selected factors by extending the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) by Ajzen (1991) with ethical sensitivity and culture. A brief discussion on 
the TPB, ethical sensitivity and culture is provided here. 
The TPB is a social psychology theory which is used to explain human 
behaviour. The TPB posits that the intention to perform behaviour and the 
perceived control that an individual has to perform that particular behaviour lead to 
conducting the actual behaviour. The TPB also claims that attitude, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural control influence an individual’s intention to 
perform behaviour. Attitude towards behaviour according to Ajzen (1991) refers to 
an individual evaluation towards the outcome of performing a particular behaviour, 
whether or not the outcome is favourable or unfavourable. Subjective norms refer 
to the influence of important others on intention to perform behaviour since we 
form our beliefs from people important to us (Ajzen, 1991). Perceived behavioural 
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control is described as the ability of an individual to have control in performing 
behaviour consists of personal and environmental factors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010). A particular behaviour is also unlikely to be performed if there is no control 
to perform the behaviour even in the existence of positive attitude and influence 
from important others (Ajzen, 1991). The TPB has been widely used in various 
fields of studies (Armitage and Conner, 2001; Ajzen, 2011). However, in tax 
context, only a few studies have attempted to use the TPB such as Bobek and 
Hatfield (2003), Saad (2010), Trivedi, Shehata and Mestelman (2005) and Buchan 
(2005), all of which in general provide mixed support for the TPB and tax 
compliance.  
Rest (1986) suggests that ethical sensitivity is an important element in 
ethical decision making process. Ethical sensitivity according to Rest (1986) is the 
awareness that our action may impact others. Rest (1986) further argues that lack 
of ethical sensitivity in determining ethical issues may lead to unethical behaviour. 
Despite ethical sensitivity is an important element in ethical judgment, a review of 
business ethics studies by O’Fallon and Butterfield (2003) suggests that it is less 
explored in research. A similar view is shared by Tan (2006) on the lack of 
research examining the influence of ethical sensitivity in tax compliance studies. A 
few studies however, have attempted to investigate the influence of ethical 
sensitivity and ethical judgment of accounting practitioners. For example, Collins 
(2000) and Emerson, Conroy and Stanley (2007) found that ethical sensitivity is 
important in the ethical decision making of accountants. In tax context, a few 
studies such as Yetmar and Eastman (2000), Buchan (2005) and Doyle et al. (2009) 
14 
 
have raised the issue of ethical sensitivity in their studies and found mixed support 
for ethical sensitivity and ethical judgment which suggest for further examination. 
Tax compliance involves ethical considerations of what is ethical and what 
is not which to a certain extent may involve the influence of culture since ethics is 
related to customary (Jardins, 2011). Hofstede (1991) also suggests that ethical 
values are part of a culture which may contribute to ethical decision making. The 
importance of culture in ethical judgment is already acknowledged (see for 
instance, Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Hunt and Vitell (1986)). However, in a 
synthesis of cultural studies in accounting by Chanchani and MacGregor (1999), an 
area that requires further examination is the effect of culture on judgment. In tax 
context, the influence of culture has been examined in studies such as Jakubowski 
et al. (2002), Alm and Torgler (2006), Bobek, Roberts and Sweeney (2007), 
Torgler and Schneider (2007), Lewis (2009) and Yong (2011) of which indicate 
mixed findings.  
1.2 An overview of the self-assessment taxation systems in Malaysia and New 
Zealand 
To better understand the tax backgrounds for this study, the following sub-
sections briefly explain the taxation systems in Malaysia and New Zealand. The 
discussion concisely describes the historical background, types of income taxed, 
and then proceeds with the implementation of the self-assessment systems. 
1.2.1 Malaysia 
Malaysia is a country located in South East Asia. Historically, Malaysia 
was formed on 16 September 1963, consisting of the Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, 
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Sarawak and Singapore.5 Prior to her independence on 31 August 1957 from the 
British Administration, the Peninsular Malaysia was known as the Persekutuan 
Tanah Melayu. In 1947, the British Administration introduced a modern taxation 
system in the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu under the first Income Tax Ordinance. As 
for Sabah, the first Income Tax Ordinance was introduced in 1957 and much later, 
in 1961, in Sarawak. In 1968, the Malaysian Parliament enacted the Income Tax 
Act 1967 (ITA) which took effect from 1 January 1968.  
Essentially, the scope of income that is taxed in Malaysia is determined on 
a territorial basis. However, the insurance services, banking and finance, and sea 
and air transport services, are taxed based on a worldwide income basis. Direct and 
indirect taxes are two main types of taxes collected by the Malaysian Government. 
A direct tax is collected by the MIRB whereas indirect tax is collected by the Royal 
Customs and Excise Department of Malaysia. Over the years, most of the 
contribution from tax revenue has come from corporate taxes, followed by 
petroleum resources and individuals (Malaysian Inland Revenue Board, 2012).  
In 2000, the Malaysian Government introduced the current year basis for 
assessing income for tax purposes as the first step to implement the self-assessment 
system in Malaysia. Prior to that, previous year basis was used tax income in 
Malaysia. Commencing in 2001, the SAS was introduced to replace the Official 
Assessment System (OAS) for corporate taxpayers. The Malaysian Government 
extended the implementation of SAS to businesses, co-operatives, partnerships and 
                                                                
5 Singapore later left Malaysia in 1965. 
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employees in 2004. Therefore, by 2005, the SAS was fully applied to all taxpayers 
in Malaysia.  
The SAS was introduced to encourage voluntary tax compliance, reduce the 
cost of collecting taxes, and bring forward the amount of tax being collected since 
current year basis is used to tax income under the SAS. It also enables the MIRB to 
divert its resources, from its traditional task of determining or assessing the 
taxpayers’ income, to focus more on tax audits, with the desire of increasing the 
income tax collected (Kassipillai et al., 2000). The change of the tax landscape 
under the SAS transfers more responsibility to comply with the tax laws to the 
taxpayers, suggesting that they have to be more responsible in managing their 
income tax.  
The implementation of the SAS in Malaysia is not without its issues.  For 
example, Loo et al. (2010) conducted a study on the impact of the SAS on the tax 
compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers in Malaysia using individual case 
studies, and found that the complexity and the ambiguity of the tax laws under the 
SAS could cause difficulties for taxpayers. Those difficulties result in taxpayers, 
either unintentionally non-complying or over complying with their obligations 
under the tax laws.   
Commencing 1 April 2015, Malaysia will implement Goods and Service 
Tax (GST) for a more effective tax system (Malaysian Inland Revenue Board, 
2013). There is a possibility that the implementation of GST will bring a new set of 
challenges to tax agents in Malaysia in assisting their clients to comply with the tax 
law. 
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1.2.2 New Zealand  
Geographically, New Zealand is located in the southwest of the Pacific 
Ocean and is formed by two main islands, the North and the South Islands. The 
implementation of the Land and Income Tax Act 1891 marked the commencement 
of the taxation of income in New Zealand. Essentially, there are currently four 
major statutes governing taxation in New Zealand. These statutes are the Income 
Tax Act 2007 (ITA 2007), Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (GST 1985), Tax 
Administration Act 1994 (TAA 1994) and Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994 
(TRAA 1994). The taxation system in New Zealand has undergone many reforms, 
including the re-writing of the Income Tax Act 1976 which was undertaken in 
stages and completed in November 2007 and became effective from 1 April 2008 
(Sawyer, 2007).  
In general, the scope of income taxed in New Zealand is determined on the 
worldwide basis. In addition to the income tax, the Goods and Service Tax (GST) 
is also applied in New Zealand. The tax revenue in New Zealand comes mainly 
from individual taxpayers and GST, followed by companies and other duties (New 
Zealand Inland Revenue Department, 2012).  
New Zealand has operated a full self-assessment system for income tax 
since 2002. Taxpayers are responsible for calculating their own tax liabilities and 
for paying the amount owing to the NZIRD or claiming a refund. The SAS in New 
Zealand does not require individuals who only receive salaries or wages, interest or 
dividends (which are taxed at source), to file a tax return with the NZIRD. Instead, 
to ensure the correct amount of tax is remitted to the NZIRD, the NZIRD relies on 
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the withholding tax system for taxing this income, and the NZIRD may also 
determine their income by issuing an income statement.  
Notwithstanding the various efforts of the NZIRD to encourage 
compliance, which cater for different types of taxpayers, non-compliance is still an 
issue in New Zealand. For instance, Gupta (2006) found that tax evasion is 
perceived as a less serious crime in New Zealand, compared to other white collar 
frauds such as accounting fraud.  
1.3 An overview of the accounting professions in Malaysia and New Zealand 
Notwithstanding that both Malaysia and New Zealand inherited British 
accounting practices and patterned their accounting professions after the British 
model (Gernon & Meek, 2001), there is the possibility that the requirements to 
appoint tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand are different due to the 
differences in the tax laws in both countries. For instance, section 153 of the 
Income Tax Act 1967, together with the Accountants Act 1967, statutorily regulate 
tax agents in Malaysia. New Zealand, on the other hand, does not statutorily 
regulate the profession but implements a voluntary registration system via s 34B of 
the TAA 1994 (Thiagarajah, 2012).  To understand how tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand are appointed, this sub-section provides a brief explanation of the 
accounting profession in both countries.  
1.3.1 Malaysia 
Based on a study by Gray (1988), the accounting profession in Malaysia is 
suggested to be statutorily controlled, displaying uniformity rather than flexibility, 
operating in secrecy rather than transparency, and conservative. Gray (1988) 
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further argues that the accounting profession in Malaysia is regulated mostly by the 
Malaysian Government rather than self-regulated, favours enforcement of uniform 
legislation for all companies, encourages high confidentiality and restricts the 
disclosure of information and finally, is cautious in taking risk of future events.  
Historically, the accounting profession in Malaysia has been influenced by 
two accounting bodies, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the 
Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), (the latter was 
previously known as the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountant 
(MACPA)). The MIA was set up under the Accountant Act 1967 as a statutory 
body, whereas the MICPA was established as a private association in 1958 
(Selvaraj, 1999). Prior to 1967, there was no regulation of the accounting 
profession in Malaysia. 
Since its inception, the MICPA has been active in providing assistance to 
its members through technical guidance and training, as well as conducting its own 
professional examinations. The MICPA was also active in issuing accounting 
standards in the early 1970s. During its early years, members of MICPA were 
mostly chartered accountants trained in the United Kingdom and Australia. The 
membership of the MICPA increased with support from the then Big Six Chartered 
Accounting firms. At the same time, graduates of the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA) experienced difficulties in becoming MICPA 
members. This led to the suggestion of establishing a local organization to regulate 
the accounting profession in Malaysia, resulting in the establishment of MIA. Both 
bodies merged in 1987, and since then the MIA has not restricted its function to 
being a statutory body but has been active in issuing standards, providing technical 
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support and training (Selvaraj, 1999). The members of the MIA are required to 
follow the bylaws of MIA in conducting their professional duties. The bylaws of 
MIA are based mainly on the Code of Professional Accountants issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants (Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 
2010).  
In addition to the above mentioned bodies, there are two further 
professional bodies which specifically cater for tax agents in Malaysia. The 
Chartered Tax Institute of Malaysia (CTIM), formerly known as the Malaysian 
Institute of Taxation (MIT), was established in 1991 under the patronage of MIA, 
before re-branding and becoming a separate entity. Its main objectives are to 
develop awareness of tax issues and protecting the tax profession to ensure 
qualified tax agents are produced in the country (Chartered Tax Institute of 
Malaysia, 2010). The other body is the Malaysian Association of Tax Accountants 
(MATA) which was established in 1988 to assist the Malay tax agents and 
company secretaries to develop their professionalism (Malaysian Association of 
Tax Accountants, 2013). Since MIA is the body governing the accounting 
profession in Malaysia, the members of CTIM and MATA are bound by the bylaws 
of the MIA.  
Eligibility to become a tax agent in Malaysia is determined under three 
conditions pursuant to section 153(3) of the ITA 1967. A person can become a tax 
agent if: 
(1) She or he is a professional accountant authorized by, or under, any written law 
to be an auditor of companies, or   
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(2) Any other professional accountants approved by the Minister of Finance or, 
(3) Any other professional accountants approved by the Minister of Finance on the 
recommendation of the Director General of the MIRB.  
According to section 153(3) of the ITA 1967, which was amended with 
effect from 1 January 2006, the term “tax agents” refers to any professional 
accountants or person, approved by the Minister of Finance (Thiagarajah, 2012). 
The definition of “professional accountants” is not provided by the ITA 1967; 
however, section 23 of the Accountants Act 1967 exclusively restricts any person 
from using the title “accountant” unless that person is a registered member of the 
MIA. 
The roles of a tax agent in Malaysia are also stipulated in the ITA 1967 
which suggest an important aspect of tax agents’ responsibility as advocates for 
their clients in the Malaysian tax system. The tax agents’ roles under the ITA 1967 
are as follows:  
(1) Advising their clients on records to be maintained, 
(2) Assisting in completing clients’ tax returns,  
(3) Advising their clients on their obligations to pay their dues as required by the 
law, 
(4) Attending the audit at clients’ premises if they are being audited, 
(5) Attending an investigation, 
(6) Participating in tax audit interviews,  
(7) Negotiations and proceedings on behalf of their clients, and 
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(8) Filing appeals as well as attending court hearings and any further appeals. 
1.3.2 New Zealand   
A study by Gray (1988) suggests that accounting practices in New Zealand 
favour professional individual judgment and self-regulated legislation, flexible in 
their accounting approach, transparent in disseminating information and lastly, 
favour a risk taking approach in uncertain future events. The history of the 
accounting profession in New Zealand can be traced back to the establishment of 
the Incorporated Institute of Accountants of New Zealand (IIANZ) in May 1894. 
Due to disputes over the enrolment of membership, in 1898, the Accountants and 
Auditors Association (AAA) was formed in Auckland. Both bodies, the IIANZ and 
AAA, were later merged and became the New Zealand Society of Accountants 
(NZSA) in 1908. In 1996, NZSA changed its name to the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ) (Emery et al., 2002) which later became 
NZICA. Since then many reforms had taken place, and currently NZICA operates 
under the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand Act 1996.  
The objectives of NZICA are to ensure the integrity of the accounting 
profession and regulate the accounting industry in New Zealand through providing 
assistance, training and education. NZICA was also the instigator, as well as one of 
the 11 members of the Global Accounting Alliance (GAA) which represents many 
of the leading professional accountancy bodies in the world (New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants, 2013). The NZICA Code of Ethics, which is mandatory 
for all its members, serves as a guide for members in performing their professional 
duties. For tax practice, a sub-section of the NZICA Code of Ethics, the Tax 
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Guideline 1 (TG-1) 2004 provides a comprehensive ethical guideline (New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2010).  
There is also the Accountants and Tax Agents Institute of New Zealand 
(ATAINZ), formerly known as Tax Agents Institute of New Zealand (TINZ), 
which was established in 1976 as an incorporated society, and serves as a platform 
to support the tax profession in New Zealand.  ATAINZ supports tax agents 
through conferences, courses, discussions and specialist advice service. In addition 
to NZICA, ATAINZ has also been granted ‘approved advisor group’ status by the 
NZIRD (Accountants and Tax Agents Institute of New Zealand, 2013). 
Furthermore, CPA Australia is another professional accounting body which has 
been in active presence in New Zealand accounting profession. Similar to NZICA 
and ATAINZ, CPA Australia has also been granted an ‘approved advisor group’ 
status by the NZIRD (CPA Australia, 2013).  
New Zealand relies on a voluntary system, using a self-regulatory approach 
for tax agents to provide their services (Thiagarajah, 2012). In New Zealand, a tax 
agent is determined according to section 34B of the TAA 1994; however, it is the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue who has the discretion whether or not to list a tax 
agent (Fisher, 2010). Pursuant to section 34B of the TAA 1994, to qualify as a tax 
agent, a person has to be a preparer of income tax returns for ten or more taxpayers 
and fall under any of the following categories: 
(1) A practitioner carrying on a professional public practice,  
(2) A person carrying on a business or occupation in which returns of income are 
prepared, or  
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(3) The Maori Trustee.  
1.4 Research gap  
The earlier discussion of this chapter suggests that tax agents are engaged to 
undertake various tasks by their clients with the ultimate concern being how much 
tax their clients could save or minimising the amount of tax that their clients must 
pay to the tax authority. Meanwhile, tax agents must also consider their obligations 
to other parties, such as the tax authority, their firm, the accounting profession and 
the public (Yetmar & Eastman, 2000). Due to their unique position, it is 
challenging for tax agents to determine the boundaries as advocates and maintain 
their professionalism at all times (Bobek & Hatfield, 2003). Furthermore, with 
changes in the tax landscape, such as the implementation of SAS, their roles are 
becoming more challenging since as a result of their expertise, taxpayers rely more 
on tax agents (Lai & Choong, 2009). The experience of other countries which have 
implemented the SAS, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, indicates that 
many taxpayers seek the assistance of tax agents in complying with their tax 
obligations after the implementation of SAS (Marshall et al., 1998).  
Notwithstanding the importance of tax agents in a tax system, studies on tax 
agents’ tax compliance behaviour, especially the ethical sensitivity of tax agents, 
remain scarce compared to research on other factors in tax compliance studies 
(Tan, 2006). While there is a possibility that the number has changed over the 
years, a review by Tan and Sawyer (2003) on tax compliance studies in New 
Zealand found that only two published studies examined the tax agents’ ethical 
decision making and their tax compliance behaviour for the period between 1990 
and 2003. In a recent study by Gupta and McGee (2010), they compared the 
25 
 
perceptions of students with accounting practitioners regarding ethics in tax 
compliance in New Zealand. The study, however, did not specifically use tax 
agents as samples. A recent unpublished study which uses tax agents as sample is 
provided by Smart (2012). The study examines the tax reporting behaviour of tax 
agents and individual taxpayers in New Zealand using the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour as framework.  
While there are a few studies in Malaysia between the period 1994 and 
2008 that involved tax agents as respondents, only Singh (2003) specifically 
examined the moral decision making of tax agents (Abdul-Jabbar & Pope, 2009). 
Similar to New Zealand, the number of studies using tax agents as samples in 
Malaysia may have changed over the years. For instance, Lai and Choong (2009) 
examined the perceptions of tax agents towards tax compliance in SAS 
environment. Lai and Choong (2010) and Abdul Aziz and Md. Idris (2012), 
investigated the use of the electronic tax filing system in Malaysia among tax 
agents. Nonetheless, the ethical decision making of tax agents in complying with 
the tax law while performing their professional roles is still not widely explored in 
Malaysia.  
Even though the importance of ethics in previous taxation studies has 
received considerable support (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Richardson and 
Sawyer, 2001), the issue of how to measure ethics remains a concern (Richardson 
and Sawyer, 2001). While the use of single item to measure ethics in prior studies 
is acknowledged in improving our understanding on the importance of ethics in tax 
compliance, arguably, individuals rely on more than one ethical dimension in their 
decision making (Reidenbach and Robin, 1988; 1990). Thus, ethical sensitivity in 
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this study is measured using the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) adapted 
from Cruz et al. (2000) which could possibly explain better the ethical decision 
making of tax agents in the study.  
Previous studies on tax compliance have almost always centred on  Western 
countries, especially the United States (US), which suggests that tax authorities 
outside the US have to be cautious in interpreting the findings of the studies 
(Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). Globalisation, however, requires a move away from 
a single location study to comparative studies (McDonald, 2000), which also 
implies that cross-cultural ethics research is becoming more important (Brand, 
2009). However, the synthesis of the literature in tax compliance studies 
undertaken by Richardson and Sawyer (2001) found that cross-cultural tax research 
is still in its infancy and should be promoted to reduce the tax knowledge gap. The 
discussion in section 1.1.3 also gives some indication of the importance of culture 
in tax studies.  
While the use of Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions to 
measure culture has been widely used in other areas of business, such as marketing 
(De Mooij, 2004), the use of Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions in 
the tax context is still limited (Tsakumis et al., 2007). This study attempts to reduce 
this gap by operationalizing Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions to 
measure culture in complying with the tax laws. This is also a response to Yong 
(2011), to use Hofstede’s (1980) cultural typology in the tax context 
internationally.  
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1.5  Objective of the study and the research questions 
Basically, the main purpose of this research is to understand the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand by examining 
some selected factors that contribute to their ethical decision making while 
performing their professional roles. This is performed mainly by extending the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) of Ajzen (1991) with another two factors, 
culture and ethical sensitivity. Within the framework of the TPB itself, specifically, 
the study aims to understand the influence of attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural control in the decision making of tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand.  
Since this study is comparative in nature, it is essential to compare the 
perceptions of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the TPB 
elements, ethical sensitivity and culture. This comparison is essential given that tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand are different in the way the accounting 
profession is being regulated in both countries and the possibility of different 
cultures between Malaysia and New Zealand as discussed in sections 1.1.2 and 1.3. 
In addition, this study also examines whether or not the tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in this study perceive culture and ethical sensitivity as 
multidimensional constructs in complying with the tax laws. The objectives of the 
study lead to the following specific research questions: 
(1) Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand indicate the same level of 
perceptions with regard to Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions in 
complying with the tax laws? 
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(2) Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same level of 
perceptions in relation to the TPB elements in complying with the tax law 
while performing their roles? 
(3) Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same level of 
perceptions in relation to the dimensions in the Multidimensional Ethics 
Scales? 
(4) Does the attitude towards tax compliance significantly influence the tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws while 
performing their professional roles? 
(5) Do subjective norms significantly influence the tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying with the tax laws while performing their 
professional roles? 
(6) Does perceived behavioural control significantly influence the tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws while performing 
their professional roles? 
(7) Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive ethical sensitivity as a 
multidimensional concept? 
(8) Does ethical sensitivity significantly influence tax agent in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the tax laws while performing their professional 
roles? 
(9) Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive culture as a 
multidimensional concept? 
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(10) Does culture significantly influence tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand 
in complying with the tax laws while performing their professional roles? 
1.6 Research methods  
Traditionally, researchers employ either the qualitative or quantitative 
approaches in conducting a research. Richardson and Sawyer (2001) for instance, 
found that survey and experimental designs are the common methods used by tax 
researchers. However, over the years, mixed method research has gained 
considerable attention in social science research (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p. 15) for instance, suggest that mixed method research 
has become the “third research paradigm”. Most likely this is because mixed 
method research is appropriate for various research disciplines in the social 
sciences (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In taxation studies, the use of mixed 
method has also been supported. For instance, McKerchar (2010) suggests that in 
mixed methods studies, the findings from using an approach can be used to inform, 
validate or compensate the weaknesses of using the other approach.  
Based on the foregoing advantages of using a mixed method approach in 
tax studies, and using pragmatism as the research lens, this study employs a mixed 
method strategy to meet the objectives of the study. The fundamental idea of mixed 
method research is to combine both quantitative and qualitative approaches in a 
single study. This study incorporates a quantitative method (survey) and qualitative 
method (telephone interview) to obtain responses from tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand. Apart from performing the preliminary and descriptive analyses 
using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 18,  
Partial Least Squares (PLS), a composite based structural equation modelling 
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(SEM) approach, is used to test the hypotheses based on research questions set out 
in Chapter 3.  
Essentially, SEM is a multivariate technique which combines factor 
analysis and multiple regressions in a single analysis which allows for a set of 
interrelated dependent and independent variables with their measures to be 
examined simultaneously (Hair et al., 2010). There are two commonly used SEM-
based approaches in social science studies, the covariance-based SEM (CBSEM) 
and PLS (Gefen et al., 2000). The latter is used since this study is prediction 
oriented and PLS is based on soft data distribution assumption which does not 
require parametric assumption.  Therefore, the assumption of normality of data 
could be relaxed and PLS has the ability to work well even with small sample size. 
In addition, CBSEM only works with measures which are developed reflectively. 
Since measures in this study were developed in formative (second order) and 
reflective mode (first order), PLS is the appropriate choice for testing the 
hypotheses. The researcher performed the PLS using SmartPLS program developed 
by Ringle et al. (2005).  As for the interview data, it was analysed thematically 
using the approach recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Braun and 
Clarke (2006). Further discussion of the research methods employed in this study is 
presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
1.7 Significance of research   
The findings from this study contribute to the existing literature in tax 
compliance in a number of ways.  As a result of globalisation, cross-cultural 
research has become more important (Ayres & Ghosh, 1999). Broadening the 
database of taxation empirical work outside the US, in this case within the Asia 
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Pacific region, could improve the understanding of tax compliance (and non-
compliance) issues and assist with identifying the differences in tax compliance 
behaviour so that appropriate strategies can be implemented to improve compliance 
(Andreoni et al., 1998). In addition, the findings from this study could provide 
some further understanding as to whether the decision making of tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand is explained to an extent by the differences in their 
cultural background. In this study, the influence of culture is measured using 
Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions, which is limited in its application 
in a tax context (Tsakumis et al., 2007).  
The importance of ethics in tax compliance studies has been supported in 
previous research; however, the approach for measuring ethics is still an area of 
concern (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). A tool that could 
be used to measure ethics in business research is the Multidimensional Ethics Scale 
(MES) developed by Reidenbach and Robin (1988; 1990) which was initially used 
to measure ethics in marketing. Cohen et al. (1993) later replicated and extended 
MES in an accounting context in the US. More recent studies, such as Cruz et al. 
(2000) and Buchan (2005), who tested the MES in tax and accounting contexts 
respectively, were also conducted in the US. This study contributes to the body of 
knowledge by testing the MES to measure ethical sensitivity on tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand using specific tax scenarios. These scenarios involved 
the over claiming of expenses and under declaring of income which according to 
Elliffe (2011), are two situations representing the core aspect of the tax gap in a tax 
system. To the researcher’s knowledge the use of MES in the tax context has not 
been tested on tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand. To examine the tax 
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compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia, Singh (2003) for instance used 
three tax scenarios with attitudinal statements indicating whether or not the tax 
agents agreed with the tax treatment in the scenarios and measured using a 7-point 
Likert scale ranging from “very high likelihood” to “very low likelihood”. Singh 
(2003) also used the Defining Issues Test (DIT) by Rest (1986) to examine the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia. Attwell and Sawyer (2001) for 
instance, used a similar questionnaire to Tooley (1992) in examining the ethical 
attitudes of tax agents in New Zealand. The respondents in their study were asked 
to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the statements provided using a 5-
point scale with a higher score indicating a more favourable opinion. In addition to 
that, Cohen et al. (1993) commented that considering MES was developed in the 
cultural context of the US, it may not be suitable for Asian culture and thus 
suggested for more testing on MES in the international studies setting. The findings 
from this study could contribute to understanding whether or not MES could be 
applied universally in the tax context.  
Oats (2012) argues that taxation studies have been dominated by the 
positivist paradigm, which leads to the use of quantitative approaches per se and 
thus suggests future research in tax to consider other alternatives. In a similar vein, 
McKerchar (2010) supports the use of mixed-method research in tax studies. The 
use of mixed-method involving tax agents in tax studies, however, has not been 
widely documented. An example of a published mixed-method study is provided 
by Hasseldine et al. (2012), which involved tax agents as their sample which 
combined the survey and interview methods to understand the role of tax 
knowledge. The pragmatism paradigm applied in this study enables the researcher 
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to apply a mixed-method approach, combining a survey and interview, to provide a 
better understanding of the factors that contribute to the ethical decision making of 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand while performing their professional roles. 
The interview findings are predicted to explain further the responses in the survey.  
Furthermore, the use of SEM, which is a second generation data analysis 
technique (Hair et al., 2010) particularly the PLS in this study, provides an 
alternative to analyse tax compliance data and predict tax compliance behaviour 
using small sample sizes with non-parametric assumption in a complex model. 
While “SEM has become de rigueur in validating instruments and testing linkages 
between constructs” (Gefen et al., 2000, p. 6) and has been supported in social 
science research such as in the areas of marketing and information systems (Urbach 
& Ahlemann, 2010; Hair et al., 2012; Ringle et al., 2012), the use of SEM 
particularly PLS, is still not widely explored in taxation studies. To the researcher’s 
knowledge, there are not many published tax studies which have applied SEM in 
their data analyses, except for a few such as Cox and Eger (2006), and Saad (2010). 
Compared to the first generation of statistical analysis such as regression which is 
only capable of testing one layer relationship between independent and dependent 
variables, the use of SEM is predicted to provide better understanding since it 
allows a set of interrelated questions to be tested in a single, systematic and 
comprehensive analysis (Gefen et al., 2000). Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore 
the use of SEM in tax context.  
The accounting scandals throughout the world have harmed the reputation 
of the accounting profession and increased the sensitivity of the public to the 
wrongdoings of accountants in business (Emerson et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2009; 
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Uysal, 2009). While much attention has been directed to the ethical standards of the 
auditors, tax agents have received attention as well since taxation services are a 
component of accounting services provided by public accounting firms. Therefore, 
as suggested by Singh (2003), the empirical evidence from tax research could be 
used as a platform to either confirm or refute the argument of deteriorating 
professionalism in the accounting industry. 
Since ethics of the accounting profession “… is a profession-wide issue 
with far-reaching consequences” (Smith & Hume, 2005, p. 213), the findings could 
also benefit the accounting profession by indirectly providing some insights into 
the factors that motivate tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand to act ethically 
while performing their roles. Once the factors that motivate tax agents are known, 
appropriate resources and mechanism could be channelled to assist tax agents in 
their ethical conduct. This could be helpful, for instance, in creating more 
awareness through training syllabus of tax agents by incorporating some elements 
of factors that motivate tax agents to ethical decision making.  
1.8 Thesis organisation  
This thesis is organised in chapters as follows. Chapter One presented the 
background information for the study, highlighted the importance of tax agents in a 
tax system and justifies Malaysia and New Zealand as settings for the study. To 
provide a better understanding of the study, this chapter also explained briefly the 
taxation systems in Malaysia and New Zealand, as well as the accounting 
profession in both countries. In addition, the chapter also presented the research 
gap, objectives of the study, research questions, summary of the research methods, 
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the significance of the research, organization of the thesis and concluded with a 
summary. 
Chapter Two reviews the past literature and concepts relevant to the study. 
In this chapter the discussions are focused on the approaches (economic and 
behavioural) in tax compliance studies, relevant theories and key variables used in 
the study. Following the literature review, Chapter Three develops the research 
framework and hypotheses. The detailed research questions are presented together 
with the hypotheses to ensure better understanding of the research content.  
Chapter Four describes the research methodology used in the study. The 
chapter explains the research paradigm, the methodology used (including the 
mixed-method approach), the research design, sampling, data collection 
techniques, instrument development and preliminary analysis used. This chapter 
also describes the structural equation modelling (SEM) approach performed in the 
study. 
Chapter Five presents the preliminary quantitative data analysis for the 
study for Malaysia and New Zealand. The chapter discusses the findings from the 
preliminary analyses and descriptive analyses of the survey. Chapter Six offers the 
findings from the PLS analysis for both Malaysia and New Zealand. The findings 
from the qualitative approach (the interview) are explained in Chapter Seven.  
The final chapter, Chapter Eight concludes the study with a discussion of 
factors that contribute to the ethical decision making of tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand and outline the limitations of the study. It also offers some 
recommendations for future research. 
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The University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand provides some 
options on the type of referencing to be used in thesis writing, as long as it is 
consistent. This thesis used APA style of referencing which is acceptable and has 
been used in previous taxation theses in this university.   
1.9 Summary  
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis by introducing some 
background information and highlighting the main ideas discussed in the thesis. 
The discussion commenced with some background information about tax 
compliance studies, including the importance of tax agents in a tax system, the 
justification for choosing Malaysia and New Zealand as the settings for the study 
and a brief description on some selected variables used in the study. The taxation 
systems in Malaysia and New Zealand are briefly considered along with the 
accounting profession in both countries. In addition, the research gap, the 
objectives of the research, research questions, summary of the methods being used, 
and the significance of the research, are also provided. As the introductory guide 
for the thesis, this chapter also provides some brief explanation to the content of the 
remaining chapters.   
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELEVANT CONCEPTS 
 
2.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the theories and prior literature which are relevant to 
this study. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the economic and non-
economic approaches taken in tax compliance studies, followed by a discussion on 
two theories for predicting human behaviour, namely the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA), and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Next, Rest’s (1986) 
Moral Decision Making Model, the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) used to 
measure ethical sensitivity in this study, culture as measured by Hofstede’s (1980) 
National Cultural Dimensions, are presented. The discussion of past studies on 
attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, ethics and culture also 
form part of this chapter. The chapter ends with a brief summary.    
2.1 An overview of economic and non-economic approaches in tax compliance 
studies 
The study of tax can be approached from multidisciplinary areas 
(McKerchar, 2010) such as law, economy, accounting, psychology and public 
finance. Essentially, previous tax compliance studies explain the issues of tax 
compliance (or non-compliance) by using either economic-based theories or 
psychology-based theories (Alm et al., 1995; Andreoni et al., 1988; Alley & James, 
2006). The differences in both approaches are related to the concept of the tax gap 
in the economic approach and voluntary compliance in the psychology-based 
approach or also known as the behavioural approach (Alley & James, 2006). As a 
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result of the different approaches, researchers in tax compliance studies explain tax 
compliance as either a problem of economic rationality or behavioural cooperation. 
The characteristics between the two approaches are illustrated in the following 
Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Economic verses Psychology Approaches in Tax Compliance Studies 
Tax compliance Economic approach Psychology approach 
Concept Tax gap (100% 
compliance less actual 
revenue) 
Voluntary, willingness to 
act in accordance with the 
spirit as well as the letter 
of the law 
Definition Narrower Wider 
Tax compliance Economic rationality Behavioural co-operation 
Exemplified by Trade off: 
1. Expected benefits of 
evading 
2. Risk of detection and 
application of penalties 
3. Maximise personal 
wealth 
Individuals are not 
simply dependent, selfish 
utility maximisers. They 
interact according to 
differing attitudes, 
beliefs, norms and roles. 
Success depends on co-
operation 
Issues of Efficiency in resource 
allocation 
Equity, fairness and 
incidence 
Taxpayer seen as Selfish calculator of 
pecuniary gains and 
losses 
Good citizen 
Can be termed Economic approach Behavioural approach 
 
Source: James and Alley (2002, p. 33). 
In studies utilising the economic-based theories, taxpayers are assumed to 
be rational in their decision making and therefore choose the options which 
maximize their expected after-tax return. The economic-based theories in tax 
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compliance studies promote economic benefits or costs as motivations to increase 
compliance. Thus, economic (tax) parameters, such as probability of being audited, 
penalties and tax rate(s), are commonly used in this economic approach to measure 
the level of compliance.  
Becker (1968) was the first to introduce the concept of crime and 
punishment from an economic approach (Kirchler, 2007). In his model, Becker 
(1968) argues that individuals make rational decision before committing a crime by 
choosing among the different types of risky or safe options. This concept of 
understanding crime and punishment from an economic approach was then applied 
into taxation in a formal model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Since then, the 
seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has become a benchmark in 
economic-based tax compliance studies (Andreoni et al., 1998). Their economic 
deterrence model was the first formal tax evasion model to explain tax compliance 
behaviour using Expected Utility Theory.  Expected Utility Theory assumes that 
individuals are rational in their decision making despite the uncertainties and risks. 
In line with Expected Utility Theory, the Allingham-Sandmo Model assumes that 
taxpayers are rational, risk averse or risk neutral, and maximise utility in their 
decision making.  
The Allingham-Sandmo Model specifically examines the income of 
individuals in two situations, the first being income after paying for taxes and 
penalties in cases when evasion is discovered and punished, while the second 
situation examines income when evasion is not discovered. The Allingham-
Sandmo Model suggests that taxpayers would only report their income after 
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considering the tax rates, the probability of being detected and the level of 
punishment.  
Despite being replicated and extended in many studies, the economic 
deterrence model is criticised essentially because of its narrow scope such as by 
assuming the probability of audit is constant and a high penalty rate, both being 
inconsistent with reality (Andreoni et al., 1998).  To a certain extent punishment 
and enforcement could encourage compliance, yet they cannot explain all 
compliance behaviour (Alm, 1991), since other subjective factors may also 
contribute to decision making in complying with the tax law (Alm et al., 1995). 
Notwithstanding that economic-based theory studies can explain tax compliance to 
a certain extent, the weaknesses in economic-based theories, in their attempt to 
fully explain tax compliance, offer opportunities to explore the issue of tax 
compliance from a non-economic perspective. The synthesis of the literature by 
Jackson and Milliron (1986), for instance, indicates that compliance with tax law is 
determined by numerous factors and is not limited to economic factors.  
While the economic-based theories offer economic benefits or costs to 
increase tax compliance, psychological theories, on the other hand are more 
focused on using psychological factors to motivate tax compliance. Thus, factors 
such as attitude, moral judgment, social norms, fairness and ethical concerns, are 
used to explain compliance with the tax laws (Tan & Sawyer, 2003; Alley & 
James, 2006). The psychological school of thought, for instance, argues that 
taxpayers comply with their tax obligations regardless of the level of penalties, the 
probability of being audited or any other economic-based enforcement. Findings 
from recent studies, such as Trivedi et al. (2005) and Bobek et al. (2007b), support 
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the argument that psychological factors are better in explaining tax compliance 
compared to economic factors. However, there is also a possibility that some 
taxpayers may operate with a mixture of both economic and psychological factors 
in fulfilling their tax obligations. Recent studies, such as Blanthorne and Kaplan 
(2008), provide an example in which both economic and psychological factors 
influence the decision of taxpayers in complying with the tax law. This is because, 
to a certain extent, taxpayers are influenced by the economic benefits or costs in 
their decision making (Alley & James, 2006).   
The different theoretical approaches in explaining tax compliance 
contribute to identifying the different type of factors in tax compliance research. 
Based on a synthesis of prior studies in tax compliance, Jackson and Milliron 
(1986) suggest fourteen main variables in tax compliance studies. The factors 
identified are age, gender, education, income level, source of income, occupation, 
peer influence, ethics, fairness, complexity, contact with revenue authority, 
sanctions, probability of detection and tax rates. In addition, in their synthesis, 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) also group cost of compliance, tax agents, framing 
decision and positive inducements, as other variables. In an update of Jackson and 
Milliron’s (1986) study, Richardson and Sawyer (2001) suggest similar 
categorizations in identifying the key factors discussed in tax compliance studies 
from the period 1986 to 1997. 
The extended model of tax compliance by Fischer et al. (1992), known as 
the Fischer Model, which is based on Jackson and Milliron’s (1986) study, broadly 
classified those fourteen factors into four groups. These four groups are: 
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(1) Demographic (for example, age and gender), 
(2) Proxy for non-compliance opportunity (such as education, income level, 
income source and occupation), 
(3) Attitudes and perceptions (for instance ethics, perceived fairness of the tax 
system and peer influence), and 
(4) Structural (such as complexity of the tax system, contact with the tax authority, 
sanctions, probability of detection and tax rates).  
Singh (2003) suggests three categories of factors in voluntary tax 
compliance namely: 
(1) Willingness to comply,  
(2) Ability to comply, and 
(3) Opportunity to evade tax.  
Willingness to comply comprises tax ethics, peer influence, perceived 
fairness, individual psyche and the real cost of compliance. Ability to comply 
incorporates the levels and type of education, experience, complexity of tax laws 
and quality of assistance.  Severity of penalties, probability of detection, sources of 
income, and tax status, are all considered as opportunity to evade tax.  Despite tax 
agents being considered as one of the important factors in tax compliance (Jackson 
& Milliron, 1986; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001), studies on tax agents are still 
considered to be relatively scant compared to other factors in tax compliance 
studies (Tan, 2006).  
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With regard to factors that contribute to the ethical decision making of tax 
agents in complying with tax laws, Roberts (1998) reviewed 52 published tax 
studies, across 50 separate factors which were later classified into 5 groups. The 
five groups of factors which form the “Economic Psychology-Processing (EPP) 
Model” (Roberts, 1998, p. 82) are: 
(1) Individual psychological factors, 
(2) Environmental factors, in terms of risks and rewards, 
(3) Input task factors,  
(4) Processing factors, and  
(5) Output task factors.  
The findings from the review by Roberts (1998), for instance, suggest that 
the ethical attitude of tax agents is an affective psychological factor which 
influences their ethical decision making. In brief, Roberts (1998) proposes that both 
individual and economic factors influence the ethical judgment of tax agents. Table 
2.2 presents the summary of Robert’s (1998) review.  
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Table 2.2 Factors tested for association with tax accountants’ judgment or 
decision making 
1. Individual Psychological Factors 
Cognitive 
 Years of experience 
 Task experience 
 Knowledge 
 Knowledge of transactions 
 Formal education 
 Job title/position in the firm 
 Age 
 Problem-solving ability 
Affective 
 Advocacy 
 Tax accountant’s risk preference 
 Ethical attitude 
 Attitudes related to professional status 
 Attitudes related to firm size 
 Attitudes associated with gender 
 
2. Environmental Factors: Risks and Rewards  
IRS Position 
 Audit probability 
 Audit success prediction 
 Penalties 
 IRS position on the issue 
 Probability of issue being 
examined on audit 
 Applicable regulatory standard for 
reporting 
 Tax rate structure 
 
Firms Expectation 
 Economic benefit to firm 
Client Characteristics 
 Dollar amount of savings at stake 
 Client payment status 
 Client risk preference 
 Client importance 
 Client tenure 
 Client preference for tax-reporting position 
 Client sophistication 
 Amount of income/operating performance 
 Client dependability 
 Client records 
 Conformity of item with client’s financial 
reporting 
3. Task Factors: Inputs 
 Ambiguity 
 Structural similarity of 
authoritative sources 
 Outcome of authoritative sources 
 Amount of legal authority 
 Complexity of law 
 Staff recommendation 
4. Processing Factors 
 Information order 
 Structured problem-solving 
approach 
 Decision aid availability 
 Framing of issue as gain/loss 
 Certainty of outcome 
 Confirmation bias 
 Hindsight bias 
 Accountability 
 Time pressure 
 Group discussion 
5. Task Factors: Output 
 Planning v compliance context  
 
Source:  Adapted from Roberts (1998, p. 82).  
 
Past studies which adopted the economic deterrence approach suggest that 
tax compliance is driven by the trade-off between costs and benefits of non-
compliance. On the other hand, the psychology model attempts to understand tax 
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compliance as a behavioural problem. Since this study is interested in 
understanding the behavioural aspect of tax agents in their decision making, the 
behavioural approach is considered more appropriate. Thus a number of 
behavioural factors will be examined to understand the ethical decision making of 
tax agents. For that purpose, this study extends the TPB by incorporating ethical 
sensitivity and the influence of culture.  
Ajzen (1991) proposes that an individual’s behaviour can be explained by 
his/her intention and perceived behavioural control. Ajzen (1991) further postulates 
that the intention of an individual to perform a behaviour in return is determined by 
an individual’s attitude, subjective norms and also perceived behavioural control 
that an individual has. Collins (2000) found that ethical sensitivity influences the 
ethical judgment of accountants and in a similar vein, Tan (2006) proposes that 
future studies in tax agents should explore more the influence of ethical sensitivity 
in the ethical decision making of tax agents. Another important aspect in the ethical 
decision making is the influence of culture. For instance, in reviewing the Fischer 
Model, Chau and Leung (2009) suggest including culture to explain tax compliance 
behaviour. To provide some understanding of tax agents’ ethical decision making 
while performing their roles, the remaining discussion in this chapter focuses on 
the theories and selected factors that are relevant for the study. 
2.2 Theories of human social behaviour  
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the TPB are commonly used to 
predict human behaviour (Sheppard et al., 1988; Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
According to Nosek et al. (2010), Ajzen’s (1991) work has the greatest influence 
among the US and Canadian social psychologists. This implies the significant 
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contribution that both the TRA and the TPB have made in understanding human 
behaviour. These two psychology theories are discussed in the following sub-
section.  
2.2.1 Theory of Reasoned Action  
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) is a social psychology theory which 
attempts to explain human behaviour postulated by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). 
Based on the cognitive self-regulation theory, the central idea in this theory 
assumes that the behaviour of an individual is determined by the intention to 
perform the behaviour. The intention is considered as the subjective probability 
that motivates and captures the determination that one has to perform the behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, the stronger the intention towards the behaviour, the 
more likely the behaviour will be performed. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) also 
postulate that the intention to perform behaviour is in return influenced by 
underlying beliefs, which are the attitude towards the behaviour and subjective 
norms.  
The attitude towards the behaviour refers to whether an individual perceives 
the consequences of a particular behaviour as favourable or unfavourable. The 
behavioural beliefs which are formed as a result of the positive and negative 
consequences an individual might experience influence the attitude of a person. 
The behavioural beliefs are salient beliefs which are obtained through experience 
and learning. Thus, an attitude towards a behaviour is considered to be favourable 
if the person perceives a positive outcome from performing the behaviour. On the 
other hand, the attitude towards behaviour is deemed to be unfavourable if the 
person perceives a negative outcome.  
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The subjective norms are the general social pressure of either performing 
the respective behaviour or not performing the behaviour. The TRA suggests that a 
person forms beliefs from people important to them, whether or not these people 
approve or disapprove the behaviour, and whether or not these people themselves 
perform the behaviour. Normative beliefs underlie the subjective norms of a 
person. Ajzen (1991) argues if the people who are important to a person perform or 
approve of a particular behaviour, there is also a possibility for that person to 
perform the similar behaviour.   
The TRA is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The TRA assumes that a person has 
complete control in deciding whether or not to perform a particular behaviour. This 
assumption is a drawback to the theory since the behavioural intention may not 
always lead a person to performing the behaviour especially when the person has 
incomplete volitional control to perform the behaviour (Sheppard et al., 1988).  
 
Figure 2.1 Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
 
 
Source: Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p. 84).  
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2.2.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour  
To overcome the limitation of the TRA, Ajzen (1991) introduced another 
construct to the TRA, perceived behavioural control, to comprehensively predict 
human behaviour. The extended theory is known as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB). In the original TRA, the behaviour of a person is influenced only 
by the intention to perform the behaviour. In the TPB, it is assumed that the 
behaviour of a person is determined not only by the intention, but also the ability of 
that person to have control in performing the behaviour.  
Ajzen (1991) argues that a particular behaviour may not likely to occur if 
that person does not have control over performing the behaviour, even in the 
existence of positive attitude and positive influence from important others towards 
the behaviour. Since measures for actual behaviour are not available, perceived 
behavioural control becomes a proxy for actual behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010), and the prediction of actual behaviour can be improved if perceived 
behavioural control precisely reflects actual control. The perceived behavioural 
control also influences the intention to perform the behaviour. It also explains the 
reason intention does not always predict behaviour, since there are potential 
constraints that may prevent a person from performing behaviour (Armitage & 
Conner, 2001). The perceived behavioural control considers personal and 
environmental factors, such as the availability of information, skills and 
opportunities for a person to engage in a particular behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010).  
In summary, the TPB suggests that the intention to perform behaviour, and 
the perceived control that a person has to perform the behaviour, lead to conducting 
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the behaviour. The intention or readiness to perform a behaviour depends on the 
attitude that a person has towards performing the behaviour, the acceptance of 
people important to that person towards the behaviour, and the perceived control 
that a person has to perform the behaviour which vary from one behaviour to 
behaviour. The TPB is presented in Figure 2.2.   
Figure 2.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
 
 
Source: Ajzen (1991, p. 182). 
To test the reliability and validity of his theory, Ajzen (1991) performs a 
meta-analysis of 16 studies in various areas such as drinking problems, weight loss, 
voting elections, cheating in an examination, all of which support his theory. 
Madden et al. (1992) compared the TRA and the TPB on ten different behaviours. 
Their study found that the TRA is more relevant when the behaviour being 
examined is under volitional control. In contrast, the TPB is more applicable and 
superior in explaining behaviour if the assumption of volitional control is violated.  
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The result of Ajzen’s (1991) meta-analysis is further supported by Armitage 
and Conner (2001). In their meta-analysis study, Armitage and Conner (2001) 
examined the competency of the TPB in understanding intentions and behaviour in 
people from a database of 185 independent studies published up to the end of 1997. 
The authors suggest that the TPB could explain around 27 percent and 39 percent 
variance in behaviour and intention, respectively. Indeed, perceived behavioural 
control contributes an average of 6 percent more to the prediction on intention 
compared to attitude and subjective norms. In contrast, subjective norms are found 
to be the weakest predictor of intention. It is argued that the measurement of 
subjective norms contributes to an unconvincing result since the majority of the 
TPB studies used single-item measurement for subjective norms. The meta-
analysis by Armitage and Conner (2001) also reveals that one of the strengths of 
the TPB is its broad ability to predict behaviour across various fields of studies.  
The findings from a more recent meta-analysis study by McEachan et al. 
(2011) from 206 articles across a range of health behaviour-based studies also 
support the use of TPB to explain behaviour towards for instance dieting, physical 
activity, abstinence from drugs and safer sex. Despite the intention-behaviour 
correlation indicating a weaker relationship compared to the findings from 
Armitage and Conner (2001), the correlations between attitude-intention, 
subjective norms-intention and perceived behavioural control-intention are 
reportedly stronger, ranging from 0.4 to 0.57, compared to the previous meta-
analysis of Armitage and Conner (2001). The weaker correlation for intention-
behaviour relationship is possibly due to the fact that in McEachan et al. (2011), 
the meta-analytic studies, examine behaviour only sometime after participants 
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completed the TPB survey. The time gap within the period of completing the TPB 
survey and observing the actual behaviour may have influenced the participants’ 
intention-behaviour relationship (McEachan et al., 2011). Interestingly, attitude 
towards behaviour remain the strongest predictor of intention.  
Despite the support shown for using the TPB in understanding human 
behaviour, it has also been criticized for several reasons. For instance, even though 
the theory records a link between intention and behaviour, the link is nevertheless 
weak or moderate and too ‘rational’, ignoring the bias that human has in making 
judgments (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Shawver & Sennetti, 2009). Similar to 
other behavioural-decision making models, the TPB depends on self-reports and 
thus the data can have biases which reduce the reliability and validity of the theory.  
In addition, although Ajzen (1991) claims self-efficacy and perceived behavioural 
control are identical, many studies indicate that self-efficacy and perceived 
behavioural control are not alike (e.g. Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
In his reply to the criticisms against the TPB, Ajzen (2011) clarifies that the 
theory never assumes rationality in predicting reality. He argues that the 
misunderstanding occurs among researchers because the TPB is concerned with 
goal-directed behaviour guided by self-regulatory processes which is 
misinterpreted as acting in rationality. According to Ajzen (2011) the low 
correlation between the intention and actual behaviour could differ considerably 
because other mediating factors could exist between the period the intention is 
assessed and the time the actual behaviour is examined. These mediating factors 
may reduce the effect of the predictive validity of intention which is taken before 
the actual behaviour is examined.  With regard to the use of self-report, the 
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findings of Armitage and Conner (2001) suggest that TPB could better explain the 
variance in behaviour when self-reports are used compared to when behaviour is 
observed. While self-efficacy was found to be more capable in explaining 
behaviour compared to perceived control in the meta-analysis by Armitage and 
Conner (2001), they  caution that the results are not conclusive since there is a 
possibility that the different effect of self-efficacy and perceived control of 
behaviour may vary depending on the type of behaviour.   
Ajzen (2011) argues that the central idea of the TPB is to predict intention 
for behaviour which is goal-directed and driven by conscious self-regulatory 
processes. The act of complying with the tax laws could be considered to be a 
behaviour which is goal-directed (the aim is to comply with the tax laws), 
specifically “behaviour which is said to be reasoned or planned” (Ajzen, 2011, p. 
1116). Due to the nature of their roles in the tax system as advocates for their 
clients and as an intermediary, there is a possibility that tax agents put themselves 
in a conflicting position. A study by Marshall et al. (1998) for instance, suggests 
that continuing to act for clients in an unethical situation is among the most 
common ethical dilemma faced by tax agents under SAS in Western Australia.  
While tax agents may want to comply with the tax law, there are other factors that 
may influence them on not being objective in their decision making. As an 
example, the mixed findings in the debate on who is instigating aggressive tax 
reporting, whether the clients or the tax agents (Tan & Sawyer, 2003), imply the 
possibility that the client may influence tax agents in tax reporting.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, the application of the TPB in this 
research which considers the existence of incomplete volitional control to predict 
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intention is considered more appropriate compared to the TRA which assumes 
volitional control in predicting intention to perform the behaviour. Since tax 
compliance and behaviour is influenced by various factors (Jackson & Milliron, 
1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001) the flexibility of the TPB, which allows for the 
addition of other predictors to improve or explain the variance in intention and 
behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) in this regard, provides another reason for choosing the 
TPB for this research. Furthermore, while the TPB has been used extensively in 
other areas of studies such as  the meta-analysis studies of Ajzen (1991), Armitage 
and Conner (2001) and McEachan et al. (2011), and is arguably the most dominant 
model to capture the relationship between attitude and behaviour (Armitage & 
Christian, 2003), the use of the TPB in tax research is limited. This is evidenced 
from a number of studies, such Bobek and Hatfield (2003), Trivedi et al. (2005), 
Saad (2010; 2011), Langham et al. (2012) and Smart (2012). Despite its limited 
application in tax context, the use of the TPB in previous taxation studies supports 
the TPB in explaining tax compliance behaviour.  
2.3 Rest’s (1986) Ethical Decision Making Model  
Tax compliance refers to the willingness of taxpayers to comply with the 
tax laws and non-compliance is associated with violating the tax laws whether or 
not it is intentional (Kirchler, 2007). This is consistent with Kinsey (1985) who 
defined non-compliance with the tax laws as the failure, intentional or 
unintentional of taxpayers to meet their tax obligations. James and Alley (2002) 
argued that while tax evasion is clearly illegal and a form of non-compliance, 
excessive tax avoidance such as searching for every possible legitimate deduction 
to reduce tax liability cannot be considered as compliance as well because even if 
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the transaction is within the letter of the law, it is not within the spirit of the law. 
This is also supported by Elliffe (2001) who argued that an aggressive tax 
avoidance approach can lead to tax evasion. Consequently, tax compliance (and 
non-compliance) behaviour is a result of ethical or unethical decision making 
process (Singh, 2003).  
Previous research in ethical decision making is dominated by two 
approaches, namely: normative ethics and descriptive ethics (Alzola, 2011). 
Normative ethics are derived from moral philosophy and theology, and focus on 
how decisions should ideally be made (Whittier et al., 2006).  The normative 
ethical approach relies on the concept of ought to be, such as how people should 
act in situations that need an ethical consideration. Distributive Justice Theory 
(DJT) is an example of a normative ethical theory used to understand tax 
compliance behaviour in tax compliance studies. The application of DJT in tax 
compliance studies addresses issues associated with fairness and justice, such as 
how much taxpayers have to pay or are entitled to receive, and whether they get 
what they deserve. Thus, DJT argues that perceptions of justice in the tax system 
could motivate taxpayers in complying with the tax law (Frecknall-Hughes & 
Moizer, 2005).  
In contrast, descriptive ethics or behavioural ethics depend on empirical 
evidence in solving ethical issues. The descriptive ethics approach is concerned 
with understanding the actual behaviour of people when solving an ethical dilemma 
(Crane & Matten, 2007). The practical aspect of this descriptive approach perhaps 
explains the reason for descriptive ethics being widely used in ethical decision 
making research. A review by O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005), from research 
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published in leading ethics business journals, indicates that descriptive ethics have 
become an important area of research based on the number of studies undertaken, 
with 110 studies before 1993, and the number increasing to 174 for the period 
between 1994 and 2003. An example of a descriptive ethics-based decision making 
model that has become the focus of many empirical studies is the Rest’s (1986) 
Model (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) which is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 Ethical Decision Making Model 
 
 
Source: Crane and Matten (2007, p. 131).  
According to Rest (1986), moral behaviour is determined by four 
independent elements which do not occur in sequence. They are moral sensitivity, 
moral judgment, moral motivation and moral character or ego strength. Moral 
sensitivity refers to the awareness that our action may impact others. By having 
moral sensitivity, a person imagines the various possible actions and their effects 
on others. Rest (1986) argues that lack of ethical or moral sensitivity in recognizing 
ethical issues in the first instance may lead to unethical behaviour. Another 
consideration in Rest’s (1986) ethical decision making model is a person’s moral 
judgment which evaluates whether an action is morally right or otherwise.  In 
contrast to the Cognitive Moral Development Theory (CMDT) proposed by 
Kohlberg (1969), Rest (1986) postulates that despite the moral judgment is 
significant, it is not the only determinant of behaviour. The priority that a person 
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chooses in performing behaviour underlies the moral motivation concept in Rest’s 
(1986) Model.  
According to Rest (1986), a person may act unethically, not because that 
person does not have the awareness to recognize a moral issue (moral sensitivity) 
or does not have the ability to assess the right action (moral judgment), but because 
that person does not put moral values as a priority (moral motivation). For instance, 
a person’s self-interest may set aside his or her moral consideration. In addition to 
the three elements, Rest (1986) also argues that a person’s moral character or their 
personality attributes, such as ego strength, determination and courage, are also 
possible to exert influence in ethical decision making. Thus, a person may have a 
strong awareness in recognizing moral issue, good moral judgment, put high 
priority to moral values but may act unethically if that person has weak moral 
character.  
In summary, Rest (1986) proposes that success in one component of his 
model does not ensure success in the other components. This maybe because, the 
four components in Rest’s (1986) Model are conceptually distinct and do not occur 
in stages. Indeed, to explain moral behaviour, each element in the model could be 
examined separately. For instance, O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) suggest that 
future studies applying Rest’s (1986) Model should examine in more detail the 
moral sensitivity component since  little research has been conducted to explore the 
moral sensitivity component compared to the other three components in Rest’s 
(1986) Model. The significance of Rest’s (1986) Model could be implied by it 
being the most cited model in accounting ethics-related studies for the period 
between 1988 and 2007 (Uysal, 2009). Rest’s (1986) Model is a general ethics 
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model that could easily be used to understand individual decision making in 
organizational settings (Jones, 1991). This perhaps explains the considerable 
support for Rest’s (1986) Model in the ethics literature.  
 Notwithstanding considerable support for Rest’s (1986) Model, similar to 
other descriptive ethical decision making models which have largely originated in 
the United States (US),  the model may contain cultural bias (Crane & Matten, 
2007). This is due to Rest’s (1986) Model being based on the US culture which 
may contain different values from other Western and non-Western cultures. For 
instance, according to Crane and Matten (2007), in the US, the interest in ethics 
studies is more on the individual actors or behaviour, whereas in the European 
countries, the focus is more on the design of the economic institutions and their 
functions. The different emphasis of ethics studies between the US and the 
European countries results in a strong US bias when examining the influence of 
individual factors such as age, gender, level of education in ethical decision making 
whereas, a strong European bias exists when discussing situational factors such as 
organizational culture, work roles and rewards in ethical decision making. 
Crane and Matten (2007) further argue that, since the components in Rest’s 
(1986) Model can be examined individually, it could possibly mislead us in our 
understanding because to differing degrees, the components in Rest’s (1986) Model 
may be related or interdependent. Rest’s (1986) Model is also criticised for 
assuming that people behave in the same manner irrespective of the moral issues 
involved. Jones (1991), whose proposition, has gained considerable support in 
ethics-based studies (eg. O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Waldron, 2009), in contrast, 
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suggests that individual judgment differs according to the moral intensity of the 
ethical issues. 
Despite the criticisms, Crane and Matten (2007) agree that Rest’s (1986) 
Model is appropriate to be used as a tool to understand the complex way of making 
ethical decision but not as an ultimate representation of understanding ethical 
decision making. Based on the foregoing discussion, and since ethical sensitivity is 
important in the ethical decision making of accountants (Collins, 2000), this study 
has selected the moral sensing element from Rest’s (1986) Model to understand the 
ethical decision making of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand while 
performing their engagement roles. This approach also seeks to respond to the 
concern addressed by Tan (2006) on the scarcity of studies on ethical sensitivity in 
understanding tax compliance behaviour of tax agents. The ethical sensitivity in 
this study is operationalized using the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) which 
is explained in the following sub-section.  
2.3.1 Multidimensional Ethics Scale   
 Notwithstanding ethics is important in explaining tax compliance 
behaviour (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001; Alm & 
Torgler, 2011), the issue of how to measure ethics in tax compliance is still 
debatable (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). In the ethics literature, a review by Kujala 
et al. (2011), found that a tool to measure ethics which has been commonly used by 
researchers is the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) developed by Reidenbach 
and Robin (1988; 1990). Arguably, humans rely on more than one ethical 
dimension in making ethical decisions, and because a single measurement scale of 
ethics cannot capture the various ethical perspectives in making an evaluation, the 
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single measurement scale has reliability problems (Reidenbach & Robin, 1988; 
1990). As an improvement to the single scale measurement of ethics, using a factor 
analysis, Reidenbach and Robin (1988) developed a multidimensional ethics scale 
in marketing ethics consisting of 33 items which reflect five normative moral 
philosophies.  
According to Reidenbach and Robin (1990), the five normative moral 
philosophies which formed the foundation of MES are not merely moral 
philosophies but encompass religious values which cover most of the distinguished 
concepts for social survival. They suggest “ideas of fairness, justice, contract, duty, 
consequence, greatest good and many others that come from the five philosophies 
can also be found in the Bible, the Koran, the writings of Buddha and in other 
religions” (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990, p. 640). They argued that, as a result, the 
MES offers a pivotal point for ethical decision making.  
The first ethical dimension is justice which comes from the Theory of 
Justice (Reidenbach and Robin, 1990). The Theory of Justice perceives fairness in 
two dimensions: fair procedures and fair outcomes (Crane and Matten, 2007). 
Consequently, the concepts of distributive and procedural justice, such as fairness 
and equity, are highlighted in this theory.  
The second ethical dimension is relativism, which refers to the belief that 
there is no universal ethical rule for everyone since ethical rules are relative to a 
specific culture. Therefore, according to relativism, what is considered as right or 
wrong is only applicable to that particular culture. For instance, the imposition of 
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Western culture on other cultures, such as Asian culture, is considered to violate 
the concept of relativism in ethics (Beauchamp et al., 2009).  
The third ethical dimension is egoism, an aspect of Teleological Ethics 
Theory (TET),6 which measures morality based on the consequences of an action in 
the long term.  Egoism Theory promotes the well-being of one individual over 
everyone else which reflects that individuals should act on the basis of one’s self 
interest. Thus an individual should only act for others if it brings benefit to one’s 
own interest and does not care of the welfare of others unless it affects the welfare 
of oneself (Beauchamp et al., 2009).  
The fourth ethical dimension in MES is utilitarian, another concept in TET. 
It emphasizes the concept of efficiency in ethical decision making by considering 
the greatest possible ratio of good to evil for all in the society. According to 
Utilitarian Theory, the consequences of an action determine whether or not an act 
is ethical. It also focuses on the maximisation of benefits and minimisation of 
harm. Thus, from the utilitarian perspective, it is acceptable to break a law if 
breaking the rule brings the greatest benefits over bad consequences to greatest of 
people (Beauchamp et al., 2009). The concept of cost and benefit analysis in 
accounting, for instance, implies the utilitarian dimension in ethical decision 
making (Cohen et al., 1993).  
                                                                
6 The traditional ethical theories could be divided into consequentialist and non-consequentialist. 
The consequentialist ethics is also referred as teleological ethics. The term teleological is originated 
from the Greek word for ‘goal’. On the other hand, non-consequentialist ethics is based on their 
individual’s right and duty. It is based on the deontological concept. The word deontological is a 
Greek word for ‘duty’ (Crane & Matten, 2007).  
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The fifth and final moral philosophy in MES is deontology, represented by 
the contractualism dimension. The deontology philosophy emphasizes the belief 
that individuals have a duty to fulfil the claims of others by applying logic to an 
ethical rule through a social contract. It is based on the decision maker underlying 
principles of being ethical. An action is deemed as ethical if the decision maker’s 
underlying principle perceives the action as morally right (Crane & Matten, 2007). 
The individual’s duty is translated in an unwritten contract or unwritten obligations 
(Cruz et al., 2000).  
Reidenbach and Robin (1990) later reduced the original MES from 33 items 
to 8 items, representing three groups of ethical dimensions which are: moral equity, 
relativism and contractualism. Similar to the original MES, the moral equity 
dimension reflects an individual perception of fairness and justice, expectation of 
family and what is morally right or not in ethical decision making. Relativism 
concerns the importance of culture and tradition in determining what is right or 
wrong in the decision making which results in the importance of culture or social 
system overtakes individual considerations. Finally, contractualism represents the 
social construct in the form of duties, rules, obligations between businesses and 
society in ethical decision making.  
The main advantage of MES is its ability to capture the beliefs of a person 
in ethical decision making while at the same time it reveals the reasons for 
believing that a particular action is ethical or unethical by using different ethical 
philosophies. This is important since not all people fit into one category 
(Reidenbach & Robin, 1988; 1990). In addition, MES also allows people to use 
only one ethical framework to make ethical decisions in all situations (Shawver & 
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Sennetti, 2009; Casali, 2011).  As a result, MES is argued to better capture the 
complexity in ethical decision making (Cohen, et al., 1993). Moreover, compared 
to other ethics measurement scales which focus on the psychological aspects of 
individuals, such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT) or Managerial Judgment Test 
(MJT), MES is considered more appropriate to measure ethics since it is based on 
moral theories (Casali, 2011). 
Furthermore, the five ethical theories in MES provide more explanation of 
the ethical choices rather than just measuring the cognitive development of an 
individual. The different ethics effects could be measured by using MES, since 
different but correlated dilemmas could be used in an MES questionnaire, unlike 
the DIT which only allows for fixed original dilemmas in its questionnaire 
(Shawver & Sennetti, 2009). The use of multiple items in the MES could also 
enhance the reliability of the scale instrument (Cohen et al., 1993).  
The use of MES in measuring ethics, however, is criticized for a number of 
reasons. The validity of MES in ethics studies can be challenged due to the 
ambiguous scale items, faulty scale development procedure, lack of ethical 
rationales, and mixed findings from replicated studies which indicate the instability 
of the scales (Hyman, 1996). Other studies, such as Kujala and Pietilaihen (2007) 
and Casali (2011), argue that the MES should not be considered as a 
multidimensional since it was developed from a single group of ethical theories, 
namely the traditional ethical theories. The MES, for example, does not consider 
contemporary ethical theories such as virtue ethics, which is capable of influencing 
ethical decision making (Casali, 2011) or female ethics (Kujala & Pietilaihen, 
2007; Kujala et al., 2011), which reveal other attributes of an individual such as 
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caring. Indeed, the MES is claimed to be biased since it embraces the masculine 
culture by only accentuating masculine attributes, such as justice, fairness, 
independence and rationality (Kujala & Pietilaihen, 2007; Kujala et al., 2011).  
Consequently, the MES should not be considered to be multidimensional; rather it 
only provides a general pattern of ethical decision making (McMahon & Harvey, 
2007).   
Furthermore, Shawver and Sennetti (2009) question the ability of the MES 
to reveal the fundamental justifications of being ethical and unethical since the 
scales in the MES do not correspond to any objective, unlike the DIT scores, which 
are correlated with the stages in Kohlberg’s (1969) moral development. Therefore, 
higher scores in the MES do not imply better moral cognition; instead the scores 
only offer an explanation to the respondents’ choices.  Notwithstanding that the 
MES  is designed to measure ethical judgment across a range of scenarios, as 
argued by Reidenbach and Robin (1988; 1990), findings from prior studies that 
used the MES, (for instance, Cohen et al., 1993; McMahon and Harvey, 2007; 
Kujala and Pietilaihen, 2007; and Nguyen and Biderman, 2008), found that the 
MES is situation specific. Indeed, to validate the MES, Reidenbach and Robin 
(1988; 1990) used a within-scenario approach. Therefore, the MES should not be 
considered as multidimensional since it is scenario dependent. This perhaps 
explains the mixed support of MES in ethics studies (Nguyen & Biderman, 2008).  
As an improvement to the original MES, different forms of the MES scales 
have been used in ethics research, such as by Cohen et al. (1993), who refined the 
MES to a 15-item scale representing all the five moral philosophies in an 
accounting context. Using similar approach to Reidenbach and Robin (1988; 1990), 
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six scenarios, of which two were related to retail scenarios and the remaining four 
were accounting-based scenarios, were used to test the refined version of the MES. 
The study involved a sample of accounting academics and members of the 
international section of the American Accounting Association who came from 
various cultural backgrounds across the United States. Principal component factor 
analysis was then applied to generate the factors and the Cronbach’s Alpha for each 
factor ranging from 0.86 to 0.96 indicating high reliability. The finalised 15-item 
scales consist of four items representing moral equity, two items to measure 
relativism, and three items each for contractualism dimension, egoism and 
utilitarianism. 
A recent example of using MES in measuring ethical sensitivity in an 
accounting context is provided by Buchan (2005) who extended TPB with ethical 
sensitivity and instrumental ethical climate among public accountants in the US. 
Two scenarios, which are developing a bid for a new client and charging personal 
expenses to the firm, were used to test the relationship between ethical sensitivity 
and intention of public accountants from five public accounting firms in the 
Northeast US. No support, however, was recorded for the relationship between 
ethical sensitivity and intention which is most likely because the scenarios being 
used to examine ethical sensitivity were different from the scenarios used to 
measure intention in the TPB. Based on the findings, Buchan (2005) also concludes 
that MES is situation specific. 
With regard to applying MES in tax context, Cruz et al. (2000) have tested 
the refined version of MES by Cohen et al. (1993) and incorporated gender as 
another dimension in the MES. The study of Cruz et al. (2000) examined the 
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ethical judgment of tax agents when they are pressured for providing aggressive 
reporting. The findings suggest that all of the five moral philosophies in the MES 
influence the ethical decision making of tax agents. The influence primarily comes 
from moral equity and contractualism. Indeed, moral equity has the highest 
influence on self-reported intentions in all three cases presented in the study. The 
study also found that relativism and utilitarianism had the largest effect on peer 
behaviour.  
As tax compliance and non-compliance behaviour is associated with ethical 
or unethical decision making, therefore, after considering the advantages and the 
disadvantages of using the MES, this study will use the MES as proposed by Cruz 
et al. (2000) to capture the moral sensitivity in ethical decision making of tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand, except for the exclusion of a gender scale. 
The gender scale is excluded from the MES since this study uses the TPB which 
assumes that the influence of demographic variables is already captured in the 
attitudes toward behaviour. Cruz et al.’s, (2000) version of MES, overall, indicates 
high reliability ranging from 0.73 to 0.94 for the moral equity, contractualism, 
relativism and utilitarianism dimensions in all three cases presented in the study. 
The only dimension rejected is egoism which indicates an average of 0.49 level of 
reliability in all three cases. Furthermore, as Cruz et al.’s (2000) MES version has 
been tested in a tax context, it is deemed appropriate for this study.  
2.4 The concept of culture  
The classic work of Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) synthesizes 164 
definitions of culture from various subject areas to understand the meaning of 
culture. In their study, the authors divide the definitions of culture into six groups, 
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namely descriptive, historical, normative, psychological, structure of patterns, and 
genetics. Based on their review, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) argue that culture 
can be characterized by symbols, is shared, learned, a way of behaving, a feeling 
and reaction, and this includes the ‘implicit culture’ which differs between 
societies. The authors also argued that ‘whole’ culture consists of many 
overlapping sub-cultures which could be regional, economic, status, occupation, 
cliques or the combinations of all the aforementioned characteristics. Based on this 
synthesis, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952, p. 181) define culture as:  
“Consist[ing] of patterns, explicit or implicit, of and for behaviour 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in 
artifacts; the essential of culture consists of traditional (historically 
derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; 
cultural systems may on the one hand be considered as products of 
action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.” 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) and Matsumoto (2007) agree that cultural 
differences could be observed from either the explicit elements (objective aspect) 
or implicit elements (subjective aspect). The explicit elements refer to the symbols 
which could represent a particular culture, for instance the physical objects of 
culture, such as clothing, food and architecture. Conversely, the implicit elements 
are concerned with the psychological aspect of culture, such as the underlying 
values which are ‘invisible’. The debate on cultural convergence for instance, is 
often centred on the explicit elements of culture (De Mooij, 2004). In terms of 
subjective elements, Matsumoto (2007) argues that Hofstede’s (1980) seminal 
67 
 
work is the first to identify the cultural variability. This perhaps explains the reason 
for Hofstede’ (1980) National Cultural Dimensions being widely used in social 
science studies.  
Ethical decision making is a social process which is transferred within a 
culture from generation to generation (Crane & Matten, 2007; Beauchamp et al., 
2009). Indeed, ethical decision making models, such as Ferrell and Gresham (1985) 
and Hunt and Vitell (1986), acknowledge the importance of culture in the ethical 
decision making process. De Mooij (2004) suggests that individuals are the 
outcome of their culture and social groupings, who share similar beliefs, attitudes, 
norms and values. Individual behaviour is the result of interaction between 
“culturally dependent social roles and individually different roles identities” 
(Matsumoto, 2007, p. 1286).  
Matsumoto (2007) further reiterates that in some situations, people are 
likely to provide similar responses irrespective of personality or culture, and in  
other cases, people give different responses due to cultural or personality diversity. 
Therefore, “behaviour [can] be determined by universal psychological processes; in 
others, mainly by personality; and yet in others, mainly by culture” (Matsumoto, 
2007, p. 1305). The influence of culture in individual behaviour and mental 
processes is further elaborated by Matsumoto and Juang (2008) as presented in 
Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.4 Culture and behaviour 
  
Source: Matsumoto and Juang (2008, p. 23). 
At the macro level, cultures are derived from the combination of ecological 
factors, social factors and biological factors. The enculturation process, according 
to Matsumoto and Juang (2008), is through family, community and institutions, 
and later forms the psychological characteristics of individuals, such as their 
attitude, beliefs, norms and behaviour. Matsumoto and Juang (2008), however, 
argue that while culture is an important factor in influencing individuals’ 
behaviour, there are also other factors such as individuals’ personalities and context 
which may affect behaviour. Consequently, the influence of culture on behaviour 
varies according to context.  
2.4.1 Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimension  
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“The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another”. 
According to Hofstede (1980; 1991), a culture which guides our daily 
practices, starts to be developed within the family, from  society, at school, and 
later influences behaviour  in the workplace. In his earlier seminal work, Hofstede 
(1980) used more than 117,000 questionnaires across 50 countries to IBM 
employees with four cultural dimensions to explain the differences of culture in 
work related values. These dimensions, as suggested by Hofstede (1980), are 
‘Power distance’, ‘Uncertainty avoidance’, ‘Individualism-collectivism’ and 
‘Masculinity-femininity’. Later, Hofstede (1991) added another dimension, ‘Long 
term orientation’ or ‘Confucian dynamism’ based on surveys from Chinese values.  
‘Power distance’ is defined as “the extent to which less powerful members 
of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 98). It outlines how a society can accept 
the inequality in power distribution and status among members of that society and 
is measured with a power-distance index (PDI). In high Power Distance societies, 
respect for elders is a basic norm since elders are perceived to have more authority 
in decision making and this respect lasts throughout life. In contrast, in low Power 
Distance societies every member in the society is treated equally regardless of age. 
In terms of education, high Power Distance societies prone to have teacher-centred 
education rather than student-centred education applied in low Power Distance 
societies.  
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The influence from the society and education is then translated in the 
workplace. Hofstede (1991, p. 4) suggests that “behaviour at work is a continuation 
of behaviour learned earlier”; thus, in low PDI countries, decision making in an 
organization is less concentrated and staff are treated equally irrespective of their 
status. In contrast, in high PDI countries, decision making is more concentrated, 
based on the level of authority and status is more likely to be used as the basis to 
treat staff (Hofstede, 2001). With regard to taxation, Tsakumis et al. (2007) argue 
that high Power Distance countries have higher levels of tax evasion compared to 
low Power Distance countries. This is due to among others the high disparity in 
income earned by the upper level and lower level classes in society and this income 
disparity is further increased by the tax system.  
‘Uncertainty avoidance’ is described as the degree to which a society 
tolerates ambiguity and uncertainty situations, and is measured using the 
uncertainty avoidance index (UAI). Hofstede (1980) argues that societies in low 
UAI countries have lower stress, are happier people, more optimistic with regard to 
their careers, more trusting and more willing to take unknown risk. In contrast, 
societies in high UAI countries are more stressed, less optimistic, more 
conservative and feel powerless toward external forces. Societies with a high UAI 
index prefer clarity, structure, law and order, and are prone to take only known 
risks while low UAI societies are comfortable with ambiguity, more innovative and 
more   tolerant towards diversity (Hofstede, 2001). Translating these attributes  of 
UAI  into a tax context, Tsakumis et al. (2007) suggest that higher level of tax 
evasion is more prevalent in high UAI countries given that people in low UAI 
countries trust their government more than people in high UAI countries (Hofstede, 
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2001), thus increases the belief by taxpayers that the  government  misuses  their 
tax funds.  
‘Individualism-collectivism’ explains the degree of preference for closely-
knit or loosely-knit relationship societies. Hofstede (2001, p. 209) describes 
individualism as “a society in which the ties between individuals are loose” and 
collectivism as “people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-
groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange 
for unquestioning loyalty”. It is about the “I” or “We” consciousness (Hofstede, 
2001, p. 227), and therefore the decision making in high individualistic society 
reflects an individual decision compared to collective decisions in low 
individualistic (collective) society.  
Another attribute of members of high individualistic society is that they 
pursue their own and their immediate family members’ interests only. Conversely, 
members in a high collectivist society will pursue the well-being of the society 
more than individual interests, and are more likely to work for the success of the 
group rather than their own personal success. Hosftede (2001) argues that a 
government in a weak or low individualist country (Collectivist culture) has a 
greater possibility of dominating with its role in the economic system of the 
country, compared to a high individualist country, which is prone to  having market 
capitalism dominate in its economic system.  
Hofstede (2001) also argues that in a high individualist society, law and 
rights are perceived to be equal for everyone in the country, but on the contrary, a 
collectivist society views that law and rights differ by groups.  As a result, 
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members of high individualist society are less inclined to evade tax since the law is 
universally imposed on everyone without any favouritism to any groups which 
result into the lower level of tax evasion (Tsakumis et al., 2007). Apart from 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism is another cultural dimension which 
significantly explains tax evasion (Richardson, 2008). 
‘Masculinity-femininity’ addresses the issue of the dominant gender role 
pattern in society. Hofstede (2001, p. 297) defines masculinity as “a society in 
which gender roles are clearly distinct” and femininity as “a society in which social 
gender overlaps”. Arguably, in a high masculine society, males are seen as superior 
to females, have high egoism and there is the practise of gender orientation in their 
work and personal lives. Members in a masculine society also regard highly 
material achievement, performance and competition. In contrast, in a highly 
feminine society, it is expected that people are treated almost equally irrespective 
of gender, there is low egoism and priority is placed on the quality of life and 
relationship with people. In tax context, a feminine society believes in providing a 
minimum quality of life for everyone and tax fund is used to subsidize lower class 
people (Hofstede, 2001). Therefore, it is postulated that tax evasion is less apparent 
in feminine society compared to masculine society (Tsakumis et al., 2007).  
The ‘long term versus short term orientation’ is described as “fostering of 
virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift”, and 
“fostering of virtues related to the past and present, in particular respect for 
tradition, preservation of ‘face’ and fulfilling social obligations” (Hofstede, 2001, 
p. 359). In a high long term orientation society, their members emphasize 
persistence and personal adaptability. In contrast, in a short term orientation society 
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members are eager for quick results and personal stability. In a tax context, Yong 
(2011) found that long term orientation societies in New Zealand tend to update 
their record keeping regularly and thus have lower tax payment problems to avoid 
tax penalties compared to short term orientation society.  
Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) National Cultural Dimensions have been widely 
used in social science studies and have contributed to explain the cross-cultural 
differences in business practices probably due to a number of reasons. First, 
Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) dimensions are independent except for Power Distance 
and Individualism-Collectivism dimensions, which are interdependent (De Mooij, 
2004). Secondly, applications and replications of Hofstede (1980; 1991) studies on 
matched and non-matched samples with different samples and at different period of 
time have confirmed that Hofstede’s dimensions are still valid (Hofstede, 2001; De 
Mooij, 2004). A recent meta-analysis study by Taras et al. (2012), on 451 empirical 
studies which used Hofstede’s Values Survey Module (VSM)  for three different 
period of time (1980s, 1990s and 2000s), found that despite Hofstede’s (1980; 
1991) National Cultural Dimension scores  decreasing since the 1980s, the 
dimensions are still relevant in explaining culture. Indeed, more recent accounting 
studies such as Patel (2003) and Tsakumis (2007) suggest that even a sub-group of 
the society (the accountants), such as in the US, Australia, India and Malaysia, all 
represent their respective national culture.  
Thirdly, Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) National Cultural Dimensions are the 
most influential work of classifying cultures, and reviews have found that in 
general Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) framework is relevant for cross-cultural research 
(Kirkman et al., 2006). Fourthly, Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) National Cultural 
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Dimensions were empirically developed based on a survey using IBM employees, 
capturing a number of countries, while other cultural constructs remain in the 
conceptualization phase (Yoo et al., 2011). Finally, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
have been widely applied to explain the effect of culture in various areas of social 
science studies (Taras et al., 2010). This is also supported by the number of citation 
index in refereed journal articles, of which 2700 articles cited Hofstede’s work 
(Hofstede, 2001).  
Despite being applied and replicated in many studies, Hofstede’s (1980; 
1991) National Cultural Dimensions are not free from criticism. Roxas and 
Stoneback (1997) commented that national boundaries do not necessarily coincide 
with culture, Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) measurements are out of date, and many 
developments have occurred since his seminal work in 1980. Therefore, the authors 
argue that the rankings are no longer relevant and the results may not be accurate 
since they do not consider sub-cultures, industry differences, and organisational 
culture. McSweeney (2002) critically argues that the methodology and assumptions 
used by Hofstede (1980) are flawed. Specifically, Hofstede’s (1980) survey ignores 
the differences in organisational culture across IBM, his questionnaire is almost 
restricted to workplace issues, the response from one organisation cannot be used 
for generalizing to the whole nation, and the assumption that national culture is 
homogenous is invalid.  
Hofstede (2002) responded to the foregoing criticisms by stressing that the 
dimensions in his work do not measure causality, the studies are carried out to find 
differences between national cultures, and thus “any set of functionally equivalent 
samples from national populations can supply information about such differences” 
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(Hofstede, 2002, p. 2). Furthermore, Hofstede (2002) argues that the matched data 
of IBM branches can provide support for his claims since IBM operates in many 
countries and thus the difference is only with respect to nationality. Hofstede 
(2002) further reiterates that even though the data is considered as old and 
outdated, the cultural dimensions have centuries-old roots and many studies from 
different areas subsequent to his initial work have provided consistent validity.  
Moreover, while there is possibility that the cultural dimensions scores of 
the countries have changed over time, past studies such as De Mooij (1998) and 
Merritt (2000), support the stability of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions. In 
his attempt to validate his earlier findings, Hofstede (2001) also compares rankings 
and indexes of other studies which apply his cultural dimensions and found support 
for his cultural dimensions. In addition, other cross-cultural studies, such as 
Trompenaars (1993), Schwartz (1994) and House et al. (2004) also used a survey 
instrument to understand the culture. The use of a survey to understand culture is 
considered as acceptable since culture could be examined from the emic (inside 
perspective) and etic (outside perspective) (Hofstede, 1998).  
Baskerville (2005) summarizes five common critiques of Hofstede (1980; 
1991) National Cultural Dimensions. First, it is not appropriate to use a survey in 
examining cultural differences; secondly, nations are not the best variable to study 
culture; thirdly, a study on a subsidiary of a company cannot represent a whole 
nation; fourthly, the IBM data is obsolete and old; and finally, four or five cultural 
dimensions are not sufficient to measure culture. Matsumoto and Juang (2008), 
however argue that since countries are determined by specific boundaries which are 
represented by their respective ecology, history, economy and government, all of 
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which are related to culture, therefore using national boundaries to explain culture 
is acceptable. 
A number of accounting based studies have attempted to examine culture 
from the perspectives of Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) National Cultural Dimensions. 
Gray (1988) for example, suggests that the degree of professionalism is more 
prevalent in high Individualism, low Uncertainty Avoidance and low Power 
Distance.  In another study, Roxas and Stoneback (1997) covers nine countries that 
come from different groupings in Hofstede’s (1980) rankings, and suggest that 
Power Distance has the most significant effect compared to the other dimensions. 
The study also concludes that irrespective of whether the classification of culture is 
made based on the accounting system or cultural dimensions, culture has an 
influence on the ethical decision making. 
In management accounting studies, Williams and Seaman (2001) support 
the claim of Hofstede (1980) on the existence of Power Distance by examining 
manufacturing firms in Singapore. Their findings demonstrate that within firms in 
high power distance nations there is likely to be a greater concentration of authority 
at higher levels. A recent study by Mir et al. (2009) comparing the voluntary 
disclosure in financial reporting between New Zealand and Indian companies 
indicates that Indian companies disclosed more compared to New Zealand 
companies. The authors conclude that the findings do not support Hofstede’s 
(1980) National Cultural Dimensions to explain the influence of culture in the 
voluntary disclosure of New Zealand and Indian companies. 
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In tax studies, the use of Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural dimensions in 
explaining the influence of culture in complying with the tax law is limited. 
Tsakumis et al. (2007) for instance, used secondary data to examine the association 
between cultural dimensions and tax evasion in 50 countries.  Richardson (2008) 
operationalized Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to examine the relationship 
between culture together with legal, political and religious factors with the level of 
tax evasion. Using interviews, a recent study by Yong (2011), for example, looked 
into the influence of intra-cultural ethnicities with tax compliance by small-
medium business operators in New Zealand. All of these studies provide some 
support to Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural dimensions to represent the culture in 
tax compliance studies.    
The limitations in Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions suggest 
that Hofstede’s (1980) ranks and scores for countries cannot be perceived as 
absolute standards. However, based on the support for Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions in prior studies suggests that a comparison between two 
countries on any dimensions is possible provided that the two countries are totally 
different on any one dimension (Hofstede, 2001). Regardless of the various 
criticisms, to date there is no other study that has attempted to examine culture in 
so much detail and that covers so many countries which suggests that, Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural dimensions remain applicable in many cross-cultural setting studies 
(Roxas & Stoneback, 1997).  
In addition to that,  other cultural framework such as Trompenaars (1993) 
and House et al. (2004), were  essentially built up from Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) 
cultural framework. This suggests that Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural framework 
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has more credibility, compared to the other two cultural frameworks. Furthermore, 
the discussions also indicate that the credibility of Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) to 
explain culture has been tested and proven in many areas of studies.  
This study employs Hofstede (1980) National Cultural Dimensions to 
explain the influence of culture in the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand after considering its limitations and potential scope 
from the earlier discussions. The discussions of Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions in this section also suggests that due to the differences in the 
attributes of national culture, there is a possibility that members of different 
national culture have a distinct concept of what comprises ethical and unethical 
behaviour.  
2.4.2 Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions of Malaysia and New 
Zealand 
In 1980, both Malaysia and New Zealand were included in Hofstede’s 
(1980) index scores and rankings of cultural values. The index scores and rankings 
were determined from surveys with IBM employees conducted in 50 countries. As 
Malaysia is not included in the study pertaining to ‘long term versus short term 
orientation’ by Hofstede (1991), the comparison for this dimension between 
Malaysia and New Zealand is unlikely and therefore, this study would only focus 
on the four cultural dimensions provided by Hofstede (1980).  Table 2.3 
summarizes the index scores and rankings for each four cultural dimensions for 
both countries.  
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Table 2.3 Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions for Malaysia and 
New Zealand 
Cultural 
dimensions 
Malaysia New Zealand 
Score Rank Score Rank 
Power Distance 104  
(High) 
1 22 
(Low) 
49 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance  
36  
(Low) 
46 49 
(High) 
39  
Individualism-
Collectivisim 
26 
(Collectivist) 
36 79 
(Individualist) 
6 
Masculinity-
Femininity 
50 
(Masculine) 
25  58 (Masculine) 17 
 
Source: Adapted from Goodwin and Goodwin (1999, p. 270). 
The above index scores and rankings suggest that Malaysia and New 
Zealand are different in three cultural dimensions and fairly similar in one cultural 
dimension. Hofstede (2007) argues that the most obvious differences between the 
Asian and Anglo-Saxon cultures are the Individualism-Collectivism and Power 
Distance dimension. As presented in the summary in Table 2.3 above, Hofstede 
(1980) proposes that Malaysia is high in Power Distance, low in Uncertainty 
Avoidance, a Collectivist and Masculine society. New Zealand, however, is 
classified as low in Power Distance, high in Uncertainty Avoidance, an 
Individualist and also a Masculine society.  Nonetheless, New Zealand society is 
considered to be more masculine compared to Malaysia based on the index scores 
and ranking. 
Malaysia, which is located in South East Asia practices Asian values 
(Kennedy, 2002). The Asian values which, for instance, involve respecting elders 
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and those higher in the hierarchy in society or an organization, is reflected in the 
way people are addressed at home, society and the workplace.  To address an uncle 
for instance, the titles of ‘Pakcik’ (in Malay), ‘Shushu’ (in Chinese) and ‘Anne’’ (in 
Indian) have to be used before addressing their names (Abdullah, 1996). The 
emphasis on status and hierarchy indicates the practice of a high Power Distance 
society which results in centralized power in decision making and subordinates are 
expected to accept direction from superiors (Lim, 2001). It is also rude for instance, 
for subordinates to openly disagree with superiors especially in public (Abdullah, 
1996).  
Notwithstanding that Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country, all ethnics in 
Malaysia believe in a closely-knit, strong family relationship, which reflects a 
Collectivist society (Mohd Iskandar and Pourjalali, 2000). Since Power Distance is 
more apparent in Malaysia based on Hofstede’s (1980) study, the decision making, 
is thus influenced more by the Power Distance rather than Collectivism which is 
translated into autocratic decision making. Therefore, while group decision making 
is important it is possible to be over-ridden by the decision made by the leader 
(Lim, 2001).  
In a low Uncertainty Avoidance society, the members are more willing to 
take risks (Hofstede, 1980) and thus more acceptable to mistakes since priority is 
on maintaining harmony, ensuring good relationship and saving face. Kennedy 
(2002), for instance, found that Malaysian managers avoid giving negative remarks 
to their subordinates to maintain harmony and Lim (2001) argues that any 
disagreement will be communicated indirectly as a way to save face. In terms of 
Masculinity, Malaysia is considered as a moderate Masculine society by Hofstede 
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(1980). A Masculine society emphasizes on the gender role pattern in society, has 
the attribute of assertiveness, focus on material success rather than quality of life. 
Lim (2001), for instance, found that regardless of ethnicities, the level of 
masculinity among Malays and Chinese managers is identical which suggests the 
convergence of values between ethnics due to the government policies.  
Brooking (2004) suggests that New Zealand is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural 
society which the population is dominated by the European descendants. There is 
also a suggestion that New Zealand is a bi-cultural country,  comprising two 
distinct cultures of the indigenous Maori and Pakeha, the European settlers (Mir, 
Chatterjee, and Rahaman, 2009). As a result of the dominant European descendants 
in New Zealand,  New Zealand society in general is influenced more by the Anglo-
Celtic culture (Brooking, 2004) or Anglo-Saxon culture (Kennedy, 2012). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural dimensions 
for New Zealand reflect the culture of Pakeha.  
The findings by Kennedy (2000; 2012), for example, indicate that New 
Zealand is low in Power Distance which is consistent with Hofstede’s (1980) 
proposition. The egalitarian characteristics are visible in the New Zealand culture 
which proposes that people should be treated equally in all aspects of life. For 
instance, the use of first names is common in all levels of age from home, at 
school, and the workplace (Kennedy, 2000). Hofstede (1980) also suggests that 
New Zealand is an Individualist society. The existence of an Individualist culture is 
also reported in a study by Goodwin and Goodwin (1999), which found that New 
Zealand students are less willing to include their team members in a study project 
compared to Malaysian students if they thought that their contribution is greater 
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than other team members. The findings from a study with business managers in 
New Zealand by Kennedy (2000) also supported the argument that New Zealand 
culture reflects an Individualist culture. In New Zealand, it is common for young 
people to be independent leaving their family to stay on their own and it is 
uncommon to see adults staying with the older generation (Kennedy, 2012).  
New Zealand is classified as a Masculine society by Hofstede (1980). This 
is perhaps further supported by Kennedy (2000), who found that New Zealand is a 
male oriented society, which encourages high performance orientation, such as 
taking pride as the first to climb Mount Everest and the first to fly directly from 
England to New Zealand. New Zealand is also considered to be a high Uncertainty 
Avoidance society in Hofstede’s (1980) study. The study by Kennedy (2000) found 
that the desire for security and stability in daily life is prevalent among business 
managers in New Zealand, which is translated into a high score   for Uncertainty 
Avoidance.  
More than 30 years have passed since Hofstede’s (1980) study of cultural 
values and there are possibilities that over the years, the cultural values of Malaysia 
and New Zealand have changed. For instance, based on a review of cultural 
changes in Malaysia between the period of 1987 to 1997 by Mohd Iskandar and 
Pourjalali (2000), the magnitude of the index scores has changed due to a fairer 
distribution of national wealth, urban migration, improved quality of life, and equal 
education and career opportunities. In a similar vein, the findings from Lim (2001) 
also indicate that Malaysians are moving towards a more egalitarian, stressful and 
individualistic society. A study by Yeoh (1999) also found contradictory results 
between Hofstede’s (1980) original scores and Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
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Dimension scores in her study among Malaysian and New Zealand accounting 
students. Using the Values Survey Module 1994 (VSM 94) by Hofstede (1994), 
Masculinity was the only dimension that was supported to have the same direction 
as proposed by Hofstede (1980) for both Malaysia and New Zealand.  
Recently, more comprehensive evidence is provided from the meta-analysis 
findings of Taras et al. (2012). The meta-analysis of studies using Hofstede’s 
Values Survey Module (VSM) by Taras et al. (2012) indicates that Malaysia is still 
higher in Power Distance compared to New Zealand. However, the level of Power 
Distance has been decreasing in both countries. Notwithstanding that Malaysia 
remains a Collectivist society, based on the meta-analytic scores, Malaysia is 
moving towards being an Individualist society. New Zealand is still considered as 
Individualist even though there is a slight decrease between the periods of the 
1990s to 2000s. 
Over the period of the 2000s both Malaysia and New Zealand are 
considered as low Uncertainty Avoidance societies. The meta-analysis also shows 
that both Malaysia and New Zealand are moving towards becoming a more 
Feminine society.  Overall, Taras et al. (2012) argue that the precision of 
Hofstede’s (1980) scores is decreasing over time much faster than projected by 
Hofstede (2001). The scores from the meta-analysis for each cultural dimension 
from 1980s to 2000s with respect to Malaysia and New Zealand are presented in 
Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.4 Standardized meta-analytic scores of Hofstede’s Value Survey 
Module for Malaysia and New Zealand 
Cultural 
Dimensions / 
Period 
Malaysia New Zealand 
1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Power 
Distance 
2.13 1.47 0.21 -0.90 -0.68 -1.04 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
-0.69 0.34 -0.64 -0.15 -0.22 -1.13 
Individualism-
Collectivism 
-1.29 -0.95 -0.93 0.69 1.37 1.03 
Masculinity-
Femininity 
0.31 0.17 -0.11 0.59 -0.09 N/A 
Note: The 1980s’ scores refer to Hofstede’s original scores after being standardized to 
ensure comparability with the meta-analysis score. Standardized meta-analytic scores 
should be between -2 to 2, while 0 means neutral.  
 
Source: Taras et al. (2012, p. 334-337). 
2.5 A review of relevant past studies  
2.5.1 The influence of attitude in tax compliance 
An important element in the TPB, as discussed in Section 2.2.2 above, is 
the attitude towards the intention to perform the behaviour.  Attitude is directly 
related to behaviour to the degree it is influenced by the intention (Armitage & 
Christian, 2003). Eriksen and Fallan (1996) argue that the definition of attitude in 
tax compliance is not clear since attitude towards tax compliance is an ambiguous 
construct. Kirchler (2007) concurs that attitude in tax compliance is a complex 
construct which represents the social construct of taxes that influences tax 
compliance behaviour. Since tax compliance is viewed as a sensitive issue, many 
studies in tax compliance use attitude towards the behaviour as a proxy rather than 
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examining actual tax compliance behaviour itself (Kirchler, 2007). In many tax 
compliance studies, Kirchler (2007) found, that while the relationships between 
attitude towards tax compliance and behaviour indicate weak relationships, these 
are significant.  
In understanding the influence of attitude and tax compliance, Eriksen and 
Fallan (1996) examine two different groups of students from marketing and law. 
They suggest that tax attitude is important in determining tax compliance behaviour 
and this tax attitude is influenced by the specific tax knowledge that the students 
possess. Their findings are aligned with Roberts et al. (1994) who suggest that 
attitudes to tax compliance become better with the increase in tax knowledge. To 
identify the beliefs and norms underlying taxpayers in complying with the tax law, 
Hanno and Violette (1996) applied the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) in an 
experimental study in the US. The findings suggest that attitude towards intention 
to comply with the federal tax law significantly influences reported tax compliance 
behaviour. The effect of attitude towards intention to comply with the tax law was 
also found to be more significant compared to subjective norms in this 
experimental study. 
The attitude of taxpayers is also examined by Chan et al. (2000), comparing 
US and Hong Kong taxpayers. Their findings suggest that the attitude of taxpayers 
is dependent on the degree of moral reasoning that the taxpayers have. For 
instance, US taxpayers who have higher moral reasoning indicate a more 
favourable attitude towards tax compliance, compared to a less favourable attitude 
of Hong Kong taxpayers who indicate lower moral reasoning.   
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Murphy (2004) examines the attitude of aggressive Australian taxpayers 
using a national tax survey including 2040 Australian taxpayers. The findings 
suggest that those taxpayers who prefer and seek an aggressive tax positions have a 
different attitude compared to other taxpayers. Their results also suggest that it is 
the taxpayers and not the tax agents who instigate the aggressive tax reporting. In 
their “slippery slope framework” Kirchler et al. (2008, p. 220) suggest that attitude 
toward taxes is an important factor that motivates taxpayers to comply with the tax 
law. They argue that a favourable attitude towards compliance will develop trust in 
the revenue authorities which will encourage voluntary tax compliance.  
With regard to accountants, a study by Buchan (2005) in five public 
accounting firms in the US, suggests that accountants’ attitude has a strong direct 
relationship with ethical intention in evaluating ethical issues presented in the 
study. Attitude also indicates a significant relationship with subjective norms 
which reflects the indirect influence of subjective norms with intention. Pinsker et 
al. (2009) found that attitudes of accounting professionals in the tax environment 
are reflected in the judgments that they make, but the same results are not found 
among auditors.   
In the US, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) conducted an experimental study 
with three scenarios: a home office scenario; a tip scenario; and a charitable 
contribution scenario, using students, a group of parents from an elementary 
school, and random mail-out respondents in Florida and Georgia, respectively as 
samples. The study found that attitude has a strong positive effect in explaining the 
tax compliance behaviour of the respondents in all three cases. In a study in Canada 
by Trivedi et al. (2005), which measured tax compliance in two different ways; a 
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hypothetical-situation and experimentally-measured compliance; the findings 
support attitude in explaining the tax compliance behaviour of the participants. 
Bobek et al. (2007a) examine the underlying reasons why taxpayers prefer refunds 
using two phases of study. The findings suggest that taxpayers’ attitude towards 
uncertainty influences their withholding tax positions.  
In a study by Saad (2011) using individual taxpayers in Malaysia and New 
Zealand, her findings suggest that taxpayers in both countries considered attitude as 
an important factor in complying with the tax law. Similar findings are provided by 
Smart (2012) in examining the tax compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers 
and tax agents in New Zealand.  This study found that attitudes towards informal 
sanctions such as tax morale are influential in motivating individual taxpayers and 
tax agents to comply or not comply with the tax law. Another recent study by 
Langham et al. (2012) among small and medium entrepreneurs in Australia found 
that attitude towards correctly reporting and maintaining tax records influences the 
intention to comply with tax obligations.  
2.5.2 Subjective norms and tax compliance 
The concept of norms in tax compliance, according to Kirchler (2007), is 
difficult to conceptualize since norms could emanate from individual standards 
(internally from the taxpayer), socially approved standards (from those who close 
to the taxpayers), or the societal norms which are from the collective or at the 
national level and translated into the tax law. Subjective norms or important 
referent others, as defined by Ajzen (1991), are global social pressure from those 
who close to a person such as family and friends, who could exert influence on a 
person’s ethical decision making because what is considered as ethical is not 
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universally consistent (Westerman et al., 2007). This is supported by Kirchler 
(2007) in a tax context, who argues that the tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers 
is influenced by the group they are associated with.  
A review of ethics studies by O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005), which 
regards subjective norm as an organizational factor, suggests that subjective norm 
is a new area of study in ethics literature and requires further examination. In their 
synthesis of past studies in tax compliance by Jackson and Milliron (1986), and 
later in an updated work by Richardson and Sawyer (2001), subjective norms in the 
form of peer influence are regarded as an important tax compliance factor. 
Similarly, the Fischer Model used by Fischer et al. (1992) also acknowledges the 
importance of subjective norms (peer influence) in explaining the tax compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers. The importance of subjective norms which is measured 
using peer influence is further supported by Westerman et al. (2007). In their study 
on respondents from Germany, Italy and Japan, Westerman et al. (2007) suggest 
that peers indicate stronger influence in a person’s ethical decision making 
compared to national culture. However, the influence of peers is stronger in the 
higher power distance and higher individualism societies.    
With respect to the ethical decision making of tax agents, Milliron (1988), 
for instance, has proposed a model examining the aggressiveness of tax agents in 
the ambiguous tax environment. Based on interviews with 12 tax agents from 
public accounting firms, Milliron (1988) suggests that peers’ opinion is an aspect 
that forms the “Preparer vulnerability” factor in offering aggressive advice to 
client.  
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The importance of subjective norms in tax compliance behaviour is also 
reported in Hanno and Violette’s (1996) study. The subjective norms/referents 
comprise ‘members of the family’, ‘current or future employer’, ‘close friends’ and 
‘spouse/significant other’, and were tested on both compliers and non-compliers 
groups. Generally, the compliers and non-compliers have the opinion that the 
referent groups expected tax compliance from them. Of all the referent groups, the 
only significant difference is the influence of family members on compliers and 
non-compliers, where the strongest effect was found on compliers compared to 
non-compliers.  
In examining the role of subjective norms in tax compliance in the US, 
Bobek and Hatfield (2003) found that subjective norms have a positive influence 
and highly significant in all three scenarios used in the study. Bobek et al. (2007a) 
applied the TPB among students in the US to understand the reasons why taxpayers 
prefer a refund. Their study indicates that subjective norms influence the 
withholding tax position of the taxpayers. The more the taxpayers are advised by 
people around them to lower their withholding tax position, the more likely they 
will perform the behaviour. The study by Trivedi et al. (2005) in Canada reports 
that subjective norms are only significant in the case of intent to comply but not in 
the case of intent to overstate the deductions.  This suggests that participants in the 
study are inclined to evade tax only if there is a genuine reason.  
In a study by Saad (2011) in Malaysia and New Zealand, the findings of the 
study support the importance of subjective norms in influencing the compliance 
behaviour of individual taxpayers in an overstating business income scenario and 
an understating other income scenario. Langham et al. (2012) reported that in a 
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survey with small medium business owners in Australia, the influence of subjective 
norms such as from bookkeepers, accountants and tax agents are effective in 
motivating taxpayer’s intention to comply with tax obligations. In a way, the 
findings also indicate the importance of tax agents in assisting taxpayers to comply 
with the tax law.  
A review of past studies by Hite et al. (2003) on the factors that affect tax 
agents’ compliance decision, indicates that tax agents’ aggressive behaviour is 
influenced by the opinions of others. In addition, their motivation to provide 
aggressive advice is also demand-driven by the aggressiveness of the clients in tax 
position. The findings imply the influence of peers and clients in their ethical 
decision making. In a recent study, Tan (2011) also found that the type of advice 
given to tax agents’ clients, to a certain extent depends on the risk profiles of their 
clients, indicating the influence of clients in the ethical decision making of tax 
agents.  
In another study, Kahle and White (2004) examine the influence of 
subjective norms using an experimental study in the US involving tax agents from 
various types of accounting firms. The results of the study suggest that tax agents 
are influenced by their clients in their decision making. Tax agents are more 
influenced by their client preferences rather than the direction of the evidence when 
making decisions. The importance of subjective norms in the compliance behaviour 
of tax agents is further supported by Smart (2012). The study which used members 
of the New Zealand Institute of Accountants (NZICA), found that subjective norms 
have a positive and significant influence on tax agents’ compliance behaviour to 
tax law. The findings suggest that subjective norms in the form of important 
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referent’s expectations, threat of losing respect from important referents and the tax 
compliance behaviour of important referents influenced the intention of tax agents 
to act ethically.  
2.5.3 Perceived behavioural control and tax compliance 
Perceived behavioural control is another element in the TPB which is 
discussed earlier in Section 2.2.2. Ajzen (1991) posits that apart from the attitude 
towards behaviour and subjective norms, intention to perform behaviour is also 
determined by the perceived behavioural control that an individual has. Perceived 
behavioural control also directly influences the performance of behaviour. Ajzen 
(1991) also proposes that the TPB has to be utilized with specific targets, goal and 
context. With regard to tax compliance, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) suggest that 
perceived behavioural control does not refer to the degree of easiness or difficulty 
to cheat in general, but it is concerned with the level of control a taxpayer believes 
he or she has in conducting specific action related to complying with the tax laws, 
such as underreporting income and overstating expenses. Kirchler (2007) describes 
perceived behavioural control as the self-confidence that a taxpayer possesses in 
filing a tax return in a self-advantageous way.   
Perceived behavioural control is still less explored in tax compliance 
studies, and in general, findings from past studies on the influence of perceived 
behavioural control in tax compliance are not favourable. For instance, the results 
from the logistic regression by Bobek and Hatfield (2003), do not support 
perceived behavioural control in explaining the cheating cases in tax compliance. 
In a similar vein, the findings from the studies by Trivedi et al. (2005) and Saad 
(2011) also indicate that perceived behavioural control is not strong enough to 
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influence tax compliance behaviour. Further, Bobek et al. (2007a) reported a 
similar finding when examining the motivation to be in a tax refund position in the 
US. The findings do not support perceived behavioural control in explaining the 
taxpayers’ preference to be in a refund position. 
A recent study by Smart (2012), which used individual taxpayers and tax 
agents as samples in New Zealand, also supports the non-significant effect of 
perceived behavioural control on the intention to comply with the tax law for 
samples in the study. Perceived behavioural control was also found to have no 
effect on the behaviour of tax agents to comply with the tax law.  Similar findings 
of a non-significant effect of perceived behavioural control is also provided by 
Langham et al. (2012). The study found that based on three tax scenarios provided 
in the study, perceived behavioural control of small and medium entrepreneurs in 
Australia does not influence the intention to comply with tax obligations as the 
level of tax complexity increases.  
2.5.4 The influence of ethics and ethical sensitivity in tax compliance 
While this study examines the influence of ethical sensitivity with the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents, it is worthwhile to understand the general 
concept of ethics before delving into ethical sensitivity. The term ethics and 
morality are commonly used interchangeably (Crane & Matten, 2007). Ethics is 
normally described as the moral principles or values that an individual has which 
influence him or her in making the right or wrong decision in a given situation 
(Crane & Matten, 2007). Being ethical, as argued by Jones (1991), is situation-
specific depending on the moral intensity of the issue.  
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In the case of complying with tax laws, this has an ethical element since it 
involves the judgment of right and wrong with respect to tax compliance. It is 
argued that having good tax ethics can increase the level of tax compliance (Singh, 
2003). Alm and Torgler (2011) suggest that the level of ethics differs across 
taxpayers, and therefore, the level of compliance among taxpayers also varies. Due 
to this, the tax compliance behaviour of a taxpayer can partly be explained by the 
role of ethics of that particular taxpayer, since taxpayers do not always behave in a 
profit-seeking condition as implied by the economic deterrence model (Alm & 
Torgler, 2011).  
The importance of ethics in tax compliance behaviour is supported by 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) in their synthesis of prior tax compliance studies, and 
later in an updated work by Richardson and Sawyer (2001). The findings from 
these studies suggest that ethics is a significant variable in explaining tax 
compliance behaviour. However, Richardson and Sawyer (2001) argue that the 
results tend to vary according to the definition of ethics adopted in each particular 
study.  
Due to the significance of ethics in tax compliance behaviour, a 
considerable number of studies have attempted to examine the issue of ethics in tax 
compliance. An example is the study of Song and Yarbrough (1978) who examine 
the ethical level of taxpayers in eastern North Carolina in the US. The findings 
from their survey demonstrate that the overall levels of ethics among those 
taxpayers are only “barely passing”, at only 60.3 percent on a scale of 1 to 100.  
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Reckers et al. (1994) investigate the ethical beliefs of taxpayers in the US 
state of Arkansas, and find that the ethical beliefs of the respondents are highly 
significant in the decision to evade tax. Henderson and Kaplan (2005) examine 
how ethical beliefs influence tax compliance by differentiating between general 
ethical beliefs and specific ethical beliefs. General ethical beliefs are collective 
beliefs of what is right or wrong such as an individual who did not cheat in the 
exam did not litter while specific ethical beliefs represent ethics in tax context. 
They propose that general ethical beliefs influence the specific ethical beliefs and 
the latter affects the tax compliance behaviour. Ho and Wong (2008) examine the 
ethical beliefs of taxpayers in Hong Kong, and suggest that ethical beliefs can be 
used to improve the tax compliance rate, especially when taxpayers have low levels 
of moral reasoning.  
In Canada, Trivedi et al. (2005) conducted an experimental study, and their 
findings demonstrate that ethics significantly influence the intention and behaviour 
in complying with tax. Indeed their study suggests that ethics is the most important 
variable which determines compliance with tax laws. The identity of taxpayers and 
their association with tax ethics is also examined in a recent study by Wenzel 
(2007) through a survey conducted in Australia. It is suggested that there is a 
positive relationship between tax ethics, and the identity of the taxpayers as an 
individual or a member of a nation.  
The tax ethics of tax agents are examined by Attwell and Sawyer (2001) in 
New Zealand. Based on the scale suggested by Song and Yarbrough (1978), their 
study demonstrates that tax agents in New Zealand have only a “barely passing” 
score, and a majority of the tax agents encountered ethical problems while 
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performing their duties. Notwithstanding the “barely passing” score, the findings 
suggest that overall, tax agents have a better understanding of tax evasion, tax 
avoidance, and tax minimization, compared to the results of an earlier study by 
Tooley (1992). Attwell and Sawyer (2001) also demonstrate that Chartered 
Accountants are more ethical compared to lawyers or other tax agents with respect 
to tax compliance issues. In a similar vein, Doyle et al. (2009), in a study involving 
tax agents in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, suggest that ethical dilemmas 
exist in tax practice, and argue that acting ethically is not merely complying with 
the tax laws.  
The ethical values of Chartered Public Accountants (CPAs), including tax 
agents prior to self-regulation and post self-regulation by the accounting profession 
in the US, are examined by Waldron and Doty (2010). Five hundred CPAs from an 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountant (AICPA) listing were selected 
through a random sampling. The results demonstrate that the ethical values of 
CPAs are indifferent subsequent to the self-regulatory environment. However, the 
self-regulation results in an increase in the intention of CPAs to behave ethically.  
Notwithstanding the various specialty areas in accounting, a survey by 
Emerson et al. (2007) found that the moral or ethical reasoning of accountants is 
significantly indifferent to their job tasks, whether or not they are doing audits, tax 
or accounting jobs. Early evidence on the ethical reasoning of CPAs is 
demonstrated by Ponemon (1992) in understanding the influence of accounting 
firm socialization with the level of ethical reasoning. The author argues that higher 
level CPAs, those progressing from manager to partner, had a lower and more 
homogenous level of ethical reasoning. Despite the claim that accounting 
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practitioners have low ethical reasoning, Wasieleski and Weber (2009) provide a 
contradictory result. In a study involving business practitioners from various job 
functions such as accounting, finance, information technology, supply chain, 
marketing and human resources, the findings suggest that business practitioners 
with an accounting background have high ethical reasoning and are placed second 
after the human resources practitioner.   
In Malaysia, Singh (2003) finds that the level of moral reasoning of the 
Malaysian tax agents are lower compared to that of US auditors. In this study, 
Singh (2003) examines the ethical decision making of tax agents by incorporating 
individual differences, cognitive process and contextual variables in explaining the 
ethical decision making of tax agents in public accounting firms. Having the 
appropriate dimensions in ethical judgment is important to ensure correct decisions 
are made. Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer (2005) discuss two contradicting ethical 
dimensions in ethical judgment. They argue that tax agents should apply the 
domain of consequentialism or deontology in making choices. Consequentialism 
emphasizes the final outcome without any concern on the method to obtain the 
outcomes (that is the end justified the means), provided that the good of the 
outcome could compensate for the bad of the means. Therefore, if tax agents favour 
the consequentialism domain then they have to consider the effects of the parties 
involved and the level of importance to each group based on the decision that they 
select. In contrast, the deontological approach to decision making suggests that 
some acts are morally obligatory and thus tax agents within this approach will 
disclose relevant information about their clients without considering the effect.  
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The effect of tax agent penalties on the ethical decision making of tax 
agents is examined by Anderson and Cuccia (2000). By using students as 
surrogates for tax agents in an experimental study, it is suggested that tax agents’ 
behaviour is in accordance with the changes in the tax agent penalties in the US. 
For instance, the respondents in the study recommended fewer aggressive tax 
positions with the increase in tax agent penalties.  
Burns and Kiecker (1995) provide an example on the ethical judgment of 
tax CPAs at supervisory level.  Their findings indicate that deontological (essential 
characteristics of the behaviour) and teleological (consequences of the behaviour) 
considerations both influence the ethical judgment of CPAs at the supervisory 
level. Interestingly, the CPAs in the study generally supported the staff under their 
supervision to make ethical decisions and disapproved of unethical decisions. 
Nevertheless, their support is influenced by the economic benefits that the ethical 
or unethical behaviour contributes to the firm. These results are in line with the 
findings from the extensive review of tax accountants’ ethical judgments by 
Roberts (1998).  
Tax agents’ ethical judgments and behavioural intentions, in cases when 
clients demand aggressive tax reporting, are examined by Cruz et al. (2000). By 
using the Multidimensional  Ethics Scale (MES) on 67 tax agents, their study 
indicates that the moral equity dimension has the greatest influence in all three 
hypothetical tax scenarios provided in the questionnaire. The ethical concerns and 
ethical environment of tax agents in the self-assessment system are examined by 
Marshall et al. (1998) in understanding the ethical judgments of these tax agents. In 
their study in Western Australia, their findings demonstrate that the most common 
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ethical problem is the failure to make reasonable inquiries if there is a lack of 
documentation. Another aspect which concerned these tax agents is continuing to 
act for clients in an unethical situation. Despite the participants in the study 
demonstrating that they are operating in an ethical environment, almost half of 
them also concurred that there are many opportunities for them to act unethically.  
In a similar study, Bobek and Robin (2007) also examine the ethical 
environment in which tax agents operate, particularly the common ethical 
dilemmas faced by tax agents and the nature of the ethical environments. Their 
study surveyed tax agents in public accounting firms who are also members of 
professional bodies, and indicates that on average, respondents feel that they are 
working in a strong ethical environment. The procedures, rules, and code of ethics 
have contributed to the strong ethical environment. Effective in-house training also 
helps them to improve their ethical decision making.  
In another study, Bobek et al. (2010) applied the same experiential 
questionnaire (EQ) by Bobek and Robin (2007) to examine the experience of 
partners and non-partners with ethical tax dilemmas. The study found that partners 
experienced an ethical tax dilemma more than non-partners. Non-partners also 
reported certain types of ethical tax dilemmas which were related to lack of 
experience. The findings suggest the possible existence of information asymmetry 
in resolving ethical dilemmas between partners and non-partners. In a recent study, 
Doyle et al. (2012a) looked into the ethical reasoning of tax agents in the UK in 
solving ethical dilemmas in tax and social contexts. Based on the ‘P’ scores of the 
DIT, the study found that tax agents used a lower level of ethical reasoning in tax 
context dilemmas compared to social context dilemmas.  
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Hume et al. (1999) demonstrate that a majority of CPAs in California 
conform to the Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice (SRTP) when 
making decisions involving ethical considerations. Results from the survey find 
that the CPAs follow the SRTP more often than the unlicensed tax agents. Despite 
the favourable findings, there is still a concern, since a significant number of CPAs 
indicate they do not adhere to the SRTP. It is suggested that some CPAs may 
choose to protect their personal benefits, such as profit-seeking, rather than 
following a code of ethics when faced with ethical decision making.  
The influence of group discussion on tax agents’ ethical decision making is 
examined by Carnes et al. (1996). By using an experimental study involving tax 
partners and managers of the then Big Six firms, the study finds that group 
discussions will lead to decisions that favour the client in cases with high 
probability of being audited and favour the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in cases 
with low probability of being audited. The process of generating advice from group 
discussion will lead to extreme decisions, and the ultimate decision making is 
actually made by the individual rather than the group. 
Rest (1986) argues that an important element which motivates ethical 
decision making is the existence of ethical sensitivity which enables an individual 
to recognize moral issues.  With regard to accounting practitioners, based on a 
review of the first 1500 articles published in the first eighteen volume of Journal of 
Business Ethics, Collins (2000) suggests that ethical sensitivity influences 
accountants in situations involving violations of the law. Despite being important, 
there is still a lack of studies investigating the influence of ethical sensitivity in 
complying with the tax law which requires further examination (Tan, 2006). 
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Notwithstanding that, a few studies have attempted to address the issue of ethical 
sensitivity and tax compliance behaviour. A study by Emerson, et al. (2007) for 
instance, provides a general understanding on the level of ethical sensitivity among 
accounting practitioners.   A survey among accounting practitioners (including tax 
agents), suggests they are more sensitive to consequences due to physical harm 
rather than violation of the laws. 
In another study, Yetmar and Eastman (2000) examined the ethical 
sensitivity of tax agents registered with the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants’ (AICPA’s) Tax Division in the US. The study argues that if tax 
agents can recognize ethical issues, they are more likely to make ethical decisions. 
Ironically, tax agents who are familiar with the Code of Ethics of AIPCA do not 
significantly recognise ethical issues more often than tax agents who are unfamiliar 
with the AICPA’s Code of Ethics.  
The issue of ethical sensitivity of tax agents is also raised by Doyle et al. 
(2009). Based on interviews with tax agents in Ireland and the United Kingdom 
(UK), Doyle et al. (2009) find that respondents are clearly confused with the role of 
ethics and argue that the ethical sensitivity of tax agents may have already 
deteriorated. For instance, respondents can only illustrate examples of ethical 
dilemmas in tax practice after being provided with specific examples by the 
interviewer.  
2.5.5 Culture and tax compliance 
It is argued that culture influences both values and ethics. It is also 
contended that different cultures embrace different values and behaviour (Axinn et 
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al., 2004). Therefore, it is important to understand the influence of culture since 
cross-border trades are common scenarios in modern business. A number of studies 
have attempted to examine the influence of culture in the accounting field. For 
instance, in a study by Gendron et al. (2006), it is suggested that professional 
Chartered Accountants in the French-speaking province of Quebec in Canada, 
display a higher professional commitment compared to Chartered Accountants in 
English-speaking provinces in Canada (Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova 
Scotia). The finding supports the proposition that culture influences the ethical 
behaviour of professional accountants.  
In another study, Jakubowski et al. (2002) investigate the differences and 
similarities in the Code of Professional Conduct of Certified or Chartered 
Accountants in the US, Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, Canada (Ontario), 
Australia, India and Hong Kong. The study finds that there are commonalities in 
some rules which suggest that some rules are culture-free. It is also suggested that 
the existence of cross- country variations in the Code of Professional Conduct 
demonstrates the influence of culture and different legal systems. Arguably the 
legal system is often a reflection of the culture (Gendron et al., 2006).   
In a more recent study, Bobek et al. (2007b) examine the relationship 
between the social norms and tax compliance intention in three countries: 
Singapore, Australia, and the US. The study argues that the country effect (culture) 
will be outweighed by the social norms. The study finds that, while social norms 
are strongly related to intention to comply with tax and explain the inter-country 
differences, the strength among the three countries is different. It is found that the 
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combination between personal norms and subjective norms is the highest in 
Singapore, followed by Australia, and the lowest is the US.  
The evidence that culture influences tax compliance is also put forward by 
Torgler and Schneider (2007). Their study examines the effect of culture on tax 
morale to comply with the tax law in Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain which have 
some similarities and differences in their cultures. Switzerland has strong 
democratic rights and has the influence of German, French, and Italian cultures. 
Belgium’s community is strongly influenced by the Dutch and French. Spain is 
considered to be a country with many historical Spanish nationalities, such as the 
Basque country, Catalonia, Galicia and Navarre. The study indicates that there is a 
possibility for culture and national pride to influence tax morale in complying with 
tax laws. 
In a similar study, Alm and Torgler (2006) examine the tax morale and tax 
compliance between the US and 15 European countries. Essentially, US taxpayers 
have higher tax morale compared to Spanish, and tax morale is also higher in the 
Northern European countries compared to the Romanic countries. They suggest 
that tax culture of each country in their studies influences the differences of tax 
compliance behaviour. Interestingly, Saad (2011) found that generally, individual 
taxpayers in Malaysia and New Zealand have similar perceptions towards tax 
compliance regardless the differences in culture between the two countries.  
Using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions, Tsakumis et al. 
(2007) investigate the influence of national culture and tax evasion in 50 countries. 
The results of their study suggest that countries which practise high uncertainty 
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avoidance, low individualism, low masculinity and are high in power distance, are 
more likely to engage in tax evasion. Extending the work of Tsakumis et al. (2007), 
Richardson (2008) includes 47 countries in a study to examine the impact of 
culture together with legal, political and religious variables on tax evasion. The 
findings from their study suggest that tax evasion is higher when there is a higher 
level of uncertainty avoidance and lower level of individualism.  
Lewis et al. (2009) compare the influence of culture in tax compliance 
between respondents in the UK and Italy. The study demonstrates that Italian 
respondents declare more as the probability of detection increases and when tax is 
framed as a gain. Italians students are also reported to declare less compared to UK 
students. In another recent study, Bame-Aldred et al. (2013) examine the influence 
of national culture on firm-level tax evasion of 3000 companies in 31 countries. 
Their findings suggest that a collectivist culture is less likely to evade tax while an 
individualistic culture indicates more possibility to perform such an action for 
personal benefit.  
In a series of intra-cultural interviews, based on Hofstede’s (1980; 2001) 
cultural dimensions by Yong (2011) in New Zealand, the author found that a 
Collectivist culture tends to use their network to reduce compliance costs and 
because a Collectivist society is committed to their group, their obligations towards 
the financial needs of the group result into delayed tax payments. In addition to 
that, a high Power Distance society has greater respect and showed greater fear 
towards the tax authority. The study also discovered that high Uncertainty 
Avoidance and Masculine societies have better record keeping which results in less 
tax compliance problems.  
104 
 
2.6 Summary  
In this chapter, relevant theories, concepts and past studies are discussed to 
provide some understanding of the factors that contribute to the ethical decision 
making of tax agents while performing their roles. The discussion in Chapter 2 
forms the framework of the study, which will be discussed in the Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.  
Based on the discussion, it is understood that tax compliance is a complex 
issue which is normally explained using either an economic or non-economic 
approach. While both approaches have contributed to explain tax compliance 
issues, this study uses the behavioural approach to examine the factors that 
contribute to the ethical decision making of tax professionals, since it is considered 
more appropriate and relevant to the context of the study.  
The review on the TRA and TPB also suggests the relevance of these 
theories in explaining behaviour. The central idea of both theories, which is to 
predict intention for behaviours which are goal-directed, is considered appropriate 
in examining the tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers since the act of complying 
with the tax law is goal-directed. However, this study will apply the TPB, since the 
various roles of tax agents may put them in conflicting positions and thus there is a 
possibility that they are in incomplete volitional control in making decisions. In 
addition to that, tax compliance is a complex issue, and since the flexibility of the 
TPB allows for the addition of other factors to explain behaviour, this suggests the 
relevance of using TPB in this study. Despite the TPB has been widely used in 
other areas of research and capable of explaining behaviour, the review of past 
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studies indicates that its application in tax studies is still limited, which suggests 
that it could be worthwhile to explore TPB in the tax context.  
This chapter also reviews relevant past studies on attitudes, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural control in a tax context, and in ethical decision 
making. The discussion suggests that attitude and subjective norms are relevant in 
determining the tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers. However, the perceived 
behavioural control has mixed support in explaining the compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers towards tax. 
The importance of ethics in tax compliance studies is also highlighted in 
this chapter which reveals that studies on ethics in a tax context have been 
conducted on various aspects. The discussions in this chapter also show that studies 
examining the ethical sensitivity of tax agents are still scarce, despite its 
importance. Hence, after considering the advantages and weakness of using Rest’s 
(1986) Model, this study uses the ethical sensitivity as postulated by Rest’s (1986) 
Model, to examine the decision making of tax agents while performing their roles. 
The ethical sensitivity in this study is measured using the Multidimensional Ethics 
Scale (MES) originally proposed by Reidenbach and Robin (198; 1990) in 
marketing and later refined by Cruz et al. (2000) in the tax context. The MES 
elements will be discussed further in Chapter 4, Research Methodology of this 
thesis.  
Another factor which is found to be relevant in explaining the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents is the influence of culture. Since the concept of 
culture is itself complex, this study proposes the use of Hofstede’s framework to 
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capture the influence of culture in the ethical decision making of tax agents after 
accounting for its advantages and weaknesses. The discussion on culture starts with 
the broad concept of culture before delving into Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions. The review of the influence of culture in tax compliance and 
decision making in this chapter indicates mixed findings.  
Notwithstanding all the reviewed studies contribute to understanding the 
influence of culture in tax compliance, little is known about the influence of 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions with respect to ethical decision making of 
tax agents or taxpayers in complying with the tax law which provides an interesting 
avenue for further research. The discussions in this chapter lead to the development 
of the research framework and hypotheses which are presented in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3   
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the conceptual research framework and the 
hypotheses development for the study. The chapter begins by presenting the 
proposed conceptual framework of the study by extending the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) with ethical sensitivity and culture. This is followed by the 
discussion on the development of the hypotheses. The last section summarizes the 
chapter.  
3.1 Conceptual Framework  
The main objective of this study is to examine some selected factors that 
influence the ethical decision making of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand 
while performing their engagement roles. To meet this objective, the researcher 
developed a formal conceptual framework so that the relationship between the 
selected factors with compliance behaviour of tax agents while performing their 
roles could be empirically examined. 
Past studies suggest that the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) postulated 
by Ajzen (1991), an established behavioural model, has been successful in 
explaining human behaviour in various fields (Madden et al., 1992; Armitage & 
Conner, 2001; McEachan et al., 2011). A review of past studies in Chapter 2 also 
suggests that the TPB has gained support in explaining the compliance behaviour 
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of taxpayers.  As a result, the conceptual framework of this study draws mainly 
from the TPB to examine the compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand.  
The TPB proposes that the behaviour of a person is directly influenced by 
the intention and the perceived behavioural control that a person possess. In 
addition, the intention to perform behaviour is motivated by a person’s attitude, 
subjective norms and the perceived behavioural control of that person. Behavioural 
intention also functions as a proxy for actual behaviour in situations when it is 
difficult to measure actual behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; O’Connor and Armitage, 
2004). Since gaining access to tax agents is difficult for the researcher to measure 
the actual behaviour of tax agents while performing their engagement roles, the 
intention to comply with the tax laws is regarded as a substitute for actual 
compliance. Previous studies in accounting and taxation, such as Bobek and 
Hatfield (2003), Buchan (2005) and Saad (2011), used a similar approach to treat 
intention as a proxy for actual behaviour in explaining the influence of the elements 
in TPB in complying with the tax laws.   
Despite there is considerable support for the use of the TPB in explaining 
human behaviour, the theory allows for the addition of other factors into the model 
to increase the power of the TPB in predicting human behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). 
One of the important factors in tax compliance studies as suggested by prior studies 
in Chapter 2 is ethics. An aspect of ethics among tax agents that is suggested to be 
explored further is the ethical sensitivity (Tan, 2006) which past studies have 
suggested to influence the intention of accountants to act ethically (Collins, 2000). 
This study proposes to include ethical or moral sensitivity as postulated by Rest 
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(1986), due to the flexibility of Rest’s (1986) Model, which allows its components 
to be examined separately. A review of the Rest’s (1986) Model also suggests that 
moral or ethical sensitivity is postulated to contribute to ethical behaviour. This 
study adapts the Multidimensional Ethics Scales (MES) refined and applied by 
Cruz et al. (2000), which has been tested in tax context, to measure the ethical 
sensitivity of tax agents in complying with the tax laws.   
Since ethical values are part of the culture (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; 
Hofstede, 1991) and tax compliance studies always involve an ethical 
consideration, namely whether or not to comply with the tax laws, the study also 
proposed to include culture as another factor to better explain the tax compliance 
behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand.  The importance of culture 
in tax context has been recommended and supported in previous studies (see for 
instance Kirchler, 2007; Torgler and Schneider, 2007; Chau and Leung, 2009).  
However, the lack of uniformity in measuring culture, has led to mixed findings on 
the importance of culture in the tax context (Kirchler, 2007). The review of past 
studies in Chapter 2 suggests that while Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural 
dimensions have weaknesses in explaining culture, based on the considerable 
support, they also have the potential to describe culture in business practices. After 
considering the criticisms and the potential for Hofstede’s (1980; 1991) cultural 
dimension to explain the culture, this study proposes to operationalize the National 
Cultural Dimensions posited by Hofstede (1980) to measure the influence of 
culture in the ethical decision making of tax agents while performing their roles.  
The review of past studies in Chapter 2 leads to the proposed conceptual 
framework as depicted in Figure 3.1. The conceptual framework in Figure 3.1 
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proposes that the tax agents’ intention to comply is influenced by their attitudes 
towards complying with the tax laws, the influence of subjective norms (important 
others), the perceived behavioural control of tax agents, their ethical sensitivity and 
finally, their culture. The proposed model is already complex and considered 
sufficient to examine the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents since ethical 
sensitivity and culture are assumed to be multidimensional which require first and 
second order factor analyses. The proposed model is then tested on two tax 
scenarios: overstating tax expense and understating income. 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual framework of tax agents’ compliance behaviour with 
tax law while performing their roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: -------- indicates that the path is not tested in the study. 
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The review of past studies in Chapter 2 of this thesis suggests that other 
researchers have examined the above mentioned factors in understanding tax 
compliance behaviour of either taxpayers or tax agents. However, the current study 
is different in several ways. First, the review in Chapter 2 indicates that many 
studies on tax agents were conducted in a single country (see for instance Attwell 
and Sawyer, 2001; Singh, 2003; Buchan, 2005; Bobek and Robin, 2007; 
Hasseldine et al., 2012). A recent interview study comparing the accountants in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland by Doyle et al. (2009) suggests that comparative 
studies involving tax agents could provide interesting insights into understanding 
the wider context of tax compliance behaviour.  
This study, which uses tax agents as a sample, is comparative in nature, 
comparing two different cultures, Malaysia and New Zealand. While there are 
studies in accounting and tax context which have compared Malaysia and New 
Zealand (for instance Yeoh (1999) who examined the accounting education, 
Goodwin and Goodwin (1999) on ethical judgment among business students and 
Saad (2011) who looked into the tax compliance behaviour of individual 
taxpayers), to the researcher’s knowledge this is the first study to compare the 
compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand. Not only the 
findings of this study could contribute to the scarcity of literature in the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents especially in the Asia-Pacific region, the study 
is also aligned with the call for more research in cross-cultural context.   
Second, in a broader context, the synthesis of previous studies in tax 
compliance, such as  Richardson and Sawyer (2001), found that past studies in 
taxation have mainly used a single approach of inquiry, for instance the use of 
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quantitative method (either survey or experimental design) to understand a 
phenomena under study. While the positivist mode of enquiry (the quantitative 
method) has dominated and contributed to understanding tax issues, Oats (2012) 
recently suggests the use of interpretivist modes of inquiry (which could be 
translated into using qualitative approach) for research in taxation to continue to 
evolve.  
Over the years, research in other fields progressively applies the mixed 
method approach in understanding knowledge (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).  
Given the multidisciplinary nature of tax studies, McKerchar (2010) argues that the 
use of mixed method approach could become an alternative to understand 
knowledge in the tax context. Since there is no single best approach in tax studies, 
the use of a mixed method approach in tax, according to McKerchar (2010), could 
address different objectives, complement one method with the others and 
strengthen the findings. A recent example of a published study using tax agents as 
samples in a mixed method approach study is provided by Hasseldine et al. (2012), 
for understanding the importance of tax knowledge in the UK.  
Due to the potential of the mixed methodical approach in providing richer 
information to understand the ethical decision making of tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand while performing their engagement roles, this study uses a mixed 
method approach in its design which is explained more in the next chapter. The 
‘mixed’ is implied first, by using two different streams of inquiries in a single 
study. In this case the survey responses are further explained in the interview.  
Secondly, it is implied at the sampling stage when respondents from the survey 
self-determined themselves to participate in the interviews.  
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Third, Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001) 
agreed that the issue of measuring ethics in tax compliance remains unresolved 
which contributed to the mixed findings on the influence of ethics in tax 
compliance behaviour. A review of past ethics studies by Kujala et al. (2011) 
suggest that the Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) developed by Reidenbach 
and Robin (1988; 1990) is commonly used to measure ethics. While there are 
studies in New Zealand such as Tooley (1992), Attwell and Sawyer (2001), and in 
Malaysia, for instance Singh (2003), which examined the influence of ethics in 
ethical decision making or moral reasoning of tax agents, none of these studies 
used MES to measure ethics in tax compliance.  The contribution of previous 
studies using ethics as a single dimensional concept is acknowledged in explaining 
the influence of ethics in tax compliance behaviour. However, testing the MES in 
the context of tax compliance as proposed in this study provides an opportunity to 
understand the influence of ethical sensitivity in the tax compliance behaviour of 
tax agents from a different perspective, as a multidimensional concept.  
Fourth, the review in Chapter 2 suggests that the application of Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural dimensions in tax studies is still limited which provides an 
opportunity for further examination. The review of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
dimensions in Chapter 2 also implied that culture could be perceived as a 
multidimensional concept which consists of Power Distance, Individualism-
Collectivism, Masculinity–Femininity and Uncertainty Avoidance. In this current 
study, it is proposed that ethical sensitivity and culture are initially subject to first 
order factor model to confirm that tax agents form their perceptions on the 
respective ethical sensitivity (MES) and cultural (Hofstede’s 1980) dimensions. 
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Two second order factor models are later developed to combine the overall 
perceptions of ethical sensitivity and culture respectively. Thereafter, the influence 
of ethical sensitivity and culture is examined on the tax agents’ compliance 
behaviour.  
Fifth, in addition, this study uses the structural equation modelling (SEM) 
approach to simultaneously examine a set of interrelated dependent and 
independent variables in understanding the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand. Notwithstanding that SEM has been widely applied 
in other area of social science research such as marketing and information systems 
(Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010; Hair et al., 2012; Ringle et al., 2012), the use of SEM 
in tax studies especially in Malaysia and New Zealand is still limited which 
provides opportunities for further exploration of SEM in tax studies.7  
Finally, it is acknowledged that other  prior studies in accounting, 
particularly in tax, may have examined the factors independently, used the TPB or 
combined similar factors in a single model (see for instance Bobek and Hatfield, 
2003; Trivedi et al., 2005; Bobek et al., 2007b; Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008; 
Saad, 2011). Buchan (2005), for example, used the TPB, moral sensitivity and 
instrumental ethical climate to explain the behaviour of public accountants in five 
firms located in a state in the Northeast of the US. Buchan’s (2005) study also used 
MES to measure moral sensitivity but the scenarios were in accounting context and 
not specifically in tax contexts. Furthermore, Buchan’s (2005) study also used 
different scenarios to test the TPB, moral sensitivity and instrumental climate.  
                                                                
7 Recent studies in Malaysia and New Zealand which have applied SEM in the context of taxation 
are provided by Saad (2010; 2011) and Smart (2012). 
115 
 
In this current study, the proposed model consists of the TPB, ethical 
sensitivity and culture.  While the measurement scales for the TPB were adapted 
from Buchan’s (2005) study and MES is used to measure ethical sensitivity, the 
researcher developed two tax scenarios based on prior tax studies and used the 
same tax scenarios to measure the influence of ethical sensitivity and culture. 
Furthermore, culture in this study is measured using Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
dimensions and the model is tested on tax agents in two different countries. Based 
on the foregoing discussions, it could be suggested that this study is different from 
previous tax compliance behavioural studies and has the potential to contribute to 
tax literature and the accounting profession.  
3.2 Hypotheses Development  
The key objective of this study is to examine some selected factors that may 
influence the ethical decision making of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand 
in complying with the tax law while performing their roles. For that purpose, the 
study uses the TPB which consists of attitudes toward behaviour, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control as the foundation to explain tax agents’ 
compliance behaviour with the tax laws while performing their roles. To further 
understand the tax agent’s compliance behaviour with the tax laws, the original 
TPB is extended with another two variables, namely ethical sensitivity and culture. 
To answer the research questions through empirically testing the proposed tax 
compliance model demonstrated in Figure 3.1, hypotheses were developed based 
on the review of past studies set out in Chapter 2. In brief, the objectives of the 
study, the research questions and the hypotheses, are mutually interrelated to 
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explain the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand 
while performing their engagement roles.  
As this study is comparative in nature, before examining the relationship of 
the variables in the conceptual framework, it is necessary to compare the overall 
perceptions of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the TPB 
elements, the MES and the Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions in the 
context of tax compliance. The following three research questions and the 
respective hypotheses focused on the overall perceptions by tax agents in this study 
with regard to the Hofstede’s National Cultural Dimensions, TPB and MES with 
tax compliance: 
1. Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand indicate the same level of 
perceptions with regard to Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
Dimensions in complying with the tax laws? 
H1: There is no significant difference between tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand with regard to the Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
Dimensions in complying with the tax laws.  
2. Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same level of 
perceptions in relation to the TPB elements in complying with the tax 
law while performing their roles? 
H2a: There is no significant difference in the level of perceptions in relation 
to the intention to comply, attitudes towards behaviour, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control between tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in the overstating tax expense scenario. 
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H2b: There is no significant difference in the level of perceptions in relation 
to the intention to comply, attitudes towards behaviour, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control between tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in the understating income scenario. 
3. Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same level of 
perceptions in relation to the dimensions in Multidimensional Ethics 
Scales (MES)? 
H3a:  There is no significant difference in the level of perceptions between 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the dimensions 
of MES in overstating tax expense scenario. 
H3b: There is no significant difference in the level of perceptions between 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the dimensions 
of MES in understating income scenario.  
The review in Chapter 2 suggests that there are previous studies which have 
compared Malaysia and New Zealand in an accounting or tax context. There are 
also studies which have used the TPB or Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
Dimensions, either independently in Malaysia and New Zealand, or comparing the 
influence of these variables with respondents in Malaysia and New Zealand in 
business studies. However, the absence of literature involving tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand which has operationalized the TPB elements, MES and 
Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions, suggest that prior evidence is not 
sufficient to conclude the direction of any relationship between the TPB, ethical 
sensitivity and culture with tax compliance to guide this current study. Due to this, 
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the current study presents the hypotheses in their null form. It is also noteworthy to 
recognize that accounting profession is subject to the influence of professional 
bodies existed in a particular country. The close monitoring through codes of ethics 
for instance implies that professional bodies could have a powerful influence on the 
accounting profession which could diminish for instance the impact of national 
culture in the ethical decision making of professional accountants (Cohen et al., 
1996).  
Once the abovementioned hypotheses are tested, the study continues with 
testing the relationships outlined in the proposed conceptual framework. The 
following hypotheses are developed with respect to the relationship of the TPB 
items, ethical sensitivity and culture in explaining the tax compliance behaviour of 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand while performing their roles in two tax 
scenarios, overstating tax expense and understating income. To ensure consistency, 
the numbering of the subsequent hypotheses follows the preceding hypotheses. 
3.2.1 Attitude towards Tax Compliance  
Ajzen (1991) contends that attitude towards a behaviour is the evaluation of 
an individual whether a particular behaviour leads to favourable or unfavourable 
outcomes.  An individual is likely to perform a particular behaviour if the outcome 
from performing the behaviour is perceived as positive rather than negative. In the 
context of tax compliance, an individual is likely to comply with the tax law if the 
outcomes from complying with the tax law are perceived as positive rather than 
negative. Consistent with the arguments postulated in the TPB, that favourable 
attitude perception towards a behaviour leads to performing the respective 
behaviour, previous studies in tax compliance as discussed in Chapter 2 have 
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documented positive influence between the attitude and intention to comply with 
the tax law.  
The discussion in Chapter 2 also reveals the scant literature in Malaysia and 
New Zealand with respect to applying the TPB in tax context especially on tax 
agents. For instance, a recent study by Saad (2011) in Malaysia on salaried 
taxpayers found a positive relationship between attitude and intention to comply 
with the tax law. However, the findings could not be conclusively applied on the 
current study considering that tax agents whose profession is guided by 
professional conduct may have different ethical considerations in their decision 
making compared to the public (salaried) taxpayers. The current study proposes the 
following hypotheses: 
4. Does attitude towards tax compliance significantly influence the tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws? 
H4: Attitude towards tax compliance significantly influences the tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws. 
3.2.2 The Influence of Subjective Norms in Tax Compliance  
Subjective norms refer to the social pressure that an individual faces 
whether or not to perform a specific behaviour. According to Ajzen (1991), human 
beings form their beliefs from people important to them, whether these people 
approve or disapprove their behaviour, and whether these important other 
themselves perform the behaviour. The TPB postulates that if important others 
approve or perform the behaviour, there is a high possibility that an individual 
might also perform the behaviour. In tax compliance, the discussion in Chapter 2 
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suggests that previous studies have documented mixed findings on the influence of 
subjective norms. This is possibly because the concept of ‘norm’ itself is difficult 
to operationalize (Kirchler, 2007). While there is considerable evidence from other 
tax jurisdictions on the influence of subjective norm in tax compliance, little is 
known about this relationship in the context of tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand. Hence, this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
5. Does subjective norm significantly influence the tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws? 
H5: Subjective norm significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying with the tax laws. 
3.2.3 Perceived Behavioural Control and Tax Compliance  
Perceived behavioural control describes the ability of an individual to have 
control and the perceived ease or difficulty in performing the behaviour. The TPB 
suggests that a positive attitude and strong subjective norms towards intention does 
not guarantee an individual to perform a particular behaviour in the absence of 
control to perform the behaviour. Perceived behavioural control exists from 
personal and environmental factors such as having the skills and opportunities to 
engage in a particular behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). An individual is likely 
to perform a particular behaviour if the perceived behavioural control is high 
(Ajzen, 1991).  
Past studies, as presented in Chapter 2, suggest that the relationship 
between perceived behavioural control and tax compliance behaviour is not well 
supported which suggests for more exploration on this factor. Since tax agents have 
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the expertise in interpreting the tax law, there is a possibility that tax agents 
indicate high perceived behavioural control which leads to performing the specific 
behaviour, in this study, overstating the expenses and understating the income for 
tax purposes. However, due to the lack of literature to support the relationship 
between perceived behavioural control and tax compliance behaviour in the context 
of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand, this study proposes the following non-
directional hypotheses: 
6. Does perceived behavioural control significantly influence the tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws? 
H6: Perceived behavioural control significantly influences tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws.  
3.2.4 Ethical Sensitivity and Tax Compliance Behaviour   
The ability to recognize the moral issue is considered as an important factor 
which could lead to ethical decision making (Rest, 1986). Jones (1991) argues that 
an individual who fails to recognize a moral issue is unable to make an ethical 
decision and based the decision only on economic rationality. The ability to 
recognize moral issues according to Jones (1991) will result into two conditions: 
the impact to others, and the choice that has to be made. The review of past studies 
in Chapter 2 suggests that in general there are mixed findings on the importance of 
ethics in tax compliance behaviour. The review also suggests that the effect of 
ethical sensitivity in tax compliance is less explored. 
In the context of tax agents and tax compliance, past studies in Chapter 2 
suggest that if tax agents could recognize moral issues, there is greater possibility 
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for tax agents to comply with the tax law. However, findings from prior studies 
indicate that this proposition is not well supported and requires further 
examination. Past studies in tax compliance in Chapter 2 also suggest that the 
absence of standard measures for ethics contribute to the mixed findings on the 
influence of ethics in tax compliance, and there is a possibility to perceive ethics as 
a multidimensional concept. Since there is no prior documented study on the 
relationship between ethical sensitivity and tax compliance in Malaysia and New 
Zealand applied to tax agents, the following hypotheses are proposed for the 
current study: 
7. Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive ethical sensitivity 
as a multidimensional concept? 
H7: Tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive ethical sensitivity as 
a multidimensional concept.  
8. Does ethical sensitivity significantly influence tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying with the tax laws? 
H8: Ethical sensitivity significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying with the tax laws.  
3.2.5 The Influence of Culture in Tax Compliance  
Complying with the tax laws involves ethical consideration and culture 
influences both ethics and values as evidenced in past accounting research 
reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The review of prior studies in Chapter 2 also 
suggests that culture is an important element which needs to be considered in 
understanding the tax compliance behaviour. However, the review of past studies 
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also indicates that culture is a complex concept to operationalize in tax context, and 
as a result there are studies which have highlighted culture as a multidimensional 
concept by using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions to measure 
culture in tax compliance. 
Similar to the findings on the importance of culture in general, the 
operationalization of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions to measure culture also 
produced mixed results. Despite Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions having 
been widely tested in other areas of research, the use of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
dimension to measure culture in tax context is still limited and requires further 
exploration.  The lack of evidence to support the link between culture which is 
measured using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions and tax 
compliance in the context of tax agents lead to the following hypotheses: 
9. Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive culture as a 
multidimensional concept? 
H9: Tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive culture as a 
multidimensional concept. 
10. Does culture significantly influence tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the tax laws? 
H10: Culture significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the tax laws. 
3.3 Summary  
This chapter presents the proposed conceptual framework as a guide to test 
the variables under study. The proposed conceptual framework is later translated 
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into formal hypotheses to be tested in the current study. Therefore, the discussions 
in this study are centralized on the operationalization of the underlying theory, the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), ethical sensitivity and culture with tax 
compliance behaviour. In addition, this chapter also discusses the relevance of this 
study to tax compliance behaviour by examining the similarities and differences 
with other prior studies.  
Prior to testing the relationship of the proposed links in the conceptual 
framework, given that the current study is a comparative in nature between tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand, there is a need to test the overall perceptions 
of tax agents with respect to the elements of the Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions, the TPB items and MES. The Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions are used to measure culture, and the MES items are used to 
measure ethical sensitivity in this study. Three preliminary hypotheses, Hypotheses 
1, 2 and 3, were developed to examine the overall perceptions of tax agents with 
regard to the Hofstede (1980) National Cultural Dimensions, TPB items and MES.  
The relationships of the variables proposed in the conceptual framework 
with tax compliance behaviour were then translated into seven hypotheses. The 
first three main hypotheses are related to the TPB. Hypothesis 4 related to the 
influence of attitude towards tax compliance behaviour of tax agents. Hypothesis 5 
to the influence of subjective norms and compliance behaviour of tax agents and 
Hypothesis 6 presents the proposed relationship between perceived behavioural 
control and tax agents. Hypothesis 7 examines whether tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand perceive ethical sensitivity as a multidimensional construct, 
Hypothesis 8 proposes the relationship between ethical sensitivity and tax 
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compliance of tax agents. Hypothesis 9 tests whether culture is formed by a 
multidimensional concept and finally, Hypothesis 10 proposes the link between 
culture and tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in the study. The next chapter 
addresses the research methods, explaining the data collection and analysis to test 
the relationships postulated in the conceptual framework.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodology for the study. In this 
chapter, the researcher discusses the research paradigm, the methodology being 
used which incorporates the emic and etic approaches in cross-cultural research, 
and the mixed method research design. The discussions also involved the sampling, 
data collection, and analysis procedures for both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. 
4.1 Pragmatism – The Research Paradigm 
Many factors may be involved in the decision to conduct research. The 
personal values, interest, experience of the researcher (Bryman & Bell, 2011), and 
the availability of the funding (Feilzer, 2010) may shape the research. A study also 
implies what knowledge and how the researcher discovers the knowledge of the 
world (McKerchar, 2008). In doing so, this study applied the pragmatism 
paradigm. The remaining of this subsection outlines the pragmatism as understood 
by the researcher in this study.  
The word ‘paradigm’ was first introduced by Kuhn (1970), which he refers 
to as the “accepted model or pattern”. Paradigm or worldview is the shared beliefs 
and values of researchers (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) in which researchers who 
believe in a shared paradigm would use the same rules and standards in conducting 
their research. Generally, there are two main opposing paradigms, namely positivist 
128 
 
and naturalist (Lincoln & Guba, 1985); positivism and interpretivism (McKerchar, 
2008; Bryman & Bell, 2011) or positivism and non-positivism (Brand, 2009; 
McKerchar, 2010), which influence researchers in their study approach.8  
The positivism paradigm suggests that the concept, principles, and 
procedure of understanding the natural science could be imitated to solve the 
problem in the social world. The positivist believes there is a single reality in social 
phenomena and this reality could be discovered through objective enquiry (Feilzer, 
2010; Bryman & Bell, 2011) resulting in accurate knowledge (Brand, 2009). To a 
positivist, the object being studied is independent of the researcher and knowledge 
is derived from the direct measurement of phenomena (Krauss, 2005) which 
underlies the quantitative approach in data collection and measurement.  
On the contrary, there is the argument that human behaviour in the social 
world is different from the object in natural science and therefore a different 
approach is required to understand the social world.  Interpretivism is the paradigm 
that recognizes the existence of subjective meanings in understanding phenomena 
(Brand, 2009) by acknowledging the differences between humans. Unlike the 
positivist, the proponents of interpretivism suggest that meaning is derived from 
the experience of the social actor, and therefore there is no pre-given concept in 
understanding social phenomena (Bryman & Bell, 2011). To fulfil this central idea, 
interpretivism is normally associated with qualitative approach (Brand, 2009) and 
allows the influence, interaction between the researcher, and the subject being 
examined in the meaning making of social phenomena (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
                                                                
8 Different terminologies have been used such as “naturalist”, “interpretivism” and “non-
positivism”. However, they refer to the same paradigm.    
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Applying the concepts of positivism and non-positivism to studies in taxation, 
McKerchar (2012b) suggests that the use of deductive reasoning and quantitative 
approach reflect the positivism paradigm. In contrast, inductive reasoning and 
qualitative approach imply the non-positivism research paradigm in understanding 
tax issues (McKerchar, 2012b).  
As a result of the paradigm ‘wars’ and the ‘incompatible thesis’ debates 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14) between the positivist who favours the 
quantitative method at one end and the interpretivist who believes in using 
qualitative method for knowledge enquiry at the other end, a middle ground 
paradigm, the pragmatism, provides another alternative to understand social 
phenomena. Pragmatism is not the only one paradigm, as critical realism also lies 
between the positivism and non-positivism (McKerchar, 2010). However, 
pragmatism is more commonly used and favoured in research enquiry using mixed 
method approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; Creswell, 
2009; Feilzer, 2010; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).  
The pragmatism paradigm is less concerned with the philosophical 
discussions on the existence of single reality or multiple realities (Creswell, 2009; 
Feilzer, 2010; McKerchar, 2010) or whether knowledge could be discovered only 
by subjective perceptions (Wheeldon, 2010). Instead, pragmatism as a research 
paradigm is concerned more about the appropriate approach to solving the research 
problems. It is also about finding the appropriate methods to answer what the 
researcher wants to know (Feilzer, 2010) by using both the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches (Creswell, 2009), since a pragmatist believes that multiple 
paradigms can be used to address a research problem (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
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2011).9 After all, “the research method(s) chosen should be those that provide the 
best opportunities for answering research questions” (Malina et al., 2011, p. 68) 
reflects the possible use of pragmatism in a mixed method research. Positioning 
oneself as a pragmatist in conducting research suggests that the researcher needs to 
be flexible, because the researcher has to accept that human characters are 
unpredictable, which may result in unexpected emergence of data (Feilzer, 2010).  
To a pragmatist, truth, meaning, and knowledge could change over time and 
what is currently obtained is regarded as provisional truth (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).10 This argument is consistent with McKerchar (2010, p. 11) 
in tax studies, who commented that “research is about discovery; it is rarely about 
truth, because realistically there is no single absolute truth”.  With respect to tax 
studies, McKerchar (2008; 2010) also suggests that it is appropriate to use 
pragmatism research paradigm in tax studies since pragmatism permits tax 
researchers to use mixed method approach in understanding tax issues.   
The aforesaid discussions imply that the pragmatism paradigm is suitable to 
be used in understanding some selected factors that influence tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in their decision-making while performing their 
engagement roles. Applying the pragmatism paradigm for this study allows the 
researcher to use a quantitative method (survey) and a qualitative method 
(interview), which could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the issue 
                                                                
9 However, as commented by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), this does not imply that researchers 
adopting pragmatism do not have to follow the correct procedures in conducting quantitative or 
qualitative studies. 
10 See Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, p.18) for comprehensive attributes of pragmatism as a 
research paradigm.  
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under study. Furthermore, given the sensitive nature of the issue under study and 
tax agents are busy people, the use of pragmatism provides some flexibility for the 
researcher in conducting the whole research.  
4.2 The Emic and Etic Approaches in Cross-Cultural Research 
A common feature of cross-cultural research is its comparative nature 
which involves at least two different cultural populations from two different 
nations, such as in this study, or two different ethnics in a single country (Vijver & 
Leung, 1997). In cross-cultural research there are two approaches to understanding 
the role of culture; from the inside perspective known also as emic, (which explains 
culture from the particular society itself), or from the outside perspective also 
known as etic, (which describes the differences across culture using constructs 
applied equally in other culture), (see Morris et al., 1999; Hunter, 2006; Matsumoto 
& Juang, 2008). Fontaine and Richardson (2003) argue that to find the similarities 
in two or more different cultures, an etic approach has to be used since it assumes 
that in all cultures there are universal constructs which can be recognized and 
scientifically measured.  
On the other hand, to find differences in cultures, an emic approach has to 
be applied because in most cultures there are unique attributes associated only with 
that particular culture. Indeed, Malhotra et al. (1996) in discussing the 
methodological issues in cross-cultural studies, argue that to be deemed as a 
“cultural-based study” demands the emic perspective whilst to fulfil the “cross” 
requires the etic perspective. Thus, research instruments in cross-cultural studies 
have to reflect both the emic and etic considerations. The emic and etic approaches 
are now briefly discussed.  
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In an emic approach, researchers use a specific culture to understand the 
problem being studied. Researchers normally used ethnography, interview, and 
observation to collect data because the nature of emic dimensions are cultural-
specific. Thus, the emic approach is considered as understanding the role of culture 
from the ‘inside’ perspective which is to explain a particular culture using its own 
terminology. Conversely, the etic approach uses universal concepts to understand 
the problem being studied due to the nature of etic dimensions which are based on 
universally acceptable construct. The etic approach is synonymous with the 
‘outside’ perspective in identifying culture from a broad, general, and standard 
approach (Berry, 1999). Consequently, the etic approach is synonymous with the 
use of a survey for collecting data, such as the study by Hofstede (1980) in 
understanding the role of different cultures (Morris et al., 1999).  
Instead of understanding emic and etic as conflicting approaches in cross-
cultural research,  Hofstede (1998), Berry (1999), Helfrich (1999),   and Morris et 
al. (1999) argue that the fundamental concepts of emic and etic are interdependent 
and complementary. Hofstede (1998, p. 19) suggests that: 
 “The first [emic] without the second [etic] gets stuck in case studies 
that cannot be generalized, the second [etic] without the first [emic] 
in abstractions that cannot be related to real life. It is almost a 
platitude that one needs to find a wise combination of emic and etic 
elements”.  
Therefore, the data collected using an emic and etic approaches do not 
result into a separation but rather as understanding the same issue from two 
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different perspectives. On that basis it is also possible to combine the emic and etic 
approaches in a single cross-cultural study. 
Culture itself is a complex concept (Hofstede, 2001) which has been 
regarded to influence an individual’s ethical reasoning (Brand, 2009) and human 
psychological processes such as attitudes, norms, and behaviour (Matsumoto & 
Juang, 2008). Consistent with the paradigm, the mixed method approach applied in 
this study and the nature of a cross-cultural research, the integration of the emic 
and etic approaches as reflected in the use of the survey (etic) and semi-structured 
interview (emic) in the data collection process of this study is considered as 
appropriate to understand the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand.   
4.3 The Motivation for the Use of a Mixed Methods Approach 
In general, quantitative research focuses on the collective viewpoints of 
respondents in interpreting the findings and thus diminishes the opinions of a single 
respondent. In contrast, qualitative research emphasizes the perceptions of a few 
participants and therefore it lacks the ability to be generalized (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2011). A quantitative research is also more concerned with finding the 
relationship between variables while a qualitative research is more interested to 
understand the subjective meaning of social phenomena (Harrison, 2013). In a 
mixed methods study, both the quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
combined to explain the issue being studied using different types of data, methods 
of collection, types of analyses, and reporting. Given this flexibility, researchers 
could apply the mixed method approach at various phases of the study, namely in 
developing the research questions and hypotheses, sampling, data collection, 
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analyses, and in reporting the findings (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2011).  
Based on an analysis of 19 definitions of mixed methods research, Johnson et 
al. (2007, p. 123) offer the following definition of mixed method research: 
“Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a 
researcher or team of researchers combines elements of qualitative 
and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and 
quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding 
and corroboration.” 
Two main features of mixed method studies are: (1) to combine both the 
quantitative and qualitative approach; and (2) this combination has to be performed 
in a single study (Grafton & Lillis, 2011; Harrison, 2013).11 While mixed method 
research does not provide a resolution for all research problems, however, 
combining the quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study could 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the research problem based on 
findings from diverse data (Creswell, 2009). Thus, the central idea of conducting a 
mixed method research is to increase the credibility and validity of the findings 
from different instruments (Wheeldon, 2010), since in mixed methods study the 
weaknesses in one method are outweighed by the other method (Patton, 1999; 
                                                                
11 McKerchar (2010), however, suggests that a mixed method research is not necessarily combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study. Two different methods of enquiry which 
come from the same methodological approach, such as using experimental design and a survey 
(quantitative approach) in a single study, could also reflect a mixed method study. 
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McKerchar, 2010; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).12 The mixed methods approach 
also reduce the possibility that the findings from the research are due to the unique 
features of the method employed (Patton, 1999; Grafton & Lillis, 2011), and thus 
reduces the biases inherent in a mono-method approach (Feilzer, 2010).  
Despite the incompatible thesis debate suggesting that the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches can never be combined in a single study due to the 
differences in their underlying paradigms (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Grafton & Lillis, 
2011), over the years mixed methods approach has gained a considerable support in 
research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The mixed methods approach is 
considered as “a research paradigm whose time has come” (Johnson & 
Onweugbuzie, 2004, p. 14) and “the third major research approach” (Johnson et al., 
2007, p. 112). In the tax context, McKerchar (2010) suggests that the use of mixed 
methods in tax studies could address different objectives of the study, inform one 
approach from the other at the design or data interpretation stage, and compare 
findings from multiple approaches.   
Tax compliance behaviour is a complex and sensitive topic because it 
involves ethical consideration of whether or not to comply with the tax law. By 
incorporating quantitative and qualitative elements in this study, it provides an 
opportunity for the researcher to include divergent views which could lead to 
deeper and comprehensive understanding of the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand. The use of a quantitative approach (survey) 
in this study allows the researcher to generalize the findings to a population of tax 
                                                                
12 See for instance, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011, pp. 8-11) for comprehensive justifications on 
using mixed method approach in research.  
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agents in public practice in Malaysia and New Zealand, and later the issue is 
explained further by using qualitative approach, namely the interview which 
collected deeper views from interview participants.  
4.4 The Mixed Method Research Design for the Study 
In conducting a mixed methods study, researchers have suggested a number 
of mixed method designs, taking into account whether both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches have equal strength or one approach dominates the other.  
The order of performing the quantitative and qualitative approaches, either 
sequentially or concurrently is also considered. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2006), for 
example developed four types of multistrand mixed design based on two 
dimensions: 
(1) Types of approach or methods employed, and 
(2) Number of strands or phases in the study.  
Onweugbuzie and Collins (2007) suggested eight mixed method research 
designs incorporating the time orientation (concurrent or sequential) and the 
relationship of the samples. Creswell (2009) and Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), 
on the other hand, suggested six common mixed method research designs 
comprising the: convergent parallel, sequential explanatory, sequential exploratory, 
embedded, transformative, and multiphase designs.  
While there are differences in terms of the number of major research 
designs being suggested for mixed method studies, Johnson and Onweugbuzie 
(2004), Onweugbuzie and Collins (2007), Creswell (2009), and Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2011) agree, that the choice of the appropriate mixed methods research 
design has to incorporate several factors. These include the timing of conducting 
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the study, the weightage to be given to each quantitative and qualitative strand, the 
choice of subjects as samples for the study, and the interpretation of the findings.  
In discussing the mixed method designs, some scholars, such as 
Onweugbuzie and Collins (2007), Creswell (2009), Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011), also agree that the mixed methods design may not be restricted to those 
being mentioned earlier, and it is also possible that the design emerges during the 
progress of the study. Bryman and Bell (2011) also commented that in reality it is 
not easy to classify mixed methods studies based on priority (quantitative, 
qualitative or equal weight) and sequence of conducting the study, since a 
“methodologist cannot create a complete taxonomy of MM designs, due to their 
(the designs’) capacity to mutate into other diverse forms” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2006, p. 13). This argument is reiterated by Onweugbuzie and Collins (2007, 
p.297), for instance, in determining the sample in mixed method study:  
“The exciting aspect of mixed methods sampling model is that a 
researcher can create more tailored and/or more complex sampling 
designs than the ones outlined here to fit a specific research context, 
as well as the research goal, research objective(s), research 
purpose, and research question(s). Also it is possible for a sampling 
design to emerge during a study in new ways, depending on how the 
research evolves”. 
Based on the above discussion the researcher concludes that the research 
design in mixed method studies do not necessarily fall strictly into any type of the 
commonly used mixed method designs, as suggested in mixed method literature, 
since the design has to report the actual mixed methods process in the study which 
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could evolve once the study progresses. In this study the researcher employs a 
cross between sequential explanatory and concurrent mixed method designs with 
an identical sample to examine some selected factors that influence tax agents in 
their decision-making while performing their engagement roles. For that reason, 
only these two relevant designs, the sequential explanatory, and concurrent mixed 
method, are further discussed in this section. An identical sample refers to the same 
sample members participating in both the quantitative and qualitative phases of the 
study (Collins et al., 2007; Onweugbuzie & Collins, 2007).  
A sequential explanatory design performs two different phases: the 
quantitative phase precedes the qualitative phase (Creswell, 2009). At the first 
phase of a sequential explanatory design, quantitative data collection and analysis 
are performed by the researcher, and in the second phase the researcher collects 
and analyses qualitative data using the same or different samples based on findings 
from the first phase (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). With respect to sampling, one 
method is used to assist the other method. The quantitative data and analysis offer a 
general view of the issue being examined, while the qualitative data and analysis 
refine and provide further insights into the quantitative phase (Harrison, 2013). In a 
typical sequential explanatory design, the qualitative findings complement the 
quantitative findings (Creswell, 2009). The quantitative findings and qualitative 
results could also be interpreted as overall mixed methods results (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2011).  
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A concurrent mixed method design,13 on the other hand, is reflected when 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis are performed concurrently 
in a single study (Creswell, 2009). In a concurrent mixed methods design, both 
quantitative and qualitative strands are given equal emphasis since they are being 
implemented in the same phase, and data from both strands are also analysed 
independently. The findings from both strands are later mixed or compared before 
providing overall conclusions (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).   
The purpose of this study is to understand the factors that influence tax 
agents’ compliance behaviour while performing their engagement roles by 
extending the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) with cultural and ethical 
sensitivity. In this study, the researcher performed both the quantitative and 
qualitative methods to understand the issue being examined. The quantitative data 
from the survey is used to obtain a general idea or understanding on some selected 
factors that influence tax agents in their tax compliance behaviour while 
performing their engagement roles by predetermining the variables that the 
researcher would like to examine based on the review of past studies. The survey, 
however, could only provide a snapshot of the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents which could explain only the broad concept of the phenomena. This is the 
situation since while surveys have been widely used in tax studies (Jackson & 
Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001), the nature of survey as a method of 
enquiry may restrict the type of questions that could be asked (McKerchar, 2012a). 
                                                                
13 Concurrent mixed method design or research is the terminology being used by Johnson and 
Onweugbuzie (2004) and Bryman and Bell (2011). Creswell (2009) uses the term ‘concurrent 
triangulation strategy’ and Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) use the term ‘convergent parallel 
design’.   
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In tax studies, a survey could also be used to obtain interview participants 
(McKerchar, 2012b). Therefore, apart from providing general understanding of tax 
agents’ compliance behaviour, the survey in this study was also used as a platform 
for survey respondents to self-identify their interest to participate in the interview. 
To compensate the limitation of survey as a method of enquiry, as well as to 
obtain in-depth insights into the factors that influence tax agents in their decision-
making while performing their engagement roles in Malaysia and New Zealand, 
the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews about the same time the survey 
was disseminated. This was undertaken since a situated, contextual method of 
enquiry which is normally associated with qualitative approach, such as interview, 
could offer many potential insights (Brand, 2009). Furthermore, in the tax context, 
McKerchar (2012b) suggests that the qualitative approach could be used to gain 
deeper understanding rather than finding the absolute truth, which is aligned with 
the pragmatism paradigm being applied in this study and the emic perspective of a 
cross-cultural research. The interview in this study also provides opportunities for 
survey respondents to explain further their responses in the survey. The design for 
the study is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
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Quantitative Data Analysis 
 Descriptive analysis 
 Structural Equation 
Modelling (Partial Least 
Squares) 
Quantitative Survey Findings 
 Scores 
 Factors 
 Modelling 
 Discussion of quantitative 
survey findings  
Quantitative Data Collection 
 Survey instrument 
- Self-reported 
questionnaire 
 Malaysia 
- A cross between 
systematic random and 
snowballing samplings 
- Mail Survey 
 New Zealand 
- Systematic random 
sampling 
- Web-based survey 
 
Qualitative Data Collection 
 Sequential identical sampling 
- Self-selection sampling 
 Interview guide based on 
variables asked in the survey 
 Semi-structured telephone 
interview 
Qualitative Data 
Analysis 
 
 Deductive, inductive, 
thematic analyses 
 Reliability and validity 
check 
  
 
Literature Review, 
Research Questions 
 Discussions on findings 
from the quantitative 
and qualitative methods, 
conclusion, limitations, 
future recommendations 
and implications  
 
Qualitative Interview 
Findings 
 Themes  
 Discussions of qualitative 
interview findings 
Figure 4.1 Diagram of the research process to understand tax agents’ tax 
compliance behaviour in Malaysia and New Zealand while performing their 
engagement role 
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As a result of time constraint in conducting the study and the availability of 
interview participants, the above diagram reflects a partially sequential explanatory 
and partially concurrent mixed methods design. In a typical sequential explanatory 
design, as discussed earlier in this section, the quantitative data gathering and 
analysis are performed in the first phase of the study. The qualitative strand is only 
performed once the quantitative strand has been completed. In this study, however, 
the data collection for the qualitative phase was carried out about the same time as 
the survey. This is because in the invitation to participate in the interview, the tax 
agents were permitted to choose their own time for the interview. This approach is 
considered to be appropriate considering that tax agents are busy people, and 
assists with motivating the interview participants to provide answers comfortably, 
avoid any bias in the answers as a consequence of the different duration of time 
spent in the interview. Furthermore, if the interviews are conducted only after the 
quantitative phase is fully completed, as suggested by the typical sequential 
explanatory approach, as a result of the time gap there is a possibility that the 
interview participants may find it challenging to recall the issues during the later 
interview.  
The sequential explanatory design in this study is reflected based on the 
following features present in this study: (1) qualitative phase, which is used to 
facilitate the quantitative findings by providing in-depth insights into the issue 
being examined, and (2) the quantitative phase which is used as a platform to 
obtain participants in the qualitative phase. The concurrent mixed methods design 
in this study is reflected in: (1) the timing of conducting the qualitative phase was 
before completion of the quantitative phase (the first phase), (2) the quantitative 
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and qualitative strands which were analysed independently. The design for this 
study is consistent with the suggestion by Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) that the 
classifications of mixed methods design, only provide a guideline to mixed 
methods design and researchers should not “try to ‘type’ their design but to reflect 
on the actual practice of mixed method research” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, 
p. 281).   
4.5 Ethical Clearance 
Considering that this study involves human participation and sensitive 
issues on tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand 
while performing their engagement roles, the researcher applied for ethical 
clearance from the Human Ethics Committee (HEC), University of Canterbury, 
before collecting data for the study. This is to ensure that the content of the study 
follows the ethical standards of the HEC. The ethical clearance received from the 
HEC was stated in the invitation to participate in the study. In addition, the 
researcher also obtained approval from the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the 
Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia to collect the data in Malaysia. The 
approval from the EPU was also stated in invitation to participate in the study for 
Malaysian respondents. The respective approval ethical clearance letters from the 
HEC and EPU are attached as Appendices A and B of this thesis.  
4.6 Sample Selection in Mixed Method Study 
Sampling in mixed methods design is more challenging since the researcher 
has to consider both the quantitative and qualitative phases in a single study 
(Onweugbuzie & Collins, 2007). Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), for instance, 
provide some recommendations to select samples for each commonly mixed 
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method research design. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), in a 
typical sequential explanatory design, the participants in the qualitative phase 
should come from those who participated in the quantitative phase, since the 
qualitative findings are intended to provide in-depth understanding of the responses 
from the quantitative phase. Likewise, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) also 
recommend using the same sample population in a concurrent mixed methods 
study if the purpose of the findings is to confirm, directly compare, or associate 
two different sets of findings in understanding a research issue. 
In addition to that, since this study is a cross-cultural study comparing 
Malaysia and New Zealand, the choice of samples being studied is another issue 
that has to be considered. This is important since in a cross-cultural study, a match 
sample has to be used to allow for comparison (Hofstede, 1980; Malhotra et al., 
1996). However, to find a matched sample in every aspect is not practical due to 
the constraints on time and resources. Hofstede (1980), for instance, used 
respondents working in IBM in a particular country irrespective of their nationality 
to be sufficient representativeness of national culture.  
In trying to understand the factors that influence tax agents in their 
decision-making, this study uses identical samples for both the quantitative and 
qualitative phases. This study uses tax agents in public practice as samples to 
reflect the reality of tax compliance behaviour of tax agents while performing their 
engagement roles. This is also aligned with the suggestion by Loe et al. (2000, p. 
200) in a review of empirical studies in ethical decision-making in business where 
they state that the use of samples who are practising in the real business world 
should be encouraged to “gain face validity in providing research results that will 
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be given serious consideration by practitioners”. The sample selection for both 
quantitative (survey) and qualitative (interview) strands is further discussed in the 
respective sections.  
4.7 Survey  
The syntheses by Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and Sawyer 
(2001) suggest that questionnaire survey is commonly used to collect data in tax 
studies. This is because a questionnaire survey is effective in collecting responses 
for the same set of questions from the samples of the study (Saunders et al., 2003). 
In this study, the survey was used to discover general understanding on the 
predetermined factors, as discussed in Chapter Two, which may influence tax 
agents while performing their roles. The survey was also used to provide an etic 
approach, as mentioned in Section 4.2, in understanding the factors that influence 
tax agents in their decision-making.  
According to Saunders et al. (2003), a questionnaire could be broadly 
divided into self-administered and interviewer administered. The self-administered 
questionnaire can be further grouped into online questionnaires, postal or mail 
questionnaires, and delivery and collection questionnaires. The interviewer-
administered questionnaire consists of telephone questionnaires and structured 
interviews. In this study, a self-administered questionnaire survey was used to 
obtain the responses of tax agents in examining the factors that influence them in 
their decision-making. The following subsections explain further the data 
collection for the quantitative phase of the study. 
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4.7.1 Sample selection for the survey  
As mentioned in Section 4.6 of this chapter, the samples used in this study 
are tax agents in public practice. Due to the availability of the data, the researcher 
used different methods to choose the sample for the study in Malaysia and New 
Zealand. Malhotra et al. (1996) suggest that in cross-cultural research, different 
techniques could be used in choosing samples in different cultures as long as 
comparison between cultures is still possible. In this study using tax agents in 
public practice in Malaysia and New Zealand is considered to be comparable since 
they represent a subsample of the tax agents’ population. The sample selection for 
Malaysia and New Zealand is further discussed in the following subsections.  
4.7.1.1 Malaysia  
Sample selection could be broadly grouped into probability and non-
probability sampling (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The sample in Malaysia was selected 
using a cross between systematic random sampling (probability sampling) and 
snowballing (non-probability sampling). Systematic random sampling chooses the 
kth number of sample from a sampling frame (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). The 
advantage of using systematic random sampling approach is it is easy to use 
(Sekaran, 2002). However, the use of systematic random sampling in sample 
selection could result in the existence of systematic bias which may lead to the 
possibility of drawing inaccurate conclusions from the data and affect the 
generalizability of the findings (Saunders et al., 2003; Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). In 
snowball sampling, the initial samples in the study are used to identify further 
samples (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Snowball sampling is helpful especially when 
there is a difficulty to identify samples for the population. However, in snowball 
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sampling, the samples obtained may not represent the population since the earlier 
samples may identify further samples which are similar to themselves (Saunders et 
al., 2003).   
An initial attempt to collect data was made with the assistance of the 
Chartered Tax Institute of Malaysia (CTIM) and as a result the sample was 
randomly selected by the CTIM.  Since this approach did not result in any fruitful 
response, the researcher then developed a list of 500 tax agents from the website of 
the Malaysian Inland Revenue Board (MIRB) using a systematic random sampling 
approach. The tax agents who are listed on the MIRB website are normally those at 
high positions, such as director and partner of taxation firms. Therefore, to obtain a 
more robust sample, the researcher used a snowballing approach by requesting 
those tax agents who were selected from the website to distribute another two sets 
of the questionnaire survey packs to their staff. A similar approach has been used 
by Singh (2003) in selecting public accountants for samples in his study in 
Malaysia. Due to the snowballing approach, there is a possibility that the samples 
also consisted of employees of tax agents. However, they are also subject to the 
same professional ethical code of conduct since the accounting profession in 
Malaysia is governed by the MIA.   
4.7.1.2 New Zealand  
Similar to Malaysia, the New Zealand data was initially collected with the 
assistance of the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA), and 
thus the sample was randomly selected by the NZICA. Due to the small number of 
responses of the survey (n = 6), the researcher decided to ignore the data collected 
from this approach. To select the potential respondents for the study, the researcher 
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later developed a database using systematic random sampling based on the listing 
of public practitioners available from the NZICA website.  
4.7.2 Sample size for survey 
A sample is a subset of a population to be examined which ideally should 
represent the population. In a quantitative approach, the sample’s responses are 
used to draw conclusions and generalize the findings to the population. The sample 
size is determined normally after considering the required confidence level and the 
extent of the precision accepted from the sample (i.e., standard error). Various 
methods could be used to determine the appropriate sample size such as Cohen 
(1988), Saunders et al. (2003), and Sekaran and Bougie (2010). Based on the 
statistical power analyses performed by Onweugbuzie et al. (2004), Collins et al. 
(2007) summarized the minimum sample size recommended for most common 
quantitative research design with moderate statistical power effect sizes of 0.80 at 5 
percent level of significance reproduced as follows: 
Table 4.1 Recommended Minimum Sample Size for Most Quantitative 
Research Design 
Research design Minimum sample suggestion 
Correlational 64 participants for one-tailed hypotheses; 82 participants 
for two-tailed hypotheses (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2004) 
Causal-comparative 51 participants per group for one-tailed hypotheses; 64 
participants for two-tailed hypotheses (Onwuegbuzie et 
al., 2004) 
Experimental 21 participants per group for one-tailed hypotheses 
(Onwuegbuzie et al., 2004) 
 
Source: Adapted from Collins et al. (2007, p. 273). 
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To determine the appropriate sample size for the study, the researcher relied 
on the guideline provided by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) which has simplified the 
sample size decision based on the population (N) and sample size (S) depicted as 
follows in Table 4.2:  
Table 4.2 Table for Determining Sample Size from a Given Population 
N S N S N S N S N S N S 
10 10 85 70 220 140 440 205 1200 291 4000 351 
15 14 90 73 230 144 460 210 1300 297 4500 354 
20 19 95 76 240 148 480 214 1400 302 5000 357 
25 24 100 80 250 152 500 217 1500 306 6000 361 
30 28 110 86 260 155 550 226 1600 310 7000 364 
35 32 120 92 270 159 600 234 1700 313 8000 367 
40 36 130 97 280 162 650 242 1800 317 9000 368 
45 40 140 103 290 162 700 248 1900 320 10000 370 
50 44 150 108 300 169 750 254 2000 322 15000 375 
55 48 160 113 320 175 800 260 2200 327 20000 377 
60 52 170 118 340 181 850 265 2400 331 30000 379 
65 56 180 123 360 186 900 269 2600 335 40000 380 
70 59 190 127 380 191 950 274 2800 338 50000 381 
75 63 200 132 400 196 1000 278 3000 341 75000 382 
80 66 210 136 420 201 1100 285 3500 346 1000000 384 
 
Source: Krejcie and Morgan (1970, p. 608). 
Based on Table 4.2, the recommended sample size for Malaysia is 322 
while for New Zealand it is 341. Prior tax compliance studies involving surveys, 
however, indicate the possibilities of obtaining a low response rate (see for instance 
Tran-Nam & Karlinsky, 2008; Mohd Isa, 2012).  As a result, the researcher decided 
to consider a larger sample size of 1,500 for each country.  
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4.7.3 Pilot testing  
Pilot testing is normally conducted before disseminating the survey to 
potential respondents of the study. The purpose of pilot testing is to refine the 
questionnaire so that respondents do not have any difficulties in understanding the 
content of the survey. This process is helpful in increasing the reliability and 
validity of the survey instrument (Saunders et al., 2003). The researcher conducted 
three stages of pilot testing for this study. In the first stage, the researcher requested 
opinions from tax academics, tax agents,14 postgraduate accounting students in the 
researcher’s department and two Malaysian postgraduates in business studies 
regarding the content of the survey. The researcher improved the questionnaire 
after considering the recommendations provided and then pilot tested the survey 
with members of Accountants and Tax Agents of New Zealand (ATAINZ), 
previously known as Tax Agents of New Zealand (TINZ). Based on the feedback 
from members of TINZ who participated in the pilot study, the researcher refined 
the questionnaire and finally, translated the survey from English into Bahasa 
Malaysia.15   
4.7.4 Data collection procedure  
The method of disseminating the self-administered questionnaire survey in 
this study is partly related to the availability of the potential respondents for the 
study. In Malaysia, postal mail was used to distribute the questionnaire, while a 
                                                                
14 The tax agents consisted of a tax staff from a Big Four public accounting firm, a tax staff member 
in a medium-sized public accounting firm, an in-house tax staff in an oil and gas company who 
previously worked in a Big Four public accounting firm, and a tax sole practitioner.  
15 The researcher holds a certificate from the Malaysian National Institute of Translation. The 
researcher also requested assistance from a tax lecturer to review the translated version to ensure the 
original concepts are maintained and equivalent to the English version.  
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web-based online survey was used in New Zealand. The use of different modes in 
collecting survey data in two different populations has been acknowledged by 
Dillman et al. (2009). However, a mixed-mode approach used for administering a 
survey has to be performed with caution since there is a possibility for 
measurement difference to occur.  This only occurs when the mode of 
administrating the survey influences the response of the participants, such as when 
one mode involves face-to-face survey and the other involves mail or online survey 
(Dillman et al., 2009; Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
Since in this study the researcher did not have any face-to-face meetings 
with the respondents in Malaysia and New Zealand, the measurement difference is 
not a concern. Furthermore, Bryman and Bell (2011) suggest that the use of paper-
based self-completion questionnaire and web-based survey in a single study 
basically does not influence the respondents’ answers to the survey. In view of the 
foregoing, the surveys in Malaysia and New Zealand are considered to be similar 
despite the different modes used. The survey modes for Malaysia and New Zealand 
are explained further in the following subsections.  
4.7.4.1 Malaysia  
The questionnaire survey was initially disseminated with the assistance of 
CTIM through advertising the link for an online survey in its bulletin (see 
Appendix C for the invitation email). However, since the approach did not provide 
any fruitful results, the researcher then used a mail survey to disseminate the 
questionnaire in Malaysia. The use of mail survey has some advantages and 
disadvantages. For instance, a mail survey is an advantage if the respondents are 
geographically widely dispersed (Bryman & Bell, 2011) and could increase the 
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possibility of getting an honest response in studies involving sensitive issues 
(McKerchar, 2012a). However, it has the disadvantages of low response rate and 
the possibility that the questionnaire is completed by someone else not in the 
position to answer the survey (Bryman & Bell, 2011). After considering the 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as the available correspondence details 
displayed on the list of tax agents on the MIRB website,16 the researcher decided to 
send the questionnaire via mail.  
The questionnaire survey package contained a cover letter, an interview 
consent form and two self-addressed stamped envelopes, one each for the 
questionnaire and interview consent form  were sent to five hundred tax agents, 
resulting in 1,500 questionnaires being sent out to potential respondents. The cover 
letter explained the purpose of the study, confirmation on the anonymity response 
for the survey, an invitation to participate in the interview, ensured confidentiality 
of the interview data and confirmed that the relevant ethics clearance was attached 
with the questionnaire. The use of two different envelopes for the questionnaire and 
interview consent form was to ensure that there was no possible association 
between the respondents in the survey and the interview participants. The potential 
respondents were given four weeks to return their responses from the date they 
received their questionnaire.   Two weeks after sending out the survey packages, 
the researcher made telephone calls to follow up with the potential respondents. 
Despite Bahasa Malaysia being the national language of Malaysia, the 
English language is widely used in commerce in Malaysia (Foo & Richards, 2004). 
Recent surveys conducted in Malaysia, for instance, Lim (2001), in investigating 
                                                                
16 The list provides the names of tax agents, their postal addresses, and their contact numbers.  
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the Malaysian business manager work values, and Singh (2003) in examining the 
ethical decision-making of public accountants in Malaysia, indicate that it is an 
acceptable practice to use English as a medium of surveys in Malaysia.  The reason 
being business managers and public accountants, are expected to have undergone 
certain levels of education and the mastery of English in Malaysia is encouraged at 
all levels from primary to tertiary education (Foo & Richards, 2004). Considering 
that tax agents in Malaysia have undergone certain levels of education and are 
familiar with English as a medium of communication, the researcher sent the 
English version of the questionnaire to the Malaysian tax agents in this study. The 
researcher, however, provided a link17 for the softcopy of the Bahasa Malaysia 
version of the questionnaire on the cover page of the mail survey so that the tax 
agents in this study have the options to respond either in English or Bahasa 
Malaysia. A sample of the questionnaire is available in Appendix D. 
4.7.4.2 New Zealand  
The first attempt to collect data in New Zealand was made with the 
assistance of NZICA by advertising the link to participate in the study in its 
Newsletter (a sample of the invitation email is provided in Appendix E). As 
mentioned in subsection 4.7.2.2, due to the discouraging response, the researcher 
later developed a database from the list of public accountants available on the 
NZICA website, and sent the questionnaire survey as well as the invitation to 
participate in interviews through online.  
                                                                
17 The link would direct potential respondents to a web-based questionnaire survey in Bahasa 
Malaysia. The web-based survey was designed similar to the process explained for the New Zealand 
web-based survey in subsection 4.7.4.2. No response, however, was recorded for the Bahasa 
Malaysia version of the survey.  
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Bryman and Bell (2011) suggest that basically there are two types of online 
surveys, namely electronic mail (email) and web-based surveys. In an email 
survey, the questionnaire is sent to the respondents via email, either as an 
attachment or embedded in the email itself. In the case of the former, respondents 
state their responses in the attachment file and return it to the sender as an 
attachment. In the embedded email survey, the questionnaire is located in the email 
itself and respondents have to state their answer in that email. Once completed, the 
respondents just need to choose the ‘reply’ button to the sender.  
A web-based survey, according to Bryman and Bell (2011), refers to 
inviting potential respondents to access a website where the questionnaire is 
located and if agreed, complete the questionnaire. Compared to email survey, the 
use of a web-based survey allows respondents’ responses to be automatically 
recorded, which could ease the workload of the researchers in managing the data 
and there is more flexibility in designing the questionnaire (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
Furthermore, similar to a mail survey, the use of web-based survey could increase 
the possibility of obtaining honest responses from respondents in sensitive issues 
(McKerchar, 2012a) such as this study. 
The researcher developed the questionnaire survey using the Qualtrics 
Survey Software (QSS) subscribed by the University of Canterbury. The QSS 
allows the researcher to design the questionnaire so that respondents could only 
answer the questionnaire once and no internet links from respondents were 
recorded to ensure anonymity. Two separate links, each for the survey and the 
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invitation to participate in interview,18 were also created. The responses from the 
survey links and invitation for the interviews were automatically recorded in two 
separate accounts. The different links were created for the survey and the interview 
to ensure the survey answers and the participant profiles could not be associated in 
any manner.  
An introduction email was sent to 1,500 potential respondents explaining 
the purpose of the study, confirming the anonymity of the survey answers, ensuring 
confidentiality of the interview information, and confirming the relevant ethical 
clearance. In the introduction email, the aforementioned two separate links were 
also included to direct respondents to the survey and the invitation to participate in 
the interview. The respondents were given four weeks to provide their responses 
and as an effort to increase the response rates two reminder emails were sent to all 
potential respondents after a month.   
4.7.5 Questionnaire design  
The questionnaire survey contains three parts; and the first part consists of 
questions related to national culture and tax compliance. In the second part, the 
researcher developed two hypothetical tax scenarios or vignettes. Part three 
presents the questions related to respondents’ demographic background, namely 
gender, age, ethnicity, experience in tax practice, type of firm and position.  
The content of the questionnaire survey is further discussed in the construct 
development and measurement section of this chapter. The survey was initially 
                                                                
18 The details of the interview link are explained in subsection 4.8.5 of this chapter. 
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developed in English and later translated into Bahasa Malaysia as an option for 
Malaysian respondents to answer in Bahasa Malaysia.  
 4.7.6 Construct development and measurement  
As explained earlier in  Chapter 3 Research Framework , to understand the 
tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand while 
performing their engagement roles, this study proposes to extend the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) by including ethical sensitivity and culture in the model. 
Therefore, the proposed model consists of six constructs, with four constructs 
derived from the TPB elements, namely intention, attitudes, subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural control, with the two other constructs being ethical 
sensitivity and culture. These theoretical constructs are latent or unobservable 
constructs, and to test these constructs, the researcher developed and adopted 
measure or indicators as presented in Appendix F, from prior studies in taxation, 
accounting, and human behaviour.  
Sekaran and Bougie (2010) suggest that measures of a construct could be 
reflective or formative. This is because a construct is not inherently reflective or 
formative, and depending on the theoretical concept, some constructs could be 
modelled either as reflective or formative (MacKenzie et al., 2011). Therefore, one 
of the important issues in designing a study is to determine whether the constructs 
to be examined are reflective or formative (Jarvis et al., 2003). Before explaining 
further the measures applied in this study, the differences between reflective and 
formative constructs are discussed in the following Section 4.7.6.1. In addition, the 
discussion on second order factors is also presented, which is important to 
understand that the construct development is at a more abstract level. In this study, 
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the constructs for ethical sensitivity and culture are perceived to be 
multidimensional, and defined using second order factor. 
4.7.6.1 Reflective and formative measures   
Measures or indicators could be distinguished as either influenced by the 
latent construct (reflective) or formed the latent construct (formative) which could 
be determined in a way by examining the direction between the latent construct and 
the measures. In reflective constructs as depicted in Figure 4.2, the measures or 
indicators are influenced by the latent construct, and thus the direction of causality 
is from the latent construct to the measures (Jarvis et al., 2003).  
Since reflective measures are influenced by the latent construct, they are 
supposed to measure the same underlying concept of the latent construct. 
Reflective measures are also expected to be highly correlated and interchangeable 
(Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). In view of the foregoing, eliminating a measure will 
not cause any changes to the meaning of the latent construct since the remaining 
measures could adequately present the latent construct (Jarvis et al., 2003). 
However, if the latent construct changes, then all reflective measures should 
change accordingly (Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010). Given the nature of reflective 
measures, statistically, reflective measures also incorporate measurement error at 
the item level (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2009). 
Formative measures as illustrated in Figure 4.2, on the other hand 
represents different dimensions of the latent construct and thus form the latent 
construct (Gefen et al., 2000). Formative measures are suitable when a latent 
construct is defined based on the combination of its measures (Henseler et al., 
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2009), which suggest that they influenced the latent construct. Since they formed 
the latent construct, the direction of causality is from the measure to the latent 
construct (Jarvis et al., 2003).  Furthermore, unlike reflective measures, which are 
supposed to be highly correlated, formative measures could have positive, no 
correlation or negative relationships (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). Due to this, 
dropping off a formative measure could possibly change the meaning of the latent 
construct (Jarvis et al., 2003), since each measure represents the different 
dimensions of the latent construct. The attributes of formative measures also 
suggest that the measurement error of the measures will only be accounted for at 
the latent construct level (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004).  
Figure 4.2 Reflective and formative measures 
Reflective measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formative measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Haenlein and Kaplan (2004, p. 289). 
To differentiate between reflective and formative measures, Jarvis et al. 
(2003) provide a set of guidelines which is reproduced in Table 4.3.  Essentially, 
the guidelines focused on four main aspects in distinguishing the reflective and 
formative measures, which are: 
(1) The direction of causality between the latent construct and the measures,  
Latent 
Construct 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Latent 
Construct 
X1 
X2 
X3 
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(2) Whether or not the measures are interchangeable,  
(3) Covariance among the measures, and  
(4) Whether or not the measures have similarity of antecedents and consequences. 
Table 4.3 Guidelines to Determine Reflective and Formative Models 
Attributes Reflective model Formative model 
Direction of causality between 
measures and construct 
Direction of causality 
is from construct to 
measures 
Direction of causality 
is from measures to 
construct 
Interchangeability of measures Measures should be 
interchangeable 
Measures need not be 
interchangeable 
Covariance among measures Measures are expected 
to covary with each 
other 
Not necessarily for 
measures to covary 
with each other 
Nomological net of construct 
indicators 
Measures are required 
to have same 
antecedents and 
consequences 
Measures are not 
required to have same 
antecedents and 
consequences 
 
Source: Adapted from Jarvis et al. (2003, p. 203). 
To illustrate reflective and formative measures, Henseler et al. (2009), for 
instance, provide an example of examining cycling fitness. In a reflective model of 
cycling fitness, the measures are based on a single underlying concept which is 
concerned with the heart rate, lactate level, and muscle proportion. A change in the 
heart rate, for instance, is correlated with the lactate level and muscle proportion. 
Likewise, the changes in the lactate level influence the heart rate and muscle 
proportion. On the other hand, if cycling fitness is developed as a formative model, 
then cycling fitness could be measured using different dimensions attributing to 
fitness such as the hours of training, nutrition intake, and drug abuse.    
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4.7.6.2 Second order factor  
The discussion in Section 4.7.6.1 only focused on the first-order latent 
constructs. However, a latent construct could be conceptualized at a more abstract 
level especially when it requires multidimensional measures to explain its 
underlying concept. Jarvis et al. (2003) suggest four different types of second-order 
factor models comprising reflective or formative measures in a single construct or a 
combination of both in a construct. The four options of second-order factor models 
are illustrated as follows:  
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Figure 4.3 Types of second-order factor models 
Type I: Reflective First-Order, Reflective 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type II: Reflective First-Order, Formative 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type III: Formative First-Order, Reflective 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type IV: Formative First-Order, Formative 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Jarvis et al. (2003, p. 205). 
In the first model, Type I, both the first-order factor and second-order factor 
are conceptualized using reflective measures. In Type II model, the first-order 
factor is developed based on reflective measures and the second-order factor is 
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conceptualized using formative constructs. In Type III, the first-order factor model 
is explained using formative measures and reflective constructs are used to describe 
the underlying concept at the second level. Finally, in Type IV model both the first-
order and the second-order factor models are conceptualized using formative 
measures and constructs. In addition to the above four second-order factor models, 
a model could also possibly contain a mixture of reflective and formative measures 
and constructs in either the first or second-order factor models (Jarvis et al., 2003). 
Examples of mixed models are presented in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Mixed models of measures and constructs 
Type V: Reflective First-Order, Mixed 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type VI: Formative First-Order, Mixed 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type VII: Mixed First-Order, Reflective 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
Type VIII: Mixed First-Order, Formative 
Second-Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Illustrated based on Jarvis et al. (2003, p. 204). 
Apart from the above mixed models, Chin (2010) for instance, recognizes 
two types of higher order construct models known as molar and molecular higher 
order constructs in explaining the conceptualization of model at higher levels. 
Second 
order 
construct 
First Order 
Construct 1 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
First Order 
Construct 2 
First Order 
Construct 3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Second 
order 
construct 
First Order 
Construct 1 
Y2 
Y3 
First Order 
Construct 2 
First Order 
Construct 3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y1 
Y3 
Second 
order 
construct 
First Order 
Construct 1 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
First Order 
Construct 2 
First Order 
Construct 3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Second 
order 
construct 
First Order 
Construct 1 
Y2 
Y3 
First Order 
Construct 2 
First Order 
Construct 3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y3 
Y1 
Y2 
Y1 
Y3 
164 
 
Based on the work of Chin and Gopal (1995), a second-order molar model is 
described as a model which has arrows from the first order constructs pointing 
towards the second-order construct. In this case, the first-order constructs are 
conceptualized as formative measures to the second-order construct. On the other 
hand, the molecular second-order model has arrows from the second-order 
construct pointing towards the first-order constructs, which implies that the first-
order constructs are reflective measures to the second-order construct. The same 
procedures in determining the validity of the first-order factor model are used to 
determine the validity of the second-order factor model (Chin, 2010). In this study, 
the analysis on the second-order factor model is performed using a repeated 
indicator approach suggested by Chin (2010), Becker et al. (2012) and Hair et al. 
(2013). Both models are depicted in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 Second-order Molar and Molecular Models 
Molar Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Molecular Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Chin (2010, p. 666). 
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Drawing from the literature review, theoretical concepts and conceptual 
framework of the study, the constructs and measures in this study applied the Type 
II which is the Reflective First-Order, Formative Second-Order Model suggested 
by Jarvis et al. (2003), or Molar Second-Order Model suggested by Chin and Gopal 
(1995) in explaining the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents while performing 
their engagement roles. At the first-order level, the reflective measures are used to 
explain the underlying concepts of the constructs while formative constructs are 
developed at the second-order factor model. For instance, culture is measured as a 
second-order factor model using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimension. 
At the first-order level, reflective measures are used to explain the attributes of 
culture. At the second-order level, the four constructs of Hofstede’s (1980) 
National Cultural Dimensions are developed as formative constructs, since these 
four constructs formed the overall meaning of culture as proposed by Hofstede 
(1980).  
4.7.6.3 Theory of Planned Behaviour  
A review by O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) indicates that scenarios or 
vignettes are widely used in ethics-based studies. The use of scenarios allows for 
decision-making to be made in a more real situation, as well as to standardise the 
social motivation for all respondents. It provides the opportunities “to manipulate 
the variable of interest while controlling for environmental factors” (O’Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2005, p. 403).  For this study, two hypothetical tax scenarios on 
overstating business expenses and understating income, respectively, were 
developed based on the literature from prior studies and used to measure the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) items, namely attitudes, subjective norms, and 
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perceived behavioural control. The scenarios on overstating expenses and 
understating income are considered as appropriate since, as suggested by Elliffe 
(2011), they imply the second type of tax gap component in a tax system.  
Notwithstanding the advantages of using scenarios, they are criticised 
because normally researchers would assume they present the actual dilemma and 
the situation is the same for all respondents. In real life, however, this may not be 
the case (O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). To increase the validity and reliability of 
the scenarios, as well as seeking to overcome the criticisms of using tax scenarios 
in this study, as mentioned in subsection 4.7.4, the researcher had requested 
opinions from tax agents, amongst others. The tax agents were asked whether or 
not the scenarios reflect the reality, the most frequent tax scenarios that they faced, 
and the level of ease and difficulty to understand the scenarios.  
Following the scenarios, a few statements to capture the TPB items were 
offered and respondents were required to provide their opinions using a seven-point 
fully anchored scale. All statements related to the TPB items were developed as 
direct measures following the guidelines suggested by Ajzen (2006), which 
measure the overall attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control 
of respondents with respect to the tax scenarios provided in the study. The scales to 
measure the TPB items were adapted from Buchan (2005), who had used the TPB 
in tax context and tested it on public accountants in the US, an approach which was 
also aligned with the guidelines suggested by Ajzen (2006). To enhance the ethical 
dilemma issues in both scenarios, the author mentioned about where the money 
from overstating the expenses or understating the income would be used. It is also 
assumed that since tax agents are taxpayers themselves, therefore what is ethical to 
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them is supposed to be ethical for their clients and vice versa. An example on the 
understating income scenario used in the study is depicted as follows: 
Adam is a sole proprietor who receives cheques and cash for his 
business. In the current year, he received a cash sale of $2,000 from 
one of his friends. He is certain that the tax authority will not know 
if the income is not reported and will not detect the income since 
there is no record about the cash sale. He notices that he will fall 
under a higher tax bracket if he declares the $2,000 cash sale. At 
the same time, he wants to renovate his shop and intends to use the 
$2,000 cash sale for that purpose. For that year, Adam omitted the 
$2,000 cash sale from his current year tax computation. If you are 
in a similar situation, what would you do?   
(a) Intention to comply with the tax law 
The intention to comply with the tax law is operationalized as the 
dependent variable of this study. The intention to comply with the tax law in this 
study is captured related to the scenarios presented in this study and therefore are 
assumed to measure the same concept.  As a result, the measures are expected to 
covary with one another and developed as reflective measures. For instance, in the 
above example, the measures for intention were used to capture whether or not the 
respondents would omit or include the cash sale in the tax computation. Three 
measures were developed to measure intention to comply in each scenario (see 
Appendix F).  
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(b) Attitudes  
Attitudes are considered as the motivation to perform behaviour based on 
how respondents evaluate the favourableness and unfavourableness of performing 
behaviour. Three reflective measures were developed to examine the attitude of 
respondents with regard to the scenarios in the study. For instance, in the under 
declared income scenario, respondents were asked whether or not they feel good or 
bad if they omit the cash sale from the tax computation. The measures are 
presented in Appendix F. 
(c) Subjective norms  
Ajzen (1991) suggests that subjective norms account for the general 
perceptions of social pressure, whether or not to comply with the wishes of 
important others. In the case of tax compliance, prior studies suggest that there are 
possibilities for respondents to comply with the tax law based on the social 
pressure from people who are considered as important to them (Bobek & Hatfield, 
2003; Buchan, 2005). To measure the latent construct, three reflective items were 
developed for each scenario, and these measures are expected to covary with one 
another, since they are measuring the same underlying concept. For instance, in the 
scenario above, respondents were requested to indicate their opinion on whether or 
not most people who are important to them agree or disagree if they omit the cash 
sale from the tax computation (see Appendix F). 
(d) Perceived behavioural control  
Perceived behavioural control in this study refers to the ability of 
respondents to have control in performing behaviour related to the scenarios. Three 
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reflective items were developed to measure perceived behavioural control of 
respondents in this study, which are expected to covary since they are measuring 
the same underlying concept. For instance, as presented in Appendix F, to 
determine the perceived behavioural control in the above scenario, respondents 
were asked to indicate their belief using a seven-point fully anchored scale on 
whether or not they have complete control to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation. 
4.7.6.4 Ethical sensitivity   
Ethical sensitivity refers to the ability to recognize moral issues before 
making any decision. Since in this study it is postulated that the respondents would 
rely on more than one dimension to make decision, the construct for ethical 
sensitivity in this study is operationalized as a second-order factor measured with 
twelve first-order items. The items were grouped into moral equity, relativism, 
contractualism, egoism, and utilitarianism. For each group, two items were 
developed to measure ethical sensitivity except for four items for moral equity 
dimension. In total, twelve items were developed to measure ethical sensitivity of 
respondents in the study which were adopted from Cruz et al (2000). All these 
measures were used to capture the ethical sensitivity of respondents related to the 
two tax scenarios, which were also used to capture the TPB elements. 
All the measures for ethical sensitivity were defined using reflective 
measures. At the second-order level, the multidimensional of ethical sensitivity is 
measured using formative constructs since these constructs tap different underlying 
concepts. Respondents in the study were required to indicate their opinions on a 
seven-point fully anchored scale. For instance, relativism is measured on a seven-
Second 
order 
construc
t 
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point fully anchored scale of “traditionally acceptable or traditionally 
unacceptable” and “culturally acceptable or culturally unacceptable” (see Appendix 
F). The following Figure 4.6 depicts an example of the conceptualization of ethical 
sensitivity in this study at the first-order and second-order levels.  
Figure 4.6 First and Second-Order Factor Model for ethical sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: RE1 and RE2 represent measures for relativism. 
4.7.6.5 Culture  
Another construct which is regarded as a second-order factor is culture. 
This is because culture in this study is measured using Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions, which for each dimension has different underlying concepts 
for explaining culture. Therefore, Power Distance, Individualism-Collectivism, 
Masculinity-Femininity and Uncertainty Avoidance are conceptualized with 
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reflective measures. At the second level, all constructs are regarded as formative 
constructs in explaining culture.  
Each construct is measured using four items related to Hofstede’s (1980) 
National Cultural Dimensions. In total, sixteen items were developed to explain 
culture in complying with the tax law. All these measures were self-developed 
based on the attributes of National Cultural Dimensions posited by Hofstede (1980; 
2001). Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the 
statement provided in the questionnaire on a seven-point scale of “strongly 
disagree” and “strongly agree”. All items to measure culture are reproduced in 
Appendix F.  
4.7.6.6 Demographic background information  
Respondents were also asked to provide their demographic background 
information such as gender, age, ethnicity of respondents, respondents’ experience 
as tax agent, type of firms, and positions. Respondents were requested to tick the 
appropriate box either as “male” or “female” to indicate their gender.  
The age of respondents was divided into nine groupings: 25 years or below, 
26 to 30 years old, 31 to 35 years old, 36 to 40 years old, 41 to 45 years old, 46 to 
50 years old, 51 to 55 years old, 56 to 60 years old, and finally, over 60 years old. 
Ethnicity consists of three main ethnics in Malaysia, “Malay”, “Chinese”, “Indian”, 
and “Others”. If “Others” was selected then the respondents were asked to indicate 
further their ethnicity. In New Zealand, ethnicity consists of “New Zealand 
European”, “Maori”, “Pacific”, “Asian” and “Others”. Similar to Malaysian 
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respondents, if “Others” was selected then respondents were required to state 
further their ethnicity.  
The years of experience as tax agents were grouped into “less than 5 years”, 
“5 to 10 years”, “11 to 20 years”, and “more than 20 years”. They were also 
requested to determine the type of firms they are currently working either in “Big 
Four public accounting firm”, “Medium size public accounting firm”, “Small size 
public accounting firm” and “Others”. If “Others” was chosen, then the 
respondents were requested to state their type of firm. Another question was on the 
position of the respondents in which they were required to state their position.  
4.7.7 Data preparation and pre-analysis 
This subsection discusses the pre-analysis performed for the quantitative 
part of the study. The discussions focused on data screening, response 
representativeness, nonresponse bias, common method bias, social desirability bias, 
descriptive analysis, and t-test analysis. 
4.7.7.1 Data screening process  
Before any further analyses could be performed, data from the 
questionnaire survey has to be coded, keyed in, examined for any missing data and 
outliers, as well as tested whether or not the data fulfil the statistical assumptions of 
the statistical test being used to analyse the data (Hair et al., 2010; Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2010).  
The data from the mail survey was coded and keyed into the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software manually. Thorough checking 
against the hardcopy of the survey was performed to ensure that no error occurred 
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during the data entry process. As for New Zealand, the Qualtrics Survey Software 
provides the option of retrieving the responses collected from the survey using 
SPSS format file. Therefore, the data was automatically entered into the system and 
coded accordingly. The existence of outliers in the data could be determined by 
examining the minimum and maximum values (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010) or 
scatterplot the data (Moore & McCabe, 2006).  
Considering that self-reports are being used in this study and the issue of 
tax compliance could be deemed as a sensitive issue, there is a possibility that some 
responses are missing.  Notwithstanding this situation, missing data is a common 
problem in undertaking research (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010), and there are some 
forms of remedies to solve the missing data problem discussed by Hair et al. 
(2010). Following the suggestion by Hair et al (2010), a case or a variable would be 
eliminated if the missing data accounted for more than 10 percent of that particular 
cases or variables. As a result, the remaining cases are considered to have less than 
10 percent of missing data, and thus the missing data can be either ignored or any 
imputation methods to solve the missing data problem could be applied (Hair et al., 
2010). A visual check on the data from Malaysia and New Zealand suggests that 
the missing data level is low and occurred in a random manner. The extent of 
missing data could also be examined using Missing Value Analysis test in SPSS. 
The remedies for missing data vary from a conservative approach, such as 
accepting only complete datasets, to those which attempt to replicate the missing 
data using regression analysis.  One method which is highly recommended by Hair 
et al. (2010) is a model-based method approach using Expectation Maximisation 
(EM), which is available in SPSS. The EM method is a two stage-iterative method, 
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which is suitable to be applied in random and non-random missing data and has the 
least bias. It will make the best estimate of the missing data and also estimate the 
parameter of the missing data (such as mean, standard deviation) assuming that the 
missing data is being replaced. Furthermore, the EM method could also handle 
small sample size of data (Hair et al., 2010).  
4.7.7.2 Response representativeness  
One method to test the representativeness of the sample is by comparing the 
respondents’ profiles with certain types of demographic information of the 
population (Saunders et al., 2003). As for Malaysia, notwithstanding that the list of 
tax agents was developed from the Malaysian Inland Revenue Board (MIRB) 
website, there is no information available from the MIRB website or MIRB annual 
report on the demographic profiles of tax agents. Therefore, to test the 
representativeness of the sample in Malaysia, the researcher compared the gender 
and age of the respondents in the study with the demographic profiles of members 
of Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) available in its 2012 Annual Report 
(Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 2012).19 In New Zealand, to examine the 
representativeness of the sample, the researcher compared the gender, age, and 
ethnicity distribution of the survey respondents in this study with the demographic 
profiles of NZICA members (New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
2012).  
                                                                
19 Despite the comparison made on a more general population of accountants in Malaysia, this 
practice is considered  to be appropriate since, as explained earlier in subsection 1.3.1 of the 
Introduction Chapter, MIA is the body which governs the accounting profession in Malaysia. 
Therefore, its members may in a way represent the accounting professionals in Malaysia. The only 
demographic profiles available from the MIA’s 2012 Annual Report are gender, age, and 
employment type. Due to this, comparisons could be made only on gender and age of the 
respondents.  
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4.7.7.3 Nonresponse bias  
Nonresponse is a challenging issue in using survey as a data collection 
instrument since a high nonresponse rate could possibly result in bias in responses. 
Nonresponse bias occurs when there are members of the sample refuse to 
participate in the study, which could be due to a failure for them to be contacted, 
they are not in the position to answer the questionnaire, time constraints or for 
some other unknown reasons they refuse to cooperate (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Due 
to this nonresponse, there is a possibility that the opinions of those who respond to 
the survey are different from those who do not respond.  With the existence of 
nonresponse bias, Sekaran and Bougie (2010) suggest that the findings should be 
generalized only to the respondents who participated in the study.  
To examine the existence of nonresponse bias in this study, the researcher 
followed the approach by Armstrong and Overton (1977), using late respondents, 
those who participated after the reminders being sent, as substitutes for 
nonrespondents. The responses were later divided into “early respondents” and 
“late respondents”, and the means of the responses were compared to check 
whether the means between the two is significant at p ≤ 0.05 using independent t-
test in SPSS. The independent t-test in SPSS provides two results, the Levene’s test 
for equality of variance, and the t-test for equality of means. The Levene’s test is 
used to determine whether or not there is equal variance between the two groups 
before deciding the appropriate t values in independent t-test. This can be done by 
checking the significance of F value at p ≤ 0.05 in the Levene’s test. The t value is 
then determined depending on whether there is equal variance between the two 
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groups or when the variance is not equal. Based on the t value, the significance of 
the means is determined at p ≤ 0.05 (Gaur & Gaur, 2006; Field, 2009).  
4.7.7.4 Common method bias  
There are many reasons why common method bias could occur in 
behavioural type of research, as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), who have 
provided an extensive summary of potential sources of common method bias. In 
general, the common method bias problem could arise as a result of using the same 
source to obtain responses and effect caused by the measurement itself such as 
ambiguity, repeated scale format, intermixing items or constructs in the 
questionnaire, and effect in the measurement as a result from where the context 
measures are obtained (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Since the data was obtained through 
self-reported survey, there is also a possibility for common method bias to exist in 
the responses (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). This is despite the proactive steps taken 
by the author by following the suggestions from Podsakoff et al. (2003) and 
Conway and Lance (2010), such as assuring anonymity,  emphasizing there are no 
right or wrong answers, counterbalancing the order of the questions, keeping the 
questions simple and precise, and also using different scale endpoints in the 
questionnaire.  
Chin et al. (2012) outlined a list of post hoc statistical methods to detect 
common method bias, with one of the most commonly applied method being the 
Harmon’s single factor test. Therefore, to assess the extent of common method bias 
in this study, the Harmon’s single factor test was performed by forcing all 
indicators to load in a single factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The test is performed 
using principal component factor analysis in SPSS. There is a problem of common 
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method bias in the data if a single factor accounts for the majority of the variance 
or one factor accounts for the majority of the covariance in the independent and 
dependent variable (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The number of factors from the 
principal component factor analysis is determined based on factors with 
eigenvalues more than 1.0.  
4.7.7.5 Social desirability bias  
A common bias that exists in ethics-based  studies and survey research is 
social desirability bias, which occurs when respondents have the tendency to 
portray favourable image by choosing answers in the questionnaire which 
perceived to be more socially desirable (Krosnick, 1999; McDonald, 2000; Bryman 
& Bell, 2011). For instance, people tend to respond that they voted in the most 
recent election even though they did not because voting is more socially admirable 
(Krosnick, 1999). Findings by Cohen et al. (1993) in an accounting context and 
Cruz et al. (2000) in taxation, which both applied MES to measure ethical 
behaviour, suggest the need to control for social desirability bias in ethics-based 
accounting studies. One way to test the existence of social desirability bias is to use 
the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD) developed by Crowne and 
Marlowe (1960), which has 33 questions using a True/False format. 
Considering that tax agents are busy people and the researcher at the same 
time has to take into account the length of the questionnaire, instead of using the 
MCSD Scale, the researcher asked two questions adopted from Cohen et al. (1993), 
which were also replicated by Cruz et al. (2000), in a study involving tax agents’ 
ethical judgment, to examine the existence of social desirability bias. In both 
hypothetical tax scenarios, respondents were asked to indicate the possibility that 
178 
 
their peers will perform the same action as described in the tax scenarios and the 
probability that they will take the same action as mentioned in the tax scenarios 
(see Appendix O). The responses to both questions were recorded using seven-
point scales, fully anchored with a High/Low, with the higher score indicating low 
probability to perform the described behaviour. The mean responses in both 
questions were then compared using Paired t-test in SPSS to determine whether 
there is any significant difference at a p value of 0.05 between these two variables, 
‘Peero/Peeru’ and ‘Selfo/Selfu’.   
4.7.7.6 Descriptive analysis  
Descriptive analysis provides basic features on how tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand understand culture, ethical sensitivity, and the TPB elements in 
tax compliance behaviour. In addition, the descriptive analysis also describes the 
demographic details of respondents in this study. In this descriptive analysis, the 
basic features are described using mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values for each item in the questionnaire survey. The frequency 
distribution is also provided where appropriate. All these analyses were performed 
using SPSS software version 18.  
4.7.7.7 t-test analysis  
The independent t-test analysis is performed to examine whether or not 
there is any significant difference in the overall perceptions of the Malaysian and 
New Zealand respondents in this study with regard to the TPB elements, ethical 
sensitivity, and culture items. The null hypothesis for this test suggests that both 
the Malaysian and New Zealand tax agents have similar perceptions on the TPB 
elements, ethical sensitivity items, and culture items, respectively. An independent 
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t-test is performed using SPSS software version 18 to generate p values similar to 
the test performed to examine nonresponse bias. Based on the Levene’s test, the 
variance between the two means for the groups will determine whether or not there 
is equal variance before the appropriate p values are chosen. Based on the p values, 
the level of significance is determined whether or not there is any significant 
different between the two groups of respondents at p ≤ 0.05. Using these p values, 
decision will be made whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis.  
4.7.8 Introduction to SEM  
The use of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) has gained considerable 
support over the past decades in social science studies, for instance, in the areas of 
marketing and information systems (Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010; Hair et al., 2012; 
Ringle et al., 2012). This perhaps is due to the ability of SEM to test latent 
constructs or variables using a two-step approach simultaneously (Hair et al., 
2012). The SEM is a second generation multivariate data analysis technique which 
permits measurement errors of the constructs to be analysed as part of the model 
and factor analysis to be combined with the hypotheses testing. Thus, unlike the 
first generation of statistical analysis, such as regression, which could only examine 
one layer of relationship between independent and dependent variables, SEM 
allows a set of interrelated questions to be examined in a single, systematic, and 
comprehensive analysis (Gefen et al., 2000). Furthermore, Hankins et al. (2000) 
suggest that SEM is a useful technique in studies incorporating TPB (such as this 
study), due to its ability to make explicit the implicit assumptions of 
unidimensionality constructs in TPB.  
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A SEM model consists of two interrelated models, the measurement or 
outer model, and structural or inner model (Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010). The 
testing of these two models involves a two-step approach as suggested by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The structural model examines the relationship 
between independent latent variables, also known as exogenous variables in SEM, 
and dependent latent variables, also referred to as endogenous variables. For each 
latent variable, it has its own measurement model which examines the validity and 
reliability of the measures or indicators of that particular latent variable. A 
complete SEM model is depicted in Figure 4.7 below. 
Figure 4.7 Structural Equation Modelling 
    
    
     
Source: Adapted from Henseler (2010, p. 109). 
There are two types of SEM analysis commonly used in social science 
research; the Covariance-based SEM (CBSEM), and Partial least squares (PLS), 
which have different underlying concepts (Gefen et al., 2011; Hair et al., 2012). 
Both SEM-based analyses are explained in the following subsections. 
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4.7.8.1 Covariance-based SEM and Partial least squares  
 (a) Covariance-based SEM 
Covariance-based SEM (CBSEM), which is normally associated with the 
software employed to perform the analysis such as LISREL and AMOS, has the 
objective of proving that the operationalization of the theory being examined is 
corroborated and supported by the data which is parameter-oriented (Hair et al., 
2010). Therefore, CBSEM aims to show that the null hypothesis is insignificant 
(Gefen et al., 2000). It requires a sound theory base and supports confirmatory 
research. In addition, CBSEM also requires normal distribution of data and only 
works with parametric assumption. There is also a strict requirement of the 
appropriate sample size in order to employ CBSEM and inadequate sample size 
may result in over rejecting models (Gefen et al., 2000). In addition to that, 
CBSEM only caters for reflective measures and does not allow measures to be 
developed formatively (Gefen et al., 2011).  
(b) Partial least squares (PLS) 
Partial least square (PLS) is the second major technique in SEM introduced 
by Wold (1985), which is designed to explain variance in data. It extends the 
principal component and canonical correlation analysis (Henseler et al., 2009) and 
has fewer requirements to be fulfilled compared to CBSEM. The PLS is considered 
to be “silver bullet” (Hair et al., 2011, p. 148) given its potential to explain causal 
relationship in theoretical models. The objective of PLS is to examine the 
significance of relationships indicated with high R2 and has a similar concept 
underlying the linear regression analysis which is prediction-oriented. Unlike 
CBSEM, PLS does not require a sound theory base, and supports both exploratory 
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and confirmatory based research (Gefen et al., 2000; Gotz et al., 2010; Urbach & 
Ahlemann, 2010). PLS, which is considered as working on a soft data assumption, 
also allows relatively robust deviations from parametric assumptions which 
perform well with non-normal data distribution (Chin, 2010; Henseler, 2010). In 
addition, there is no strict requirement on the appropriate number of samples in 
PLS analysis and it works well even with a small number of samples (Hair et al., 
2012) with several indicators (Henseler, 2010). Unlike CBSEM, PLS analysis 
could cater for both reflective and formative measures in the same model (Gefen et 
al., 2000, Gefen et al., 2011). The discussion on CBSEM and PLS are summarized 
in Table 4.4.   
Table 4.4 Attributes of CBSEM and PLS 
Criteria CBSEM PLS 
Objective  Parameter-oriented Prediction-oriented 
Approach Covariance-based Variance-based 
Assumption Multivariate normal 
distribution (parametric) 
Predictor specification 
(nonparametric) 
Parameter estimates Consistent Consistency at large as 
indicators and sample size 
increases 
Latent variable scores Indeterminate Explicitly estimated 
Epistemic relationship 
between a latent variable 
and its measures 
Typically only with 
reflective measures 
Work with either formative 
or reflective mode 
Implications Optimal for parameter 
accuracy 
Optimal for prediction 
accuracy 
Model complexity Small to moderate 
complexity (e.g., less than 
100 indicators) 
Large complexity (e.g., 100 
constructs and 1,000 
indicators) 
Sample size Minimal 
recommendations range 
from 200 to 800 
Minimal recommendations 
range from 30 to 100 cases 
 
Source: Chin and Newsted (1999, pp. 307-341). 
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4.7.8.2 Justifications for using PLS in this study 
The above discussions provide some basis to justify the use of PLS in this 
study. First, PLS is more appropriate considering this study is prediction-oriented, 
which is to predict the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents by extending the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) with two other additional factors, ethical 
sensitivity and culture. Second, PLS has soft data distribution assumption which 
does not restrict on parametric assumption, thus provides more option for data 
analysis. Third, prior studies indicate the small number of sample size in tax studies 
involving tax agents. Since PLS could allow for a small to moderate number of 
samples, thus it is more suitable considering that PLS enables analysis to be 
performed irrespective of the number of samples available. Finally, measures and 
constructs in this study were developed in both formative and reflective way. In the 
case of PLS, it could cater for both while CBSEM only works with reflective 
measures.  Consequently, it is more appropriate to use PLS compared to CBSEM. 
The study used SmartPLS 2.0 (M3) Beta software developed by Ringle et al. 
(2005) to perform the PLS analysis. 
4.7.8.3 Model evaluation  
A SEM model comprises measurement and structural models which are 
interrelated. A confirmatory technique is used to validate the measures for each 
individual latent construct at the measurement model level while the structural 
model evaluates the relationships among the latent constructs at the theoretical 
level. The model evaluation for both measurement model and structural model is 
further discussed as follows.  
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(a) Evaluation of the measurement model  
The measurement model evaluates the association between measures and 
latent constructs. In the measurement model the validity and reliability of measures 
in each construct are determined before testing the relationships of constructs at the 
structural level. A measurement model could consist of reflective measures, 
formative measures or a combination of both reflective and formative measures 
(Gotz et al., 2010). Depending on the mode of the measures being used in the 
measurement model, either as reflective or formative, the validity and reliability of 
the measurement model is determined differently. A reflective construct, for 
instance, inherits the classical test theory which incorporates measurement error in 
each measure or indicator of the measurement model (Henseler et al., 2009). On 
the other hand, a formative construct consists of independent measures which form 
the construct, and thus measurement error is only included at the construct level 
(Howell & Breivik, 2007).   
(i) Construct reliability 
Construct reliability tests the consistency of the measures which directly 
assess the level of measurement error (Noar, 2003). A reflective measure is tested 
using the classical test theory20 and factor analysis, which expect a high degree of 
internal reliability (Jarvis et al., 2003). In a reflective construct, two techniques are 
used to determine reliability at the individual measure level and construct level. 
The individual measure is assessed based on its factor loading to determine its 
reliability, and the overall internal consistency of the construct  can be observed 
                                                                
20 A classical test theory is concerned with examining the observed variances or covariances of 
measures (Jarvis et al., 2003).  
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using composite reliability which estimates the inter-correlations among measures 
(Henseler et al., 2009; Gotz et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2012).  
Since the reliability of each measure varies, the factor loading of a 
reflective measure indicates the level of variance explained by the construct. There 
is no absolute threshold for factor loadings in a PLS model. Hair et al. (2010), for 
instance, suggests a cut-off loading of 0.50 while the common acceptable threshold 
is 0.70, which suggests that more than 50 percent of the variance (based on the 
squared standardized outer loadings) in a measure is explained by the construct 
(Gotz et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2012). In research involving newly developed 
measures such as in this study, loadings of 0.40 are acceptable and a measure 
which has factor loading smaller than 0.40 should be eliminated (Hair et al., 2012). 
Henseler et al. (2009), however, provide a different point of view in eliminating a 
reflective measure in a PLS model. In their view, a reflective measure should only 
be discarded from the model if the loading is low and eliminating the reflective 
measure increases the overall internal consistency of the construct. This is because 
while a single-item measure is allowed in PLS, it is performed with caution since 
the use of a single indicator may have the tendency to overestimate the 
measurement model and underestimate the structural model (Diamantopoulos et al., 
2012; Ringle et al., 2012).  
The composite reliability which evaluates the overall internal consistency of 
a construct and interpreted similar to Cronbach’s alpha, is used to assess the 
construct reliability in a PLS model (Gotz et al., 2010; Hair et al, 2012). Compared 
to Cronbach’s alpha which uses equal weighting for all measures, the composite 
reliability is  favoured in explaining the construct reliability in a PLS model, since 
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composite reliability does not assume equivalence across measures (Chin, 2010), 
and thus considers the possibility that factor loadings for measures are varied 
(Henseler et al., 2009). The composite reliability which is available from the PLS 
analysis is defined using the following formula: 
 
The  represents the loading of measure i while F indicates the factor 
variance and   refers to measurement error of measure i.  
The value of composite reliability varies between 0 to 1 and a value larger 
than 0.60 is considered as acceptable (Gotz et al., 2010). Fornell and Larcker 
(1981), for instance, suggest a higher composite value which is above 0.70 for a 
construct to be included in the model. Henseler et al. (2009) and Hair et al. (2012) 
both argue that a composite value below 0.60 portrays lack of reliability but 
acceptable in exploratory research. 
Unlike reflective measures, which are concerned with the level of 
unidimensionality, formative measures are considered to be multidimensional and 
each measure represents a different underlying concept to the construct (Chin, 
2010). Therefore, the reliability of formative measure is considered not important 
but a more appropriate technique is to ensure the formative measures meet the 
validity assumptions.   
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(ii) Construct validity   
Construct validity evaluates whether or not a measure represents the 
concept that it is supposed to measure (Noar, 2003). To test the validity of the 
reflective constructs, PLS applies the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) technique 
which could confirm the strength of the measures by observing the convergent 
validity and discriminant validity of the constructs. The convergent validity test 
examines whether or not a set of indicators measures the same concept 
(unidimensionality) and can be observed using the average variance extracted 
(AVE) of the construct (Henseler et al., 2009). Statistically, the AVE is defined 
using the following formula: 
 
where  represents the loading of measure i while F indicates the factor 
variance and   refers to measurement error of measure i.  
The value of AVE should be at least 0.50 to be considered as sufficient in 
explaining more than half of the variance of a construct’s measures (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981; Henseler et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2012), whereas a value less than 
0.50 indicates that the variance is related more with error variance rather than 
variance of the measures (Gotz et al., 2010). 
The discriminant validity test examines whether or not items differentiate 
among constructs or measure different concepts. There are two ways to determine 
discriminant validity in PLS, based on items cross-loadings and Fornell-Larcker 
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criterion (Henseler et al., 2009). The item cross-loadings approach tests the 
existence of discriminant validity at the item level, suggesting that the loading for 
each measure should be higher compared to all its cross-loadings (Gotz, et al., 
2010). While the commonly accepted threshold for items loadings is 0.70 (Gotz et 
al., 2010), Hair et al. (2010) accept a cut-off value of 0.50 and Chin (2010) also 
acknowledges that in exploratory studies, a factor loading of 0.50 is acceptable. In 
a more recent study, Hair et al. (2012) suggest that loadings of 0.40 are acceptable 
in studies involving newly developed measures such as in this study.  
Unlike the item cross-loadings test which is more liberal, the Fornell-
Larcker criterion test developed by Fornell and Larcker (1981) is regarded more 
systematic (Henseler et al., 2009; Chin, 2010). The Fornell-Larcker test proposes 
that the square root of the AVE for each construct should be greater than its 
correlations with other construct to achieve discriminant validity. This is to indicate 
that a construct shares more variance with its measures rather than with other 
constructs.  
To test the validity of formative construct in PLS analysis, the weights and 
the significance of the formative indicators are observed. Based on t-statistics and 
level of significance (p values) from the bootstrapping procedure as well as the 
PLS weights (Henseler et al., 2009), decisions will be made whether to retain or 
drop a measure from the model. This procedure enables the relevance of each 
measure in forming the construct to be assessed (Hair et al., 2012).  
Formative measures could contain positive, negative or no correlations, and 
normally is smaller than factor loadings (Gotz et al., 2010). For formative 
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measures, Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) suggest that any non-significant 
indicator should be eliminated to obtain a better significance path. Bollen and 
Lennox (1991) and Henseler et al. (2009), however, suggest retaining both 
significant and non-significant indicator to maintain the content validity of the 
formative constructs as long as its existence is conceptually justified. This means 
that formative indicators with small weights and non-significant paths should not 
simply be eliminated. The decision to eliminate a formative measure has to take 
into account its contribution to the construct since eliminating a measure could 
possibly change the meaning of the construct (Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009). 
Unless multicollinearity apparently exists, then the measure is recommended to be 
eliminated from the model (Gotz et al., 2010). This is because a high level of 
multicollinearity suggests redundancy (Henseler et al., 2009).  
The level of multicollinearity among the formative indicators could be 
examined by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF), the condition index for 
each indicator (Hair et al., 2012) and the tolerance value (Hair et al., 2013). The 
lower VIF values suggest less multicollinearity among the indicators. Prior studies 
suggest cut-off values for VIF should not exceed 3.3 (Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 
2006), 5.0 (Hair et al., 2012) and 10 (Hair et al., 2010; Gefen et al., 2011). 
However, any VIF value more than 1 indicates the existence of multicollinearity 
even though it is not substantial (Henseler et al., 2009). The value for condition 
index, as suggested by Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) and Hair et al. (2012), 
should not exceed 30 to ensure there is no multicollinearity in the model.  A 
tolerance value of 0.20 and lower indicate the possibility of multicollinearity (Hair 
et al., 2013).  
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(b) Evaluation of the structural model 
Once the measurement model has been successfully evaluated, the 
evaluations of structural model in PLS could be performed based on R-squares and 
path coefficient. In addition, to determine the statistical significance of the path 
coefficient in the structural model, a resampling technique needs to be used. The 
analyses are further discussed below. 
(i) R-squares  
The primary analysis to test the structural model is by observing the value 
of R-squares, which indicate the coefficient of determination. The R-squares 
measure the relationship of the construct’s variance with its total variance and are 
interpreted similar to ordinary least squares regression (Chin, 2010). There is no 
threshold level for an acceptable R-square since it depends on the research context 
(Hair et al., 2012). However, the higher R-squares are the better since they explain 
a higher percentage of variance (Gotz et al., 2010). It is also commonly accepted 
that the value of 0.60 is considered as substantial while 0.30 is regarded as 
moderate and value around 0.19 indicates weak relationship (Henseler et al., 2009; 
Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010).  
(ii) Effect size 
Additionally, the R-squares are also useful in examining the impact of an 
independent latent variable on a dependent latent variable, known as the effect size, 
signified by . The effect size is determined by performing the calculation of the 
dependent variable’s coefficient in the structural model twice, first with the 
respective independent latent variable, and second without that particular 
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independent latent variable. Similar to the interpretation of multiple regressions 
promoted by Cohen (1988),  of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 suggests weak, moderate, 
and strong effects (Henseler et al., 2009; Chin, 2010; Gotz et al., 2010; Hair et al., 
2012). The effect size formula is defined as follows: 
 
(iii) Path coefficient  
The next step is to examine the path coefficient of the relationship between 
constructs. In this case, the algebraic signs, magnitude, and significance of the path 
coefficient are observed. Paths which signs are contrary to the theoretical 
assumptions are considered as not supporting the postulated hypotheses and should 
be rejected. To assess the significance of the path coefficient, Henseler et al. (2009) 
and Hair et al. (2012) suggest using the bootstrapping technique which provides t 
values and p values. The magnitude of the path coefficient indicates the strength of 
the relationship which should be at least 0.10 and the level of significance should 
be at least 0.50 (Urbach & Ahlemann, 2010). 
(iv) Bootstrapping 
Since PLS does not assume normality data distribution, it relies on 
nonparametric resampling technique in its evaluations.   There are two methods to 
conduct this resampling in PLS, bootstrapping and jack-knifing (Hair et al., 2012). 
The jack-knife procedure which is perceived as an approximation to bootstrapping, 
however, has been  applied less in recent years most likely because it is viewed as 
less competent compared to bootstrapping (Chin, 2010). To examine the 
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significance level in PLS, the study performed the bootstrapping technique which 
generates the t values and confidence intervals. The bootstrapping technique 
assumes that the observed sample represents the population and creates bootstrap 
samples by randomly replacing the cases from the original dataset. Each bootstrap 
samples contains the same number of cases as in the original sample (Henseler et 
al., 2009). In this study, a resampling with 5000 samples is used consistent with the 
suggestions by Henseler et al. (2009) and Hair et al. (2011; 2012).    
4.8 Interview  
A qualitative enquiry such as interview could be used to understand patterns 
of experience in lives (Dilley, 2000) since the perspective of others could be 
meaningful and able to be made explicit (Patton, 1990). Due to this, researchers 
conduct interview to understand “what is in and on someone else’s mind” (Patton, 
1990, p. 278). The interviews in this study are conducted to provide more 
information on the factors that influence tax agents in their decision-making while 
performing their engagement roles. Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 4.2, the 
use of interviews in this study for data collection reflects the emic (inside 
perspective) approach in understanding the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand. In the emic approach, researchers use a specific 
culture to understand the issue being examined and researchers normally used 
ethnography, interview, and observation to collect data because the nature of emic 
dimensions is cultural specific (Malhotra et al., 1996).  
One of the criticisms of using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
Dimensions is that survey is not appropriate to be used in examining culture 
(Baskerville, 2005). In view of the foregoing, the use of interviews in this study 
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could complement the weaknesses of using a survey in understanding the influence 
of culture in tax compliance behaviour of tax agents since the survey itself, as 
suggested by Feilzer (2010), may only provide a glimpse of the social phenomena 
without providing in-depth understanding of which the interview could offer.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) differentiate interviews into two types: structured 
interviews and unstructured or specialized interviews. In a structured interview, 
researchers prepare the questions prior to the interview and participants are 
expected to provide answers according to the framework prepared by the 
researcher. On the other hand, an unstructured interview depends on the 
participants’ responses during the interview to guide the direction of the interview. 
Saunders et al. (2003) suggest three different categories: structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured or in-depth interviews, while Bryman and Bell (2011) broadly 
grouped interviews into two types: structured interviews and qualitative interviews, 
(with the latter is formed from semi-structured and unstructured interviews). 
Structured interviews use a questionnaire with questions and standard answers 
determined a priori (Saunders et al., 2003; Bryman & Bell, 2011). Similar to 
Saunders et al. (2003) explanation of the features of semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews, a qualitative interview is considered to be nonstandardized 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
The different types of interview serve different purposes of studies. 
According to Saunders et al. (2003), a structured interview is more appropriate for 
a descriptive or explanatory based study while a semi-structured interview is more 
suitable for exploratory and explanatory based studies. The unstructured or in-
depth interview is more useful for studies which are exploratory in nature 
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(Saunders et al., 2003). In this study, the researcher used the semi-structured 
interview and the justifications for using semi-structured interview are further 
discussed in Section 4.8.1.  
4.8.1 Justifications for using semistructured telephone interview   
A semi-structured interview is the most common approach of all qualitative 
methods (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). This is probably due to its flexibility (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011), since although the researcher has a list of questions and themes to be 
covered, these may vary from one interview to the other (Saunders et al., 2003). A 
semi-structured interview also has the ability to disclose important aspects of 
human behaviour (Qu & Dumay, 2011) because a semi-structured interview could 
reveal not only the ‘what’ and ‘how’ but also the ‘why’ (Saunders et al., 2003).  
Consequently, the researcher chose the semi-structured interview to explain further 
the factors that have been examined in the questionnaire survey. At the same time, 
the semi-structured interview was also used to discover if there were any other 
factors that may influence tax agents in their decision-making while performing 
their engagement roles.  
Interviews could be conducted in the form of a focus group or one to one, 
which for the latter, researchers could either perform this as a face-to-face 
interview or by telephone (Saunders et al., 2003). Despite some drawbacks of using 
telephone interviews, such as missing the opportunity to witness the nonverbal 
reactions (body language) of the interview participants which could be important in 
interpreting the findings (Bryman & Bell, 2011), and the limited time to conduct 
the telephone interview resulting in less participation and lack of an opportunity to 
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ask complex questions (Saunders et al., 2003), the use of telephone interview in 
this study is considered to be appropriate.  
This study examines the ethical decision-making of tax agents in complying 
with the tax laws while performing their engagement roles, which could be 
considered to be sensitive and involves tax agents who are located in different parts 
of Malaysia and New Zealand. Therefore, it is impractical to conduct face-to-face 
interviews due to the scattered distance, time involved and cost constraints. It is 
also cost and time effective to use the telephone in conducting the interview since 
tax agents are normally busy people. Furthermore, Bryman and Bell (2011) suggest 
that a telephone interview is more effective in encouraging participation during 
interviews especially if the interviews involve sensitive issues. Qu and Dumay 
(2011) also recommend that it is not appropriate to use, for instance, a focus group 
to study sensitive issues.  
4.8.2 Development of interview guide   
To assist the researcher during the interview process, the researcher 
prepared an interview guide, consisting of a list of questions based on several 
themes relevant to the study. Even though the themes are determined a priori based 
on the literature review, the nature of a semi-structured interview which is flexible 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011) allows some freedom for other themes to emerge during the 
interview. This helps to understand further the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in the study.  
Compared to structured interview, the lack of standardization in semi-
structured interviews could become a disadvantage as well since it could result into 
lack of reliability in its findings (Saunders et al., 2003). The use of an interview 
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guide could be helpful in reducing the reliability issues since the interview guide 
helps the researcher to ensure that the interviews are more systematic and focused 
on within a subject area (Patton, 1990). In this study, the use of the interview guide 
as the “guide to the journey” (Dilley, 2000, p. 133) also helps the researcher to 
carefully manage the limited time and resources (Patton, 1990).  
The interview guide used in this study covers the importance of the Theory 
of Planned Behaviour (TPB) items, ethics, and culture in complying with the tax 
law from the viewpoints of tax agents. While these factors have been examined in 
the survey, the viewpoints of tax agents participated in the interview provide 
further understanding on the influence of these factors in their decision-making 
while performing their roles. In developing the interview guide, the researcher also 
obtained suggestions from accounting academics who are expert in qualitative 
research, and as a result some changes have been made to the wording of the 
questions.21 The interview guide for the study is presented in Appendix G of this 
thesis.  
4.8.3 Sample selection for interview  
Sampling in qualitative inquiry is different from the quantitative approach 
since qualitative inquiry emphasizes on obtaining rich information, while 
quantitative approach concerns more with generalization in understanding social 
phenomena. While Patton (1990) suggests 16 strategies in selecting samples for 
qualitative inquiry, sampling in qualitative studies could be broadly regarded as 
purposeful sampling (Patton, 1990; Coyne, 1997). This is because a researcher 
                                                                
21 The initial draft of the interview guide was presented during the proposal defence at the 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, University of Canterbury.  
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purposely selects information-rich cases which could fit into the study (Coyne, 
1997). 
As discussed in Section 4.6, in selecting the sample for the qualitative phase 
in this study, the researcher also has to take into account that the findings from the 
qualitative phase are used to provide in-depth understanding of the factors that 
influence tax agents in their decision-making while performing their engagement 
roles. For that reason, the interview participants in this study were identified from 
the survey conducted by the researcher in the quantitative phase of this study. The 
interview participants came from those survey respondents who agreed to be 
involved in the interview.  This type of sampling could be considered as self-
selection sampling as explained by Saunders et al. (2003, p. 177) since the 
researcher allows individual “to identify their desire to take part in the research”. 
Invitations to participate in the interview were sent together with the survey to 
potential survey respondents in Malaysia and New Zealand.  
4.8.4 Sample size for interview 
The process to understand social phenomena in quantitative and qualitative 
methods have different approaches. While a quantitative method focuses on 
numbers to derive meanings, a qualitative method on the other hand emphasizes the 
richness of information or words to develop meanings in understanding social 
phenomena (Saunders et al., 2003).  This is because under the qualitative method, 
the purpose is to obtain contextual understanding of a particular situation which 
requires rich data and depth understanding, and  as a result the issue of 
representativeness in qualitative methods is less important compared to quantitative  
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methods (Bryman & Bell, 2011).The concept of emphasizing  words rather than 
numbers guides the researcher in this study to determine the appropriate sample 
size for the qualitative approach performed in this study.  
In determining the appropriate sample size in qualitative inquiry, Patton 
(1990, p.184) argues that:  
“There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample 
size depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, 
what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and 
what can be done with available time and resources.” 
Patton’s (1990) argument implies that there is no specific guideline to 
determine sample size in qualitative studies and several factors such as richness of 
information, available time and resources, guide researchers in deciding the 
appropriate sample size. One approach suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 
202), in determining the appropriate sample size in a qualitative study, is to rely on 
the concept of redundancy or data saturation effect as a rule: “Finally, the criterion 
invoked to determine when to stop sampling is informational redundancy…” 
However, Guest et al. (2006) argue that the concept of the data saturation 
effect is difficult to be applied prior to data collection, and instead suggest that for 
an interview, the minimum sample is 12 participants. If the sample is highly 
homogenous, a sample of 6 interviews would be sufficient to enable a meaningful 
theme to appear (Guest et al., 2006). While Collins et al. (2007) suggest that the 
appropriate number of participants in qualitative-based studies depends on expert 
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opinion they also provide a summary on the recommended minimum number of 
sample size for most common qualitative studies reproduced as follows: 
Table 4.5 Recommended Minimum Sample Size for Most Common 
Qualitative Research Design 
Research design Minimum sample size suggestion 
Case study 3-5 participants (Creswell, 2002) 
Phenomenological  10 interviews (Creswell, 1998), 6 interviews 
(Morse, 1994) 
Grounded theory 15-20 participants (Creswell, 2002), 20-30 
participants (Creswell, 1998) 
 
Source: Adapted from Collins et al. (2007, p. 273). 
In this study, the sampling procedure for the interview is based on self-
identified sampling. Therefore, the sample size relies heavily on the willingness of 
survey respondents to participate in subsequent interviews while at the same time 
considering the time and resources available.  
4.8.5 Data collection procedure   
Following the different modes of collecting survey data in Malaysia and 
New Zealand, as discussed in Section 4.7.4, this study used two different methods 
of sending invitation to participate in the semi-structured telephone interview. The 
researcher sent the invitation to participate in interviews with the mail survey 
questionnaire in Malaysia and online web-based survey in New Zealand.  
In Malaysia, the researcher mailed the invitation to participate in the 
interview and the consent form, together with the questionnaire survey and two 
self-addressed stamped envelopes to ensure that there was no association between 
the respondents in the survey and the interview participants. As mentioned in 
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Section 4.7.4.1, the researcher also attached a cover letter explaining the purpose of 
the study, confirming the anonymity of the responses of the survey, ensuring the 
confidentiality of the interview data and confirming that the relevant ethics 
clearance has been obtained, with the survey package. In the consent form 
(available in Appendix H), the author also requested the interested participants to 
provide their correspondence details. 
As discussed in Section 4.7.4.2, an online web-based survey was used to 
collect quantitative data in New Zealand. In the introduction email to potential 
survey respondents, apart from the survey link, another link inviting participation 
in interviews was also included. The separate link was to ensure that the 
information provided in the interview link could not be associated in any manner 
with the responses in the earlier survey. The author briefly explained the procedure 
for the interview, confidentiality of the interview information, confirmed the 
relevant ethical clearance, requested their consent to perform the interview, and 
required interested participants to provide their contact details.  
As stated earlier, the potential interview participants in Malaysia and New 
Zealand were required to provide their correspondence details, such as name, 
contact number, email address, date, and time they would be available for the 
interview. A few days before the interviews, the researcher made follow-up 
telephone calls requesting the tax agents to confirm their participation. Since tax 
agents are busy people, this approach allows the interview participants to determine 
their own availability, and could avoid bias in responses between those who are 
busy and less busy, since participating in an interview is time consuming (Saunders 
et al., 2003).  
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The interviews were conducted between November 2011 and January 2012 
in Malaysia. Since the researcher felt that the initial interview participants in New 
Zealand (n = 6) were not sufficient to provide in-depth understanding of tax 
agents’ compliance behaviour in New Zealand, the telephone interviews in New 
Zealand were extended to February 2012 after sending the survey reminder for the 
second time. On average each participant in this study was interviewed for 
approximately 30 to 45 minutes. In Malaysia, the interview was conducted using a 
mix of Bahasa Malaysia and English. This was because, as mentioned in Section 
4.7.4.1, while Bahasa Malaysia is the official language in Malaysia, English is 
commonly used in commerce (Foo & Richards, 2004).  
Before the start of the interview, the researcher briefly explained to the 
interview participants about the objective of the study, interview process, and asked 
for their consent to record the interview. The interview was recorded using an 
audiotape and this allowed the researcher to concentrate on the questioning and 
listening during the interview (Saunders et al., 2003). The recordings of the 
interviews also provide opportunities for a more thorough examination on the 
information which could lead to more accurate findings (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
4.8.6 Data analysis  
A few approaches have been suggested by researchers to analyse qualitative 
data. Lincoln and Guba (1985), for instance, propose the concepts of unitizing, 
categorizing, finding patterns, and member checking. Unitizing refers to finding 
units of information that can be used to form categories. A unit of information has 
two features: it could provide some understanding to what the researcher wants to 
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know and is interpretable on its own. The second step, categorizing, involves 
reviewing all the units and put them into the appropriate categories. It is in this 
second step that new themes or categories emerge. In this second step, researchers 
name the categories which form the content of the category. The next step is 
finding the patterns of the categories by ensuring that the categories are not 
overlapping, checking if there is any association between the categories, and 
review the entire category to ensure nothing has been omitted. Finally, the member 
checking procedure requires interview participants to check the construction of the 
interview information and agree that the analysis reflects their actual interview 
answers.  
Saunders et al. (2003) suggest that data analysis in qualitative methods 
could broadly follow the deductive or inductive approaches. However, they also 
argue that it is possible to combine both methods in analysing qualitative data. The 
deductive approach starts with designing the questions according to a 
predetermined theory and thus the theme for the interview emerges from the 
interview questions. On the other hand, in an inductive approach, the researcher 
collects the data, analyses it and at the same time examines which themes will be 
focused on further. In the inductive approach there is no theory developed prior to 
the data collection; instead, the theory emerges from the data collection process 
(Saunders et al., 2003).   
Another approach to analyse qualitative data is by using thematic analysis. 
According to Braun and Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is the foundation method 
for qualitative analysis which involves finding repeated patterns of meaning from 
data. It is a method to identify, analyse, and report the patterns in data. Despite the 
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argument that thematic analysis is perceived as accepting any themes emerge from 
the data, thematic analysis is still considered  to be essential due to its flexibility, 
ease to apply, ability to capture similarities and differences across the data set, and  
ability to generate unanticipated insights (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The six phases of 
thematic analysis as suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006) are summarized in 
Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 Phases in Thematic Analysis 
 Phases Process 
1 Familiarizing with the 
data 
Transcribing the data (if necessary) 
2 Generating initial codes Coding systematically interesting features of the data 
3 Searching for themes Collating codes into potential themes 
4 Reviewing themes Checking if the themes represent the data at level 1 and 
level 2 
5 Defining and naming 
themes 
Refine the specific themes, the overall account of the 
data, generating clear definitions and names for each 
theme 
 
 
6 Producing the report Relating back the analysis with the research questions 
and the literature, producing report 
  
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006, p.87). 
The discussion on qualitative data analysis suggests that there are similar 
steps which have to be performed in analysing qualitative data. In this study, the 
researcher used a combination of deductive and inductive approaches in analysing 
the data to provide better understanding on the factors that influence tax agents in 
their decision-making. While in the deductive approach the themes are determined 
based on the questions asked, the inductive approach, on the other hand, allows 
themes to emerge from the data itself. The use of deductive and inductive approach 
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as the foundation is aligned with the purpose of conducting semi-structured 
interviews, which was discussed earlier. In addition, the researcher also referred to 
the steps suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Braun and Clarke (2006) in 
analysing the data which, in the opinion of the researcher have some similarities.  
Essentially, there were three main steps involved in analysing the interview 
data for the study. Firstly, the researcher transcribed the recording into written text. 
The process of transcribing interview recordings is the first step in data analysis 
and it is important because it reflects how the researcher interprets the data (Bailey, 
2008). On average it took approximately 4 hours for the researcher to transcribe the 
recording of each interview. This amount of time was required, since as suggested 
by Bailey (2008), transcription involves close observation of the data by repeated 
careful listening to the audiotape. As the interview in Malaysia was conducted in a 
mixed language of Bahasa Malaysia and English, after transcribing the recording 
for the Malaysian sample, the researcher translated the raw transcript into a full 
English text before further analysis.   
The second phase was the process of coding the data (Braun & Clarke, 
2006) or ‘unitizing’ as suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985). Once the coding 
process has been completed, the researcher put the codes into the respective 
themes. Some of the themes were determined a priori based on questions asked 
during the interviews; however, some new themes also emerge from the interview 
responses. The themes of the interview will be discussed further in Chapter 7 
containing Interview Findings  Apart from finding the themes, in this second step 
the researcher also assigns names to the themes and checks for theme consistency 
so that the names of the themes reflect their content and there is no overlapping of 
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codes in the themes. Finally, to increase the validity of the findings, the final stage 
involved the member checking procedure as suggested by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), Creswell and Miller (2000), and Creswell (2009).  
4.8.6.1 Reliability and validity of interview findings 
In qualitative methods, reliability and validity have different concepts 
compared to reliability and validity in quantitative methods. Reliability in 
qualitative methods does not suggest findings will be repeatable since the findings 
reflect the reality at the time when the interviews are performed (Saunders et al., 
2003). Following the suggestions by Saunders et al. (2003), Braun and Clarke 
(2006), and Creswell (2009), to increase the reliability of the interview findings, 
the researcher transcribed the recording, repeatedly checked the transcript, and 
compared the transcript against the recording to ensure there was no obvious 
mistake.  
Validity in qualitative research is defined as how accurate and reliable the 
data represent the realities of the interview participants in understanding the social 
phenomena (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Le Compte, 2000). One common method to 
determine the validity in a qualitative study is to use the member checking 
procedure (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Creswell & Miller, 2000; Creswell, 2009). The 
member checking procedure is considered to establish the validity of qualitative 
findings using the lens of the participants (Creswell & Miller, 2000). It is among 
the eight primary procedures frequently used to determine validity in a qualitative 
study (Creswell, 2009). The member checking procedure involves requesting 
interview participants to confirm the credibility of the information by asking the 
participants to check whether the themes are correct and the overall information is 
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accurate (Creswell & Miller, 2000).22 In this study, five interview participants 
checked the refined interview transcripts and the themes identified in determining 
the validity of the findings. All of them agreed with the themes proposed in the 
study.  
4.9 Summary  
The discussions in this chapter started with the research paradigm used in 
this study, followed by the emic and etic approaches in cross-cultural research, 
motivation for using mixed-methods approach, design of the study, and ethical 
clearance. The sample selection in mixed-method study was also highlighted before 
moving to the discussions on the quantitative and qualitative methods used in the 
study.  
The discussions on quantitative methods initially were centred on the 
justification of using survey.  Sample selection and sample size for the survey, pilot 
testing, procedure to collect data, the design of the questionnaire were also 
highlighted for both Malaysia and New Zealand. The discussions proceeded with 
construct development and measurement (reflective, formative, second order 
factor, measures for variables tested in the study) for both countries. The researcher 
also explained the procedures for data preparation and pre-analysis, namely the 
data screening process, tests for response representativeness, nonresponse bias, 
common method bias, social desirability bias, and descriptive analysis. The 
discussions were then concentrated on structural equation modelling (SEM) applied 
in the study, explaining the types of SEM modelling and model evaluations, both at 
                                                                
22 According to Creswell (2009), it is sufficient to provide the participants with the preliminary 
analysis consisting of themes of interview findings in member checking procedure.  
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the measurement of the first-order factor and second-order factor, and structural 
models.  
In this chapter, discussions on the qualitative approach (interview) were 
also presented by first explaining the types of interviews and followed by 
justifications for using semi-structured telephone interview. The development of 
interview guide, sampling and sample size for interviews, and procedures to collect 
interview data for both Malaysia and New Zealand were also discussed. In 
addition, the researcher also highlighted the data analysis process for the interview 
data, namely transcribing, coding, finding themes and checking for reliability and 
validity of the findings. The next chapter, Preliminary Analysis and Results 
presents the preliminary findings from the survey for both Malaysia and New 
Zealand.  
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CHAPTER 5  
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the preliminary results from the survey analysis 
before performing the model assessment analyses as set out in Chapter 6. The 
chapter is divided into two main parts: the survey response analysis, and 
preliminary analysis. The discussions in the survey analysis part focus on the 
response rate, demographic background of survey respondents, response 
representativeness and nonresponse bias for both Malaysia and New Zealand. In 
the preliminary analysis, the explanations centre on the data screening process, 
common method bias results, findings from the social desirability bias analysis, 
descriptive analysis and finally, the results from the t-test analysis. The chapter 
ends with a summary. 
5.1 Survey response analysis  
The survey response analysis discusses the response rate for both Malaysia 
and New Zealand, demographic profiles of survey respondents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand, response representativeness in both countries and non-response bias 
analysis. 
5.1.1 Response rate  
In any survey studies, the survey response rate is important for the 
generalisation of the findings to the whole population (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). 
Ideally, a high response rate is required to generalise the findings since a low 
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response rate suggests that the findings need to be generalized with great caution 
(Saunders et al., 2003). In the case of a low response rate, another approach is to 
generalise the findings to the observed samples participated in the study rather than 
generalise the findings to the whole population (Sekaran, 2002). The survey 
response rates for Malaysia and New Zealand are explained in the following 
subsections.  
5.1.1.1 Malaysia  
In Malaysia, the data collection was made between October 2011 and 
December 2011. Out of 1,500 survey questionnaires mailed to tax agents, 3 blank 
survey questionnaires were returned to the researcher with a note informing the 
agents are no longer in tax practice and  provide only  management accounting 
services.  During the follow-up, the researcher was also informed that 3 addressees 
have moved to other business premises and a further 9 survey questionnaires were 
unable to be delivered to the potential respondents. Eventually only 92 responses 
were completed and returned to the researcher for analysis. The survey response 
rate for Malaysia is summarized as follows: 
Table 5.1 Mail survey response rate for Malaysia 
Particulars Quantity 
Number of questionnaires mailed 1,500 
No longer in tax practice       (3) 
Delivered but addressee has moved       (9) 
Total available questionnaires 1,488 
Number of responses received      92 
Response rate (%)   6.2 
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The response rate for Malaysia was ascertained by calculating the number 
of responses received with total available questionnaires, resulting in a 6.2 percent 
of response rate. It is disappointing to note that the response rate obtained from 
Malaysia is low and lower than the average of 30 percent response rate for postal 
mail survey as suggested by Evans (2003) in tax compliance cost studies. Low 
response rates in tax studies have been experienced by other tax studies as well. A 
study on tax compliance cost of personal taxpayers in India by Chattopadhyay and 
Das-Gupta (2002) for instance, only managed to obtain a response rate of 2 percent 
from the postal survey, and out of 120 questionnaires sent to tax agents only 1 
questionnaire was completed and returned. A recent study by Mohd Isa (2012) 
among corporate taxpayers in Malaysia for instance, indicates an overall mixed-
mode survey response rate of 5 percent. If analysed independently, the postal 
survey in Mohd Isa (2012) study only generated 59 useable responses with 2.5 
percent response rate.  
There are several possible reasons contributing to the low response rate 
obtained for Malaysian survey. In Malaysia, a cross between systematic random 
sampling and snowballing sampling was used to select samples for the study. The 
snowballing sampling required tax agents who were initially identified from the 
systematic random sampling to disseminate the questionnaires to their colleagues. 
However, the researcher could not determine if the tax agents either refused to 
distribute the other two survey packages to their colleagues or even if they 
disseminated them, they could not enforce their colleagues to participate since this 
survey is voluntary. For instance, during the follow-up, some tax agents mentioned 
that they had passed the other two survey packs to their subordinates but they could 
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not force them to participate. As a result, the actual number of surveys distributed 
and received by potential respondents in Malaysia is not known which may lead to 
the low response rate for Malaysia.  
In addition, some tax agents mentioned that they are busy and do not have 
the time to fill in the questionnaire survey despite being informed by the researcher 
during the follow-up calls that late responses are still acceptable. The busy 
schedule of tax agents even during the off peak period is understood since they 
may be involved in other tax work, such as tax planning, and to a certain extent 
could contribute to their reluctance to participate in the study. Given the sensitive 
issues explored in the survey, there is also the possibility that some tax agents do 
not feel comfortable to answer questions about themselves despite participation 
being anonymous. Another potential factor is that there are some tax agents who 
simply do not have the interest to participate without giving further explanation for 
their refusal. During the follow-up calls some tax agents mentioned that they have 
received the questionnaire but did not guarantee that they would participate in the 
study.   
Nonetheless, the number of useable responses in this study is adequate for 
further analysis. The number of responses exceeds the requirement for PLS 
analysis based on the ten times rules of thumb as suggested by Hair et al. (2012). 
The ten times rule of thumb suggests that the minimum number sample size should 
be ten times  the number of path relationships directed to a particular construct in 
the structural model (Hair et al., 2012). The number of responses also fell between 
the minimum sample requirement suggested by Chin and Newsted (1999) for PLS 
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analysis, and exceeds the recommended minimum sample size for quantitative 
studies by Collins et al. (2007).  
5.1.1.2 New Zealand   
In New Zealand, the data collection was made between October 2011 and 
January 2012. The questionnaire was developed using Qualtrics Survey Software 
(QSS) subscribed by the University of Canterbury, and disseminated to 1,500 
members of NZICA listed as public practitioners in New Zealand, (details are 
available from NZICA’s website). An introductory email explaining the 
background of the study, containing the links for the survey and interview, was sent 
to these 1,500 potential participants. Out of these 1,500 initial invitations, 16 tax 
agents sent emails to the researcher, notifying their refusal to participate in the 
study. A further 185 emails were opened by potential respondents and 135 
participants provided their responses. The survey response rate is provided in Table 
5.2.  
Table 5.2 Online survey response rate for New Zealand 
Particulars Quantity 
Number of invitations 1,500 
Not able / not willing to answer    (16) 
Total available  1,484 
Emails opened    185 
Number of responses received    135 
Response rate (%)        9.1 
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The response rate for the study was determined by calculating the ratio of 
number of responses received to total surveys available, yielding a 9.1 percent 
response rate.23 Similar to Malaysia, the total responses are somewhat 
disappointing, but the sample size is sufficient for statistical analysis. Other tax 
studies using online surveys also obtained low response rates.  Tran-Nam and 
Karlinsky (2008), for instance, recorded a survey response rate of 8.6 percent in an 
online survey among tax agents in Australia. In recent online surveys among small 
business taxpayers in Australia, Lignier and Evans (2012) only obtained a response 
rate of around 4.5 percent. Another recent online surveys among small business 
taxpayers in Canada, South Africa and United Kingdom by Hasseldine et al. 
(2012), also recorded low response rates of 1.35 percent, 6.7 percent and 0.9 
percent respectively.  Furthermore, the completed useable responses of 119 for 
New Zealand, as explained in sub-section 5.2.1, meets the requirement of the “ten 
times rule of thumb” in determining the minimum sample size in PLS (Hair et al., 
2012, p. 144), and exceeds the minimum requirement  for a sample size suggested 
by Chin and Newsted (1999) and Collins et al. (2007).  
Some feedback provided by the Chartered Accountants invited to 
participate in the survey suggest several reasons for not participating. First, not all 
Chartered Accountants listed as “Public Practitioner” in the NZICA’s website are 
in tax practice. There are members who are involved only in other accounting 
practices such as auditing, management accounting and financial accounting. The 
database available from the NZICA’s website, however, does not differentiate 
                                                                
23 Tran-Nam and Karlinsky (2008) calculated the response rate in their study, which also used an 
online questionnaire, by dividing the actual number of responses with the total number of emails 
opened. If the same method is applied in this study, it generates a response rate of 72.97 percent.  
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members according to their expertise in sub-areas of accounting namely audit, tax, 
management and financial accounting. Therefore, it is unlikely to prepare a list 
containing only tax agents from the database. Consequently, there is a possibility 
that the sample frame may have not captured the actual number of NZICA 
members who practised as tax agents, resulting into an understated response rate. 
Some of the comments indicate this situation: 
“We only do audit, no taxation” 
“We only do management systems and financial systems” 
Another potential reason is tax agents are over-committed and have time 
constraints with their tax work, as suggested by the following electronic mails sent 
to the researcher:  
“I am over-committed this time” 
“Sorry, do not have the time” 
In addition to that, there are also Chartered Accountants who indicated their 
reluctance to participate without giving any further reasons as commented below: 
“Not able to participate” 
“Unable to do the survey” 
As a result of higher internet security practised by organizations, there is 
also a possibility that the emails sent to the potential survey respondents are not 
delivered into their mailbox and considered as unsolicited or spam emails (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). Thus, the actual number of surveys received by tax agents is 
unknown, and this could be another possible reason contributing to the low 
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response rate obtained in this study. Similar to Malaysia, it is also likely that some 
tax agents refused to participate in the survey due to the sensitive nature of the 
survey. As professionals, they may feel uncomfortable to answer questions about 
their own tax compliance behaviour.  
5.1.2 Demographic background  
The demographic background of survey respondents for Malaysia and New 
Zealand are tabulated in Tables 5.3 to 5.8. The survey respondent profiles consist 
of information on gender, age, ethnicity, working experience, type of firms 
currently working, and position in the firm. While there are differences in 
demographics between the Malaysian and New Zealand samples, no further test 
was conducted since this study used the TPB which assumes that the influence of 
demographic background is already captured in the attitude of the respondents.  
5.1.2.1 Gender  
With reference to the gender of survey respondents, it could be suggested 
that for Malaysian respondents, female tax agents dominated the survey 
participation compared to male tax agents. More than half of the survey 
respondents in Malaysia are female (53), compared to 39 males who participated in 
the study.  In New Zealand, males dominated the survey participation with 83 
participants, with 35 only from females.  
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Table 5.3 Gender of survey respondents 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
Gender Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Male 39 42.4 83 69.8 
Female 53 57.6 35 29.4 
Missing 0 0 1   0.8 
Total 92 100 119 100 
 
5.1.2.2 Age   
In Malaysia, the majority of the respondents were below the age of 30 (45.6 
percent). In contrast, only nine New Zealand respondents fell below this age level. 
The data also indicates that a significant number of the New Zealand respondents 
were between the ages of 41 to 55 years old (61.4 percent) as illustrated below. 
Overall, it could be suggested that respondents from Malaysia are younger 
compared to the New Zealand respondents.  
Table 5.4 Age of survey respondents 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
Age (years) Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
25 or below 22 23.9 6 5.0 
26-30   20 21.7 3 2.5 
31-35 11 12.0 8 6.7 
36-40 13 14.1 8 6.7 
41-45 9 9.8 25 21.0 
46-50 5 5.4 21 17.7 
51-55 4 4.3 27 22.7 
56-60 3 3.3 8 6.7 
Over 60 5 5.4 13 10.9 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Total 92 100* 119 100* 
*Note: Rounded-up to the nearest whole number. 
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5.1.2.3 Ethnicity  
With regard to ethnicity, majority of the respondents were Malays with 74 
respondents (80.4 percent), followed by 15 Chinese and 2 Indian respondents. 
Likewise, in New Zealand, the survey participation is also dominated by those with 
European ethnicity with 104 respondents (87.4 percent). Other ethnics such as 
Maori, Pacific and Asian, are represented by 6 respondents (5 percent) from the 
total survey participation.  Seven respondents fell under the category of “Others”, 
but did not elaborate further their ethnicity.  
Table 5.5 Ethnicity of survey respondents 
 Malaysia  New Zealand 
Ethnicity Frequency Percent Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
Malay 74 80.4 NZ 
European 
104 87.4 
Chinese 15 16.3 Maori 1 0.8 
Indian 2 2.2 Pacific 1 0.8 
   Asian 4 3.4 
   Others 7 5.9 
Missing 1 1.1 Missing 2 1.7 
Total 92 100  119 100 
 
5.1.2.4 Working experience in tax practice 
A significant number of survey respondents in Malaysia have less than 5 
years of experience in tax practice (41 respondents) contributing to 44.6 percent of 
the total survey participation.  Twenty one respondents, equivalent to 22.8 percent, 
have around 11 to 20 years of tax working experience, followed by 17 respondents 
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who have between 5 to 10 years tax working experience. In this study, 13 
respondents from Malaysia had more than 20 years of tax working experience.  
A different pattern of tax working experience is recorded for New Zealand. 
The majority of the New Zealand respondents, 62 tax agents, stated that they have 
more than 20 years of tax working experience which is equivalent to 52.1 percent. 
This is followed by 33 respondents (27.7 percent) who indicated that they have 
around 11 to 20 years of experience in tax practice.  Thirteen respondents (10.9 
percent) have between 5 to 10 years of tax working experience and 11 of the 
respondents mentioned that they have less than 5 years of experience.  
 Table 5.6  Working experience of survey respondents 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
Experience  
(years) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Less than 5 41 44.6 11 9.2 
5-10 17 18.5 13 10.9 
11-20 21 22.8 33 27.7 
More than 20 13 14.1 62 52.1 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Total 92 100 119 100* 
Note: Rounded-up to the nearest “0”. 
5.1.2.5 Type of firms   
The data in Table 5.7 below indicates that majority of the survey 
respondents from Malaysia came from small size public accounting firms with 39 
participants.  They contributed 42.4 percent from the total survey participation 
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from Malaysia. The second largest group of respondents came from medium size 
public accounting firms with 30 participations (32.6 percent). There were 8 
representatives from “Big Four” public accounting firms, 5 respondents were from 
tax consulting firms and 3 sole practitioners.  Seven respondents, however, did not 
indicate the type of firms they are currently working. Similarly, in New Zealand, a 
significant number of participants came from small size public accounting firms 
with 73 respondents, who contributed 61.3 percent from the total survey 
participation from New Zealand in this study. This is followed by 23 respondents 
from medium size public accounting firms, 9 participations each from tax 
consulting firms and sole practitioners. The smallest number of participants in New 
Zealand came from “Big Four” public accounting firms with only 5 respondents.  
Table 5.7 Type of firms of survey respondents 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
Types of firm Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
‘Big Four” public 
accounting firms 
8 8.7 5 4.2 
Medium size public 
accounting firms 
30 32.6 23 19.3 
Small size public 
accounting firms 
39 42.4 73 61.3 
Tax consulting firms 5 5.4 9 7.6 
Sole Practitioner 3 3.3 9 7.6 
Missing 7 7.6 0 0 
Total 92 100 119 100 
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5.1.2.6 Position   
The survey respondents were also required to state their current position in 
their firm. In Malaysia, for instance, the terms ‘tax assistant’, ‘tax executive’, and 
‘tax associate’, basically refer to the most junior level of tax staff in a firm. In this 
study, a majority of the respondents from Malaysia, (22 participations), are at the 
level of tax assistant/tax executive/tax associate, which constitutes 23.9 percent 
from the total survey participation. This is followed by the position of ‘manager’ at 
a slightly lower number of participations of 21 respondents (22.8 percent). The 
third largest group of respondents from Malaysia are at the level of senior tax 
assistant/senior tax executive/senior tax associate, with 17 respondents, and 
contribute to 18.5 percent of the total survey participation.  Eleven of the 
respondents are at the level of Partner, while the positions of senior manager, 
principal, director, sole-practitioner and tax consultants, are minimally represented 
in this study.  Six of the survey respondents declined to state their position in the 
firm. In comparison with New Zealand, a majority of the respondents are partners 
of the firms. A sizeable number of 36.9 percent, of the total survey participation for 
New Zealand in this study were partners. The second position was director, which 
is represented by 25 participations or 21 percent. This is followed by respondents 
who are at the level of manager with 12 respondents or 10.1 percent. The positions 
of principal, sole practitioner and tax consultant were moderately represented with 
9 participants for each category. The remaining positions are intermediate 
accountant (5 participations), senior accountant (1 respondent), senior manager (2 
respondents) and associate partner (3 respondents).  
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Table 5.8 Positions of survey respondents 
 Malaysia  New Zealand 
Positions Frequency Percent Positions Frequency Percent 
Tax assistant / 
executive /associate 
22 23.9 Intermediate 
Accountant 
5 4.2 
Senior tax assistant / 
executive /associate 
17 18.5 Senior 
Accountant 
1 0.8 
Manager 21 22.8 Manager 12 10.1 
Senior Manager 3 3.3 Senior 
Manager 
2 1.7 
Principal 1 1.1 Principal 9 7.6 
Director 4 4.3 Director 25 21 
Partner 11 12 Associate 
Partner 
3 2.5 
Sole Practitioner 3 3.3 Partner 44 36.9 
Tax Consultant 4 4.3 Sole 
Practitioner 
9 7.6 
Missing 6 6.5 Tax 
Consultant 
9 7.6 
   Missing 0 0 
Total 92 100  119 100 
 
5.1.3 Response representativeness   
One method to determine the representativeness of the samples is by 
comparing the demographic background of respondents with the whole population 
(Saunders et al., 2003). Due to the unavailability of information from MIA’s 2012 
Annual Report, the representativeness of the samples from Malaysia was 
established by comparing only the gender and age of survey respondents with the 
MIA membership population. In New Zealand, based on information obtained from 
223 
 
the NZCIA‘s 2012 Annual Report, comparisons on gender, age and ethnicity were 
made between the survey respondents and NZICA membership population to 
determine representativeness. 
5.1.3.1 Malaysia   
According to the statistics provided in MIA’s 2012 Annual Report, males 
and females are equally represented in MIA membership for the year ended June 
2012. Looking at both datasets, there is a marginal difference between the ratio of 
males and females in the current study with the gender ratio in the total MIA 
membership. Based on this, it could be suggested that the gender ratio of males and 
females in the current study ‘moderately’ reflects the gender mix of the population.  
Originally, the age brackets established for the study were different from 
the age bands of the population. To make it more comparable, the age brackets of 
the original study were transformed to the same age brackets of the population. 
Based on the age tabulation sets out in Table 5.9, in comparison with the MIA 
population, it could be suggested that respondents below the age of 30 are over-
represented in the current study.24 The comparison also indicates that the age 
pattern of the observed sample differs from the population. While the age of the 
population concentrates at the middle age level, the age of observed samples 
generally centred on the young and middle age levels. Arguably, the age of the 
respondents does not sufficiently resemble the age of the total population.  
                                                                
24 This study did not use MIA members as samples but tax agents in public practice as well as tax 
staff employed by the tax agents as explained earlier in sub-section 4.7.1.1. A person is not required 
to be a member of MIA to become a tax agent in Malaysia. Even if the employees of the tax agents 
are not MIA members, they are still obliged to the same professional ethics as MIA members since 
MIA governs the accounting profession in Malaysia.  
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Unfortunately, the breakdown of membership ethnicity is not available 
from the MIA’s 2012 Annual Report.25 However, it was reported by the then 
MIA’s President in the media that for the year 2012, the representation of Malay 
accountants in MIA membership was around 28 percent (Unknown, 2012). Based 
on this information, it could be suggested that Malays were over represented in the 
study. It also implies that there is little evidence to conclude that the ethnicity of 
the observed sample mirrored the ethnicity of the population. Despite this, as 
mentioned in sub-section 2.4.2, prior studies in Malaysia such as Lim (2001) found 
that, regardless of their ethnicities, managers in Malaysia are similar in their 
decision making.26 
In general, after reviewing both datasets from three selected criteria, namely 
gender, age and ethnicity, there is a concern that the observed sample does not truly 
represent the population except for gender which approximately reflects the total 
population. One possible reason could be due to the existence of selection bias as a 
result from employing a cross between systematic random sampling and 
snowballing in data collection. Arguably, there is also the possibility that different 
ethnics have different level of survey response rate (Lyness and Kropf, 2007).   
 
                                                                
25 Personal communication with the officer-in-charge confirmed that MIA does not reveal their 
membership demographic background except as disclosed in its annual report to oblige with its 
Database Information Privacy Policy. 
26 This thesis examines the influence of culture at the national level by using Hofstede’s (1980) 
National Cultural Dimensions to measure culture. Therefore the issue of ethnicity is not considered 
to be relevant in the context of this thesis. Consistent with other tax compliance studies such as Saad 
(2011) and Mohd Ali (2013) ethnicity is only used to determine representativeness of the samples in 
the study. It is also consistent with the suggestion by Sekaran (2002) in determining the 
representativeness of the sample over the population.  
225 
 
Table 5.9 Comparison between survey response and population - Malaysia 
 Survey response   MIA  population 
Items Frequency Percentage   Frequency Percentage 
Gender  
Male  39 42.4 Male 14,245 50 
Female 53 57.6 Female 14,245 50 
Age a 
Below 30 42 45.7 Below 30 2,207 8 
31-40 24 26.1 31-40 12,401 43 
41-50 14 15.2 41-50 8,804 31 
51-60 7 7.6 51-60 3,877 14 
Above 60 5 5.4 Above 60 1,200 4 
Ethnicity 
Malay 74 80.4 Data was not disclosed in MIA’s Annual 
Report b 
Chinese 15 16.3 
Indian 2 2.2 
Note: (a) The original age bands for the study were re-grouped to be consistent with 
MIA’s data. 
(b) Nonetheless, it was reported in the media that the Malays formed 28 
percent of MIA membership in 2012 (Unknown, 2012). 
(c) All figures exclude respondents with missing data. 
 
5.1.3.2 New Zealand   
While equal numbers of males and females have been entering the New 
Zealand accounting profession (Whiting & Wright, 2001) and female membership 
of NZICA has increased over the years (Hopman & Lord, 2009), the statistics 
provided by the NZICA suggests that males still dominate the accounting 
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profession. For the year ended June 2012, NZICA had 33,297 members of which 
58 percent were males and the remaining 42 percent females (NZICA Annual 
Report, 2012). Therefore, it is not surprising that males are represented more than 
females in this study. While there is a slight difference with regard to the ratio of 
males and females in the study, with the ratio of males and females in the total 
population of NZICA membership as tabulated in Table 5.10, it can be concluded 
that the observed samples in the study approximately reflect the gender of the 
population. Due to the differences in the age brackets employed in the study with 
the NZICA membership population, it is inappropriate to make any comparison 
between the two datasets. However, it could be suggested that majority of the 
respondents are ‘middle aged’ which approximately resembles the NZICA 
membership population.  
The statistics of NZICA membership indicates that majority of the members 
are of New Zealand and European ethnicity with 60.2 percent. The second largest 
group was formed by “Other ethnics” with 24 percent, followed by Asian with 15 
percent and the least members, Maori, formed only 0.8 percent of the total 
membership population. An identical pattern of ethnicity was evidenced in the 
observed samples. The largest group of respondents came from the New Zealand 
European, followed by “Others” ethnicity, Asian, and the least respondents were of 
Maori ethnicity. Based on the pattern, it is argued that the ethnicity of the observed 
samples mirrored the ethnicity of the membership population.  
In summary, the observed samples approximately represented the 
population of NZICA’s membership based on some selected criteria. Except for 
unavailable information, comparisons between the observed samples and total 
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population suggest that the samples in the study somewhat reflect the total 
population. 
Table 5.10 Comparison between survey response and population- New 
Zealand 
 Survey response   NZICA  population 
Items Frequency Percentage   Frequency Percentage 
Gender  
Male  83 69.7 Male 19,312 58 
Female 35 29.4 Female 13,985 42 
Age 
25 or below 6 5 Under 30 4,662 14 
26-30 3 2.5 30-39 7,991 24 
31-35 8 6.7 40-49 9,656 29 
36-40 8 6.7 50-59 6,326 19 
41-45 25 21 60 or over 4,329 13 
46-50 21 17.6    
51-55 27 22.7    
56-60 8 6.7    
Over 60 13 10.9    
Ethnicity 
New Zealand 
European 
104 87.4 New 
Zealander 
and 
European 
20,644 60.2 
Maori 1 0.8 Maori 2,664 0.8 
Pacific 1 0.8 Asian 4,995 15 
Asian 4 3.4 Othersa 7,991 24 
Others 7 5.9    
Note: (a) This category consists of Middle Eastern, African, Pacific and not disclosed 
category 
(b) All figures exclude missing data  
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5.1.4 Nonresponse bias  
To examine the existence of non-response bias between those who 
participated in the study and those who refused to participate, the responses were 
divided into early and late responses, as explained in sub-section 4.7.7.3. The late 
respondents were used as substitutes of non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977). For this purpose, the difference of means of the early and late responses on 
sixteen cultural items was then compared to determine whether or not it was 
significant at p ≤ 0.05 using independent t-test analyses.  
5.1.4.1 Malaysia  
The results from the independent t-test analysis between early and late 
responses for Malaysian survey are illustrated in Table 5.11 below, consisting of 
the mean, standard deviation and the respective two-tailed p-values. The results 
from the analysis suggest that nonresponse bias is not a serious threat to the study 
since both early and late respondents responded similarly to the survey. A majority 
of the items have p-values of more than 0.05 except for item MAS4 which has a p-
value of less than 0.05 but more than 0.01. Notwithstanding that, it is not 
completely guaranteed that there is no response bias in the study considering the 
small number of samples from Malaysia. The full results from the analysis are 
available in Appendix I.  
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Table 5.11 Mean and Standard Deviation for Early and Late Responses – 
Malaysia 
 
Response N Mean Std. Dev. 
p-value (two 
tailed) 
PD1 Early 47 4.79 1.781 0.488 
Late 45 5.04 1.713  
PD2 Early 47 3.34 2.042 0.119 
Late 45 3.95 1.620  
PD3 Early 47 3.91 1.653 0.201 
Late 45 4.39 1.853  
PD4R Early 47 2.89 1.323 0.646 
Late 45 3.02 1.302  
IND1R Early 47 2.28 1.425 0.217 
Late 45 2.67 1.581  
IND2 Early 47 4.38 1.609 0.231 
Late 45 4.00 1.430  
IND3 Early 47 3.38 2.049 0.237 
Late 45 2.96 1.348  
IND4R Early 47 3.23 1.371 0.386 
Late 45 3.00 1.206  
MAS1 Early 47 3.90 1.772 0.585 
Late 45 4.09 1.490  
MAS2 Early 47 5.04 1.351 0.365 
Late 45 5.29 1.236  
MAS3 Early 47 3.30 1.502 0.263 
Late 45 3.67 1.638  
MAS4 Early 47 5.17 1.324 0.048* 
Late 45 4.62 1.302  
UAV1 Early 47 5.98 0.921 0.090 
Late 45 5.35 1.265  
UAV2R Early 47 3.55 1.780 0.330 
Late 45 3.89 1.496  
UAV3 Early 47 4.98 1.294 0.177 
Late 45 4.58 1.530  
UAV4R Early 47 3.79 1.587 0.648 
Late 45 3.93 1.468  
*Significant at p≤ 0.05 
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5.1.4.2 New Zealand  
The results for the nonresponse bias test for New Zealand are presented in 
Table 5.12 below, which state the mean, standard deviation and p-values for two-
tailed test between the early and late respondents. The results indicate that majority 
of the items have p-values of more than 0.05 indicating that early and late 
respondents responded similarly to the survey. As for two items, PD2 and MAS4, 
they have p-values of less than 0.05 but both are more than 0.01.  Based on these 
findings, similar to Malaysia, it could be suggested that non-response bias is not a 
serious concern in the survey responses from New Zealand. Nonetheless, this does 
not fully assure the non-existence of response bias considering that the study only 
recorded a small number of samples from New Zealand. The detailed results for the 
analysis are available in Appendix J.  
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Table 5.12 Mean and Standard Deviation for Early and Late Responses – New 
Zealand 
 
Response N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
p-value 
(two tailed) 
PD1 Early 73 4.85 1.515 0.339 
Late 46 5.13 1.614  
PD2 Early 73 2.55 1.202 0.025* 
Late 46 3.13 1.439  
PD3 Early 73 3.97 1.481 0.648 
Late 46 4.11 1.729  
PD4R Early 73 3.77 1.370 0.456 
Late 46 3.57 1.530  
IND1R early 73 2.26 1.080 0.562 
late 46 2.15 .816  
IND2 early 73 4.12 1.649 0.966 
late 46 4.11 1.935  
IND3 early 73 2.54 1.403 0.610 
late 46 2.67 1.461  
IND4R early 73 4.47 1.500 0.758 
late 46 4.57 1.734  
MAS1 early 73 3.48 1.690 0.790 
late 46 3.39 1.782  
MAS2 early 73 5.33 1.001 0.097 
late 46 4.92 1.458  
MAS3 early 73 2.57 1.022 0.784 
late 46 2.63 1.271  
MAS4 early 73 4.73 1.326 0.034* 
late 46 4.72 1.393  
UAV1 early 73 5.81 1.174 0.394 
late 46 6.00 1.174  
UAV2R early 73 4.15 1.793 0.287 
late 46 3.80 1.600  
UAV3 early 73 4.23 1.559 0.306 
late 46 3.93 1.511  
UAV4R early 73 4.64 1.284 0.692 
late 46 4.74 1.405  
*Significant at p < 0.05.  
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5.2 Preliminary analysis  
The preliminary analysis involved several analyses namely a data screening 
process, common method bias analysis, social desirability analysis, descriptive 
analysis and t-test analysis.  
5.2.1 Data screening process  
The data screening process involved treatment of missing values, 
determining outliers and normality of the data, to ensure the data fulfil the 
assumptions of the statistical test (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). Missing data is 
considered as a common problem in research (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). A check 
on the Malaysian data revealed that all 92 responses received have less than 10 
percent missing data. Hair et al. (2010) suggest that any remedies of missing data 
could be applied if the missing data is less than 10 percent. Following the 
recommendation of Hair et al. (2010), the Expectation Maximisation (EM) method 
was used to treat the missing data problem for Malaysia.  
Similar to Malaysia, an initial check on the New Zealand data indicated that 
out of 135 responses received, 16 have missing data have more than 10 percent. 
Following the suggestion by Hair et al. (2010), these 16 cases were removed from 
the dataset leaving 119 useable cases for further analysis. Since any imputation 
methods could be used for cases with less than 10 percent missing data (Hair et al., 
2010), similar to Malaysia, the EM method was used to replace the missing values. 
Once the missing data was determined, the existence of outliers was tested in both 
datasets from Malaysia and New Zealand by examining the minimum and 
maximum values from the frequencies analysis (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010).  
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The normality of the data was checked by examining the skewness and 
kurtosis of the data distribution. The results from Malaysia indicate that the 
majority of the data fell within the acceptable range of +/- 3 for skewness (Lind et 
al., 2008) and +/- 3 for kurtosis (Gaur and Gaur, 2006),  with very few data 
deviating slightly from the acceptable values. A check on the skewness and 
kurtosis of New Zealand data also revealed that majority of the data fell within the 
acceptable range of +/-3 for skewness and kurtosis values (Gaur and Gaur, 2006; 
Lind et al., 2008) with some data  falling outside the acceptable normality values. 
Considering that this study involves sensitive issues, it is expected that some 
responses may skew positively or negatively. 
Despite some of the data for both Malaysia and New Zealand falling 
beyond the accepted normality range, as displayed in Appendix K and Appendix  
L, it could still be suggested that the data is approximately normal. Hair et al. 
(2010) suggest that non-normality will have unfavourable impact to the findings if 
the samples are less than 50, which in this case, is not relevant for the study since 
the number of samples for both countries are more than 50. In addition to that, 
according to the central limit theorem, the mean sample from a sample size 
increases with the number of sample and if the number of the sample is more than 
30 (such as in this study), the mean of the samples would be approximately 
normally distributed even when the original population is not normal (Field, 2009; 
Lind et al., 2008). In a Monte Carlo analysis performed by Moore and McCabe 
(2006), they found that for a sample of at least 40 in each group, a t-test analysis 
could be used, without any consideration for skewness or outliers, which could be 
due to the central limit theorem (Lind et al., 2008). Furthermore, the Partial Least 
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Squares (PLS) applied in this study is not restricted to any distribution assumption 
of the data. The minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis are presented in 
Appendices K and L.  
5.2.2 Common method bias analysis  
As mentioned earlier in sub-section 4.7.7.4, apart from following the 
suggestions by Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Conway and Lance (2010) to reduce 
common method bias in the study, Harmon’s single factor test was also performed 
to assess the extent of common method bias in the study by forcing all indicators to 
load in a single factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003). There is a problem of common 
method bias if a single factor accounts for the majority of the variance.  
The results from the principal factor analysis for Malaysian data suggest 
that there are eighteen factors extracted with eigenvalues more than 1 with a 
cumulative value of 80.53 percent of the total variance. Since factor one only 
accounted for 26.74 percent of the variance, it could be suggested that in this study 
the impact of common method bias is minimal and is not a serious issue in the 
survey findings from Malaysia. Similar to Malaysia, a test to assess the extent of 
common method bias in survey data from New Zealand was also performed using 
the Harmon’s single factor test. The test on New Zealand survey data also revealed 
the marginal existence of common method bias indicating that common method 
bias is not a serious threat in this study. There are twenty factors with eigenvalue 
more than 1 which cumulatively accounted for 78.04 percent of the total variance 
generated by this analysis from New Zealand survey data. However, factor one 
accounted for only 20.47 percent of the variance. Notwithstanding that, it is not 
fully guaranteed that the survey findings for the study are fully free from any bias. 
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The detailed analyses for examining common method bias for both countries are 
presented in Appendices M and N.  
5.2.3 Social desirability bias   
Social desirability bias may exist in self-reports study especially if the study 
involves sensitive issues (Bryman and Bell, 2011), such as in this study. In self-
report studies, respondents have the tendency to depict themselves with a 
favourable image by choosing answers which interpreted as more socially desirable 
which could introduce bias to the findings of the study (Krosnick, 1999). To 
determine the existence of social desirability bias in the study, the respondents 
were asked the possibility that they and their peers will perform the action as 
described in the overstating tax expenses scenario and understating income 
scenario. All responses were recorded using seven-point scales, fully anchored with 
a High/Low, with higher scales indicating lower probability to perform the 
described behaviour in the scenarios. The findings from the paired t-test for both 
Malaysia and New Zealand are presented in the following sub-sections.  
5.2.3.1 Malaysia  
The results from the paired t-test suggest that social desirability bias exist in 
the study for both over-reporting tax expenses scenario (t = -5.162, p < 0.01) and 
under-reporting income tax scenario (t = -4.707, p < 0.01). The findings indicate 
that survey respondents from Malaysia perceived themselves as more ethical 
compared to their peers. The findings are summarized in Table 5.13.  
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Table 5.13 Measures of social desirability bias - Malaysia 
  Peero/Peerua Selfo/Selfub   
Scenarios N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. t -value 
p–value 
(two 
tailed)  
Overstating 
expenses 
92 4.03 1.700 4.83 1.56 -5.162 .000 
Understating  
income 
92 4.13 1.762 4.89 1.687 -4.707 .000 
Notes: a  “The probability that my peers will take the same action is …” 
 b “The probability that I will take the same action is….” 
 All responses were rated with seven-point scales, fully anchored with High/Low 
with   higher scores indicating low probability to perform the described behaviour 
 
 
5.2.3.2 New Zealand  
Similar to the Malaysian survey respondents in the study, the findings 
indicate that social desirability bias exists in the responses of New Zealand survey 
respondents. In both scenarios, the overstating tax expenses (t = -6.513, p < 0.01) 
and understating income (t = -6.103, p < 0.01), there are statistically significant 
differences between the perception of how likely tax agents in the study perform 
the described behaviour in the scenario (Selfo/Selfu), with the possibility that their 
peers will perform similar behaviour (Peero/Peeru). The results indicate that New 
Zealand tax agents in the study are likely to perceive themselves as more ethical 
compared to their peers.  
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Table 5.14 Measures of social desirability bias – New Zealand 
  Peero/Peerua Selfo/Selfub   
Scenarios N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
t-value p–value 
(two 
tailed) 
Overstating 
expenses 
119 4.40 1.986 5.39 2.022 -6.513 
.000 
Understating 
income 
119 4.95 1.991 5.85 1.885 -6.103 .000 
Notes: a  “The probability that my peers will take the same action is …” 
 b “The probability that I will take the same action is….” 
 All responses were rated with seven-point scales, fully anchored with High/Low 
with   higher scores indicating low probability to perform the described behaviour 
 
In sum, social desirability bias exists in the responses of survey respondents 
from Malaysia and New Zealand in both tax scenarios presented in the study. The 
survey respondents in this study from both countries have the tendency to perceive 
themselves as more ethical compared to their peers in overstating tax expenses and 
understating tax income. The findings are consistent with other ethics-based studies 
on accountants, such as Cohen et al. (1993) and Cruz et al. (2000). While the 
existence of social desirability bias suggests that the findings from this study have 
to be interpreted with caution, it also supports the suggestion by Cruz et al. (2000) 
on the importance of testing for social desirability bias in tax compliance studies. 
The findings also indicate that survey respondents in both countries perceive 
themselves and their peers as less likely to involve in understating tax income 
compared to overstating tax expenses, which supports the argument by Jones 
(1991) that being ethical is situation specific.  
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5.2.4 Descriptive analysis  
Descriptive analysis is frequently used to interpret basic features of the 
data. In this descriptive analysis, the minimum, maximum, mean and standard 
deviation are presented for each item measuring culture, Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) and ethical sensitivity. The measures for each item are also 
provided as per outlined in the questionnaire with the respective codes. 
5.2.4.1 Malaysia  
This section explains findings from the perceptions of survey respondents 
from Malaysia on culture, TPB items and ethical sensitivity, in complying with the 
tax law while performing their roles as tax agents. The descriptive statistics results 
are outlined in Table 5.15 to Table 5.19. 
(a). Measures of culture  
The Descriptive results for culture are presented in Table 5.15 below 
displaying four of Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions operationalized 
in tax compliance context. To interpret the results, the lower the mean values, 
indicates higher disagreement on the influence of culture in complying with the tax 
law. The overall results suggest that respondents have mixed opinions on the 
influence of Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity and Uncertainty 
Avoidance in complying with the tax law. The overall mean of Power Distance of 
3.92 indicates that there is low gap of Power Distance between the junior and their 
superior in the study when complying with the tax law. There were mixed of 
opinions on individualism and tax compliance behaviour with the means ranging 
from 2.47 to 4.20, resulting in an overall mean of 3.24, leaning towards low 
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individualism. While the means for Masculinity measures were mixed, they were 
moving towards higher Masculinity culture in complying with the tax law with an 
overall mean of 4.38. The Uncertainty Avoidance measures also generated mixed 
means, ranging from 3.72 to 5.67 resulting in an overall mean of 4.51. This 
suggests that respondents in the study had the tendency to practise high Uncertainty 
Avoidance culture in complying with the tax law while performing their roles as 
tax agents.  
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Table 5.15 Descriptive statistics on measures of culture - Malaysia 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Power Distance PD 92 1 7 3.92 1.023 
A junior staff should follow the instructions from 
his/her superior in complying with the tax law 
PD1 92 1 7 4.91 1.743 
A junior staff should feel afraid to disagree with 
his/her superior in complying with the tax law 
PD2 92 1 7 3.64 1.863 
Most of the time, a superior is expected to tell 
his/her junior staff on what to do in complying 
with the tax law 
PD3 92 1 7 4.15 1.760 
A junior staff should always be involved in the 
decision making when dealing with client’s tax 
matters * 
PD4R 92 1 7 2.96 1.307 
Individualism IND 92 1 7 3.24 0.822 
The benefits that we as a society could enjoy 
from the amount of tax collected is very 
important to me * 
IND1R 92 1 7 2.47 1.508 
When complying with the tax law, I only 
consider the effect to my client 
IND2 92 1 7 4.20 1.528 
I do not care whether or not the society would 
benefit from the amount of tax collected as long 
as I could enjoy the tax benefit 
IND3 92 1 7 3.17 1.746 
I would consider the long term effect to the 
society when complying with the tax law* 
IND4R 92 1 7 3.12 1.291 
Masculinity MAS 92 1 7 4.38 0.825 
I would rather challenge the tax authority than 
negotiate with them in a tax lawsuit 
MAS1 92 1 7 3.99 1.634 
I always feel confident with the decision that I 
make when complying with the tax law 
MAS2 92 2 7 5.16 1.295 
I prefer to challenge the tax authority’s decision 
rather than negotiate with them 
MAS3 92 1 7 3.48 1.572 
I always feel confident to make my own 
decisions while dealing with my client’s tax 
matter 
MAS4 92 1 7 4.90 1.335 
Uncertainty Avoidance UAV 92 1 7 4.51 0.810 
The more precise the tax law, the better UAV1 92 3 7 5.67 1.140 
I do not mind having differences in tax 
judgments with the tax authority. * 
UAV2R 92 1 7 3.72 1.647 
When complying with the tax law, I avoid taking 
any tax risk since a tax risk could cause 
unfavourable effect 
UAV3 92 1 7 4.78 1.421 
When complying with the tax law, a tax risk is an 
opportunity. * 
UAV4R 92 1 7 3.86 1.523 
*Scores for the items were reversed coded. 
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(b). Measures of Theory of Planned Behaviour items  
Table 5.16 outlines the results from the descriptive statistics analysis for 
TPB items with respect to overstating tax expenses scenario. To interpret the 
results, the lower the means of Intention, Attitude and Subjective Norms, imply the 
less possibility to overstate tax expenses resulting in complying with the tax law. 
On the other hand, the lower the mean of Perceived Behavioural Control, this 
indicates greater control to overstate tax expenses resulting in noncompliance.  
Except for Perceived Behavioural Control, the overall results suggest that 
respondents in the study were less likely to overstate tax expenses in complying 
with the tax law. Intention to overstate tax expenses recorded an overall mean of 
3.03, indicating the tendency of respondents not to overstate the tax expenses. The 
overall mean of attitude of 3.16 also implies that respondents in the study have 
unfavourable perceptions towards overstating tax expenses. With regard to 
Subjective Norms, respondents had the opinion that people who are important to 
them were not supportive of overstating tax expenses. The overall mean of 
Perceived Behavioural Control of 3.76, however, suggests that respondents 
believed they have the control to overstate the tax expenses.  
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Table 5.16 Descriptive statistics on measures of Theory of Planned Behaviour 
items (Overstating tax expenses scenario) - Malaysia 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Intention INO 92 1 7 3.03 1.585 
If I had the opportunity, I would overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the tax return* 
(Likely…Unlikely) 
INO1R 92 1 7 3.20 1.841 
I would never overstate the business travelling 
expenses claimed in the tax return (True…False) 
INO2 92 1 7 2.97 1.687 
In the future, I may overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return (True…False) 
INO3R 92 1 7 2.91 1.739 
Attitude ATO 92 1 7 3.16 1.511 
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
claimed in the tax return is* (Good…Bad) 
ATO1R 92 1 7 2.91 1.587 
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return is (Worthless…Useful) 
ATO2 92 1 7 3.46 1.667 
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return is (Harmful…Beneficial) 
ATO3 92 1 7 3.12 1.715 
Subjective norms SNO 92 1 7 3.74 1.144 
Most of people important to me think that I should 
overstate the business travelling expenses* 
(Agree…Disagree) 
SNO1R 92 1 7 3.24 1.640 
Most of people important to me will look down at me 
if I overstate the business travelling expenses in the 
tax return (Likely…Unlikely) 
SNO2 92 1 7 4.06 1.708 
No one who is important to me thinks it is OK to 
overstate the business travelling expenses in the tax 
return (Agree…Disagree) 
SNO3 92 1 7 3.91 1.675 
Perceived Behavioural Control PBO 92 1 7 3.76 1.142 
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return is (Easy…Difficult) 
PBO1 92 1 7 4.15 1.875 
With my expertise, I could easily overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the tax return if I 
wanted to (Agree…Disagree) 
PBO2 92 2 7 3.75 1.936 
How much control do you have over overstating the 
business travelling expenses in the tax return 
(Complete control…Absolutely no control) 
PBO3 92 1 7 3.37 1.608 
* Scores for the items were reverse coded. 
Table 5.17 illustrates the opinions of respondents in the study with regard to 
complying with the tax law in the understating income scenario. Similar to the first 
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scenario, the lower the means of Intention, Attitude and Subjective Norms reflect 
greater possibility to comply with the tax law by not underreporting income of 
$2,000. In contrast, the lower the mean of Perceived Behavioural Control, this 
suggests respondents have higher control to understate the income, consequently 
promoting noncompliance. 
Similar to the first scenario on overstating tax expenses, overall, 
respondents in the study were less likely to involve in noncompliance behaviour, in 
this case understating income. The overall mean of Intention of 3.20 implies that if 
respondents were in the same situation as described in the scenario, they would 
have less intention to understate income in the tax computation. Likewise, the 
results reveal that respondents had favourable attitude towards tax compliance 
based on the overall mean of Attitude of 3.14. In a similar vein, based on the 
overall mean of Subjective Norms of 3.74, it could be suggested that respondents in 
the study believe their important others disapproved understating income 
behaviour. Comparable to the first scenario, tax agents in the study indicated that 
they had control to understate income for tax purposes based on the overall mean 
of 3.21 resulting into the tendency to noncompliance. 
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Table 5.17 Descriptive statistics on measures of Theory of Planned Behaviour 
items (Understating income scenario) - Malaysia 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Intention INU 92 1 7 3.20 1.477 
If I had the opportunity I would omit the $2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation.* (Likely…Unlikely) 
INU1R 92 1 7 3.28 1.842 
I would never omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation (True…False) 
INU2 92 1 7 3.29 1.694 
In the future, I may omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation* (True…False) 
INU3R 92 1 7 3.03 1.679 
Attitude ATU 92 1 7 3.14 1.264 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation is (Good…Bad) 
ATU1R 92 1 6 2.66 1.345 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation is (Worthless…Useful) 
ATU2 92 1 7 3.54 1.536 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation is (Harmful…Beneficial) 
ATU3 92 1 7 3.23 1.534 
Subjective norms SNU 92 1 7 3.74 1.164 
Most of people important to me think I should omit 
the $2,000 cash sale from the tax computation* 
(Agree….Disagree) 
SNU1R 92 1 7 3.43 1.775 
Most people who are important to me will look down 
at me if I omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation (Likely…Unlikely) 
SNU2 92 1 7 3.87 1.787 
No one who is important to me thinks it is OK to 
omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax computation 
(Agree…Disagree) 
SNU3 92 1 7 3.93 1.653 
Perceived Behavioural Control PBU 92 1 7 3.21 1.468 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation is (Easy…Difficult) 
PBU1 92 1 7 3.48 1.854 
With my expertise, I could easily omit the $2,000 
cash sale from the tax computation if I wanted to 
(Agree…Disagree) 
PBU2 92 2 7 2.86 1.701 
How much control do you have over omitting the 
$2,000 cash sale from the tax computation? 
(Complete control…Absolutely no control) 
PBU3 92 1 7 3.28 1.666 
* Scores for the items were reverse coded. 
c. Measures of ethical sensitivity  
The similar scenarios of overstating tax expenses and understating income 
used to measure TPB were applied to measure the ethical sensitivity of tax agents 
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in the study. Table 5.18 demonstrates the descriptive statistics on measures of 
ethical sensitivity for over claiming tax expense scenario. The results indicate that 
respondents evaluated moderately each moral dimension in the case of overstating 
business travelling expenses for tax purposes. This could be evidenced from the 
overall mean values of each moral philosophy in the MES which centred near to 
the middle point of the scale.  
The overall mean of Moral Equity of 4.87 suggests that respondents regard 
overstating tax expenses as leaning more towards injustice, unfairness, not morally 
right and not acceptable to their family. With respect to Relativism, respondents 
indicate that the act of overstating tax expense inclined more towards traditionally 
and culturally unacceptable, with an overall mean value of 4.44. The overall mean 
value of Egoism of 3.78 implies that respondents perceived overstating tax expense 
as unethical since it promoted the well-being of oneself over the others.  
The act of overstating business travelling expenses for tax purposes was 
also perceived as not ethical since it did not produce the greatest utility for greatest 
number of people or maximize benefits over harm to all parties involved. This 
could be seen from the overall mean value of Utilitarianism dimension of 4.18. 
Finally, with an overall mean value of 4.67, respondents also had the opinion that 
overstating tax expense had violated the unwritten contract and violated unwritten 
promise. The violations imply an unethical behaviour according to Contractualism 
moral philosophy.   
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Table 5.18 Descriptive statistics on measures of ethical sensitivity (Overstating 
tax expenses scenario) - Malaysia 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
In your opinion, Rose’s decision to overstate the business travelling expenses is: 
Moral Equity MEO 92 1 7 4.87 1.416 
Just…….Unjust MEO1 92 1 7 4.64 1.661 
Fair…….Unfair MEO2 92 1 7 4.91 1.601 
Morally right …….Not morally right MEO3 92 2 7 5.22 1.389 
Acceptable to my family…….Not acceptable 
to my family 
MEO4 92 1 7 4.71 1.741 
Relativism REO 92 1 7 4.44 1.603 
Traditionally acceptable…….Traditionally 
unacceptable 
REO1 92 1 7 4.41 1.665 
Culturally acceptable…….Culturally 
unacceptable 
REO2 92 1 7 4.47 1.713 
Egoism EGO 92 1 7 3.78 1.225 
Not self-promoting for Rose…….Self-
promoting for Rose* 
EGO1R 92 1 7 3.83 1.681 
Personally satisfying for Rose…….Not 
personally satisfying for Rose 
EGO2 92 1 7 3.74 1.722 
Utilitarianism UTO 92 1 7 4.18 1.277 
Produces greatest utility……..Produces the 
least utility 
UTO1 92 1 7 4.23 1.563 
Minimizing benefits while maximizing 
harm……Maximizing benefits while 
minimizing harm* 
UTO2R 92 2 7 4.14 1.688 
Contractualism COO 92 1 7 4.67 1.467 
Violating an unwritten contract…….Not 
violating an unwritten contract* 
COO1R 92 1 7 4.68 1.482 
Violating an unspoken promise…….Not 
violating an unspoken promise 
COO2R 92 1 7 4.66 1.485 
*Scores for the items were reverse coded. 
Table 5.19 summarizes the perceptions of respondents on their ethical 
sensitivity based on five moral philosophies of MES with regard to the understating 
income scenario. Overall, comparable to the scenario of over claiming a tax 
expense, respondents evaluated moderately each of the moral dimensions since 
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most of the means were near to the mid-point scales. The overall mean of Moral 
Equity dimension of 5.13 demonstrates that respondents perceived the act of 
omitting income of $2,000 for tax purposes was highly unjust, unfair, not morally 
right and not acceptable to their family. Respondents also believed that the act of 
understating income was traditionally and culturally unacceptable based on the 
overall mean of Relativism of 4.57.  
Based on the overall mean of Egoism of 3.99, respondents in the study also 
indicated that understating income for tax purpose was unethical since it supported 
self-interest. Respondents in the study were also of the view that understating 
income of $2,000 for tax purposes was not providing the greatest benefits for the 
greatest number of people and thus did not maximize benefits over harm. This was 
demonstrated by the overall mean of Utilitarianism of 4.17. The overall mean of 
4.76 of Contractualism dimension also suggests that respondents regard the 
understating income for tax purpose described in the scenario as violating the 
social contract and therefore, deemed unethical.  
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Table 5.19 Descriptive statistics on measures of ethical sensitivity 
(Understating income scenario) – Malaysia 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
In your opinion, Adam’s decision to omit the $2,000 cash sale is: 
Moral Equity MEU 92 1 7 5.13 1.340 
Just…….Unjust MEU1 92 1 7 5.09 1.559 
Fair…….Unfair MEU2 92 1 7 5.13 1.499 
Morally right …….Not morally right MEU3 92 2 7 5.46 1.370 
Acceptable to my family…….Not acceptable to 
my family 
MEU4 92 1 7 4.85 1.564 
Relativism REU 92 1 7 4.57 1.516 
Traditionally acceptable…….Traditionally 
unacceptable 
REU1 92 1 7 4.51 1.593 
Culturally acceptable…….Culturally 
unacceptable 
REU2 92 1 7 4.62 1.616 
Egoism EGU 92 1 7 3.99 1.063 
Not self-promoting for Adam…….Self-
promoting for Adam* 
EGU1R 92 1 7 4.00 1.534 
Personally satisfying for Adam…….Not 
personally satisfying for Adam 
EGU2 92 1 7 3.99 1.674 
Utilitarianism UTU 92 1 7 4.17 1.221 
Produces greatest utility……..Produces the least 
utility 
UTU1 92 1 7 4.23 1.563 
Minimizing benefits while maximizing 
harm……Maximizing benefits while minimizing 
harm* 
UTU2R 92 2 7 4.11 1.627 
Contractualism COU 92 1 7 4.76 1.472 
Violating an unwritten contract…….Not 
violating an unwritten contract* 
COU1R 92 1 7 4.78 1.496 
Violating an unspoken promise…….Not 
violating an unspoken promise 
COU2R 92 1 7 4.73 1.505 
*Scores for the items were reverse coded. 
5.2.4.2 New Zealand   
In this section, the New Zealand respondents’ opinions on culture, the TPB 
items and ethical sensitivity in tax compliance are presented using descriptive 
statistics. The descriptive statistics are set out in Table 5.20 to Table 5.24.  
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(a). Measures of culture   
Table 5.20 presents the perceptions of respondents from New Zealand on 
culture and tax compliance behaviour using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
Dimensions. Similar to Malaysia, to interpret the results, the lower are the mean 
values, indicates higher disagreement on the influence of culture in complying with 
the tax law. Comparable to Malaysia, the overall results suggest that respondents 
have mixed opinions on the influence of Power Distance, Individualism, 
Masculinity and Uncertainty Avoidance in complying with the tax law.  
The overall mean of Power Distance of 3.86 reveals that there was a low 
gap of Power Distance between the junior and their superior in the study when 
complying with the tax law. With regard to the Individualistic attribute, the 
responses were mixed with the means ranging from 2.22 to 4.51. The overall mean 
of 3.36, however, suggests that respondents were more inclined towards collectivist 
characteristic in their tax compliance behaviour while performing their roles as tax 
agents. Likewise, the means for Masculinity measures were mixed, but they were 
moving towards a higher Femininity culture in complying with the tax law. With 
an overall mean of 4.67, this suggests that respondents in the study prone to regard 
high Uncertainty Avoidance culture in complying with the tax law while 
performing their engagement roles as tax agents.  
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Table 5.20 Descriptive statistics on measures of culture – New Zealand 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Power Distance PD 119 1 7 3.86 0.982 
A junior staff should follow the instructions from his/her 
superior in complying with the tax law 
PD1 119 1 7 4.96 1.554 
A junior staff should feel afraid to disagree with his/her 
superior in complying with the tax law 
PD2 119 1 6 2.77 1.324 
Most of the time, a superior is expected to tell his/her 
junior staff on what to do in complying with the tax law 
PD3 119 1 7 4.03 1.576 
A junior staff should always be involved in the decision 
making when dealing with client’s tax matters * 
PD4R 119 1 7 3.69 1.431 
Individualism IND 119 1 7 3.36 0.953 
The benefits that we as a society could enjoy from the 
amount of tax collected is very important to me * 
IND1R 119 1 6 2.22 0.984 
When complying with the tax law, I only consider the 
effect to my client 
IND2 119 1 7 4.12 1.757 
I do not care whether or not the society would benefit 
from the amount of tax collected as long as I could enjoy 
the tax benefit 
IND3 119 1 7 2.59 1.421 
I would consider the long term effect to the society when 
complying with the tax law* 
IND4R 119 1 7 4.51 1.588 
Masculinity MAS 119 1 7 3.98 0.811 
I would rather challenge the tax authority than negotiate 
with them in a tax lawsuit 
MAS1 119 1 7 3.44 1.720 
I always feel confident with the decision that I make when 
complying with the tax law 
MAS2 119 1 7 5.17 1.209 
I prefer to challenge the tax authority’s decision rather 
than negotiate with them 
MAS3 119 1 5 2.59 1.120 
I always feel confident to make my own decisions while 
dealing with my client’s tax matter 
MAS4 119 2 7 4.72 1.346 
Uncertainty Avoidance UAV 119 1 7 4.67 0.910 
The more precise the tax law, the better UAV1 119 2 7 5.88 1.173 
I do not mind having differences in tax judgments with the 
tax authority. * 
UAV2R 119 1 7 4.02 1.722 
When complying with the tax law, I avoid taking any tax 
risk since a tax risk could cause unfavourable effect 
UAV3 119 1 7 4.12 1.541 
When complying with the tax law, a tax risk is an 
opportunity. * 
UAV4R 119 2 7 4.68 1.327 
* Scores for the items were reverse coded 
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(b). Measures of Theory of Planned Behaviour items  
Table 5.21 outlines the results from the descriptive statistics analysis for 
TPB items with respect to overstating tax expenses scenario. Similar to the 
Malaysian respondents, to interpret the results, the lower are the means of 
Intention, Attitude and Subjective Norms, suggests the less possibility to over 
claim tax expenses resulting in complying with the tax law. On the other hand, the 
lower the mean of Perceived Behavioural Control indicates greater control to over 
claim tax expenses resulting in noncompliance.  
The overall results suggest that respondents in the study were less likely to 
overstate tax expenses in complying with the tax law. Intention to overstate tax 
expenses recorded an overall mean of 2.10, suggesting a low possibility of 
respondents to overstate tax expenses. Respondents also indicated their 
unfavourable perceptions towards overstating tax expenses with an overall mean of 
attitude of 2.25. Respondents in the study were also of the view that people who are 
important to them disapproved the act of overstating tax expenses. This could be 
evidenced from the overall mean of Subjective Norms of 2.67. With regard to 
Perceived Behavioural Control, the overall mean of 2.97 suggests that respondents 
believed they have high control to overstate tax expenses indicating the tendency to 
noncompliance. 
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Table 5.21 Descriptive statistics on measures of Theory of Planned Behaviour 
items (Overstating tax expenses scenario) – New Zealand 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Intention INO 119 1 7 2.10 1.353 
If I had the opportunity, I would overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the tax 
return* (Likely…Unlikely) 
INO1R 119 1 7 2.06 1.714 
I would never overstate the business 
travelling expenses claimed in the tax return 
(True…False) 
INO2 119 1 7 2.39 1.708 
In the future, I may overstate the business 
travelling expenses in the tax return 
(True…False) 
INO3R 119 1 7 1.86 1.355 
Attitude ATO 119 1 7 2.25 1.230 
For me to overstate the business travelling 
expenses claimed in the tax return is* 
(Good…Bad) 
ATO1R 119 1 7 1.72 1.157 
For me to overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return is 
(Worthless…Useful) 
ATO2 119 1 7 2.61 1.642 
For me to overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return is 
(Harmful…Beneficial) 
ATO3 119 1 7 2.43 1.619 
Subjective norms SNO 119 1 7 2.67 1.399 
Most of people important to me think that I 
should overstate the business travelling 
expenses* (Agree…Disagree) 
SNO1R 119 1 6 2.04 1.399 
Most of people important to me will look 
down at me if I overstate the business 
travelling expenses in the tax return 
(Likely…Unlikely) 
SNO2 119 1 7 3.04 1.955 
No one who is important to me thinks it is 
OK to overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return (Agree…Disagree) 
SNO3 119 1 7 2.93 1.943 
Perceived Behavioural Control PBO 119 1 7 2.97 1.290 
For me to overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return is 
(Easy…Difficult) 
PBO1 119 1 7 4.45 2.396 
With my expertise, I could easily overstate 
the business travelling expenses in the tax 
return if I wanted to (Agree…Disagree) 
PBO2 119 1 7 2.32 1.850 
How much control do you have over 
overstating the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return (Complete 
control…Absolutely no control) 
PBO3 119 1 7 2.14 1.367 
*Scores for the items were reverse coded.  
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Similar to the Malaysian respondents, the New Zealand respondents were 
also provided with an understating income scenario to examine their tax 
compliance behaviour. Table 5.22 exhibits the descriptive statistics of TPB items in 
the case of understating income for tax purposes. Comparable to the first scenario, 
the lower are the means of Intention, Attitude and Subjective Norms, suggests a 
less possibility to understate income and thus promotes tax compliance. On the 
contrary, the lower is the mean of Perceived Behavioural Control indicates greater 
control to understate income leading to noncompliance.  
Overall, the results suggest that respondents in the study were less likely to 
understate income of $2,000 in their tax computation. For instance, intention to 
understating income documented an overall mean of 1.77, suggesting low 
possibility of respondents to understate income. The overall mean of attitude of 
2.24 indicates the respondents’ unfavourable perceptions towards understating 
income. Respondents in the study also had the opinion that people who are 
important to them did not favour understating income behaviour which could be 
seen from the overall mean of Subjective Norms of 2.42. Notwithstanding that, 
respondents believed they had the control to understate income based on the overall 
mean of Perceived Behavioural Control of 2.82 which could result in 
noncompliance.  
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Table 5.22 Descriptive statistics on measures of Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(Understating income scenario) – New Zealand 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Intention INU 119 1 7 1.77 1.146 
If I had the opportunity I would omit the 
$2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation.* (Likely…Unlikely) 
INU1R 119 1 7 1.55 1.212 
I would never omit the $2,000 cash sale 
from the tax computation (True…False) 
INU2 119 1 7 2.04 1.709 
In the future, I may omit the $2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation* 
(True…False) 
INU3R 119 1 7 1.71 1.271 
Attitude ATU 119 1 7 2.24 1.214 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation is (Good…Bad) 
ATU1R 119 1 5 1.36 0.686 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation is (Worthless…Useful) 
ATU2 119 1 7 2.98 2.095 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation is 
(Harmful…Beneficial) 
ATU3 119 1 7 2.37 1.808 
Subjective norms SNU 119 1 7 2.42 1.421 
Most of people important to me think I 
should omit the $2,000 cash sale from the 
tax computation* (Agree….Disagree) 
SNU1R 119 1 7 2.15 1.629 
Most people who are important to me will 
look down at me if I omit the $2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation 
(Likely…Unlikely) 
SNU2 119 1 7 2.66 1.866 
No one who is important to me thinks it is 
OK to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the 
tax computation (Agree…Disagree) 
SNU3 119 1 7 2.45 1.817 
Perceived Behavioural Control PBO 119 1 7 2.82 1.341 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation is (Easy…Difficult) 
PBU1 119 1 7 4.27 2.603 
With my expertise, I could easily omit the 
$2,000 cash sale from the tax computation 
if I wanted to (Agree…Disagree) 
PBU2 119 2 7 2.04 1.564 
How much control do you have over 
omitting the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation? (Complete 
control…Absolutely no control) 
PBU3 119 1 7 2.13 1.507 
*Scores for the items were reverse coded. 
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c. Measures of ethical sensitivity  
Table 5.23 summarizes the perceptions of respondents from New Zealand 
on ethical sensitivity and tax compliance behaviour. The similar scenario of 
overstating tax expenses used to measure TPB was tested on ethical sensitivity of 
tax agents in the study. The overall results indicate that respondents evaluated 
positively their ethical sensitivity with regard to overstating tax expense based on 
the overall means of each moral dimension. The overall mean of Moral Equity of 
6.00 suggests that respondents regard overstating tax expenses as highly unjust, 
unfair, not morally right and not acceptable to their family. With regard to 
Relativism, the overall mean of 5.04 suggests that respondents viewed overstating 
tax expenses as traditionally and culturally unacceptable. The overall mean value 
of Egoism of 2.95 reflects respondents’ perception towards overstating tax expense 
as unethical since it only benefitted one own self-interest.   
Respondents also perceived overstating a tax expense as unethical since it 
breached the Utilitarian moral philosophy. The overall mean value of Utilitarianism 
of 4.50 indicates that the act of overstating a tax expense did not produce the 
greatest utility for the greatest number of people or maximize benefits over harm to 
all parties involved. With an overall mean value of 5.03 for the Contractualism 
dimension, respondents were of the view that overstating tax expense was unethical 
since it had dishonoured the unwritten contract and violated unwritten promise. 
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Table 5.23 Descriptive statistics on measures of ethical sensitivity (Overstating 
tax expenses scenario) – New Zealand 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
In your opinion, Rose’s decision to overstate the business travelling expenses is: 
Moral Equity MEO 119 1 7 6.00 1.114 
Just…….Unjust MEO1 119 1 7 5.87 1.443 
Fair…….Unfair MEO2 
119 
1 7 5.92 1.348 
Morally right …….Not morally right MEO3 
119 
1 7 6.22 1.151 
Acceptable to my family…….Not acceptable to my 
family 
MEO4 
119 
2 7 5.97 1.311 
Relativism REO 119 1 7 5.04 1.682 
Traditionally acceptable…….Traditionally 
unacceptable 
REO1 
119 
1 7 5.08 1.778 
Culturally acceptable…….Culturally unacceptable REO2 
119 
1 7 5.00 1.707 
Egoism EGO 119 1 7 2.95 1.335 
Not self-promoting for Rose…….Self-promoting for 
Rose* 
EGO1R 
119 
1 7 2.66 1.856 
Personally satisfying for Rose…….Not personally 
satisfying for Rose 
EGO2 
119 
1 7 3.24 1.982 
Utilitarianism UTO 119 1 7 4.50 1.363 
Produces greatest utility……..Produces the least utility UTO1 
119 
1 7 4.47 1.716 
Minimizing benefits while maximizing 
harm……Maximizing benefits while minimizing 
harm* 
UTO2R 
119 
1 7 4.54 1.706 
Contractualism COO 119 1 7 5.03 1.768 
Violating an unwritten contract…….Not violating an 
unwritten contract* 
COO1R 
119 
1 7 5.08 1.867 
Violating an unspoken promise…….Not violating an 
unspoken promise 
COO2R 119 1 7 4.98 1.761 
*Scores for the items were reverse coded.  
Table 5.24 presents the descriptive statistics for the second scenario, 
understating income and ethical sensitivity of New Zealand respondents. Similar to 
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the first scenario, respondents assessed the morality of understating income with 
high ethical sensitivity based on the overall mean values of each ethical dimension. 
Referring to the overall mean of Moral Equity of 6.66, it could be suggested that 
respondents in the study perceived understating income for tax purposes, in this 
case of $2,000, as unethical since it violated the principles of moral equity.  
Respondents also had the view that understating income for tax purposes 
was traditionally and culturally unacceptable. This was confirmed by the overall 
mean of Relativisim of 5.67. Understating income for tax purposes was also 
regarded as unethical based on the overall mean value of Egoism of 2.67, 
indicating that understating income would only fulfil one’s self-interest. Equally, 
respondents were of the opinion that understating income would not result into 
having the greatest utility for the greatest number of people or maximizing benefits 
over minimizing harm for all parties involved. This could be evidenced from the 
overall mean of Utilitarianism of 4.72. With the overall mean value of 5.42, 
respondents perceived understating income as violating the social contract under 
the Utilitarian ethical dimension, resulting into unethical conduct.  
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Table 5.24 Descriptive statistics on measures of ethical sensitivity 
(Understating income scenario) – New Zealand 
Measures Code N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
In your opinion, Adam’s decision to omit the $2,000 cash sale is: 
Moral Equity MEU 119 1 7 6.66 0.754 
Just…….Unjust MEU1 119 1 7 6.60 1.137 
Fair…….Unfair MEU2 119 1 7 6.66 0.932 
Morally right …….Not morally right MEU3 119 4 7 6.79 0.662 
Acceptable to my family…….Not 
acceptable to my family 
MEU4 119 2 7 6.57 0.962 
Relativism REU 119 1 7 5.67 1.567 
Traditionally acceptable…….Traditionally 
unacceptable 
REU1 119 2 7 5.72 1.746 
Culturally acceptable…….Culturally 
unacceptable 
REU2 119 2 7 5.62 1.589 
Egoism EGU 119 1 7 2.67 1.457 
Not self-promoting for Adam…….Self-
promoting for Adam* 
EGU1R 119 1 7 2.19 1.395 
Personally satisfying for Adam…….Not 
personally satisfying for Adam 
EGU2 119 1 7 3.14 .630 
Utilitarianism UTU 119 1 7 4.72 1.383 
Produces greatest utility……..Produces the 
least utility 
UTU1 119 1 7 4.86 1.628 
Minimizing benefits while maximizing 
harm……Maximizing benefits while 
minimizing harm* 
UTU2R 119 2 7 4.58 1.902 
Contractualism COU 119 1 7 5.42 1.747 
Violating an unwritten contract…….Not 
violating an unwritten contract* 
COU1R 119 1 7 5.45 1.807 
Violating an unspoken promise…….Not 
violating an unspoken promise 
COU2R 119 1 7 5.39 1.738 
*Scores for the items were reverse coded.   
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5.2.5 t-test analysis  
The t-test analysis performed in the study allows the researcher to examine 
whether or not there is any significant difference of the overall perceptions of tax 
agents in the study from Malaysia and New Zealand on culture, TPB items, and 
ethical sensitivity in complying with the tax laws. The t-test analysis was used to 
test Hypotheses 1 to 3 set out in Section 3.2 in Chapter 3, Research Framework and 
Hypotheses Development of this thesis, and thus, answer the first three research 
questions of this study. For the TPB items and ethical sensitivity, the t-test was also 
performed on both overstating tax expense and understating tax income scenarios. 
The detailed results are provided in Appendix Q. 
5.2.5.1 Culture and tax compliance behaviour 
Table 5.25 set outs the results from the t-test analysis comparing Malaysian 
and New Zealand respondents on culture and tax compliance behaviour, indicating 
the means with the respective p-values. The p-values determine whether or not the 
perceptions of respondents from Malaysia and New Zealand differ significantly. 
The results indicate that the p-values for Power Distance, Individualism and 
Uncertainty Avoidance in complying with the tax laws are more than 0.05 
indicating that the perceptions of Malaysian and New Zealand respondents with 
regards to these three items do not differ significantly. However, the p-value for 
Masculinity which is significant at p ≤ 0.01 implies that tax agents from Malaysia 
and New Zealand differ in their perceptions on Masculinity and tax compliance.  
Therefore, the null hypothesis stating that ‘There is no significant difference 
between tax agents from Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to Hofstede’s 
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(1980) National Cultural Dimensions in complying with the tax law’ is partially 
supported.  
The means also suggest there is a higher tendency for tax agents in 
Malaysia to practise Power Distance and Masculinity in their ethical decision 
making approach while complying with the tax laws compared to tax agents in 
New Zealand. On the other hand, tax agents in New Zealand were prone to be more 
Individualistic and high in Uncertainty Avoidance in their approaches while 
complying with the tax laws compared to tax agents in Malaysia.  
Table 5.25 Comparison between tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand on 
Culture 
 Malaysia New Zealand  
Measures N Mean N Mean p-value 
(two-tailed) 
Power Distance 92 3.92 119 3.86 .697 
Individualism 92 3.24 119 3.36 .333 
Masculinity 92 4.38 119 3.98 .000 
Uncertainty Avoidance 92 4.51 119 4.67 .171 
 
5.2.5.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour and tax compliance 
Table 5.26 presents the results from comparing the perceptions of tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with respect to TPB items and over claiming 
tax expenses. The results indicate that all p-values for the TPB items are 
significantly different at p ≤ 0.01. The results suggest that tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand had different perceptions on intention, attitude, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control in overstating tax expense scenario.  
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Consequently, the null hypothesis stating ‘There is no significant difference 
in the level of perceptions in relation to the intention to comply, attitudes towards 
behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control between tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand in overstating tax expense scenario’ is completely 
rejected.  
The mean values also indicate that tax agents in New Zealand were less 
likely to over claim tax expense compared to tax agents in Malaysia.  
Table 5.26 Comparison between tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand on 
Theory of Planned Behaviour Items (Overstating tax expenses scenario) 
 Malaysia New Zealand  
Measures N Mean N Mean p-value (two-
tailed) 
Intention 92 3.03 119 2.10 .000 
Attitude 92 3.16 119 2.25 .000 
Subjective Norms 92 3.74 119 2.67 .000 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
92 3.76 119 2.97 .000 
 
Table 5.27 exhibits the results from comparing the means of perceptions on 
TPB items in understating income scenario between tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand. The p-values for intention, attitude and subjective norms indicate 
that they are significant at p ≤ 0.01 and p ≤ 0.05 for perceived behavioural control. 
This indicates that the perceptions of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with 
regard to intention, attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, 
were different.  
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Therefore, the null hypothesis stating that ‘There is no significant difference 
in the level of perceptions in relation to the intention to comply, attitudes towards 
behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control between tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand in understating income scenario’ can be rejected.  
The mean values in Table 5.27 suggest that tax agents in New Zealand were 
more inclined to comply with the tax laws compared to tax agents in Malaysia.  
Table 5.27 Comparison between Tax Agents in Malaysia and New Zealand on 
Theory of Planned Behaviour Items (Understating income scenario) 
 Malaysia New Zealand  
Measures N Mean N Mean 
p-value (two-
tailed) 
Intention 92 3.20 119 1.77 .000 
Attitude 92 3.14 119 2.24 .000 
Subjective Norms 92 3.74 119 2.42 .000 
Perceived Behavioural 
Control 
92 3.21 119 2.82 .045 
 
5.2.5.3 Ethical Sensitivity  
The results from the t-test analysis on the means of responses of tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand, with regard to ethical sensitivity and overstating tax 
expenses, are displayed in Table 5.28 below. The results suggest that there is 
significant difference between tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in their 
perceptions of Moral Equity, Relativism and Egoism in overstating tax expenses.  
This is evidenced from the p-values of these three MES dimensions which are less 
than 0.05. As for Utilitarianism and Contractualism, the p-values of the means are 
more than 0.05, suggesting that tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand had 
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similar perceptions on Utilitarianism and Contractualism dimensions in the 
overstating tax expenses scenario.  
Based on the results, it could be suggested that the null hypothesis stating 
‘There is no significant difference in the level of perceptions between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the dimensions of MES in overstating 
tax expenses scenario’ is not fully supported.  
The null hypothesis is rejected for Moral Equity, Relativism and Egoism 
dimensions, and accepted for Utilitarianism and Contractualism dimensions. The 
means also suggest that tax agents in New Zealand have greater ethical sensitivity 
in complying with the tax law compared to tax agents in Malaysia.  
Table 5.28 Comparison between Tax Agents in Malaysia and New Zealand on 
Ethical Sensitivity Overstating tax expenses scenario) 
 Malaysia New Zealand  
Measures N Mean N Mean 
p-value (two-
tailed) 
Moral Equity 92 4.87 119 6.00 .000 
Relativism 92 4.44 119 5.04 .009 
Egoism 92 3.78 119 2.95 .000 
Utilitarianism 92 4.18 119 4.50 .084 
Contractualism 92 4.67 119 5.03 .108 
 
Table 5.29 outlines the results on the t-test analysis, comparing the means 
of perceptions on ethical sensitivity in understating income scenario between tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand. The results indicate that all p-values are less 
than 0.05 implying that tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand had different 
perceptions on the MES dimensions in under reporting income tax scenario. The 
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results also revealed that Moral Equity, Relativism and Egoism dimensions were 
significant at p ≤ 0.01.  
Consequently, there is sufficient support to reject the null hypothesis that 
‘There is no significant difference in the level of perceptions between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the dimensions of MES in understating 
income scenario’.  
Similar to the overstating income tax scenario, the means of the ethical 
dimensions suggest that tax agents in New Zealand have higher ethical sensitivity 
in complying with the tax laws compared to tax agents in Malaysia.  
Table 5.29 Comparison between Tax Agents in Malaysia and New Zealand on 
Ethical Sensitivity (Understating income scenario) 
 Malaysia New Zealand  
Measures N Mean N Mean p-value (two-
tailed) 
Moral Equity 92 5.13 119 6.66 .000 
Relativism 92 4.57 119 5.67 .000 
Egoism 92 3.99 119 2.67 .000 
Utilitarianism 92 4.17 119 4.72 .002 
Contractualism 92 4.76 119 5.42 .004 
 
5.2.5.4 Summary of the results from the preliminary hypotheses tests  
The preliminary hypotheses tests were performed to answer the first three 
research questions on whether or not tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have 
similar perceptions on culture, TPB items and ethical sensitivity in their tax 
compliance behaviour. It is interesting to note that the results from the t-test 
analyses revealed a number of similarities and differences of their perceptions 
towards culture, TPB items and ethical sensitivity in complying with the tax laws. 
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Table 5.30 Summary of Results for Preliminary Hypotheses Tests 
Research Questions Hypotheses Findings 
1. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand indicate the 
same level of perceptions with 
regard to Hofstede’s (1980) 
National Cultural Dimensions in 
complying with the tax law? 
There is no significant difference 
between tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand with regard to 
Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions in complying 
with the tax law 
Partially supported. 
Accept for Power 
Distance, Individualism 
and Uncertainty 
Avoidance. Reject for 
Masculinity. 
2. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand have the same 
level of perceptions in relation 
to the TPB elements in 
complying with the tax law 
while performing their roles? 
2a : There is no significant 
difference in the level of 
perceptions in relation to the 
intention to comply, attitudes 
towards behaviour, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural 
control between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
overstating tax expense scenario 
Rejected 
 2b: There is no significant 
difference in the level of 
perceptions in relation to the 
intention to comply, attitudes 
towards behaviour, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural 
control between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
understating income scenario 
Rejected 
3. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand have the same 
level of perceptions in relation 
to the dimensions in 
Multidimensional Ethics Scale 
(MES)? 
3a: There is no significant 
difference in the level of 
perceptions between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand with 
regard to the dimensions of MES in 
overstating tax expense scenario 
Partially supported. 
Accept for Utilitarianism 
and Contractualism 
dimensions. Reject for 
Moral Equity, Relativism 
and Egoism dimensions. 
 3b: There is no significant 
difference in the level of 
perceptions between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand with 
regard to the dimensions of MES in 
understating income scenario 
Rejected 
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5.3 Summary  
In this chapter, the results from the preliminary analysis were discussed 
involving two main parts, which were survey response analysis and preliminary 
analysis. The survey response analysis covered findings on response rate, 
demographic background, response representativeness and nonresponse bias. The 
preliminary analysis part focused on data screening, common method bias, social 
desirability bias, descriptive statistics and t-test analysis. 
It is important to note that the current study only obtained low response 
rates for Malaysia and New Zealand. Despite the low response rate, this did not 
hinder further statistical analysis to be performed given that the number of samples 
for each country fulfilled the requirement of the relevant statistical tests employed 
in the study. In addition, the sample was not truly representive of the population, 
especially in the case of Malaysia.  
As a result of the low response rates and lack of representativeness of the 
observed sample, compared to total population, generalization of the findings from 
this study need to be treated with caution. Notwithstanding that, given the limited 
study on tax agents’ ethical decision making in Malaysia and New Zealand, the 
findings from this study are still beneficial in understanding the compliance 
behaviour of tax agents while performing their engagement roles.  
A test on nonresponse bias was also conducted between early and late 
respondents. The results indicate that nonresponse bias was not a serious threat in 
this study. However, given the number of the sample was considered as small to 
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moderate,27 the absence of nonresponse bias could not be fully guaranteed. The 
treatment for missing data using EM method, checking for outliers and testing for 
normality were discussed in the screening data section.  
The results from the common method bias test conducted in the study 
suggest that common method bias was not a serious issue. Notwithstanding that, it 
was not fully confirmed that the study is free from any bias. The results from the 
social desirability bias test, for instance, indicate that social desirability bias exists 
in the survey responses.  
The descriptive statistics provide some overview of the perceptions of 
respondents on the selected factors examined in this study. Comparisons on the 
responses between respondents from Malaysia and New Zealand were tested using 
t-test analysis. It is interesting that there were some similarities and differences 
between respondents from Malaysia and New Zealand in their perceptions towards 
culture, the TPB items and ethical sensitivity in complying with the tax laws.  
The results suggest that Malaysian respondents favour to be in Power 
Distance and Masculinity positions in complying with the tax law while 
performing their engagement roles. New Zealand respondents were more prone to 
be individualistic and favour uncertainty avoidance cultural attributes in complying 
with the tax law. 
It is also noted that New Zealand respondents were less likely to overstate 
tax expenses and understate income tax compared to Malaysian respondents. New 
                                                                
27 In general any sample of at least 30 is normally acceptable for statistical analysis due to the 
central limit theorem (Moore & McCabe, 2006; Lind et al., 2008).  
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Zealand respondents also had higher ethical sensitivity in both tax scenarios 
compared to Malaysian respondents. The next chapter explains the model 
assessment results using the PLS analysis.  
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CHAPTER 6  
MODEL EVALUATION  
 
6.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the results from the model evaluation conducted as 
part of this study. Specifically, the discussions of the chapter focus on the 
measurement model at the first order factor by examining the reliability and 
validity of the indicators and constructs. The discussion also covers the second 
order factor model and structural model. Finally, the results from the hypotheses 
testing are presented. The chapter ends with a summary. 
6.1 Measurement model – First order factor model  
In the measurement model, the reliability and validity of the measures in 
each construct are determined to evaluate whether or not the measures represent the 
constructs. In this study, six constructs of: intention, attitudes, subjective norms, 
perceived behavioural control, ethical sensitivity and culture, are developed. Since 
this study is comparative in nature, the reliability and validity tests have to be 
performed simultaneously to ensure they are acceptable in both tax environments. 
6.1.1 Reliability of reflective constructs  
The reliability of reflective construct as discussed in Chapter 4, Research 
Methodology could be determined at two stages, at the individual level and 
construct level. At the individual level, the measure is tested on its factor loadings 
and overall consistency of the construct (composite reliability) is used at the 
construct level (Henseler et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2012; Hair et al., 2013).  
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6.1.1.1 Indicators’ reliability  
Table 6.1 to Table 6.4 present the loadings, t-values and level of 
significance of each measure used in the study. This step is important to determine 
which measures are considered as significant for the study. For instance, based on 
the reliability test, not all measures for culture are included in the revised model 
later on. Similar approaches were taken by prior studies using PLS in tax context 
such as Saad (2011) and Smart (2012) in determining which measures should be 
retained in the model.  
As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, section 4.7.8.3, there is no absolute 
threshold for factor loadings in PLS. While the common acceptable loading is 0.70, 
a factor loading of 0.50 is also acceptable (Hair et al., 2012). In studies involving 
newly developed measures, such as this study, a loading of 0.4 is still acceptable 
(Henseler et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2012). In fact, Hair et al. (2011) argue that, 
sometimes a weak indicator has to be retained to ensure content validity. The 
results in Table 6.1 indicate that the factor loadings vary from 0.989 to -0.381. In a 
reflective construct, a measure is a candidate for deletion if its deletion contributes 
to a better value of average variance extracted (AVE). However, deletion of a 
measure needs to be done with caution because while a single-item measure is 
allowed in PLS, it may prone to bias in estimating the measurement and structural 
models. In Table 6.1, several items in italics are candidates for deletion at the next 
level.  
 
271 
 
Table 6.1 Reflective constructs, measures and loadings for overstating tax 
expense scenario (original model) 
Constructs 
Malaysia New Zealand 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
Power Distance (PD) AVE =0.418 AVE =0.450 
PD1 0.535 1.681 0.10 0.715 3.007 0.001 
PD2 0.790 3.829 0.001 0.702 3.360 0.001 
PD3 0.866 4.448 0.001 0.788 3.796 0.001 
PD4R -0.102 0.301 Not sig. 0.418 1.922 0.1 
Individualism (IND) AVE =0.231 AVE =0.442 
IND1R 0.606 1.578 Not sig. 0.730 4.839 0.001 
IND2 0.108 0.267 Not sig. 0.328 1.435 Not sig. 
IND3 0.706 1.945 0.10 0.865 9.905 0.001 
IND4R 0.220 0.526 Not sig. 0.618 4.453 0.001 
Masculinity (MAS) AVE =0.278 AVE =0.316 
MAS1 -0.305 0.678 Not sig. -0.232 0.771 Not sig. 
MAS2 0.677 1.907 0.10 0.553 2.336 0.05 
MAS3 -0.200 0.322 Not sig. -0.052 0.184 Not sig. 
MAS4 0.739 1.930 0.10 0.949 3.336 0.001 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAV) 
AVE = 0.271 AVE = 0.383 
UAV1 0.610 1.435 Not sig. 0.634 2.433 0.05 
UAV2R -0.368 0.761 Not sig. 0.769 3.396 0.001 
UAV3 0.668 1.848 0.10 0.652 2.960 0.005 
UAV4R 0.359 1.047 Not sig. 0.336 1.153 Not sig. 
Intention (INO) AVE =0.814 AVE =0.722 
INO1R 0.909 35.348 0.001 0.907 43.574 0.001 
INO2 0.897 37.937 0.001 0.758 12.196 0.001 
INO3R 0.900 39.762 0.001 0.879 26.884 0.001 
Attitude (ATO) AVE =0.832 AVE =0.687 
ATO1R 0.913 46.995 0.001 0.835 32.298 0.001 
ATO2 0.907 34.817 0.001 0.790 14.375 0.001 
ATO3 0.916 32.708 0.001 0.860 30.074 0.001 
Subjective norms 
(SNO) 
AVE =0.431 AVE = 0.623 
SNO1R 0.924 23.075 0.001 0.836 24.128 0.001 
SNO2 0.639 4.351 0.001 0.756 11.828 0.001 
SNO3 0.174 0.733 Not sig. 0.772 13.524 0.001 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
(PBO) 
AVE = 0.326 AVE = 0.318 
PBO1 0.841 1.716 0.10 -0.393 0.847 Not sig. 
PBO2 0.358 1.095 Not sig. 0.147 0.611 Not sig. 
PBO3 -0.381 0.755 Not sig. 0.882 1.730 0.10 
Moral Equity (MEO) AVE =0.789 AVE = 0.719 
MEO1 0.925 42.687 0.001 0.900 26.054 0.001 
MEO2 0.910 26.282 0.001 0.941 70.980 0.001 
MEO3 0.906 40.363 0.001 0.798 8.837 0.001 
MEO4 0.806 12.677 0.001 0.737 10.262 0.001 
Relativism (REO) AVE = 0.901 AVE = 0.931 
REO1 0.951 48.852 0.001 0.985 102.304 0.001 
REO2 0.948 58.992 0.001 0.965 89.410 0.001 
Egoism (EGO) AVE =0.518 AVE =0.485 
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EGO1R 0.639 1.814 0.10 0.487 1.314 Not sig. 
EGO2 0.792 2.639 0.01 0.856 2.721 0.01 
Utilitarianism (UTO) AVE =0.616 AVE =0.634 
UTO1 0.805 7.088 0.001 0.808 7.241 0.001 
UTO2R 0.764 5.167 0.001 0.785 5.869 0.001 
Contractualism 
(COO) 
AVE =0.978 AVE =0.950 
COO1R 0.989 260.835 0.001 0.978 18.425 0.001 
COO2R 0.988 221.215 0.001 0.972 15.951 0.001 
Note: Items in italics are candidates for deletion.  
The deletion of some measures in Table 6.1 have resulted in better AVEs 
for majority of the constructs in which they exceeded the threshold for AVE of 
0.50 as indicated in Table 6.2. However, there are constructs (IND, PBO and EGO) 
which are marginally below 0.50. Similar findings have been documented by 
Duarte and Raposo (2010) and Smart (2012) in evaluating the loadings of the 
constructs in their studies. Duarte and Raposo (2010), for instance, retained a 
construct with an AVE of 0.361 in their measurement model. Thus, after 
considering the contribution to content validity, all other measures were retained as 
presented in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 Reflective constructs, measures and loadings for overstating tax 
expense scenario (revised model) 
Constructs 
Malaysia New Zealand 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level of 
sig. 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level of 
sig. 
Power Distance (PD) AVE = 0.554 AVE = 0.600 
PD1 0.540 2.457 0.05 0.762 3.346 0.001 
PD2 0.788 4.706 0.001 0.738 3.201 0.005 
PD3 0.868 6.797 0.001 0.821 4.158 0.001 
Individualism (IND) AVE = 0.470 AVE = 0.714 
IND1R 0.659 2.346 0.05 0.753 4.668 0.001 
IND3 0.711 2.598 0.05 0.927 15.046 0.001 
Masculinity (MAS) AVE = 0.608 AVE = 0.641 
MAS2 0.727 3.723 0.001 0.966 17.509 0.001 
MAS4 0.829 4.262 0.001 0.811 2.825 0.01 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAV) 
AVE = 0.528 AVE = 0.560 
UAV1 0.681 2.396 0.05 0.811 2.825 0.01 
UAV3 0.770 2.768 0.01 0.729 2.535 0.05 
Intention (INO) AVE = 0.814 AVE = 0.722 
INO1R 0.909 35.795 0.001 0.908 45.414 0.001 
INO2 0.896 36.767 0.001 0.756 12.108 0.001 
INO3R 0.901 40.712 0.001 0.878 26.640 0.001 
Attitude (ATO) AVE = 0.832 AVE = 0.687 
ATO1R 0.913 46.463 0.001 0.835 32.254 0.001 
ATO2 0.907 34.413 0.001 0.789 14.536 0.001 
ATO3 0.916 32.541 0.001 0.860 30.081 0.001 
Subjective norms 
(SNO) 
AVE = 0.631 AVE = 0.689 
SNO1R 0.934 28.668 0.001 0.860 22.455 0.001 
SNO2 0.624 4.276 0.001 0.799 13.244 0.001 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
(PBO) 
AVE = 0.540 AVE = 0.476 
PBO1 0.945 5.288 0.001 0.974 3.949 0.001 
PBO2 0.433 1.666 0.100 0.056 0.240 Not sig. 
Moral Equity (MEO) AVE = 0.790 AVE = 0.719 
MEO1 0.925 42.901 0.001 0.900 26.594 0.001 
MEO2 0.910 26.051 0.001 0.941 70.899 0.001 
MEO3 0.906 39.985 0.001 0.798 8.754 0.001 
MEO4 0.806 12.872 0.001 0.737 10.099 0.001 
Relativism (REO) AVE = 0.901 AVE = 0.931 
REO1 0.951 46.538 0.001 0.965 104.287 0.001 
REO2 0.948 59.329 0.001 0.965 89.637 0.001 
Egoism (EGO) AVE = 0.518 AVE = 0.485 
EGO1R 0.640 2.371 0.05 0.486 1.710 0.10 
EGO2 0.792 3.350 0.01 0.857 3.518 0.001 
Utilitarian (UTO) AVE = 0.616 AVE = 0.634 
UTO1 0.805 6.875 0.001 0.808 7.223 0.001 
UTO2R 0.764 5.164 0.001 0.785 5.915 0.001 
Contractualism 
(COO) 
AVE = 0.978 AVE = 0.950 
COO1R 0.989 211.155 0.001 0.978 19.572 0.001 
COO2R 0.988 222.292 0.001 0.972 15.270 0.001 
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Similar approaches have been applied to assess the reliability of measures 
for the understating income scenario. The results in Table 6.3 suggest that some 
measures did not meet the required threshold and became candidates for deletion in 
the next process. Overall, the factor loadings for the measures in understating 
income scenario vary from 0.999 to - 0.527.  
Table 6.3 Reflective construct, measures and loadings for understating income 
scenario (original model) 
Constructs 
Malaysia New Zealand 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level of 
sig. 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
Power Distance (PD) AVE = 0.347 AVE = 0.358 
PD1 0.338 1.528 Not sig. 0.503 1.955 0.10 
PD2 0.658 3.157 0.005 0.801 3.375 0.001 
PD3 0.878 4.946 0.001 0.468 1.869 0.10 
PD4R 0.261 1.095 Not sig. 0.563 2.452 0.05 
Individualism (IND) AVE = 0.276 AVE = 0.408 
IND1R 0.680 2.605 0.01 0.674 3.821 0.001 
IND2 -0.239 0.982 Not sig. 0.146 0.919 Not sig. 
IND3 0.668 2.549 0.05 0.922 14.702 0.001 
IND4R 0.370 1.553 Not sig. 0.553 3.383 0.001 
Masculinity (MAS) AVE = 0.316 AVE = 0.300 
MAS1 0.194 0.790 Not sig. -0.527 2.506 0.05 
MAS2 0.762 3.322 0.005 0.450 1.867 0.10 
MAS3 -0.167 0.722 Not sig. -0.097 0.515 Not sig. 
MAS4 0.785 3.220 0.005 0.843 6.089 0.001 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAV) 
 AVE = 0.245 AVE = 0.378 
UAV1 0.835 3.684 0.001 0.727 4.955 0.001 
UAV2R -0.407 1.621 Not sig. 0.669 5.143 0.001 
UAV3 -0.004 0.020 Not sig. 0.666 4.186 0.001 
UAV4R 0.343 1.345 Not sig. 0.303 1.619 Not sig. 
Intention (INU) AVE = 0.721 AVE = 0.667 
INU1R 0.902 51.765 0.001 0.841 16.244 0.001 
INU2 0.788 10.359 0.001 0.777 12.298 0.001 
INU3R 0.853 16.208 0.001 0.830 17.166 0.001 
Attitude AVE = 0.730 AVE = 0.545 
ATU1R 0.827 26.530 0.001 0.791 14.070 0.001 
ATU2 0.877 23.853 0.001 0.631 6.888 0.001 
ATU3 0.856 18.255 0.001 0.781 12.999 0.001 
Subjective norms 
(SNU) 
AVE = 0.420 AVE = 0.634 
SNU1R 0.825 8.685 0.001 0.657 4.898 0.001 
SNU2 0.757 6.353 0.001 0.818 12.023 0.001 
SNU3 0.085 0.505 Not sig. 0.895 26.192 0.001 
Perceived 
Behavioural Control 
(PBU) 
AVE = 0.476 AVE = 0.376 
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PBU1 0.999 3.420 0.001 0.177 0.976 Not sig. 
PBU2 0.429 1.672 0.10 0.381 1.814 0.10 
PBU3 0.496 1.901 0.10 0.975 8.380 0.001 
Moral Equity (MEU) AVE = 0.801 AVE = 0.670 
MEU1 0.927 36.668 0.001 0.858 16.426 0.001 
MEU2 0.954 81.190 0.001 0.820 6.725 0.001 
MEU3 0.877 19.743 0.001 0.903 18.201 0.001 
MEU4 0.815 13.623 0.001 0.675 4.663 0.001 
Relativism (REU) AVE = 0.892 AVE = 0.880 
REU1 0.942 22.074 0.001 0.958 18.800 0.001 
REU2 0.948 44.555 0.001 0.917 11.183 0.001 
Egoism (EGU) AVE = 0.484 AVE = 0.539 
EGU1R 0.981 4.792 0.001 0.522 1.894 0.10 
EGU2 0.068 0.252 Not sig. 0.897 3.868 0.001 
Utilitarian (UTU) AVE = 0.586 AVE = 0.610 
UTU1 0.767 6.223 0.001 0.722 5.294 0.001 
UTU2R 0.764 5.237 0.001 0.836 10.257 0.001 
Contractualism 
(COU) 
AVE = 0.981 AVE = 0.971 
COU1R 0.981 109.508 0.001 0.988 180.621 0.001 
COU2R 0.981 141.726 0.001 0.983 85.931 0.001 
Note: Items in italics are candidates for deletion. 
The same rules were applied to measures in the understating income 
scenario in retaining or deleting a particular measure. A majority of the items met 
the threshold value of at least 0.50. There are, however, items with low loadings, 
(PD3, UAV4R, PBU1, EGU2), yet these are retained to avoid the use of single-
item measure in the measurement model. Furthermore, the values of AVEs for the 
respective constructs are still considered to be acceptable. Therefore, the items in 
Table 6.4 were all retained for further analysis.   
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Table 6.4 Reflective construct, measures and loadings for understating income 
scenario (revised model) 
Constructs 
Malaysia New Zealand 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
PLS 
loadings 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
Power Distance 
(PD) 
AVE =0.683 AVE = 0.509 
PD2 0.662 3.496 0.001 0.990 4.048 0.001 
PD3 0.964 11.222 0.001 0.196 0.688 Not 
sig. 
Individualism 
(IND) 
AVE = 0.470 AVE = 0.694 
IND1R 0.688 2.410 0.05 0.683 3.926 0.001 
IND3 0.683 2.399 0.05 0.960 24.225 0.001 
Masculinity 
(MAS) 
AVE = 0.610 AVE = 0.642 
MAS2 0.776 3.416 0.001 0.592 2.335 0.05 
MAS4 0.785 3.196 0.005 0.966 9.285 0.001 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
(UAV) 
 AVE = 0.485 AVE = 0.503 
UAV1 0.845 3.450 0.001 0.976 6.805 0.001 
UAV4R 0.506 1.748 0.10 0.231 0.967 Not 
sig. 
Intention (INU) AVE = 0.721 AVE = 0.666 
INU1R 0.903 53.300 0.001 0.843 17.580 0.001 
INU2 0.788 10.442 0.001 0.778 12.270 0.001 
INU3R 0.852 15.670 0.001 0.827 15.843 0.001 
Attitude AVE = 0.730 AVE = 0.545 
ATU1R 0.827 26.538 0.001 0.791 13.765 0.001 
ATU2 0.879 23.993 0.001 0.630 6.726 0.001 
ATU3 0.856 18.386 0.001 0.782 12.741 0.001 
Subjective norms 
(SNU) 
AVE = 0.630 AVE = 0.691 
SNU1R 0.822 8.789 0.001 0.747 4.792 0.001 
SNU2 0.764 7.100 0.001 0.908 12.983 0.001 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control (PBU) 
AVE = 0.632 AVE = 0.505 
PBU1 0.999 3.886 0.001 0.105 0.547 Not 
sig. 
PBU3 0.514 1.907 0.10 0.999 9.159 0.001 
Moral Equity 
(MEU) 
AVE = 0.801 AVE = 0.670 
MEU1 0.927 36.576 0.001 0.858 16.585 0.001 
MEU2 0.954 82.517 0.001 0.820 6.718 0.001 
MEU3 0.877 19.869 0.001 0.903 18.368 0.001 
MEU4 0.815 13.911 0.001 0.674 4.624 0.001 
Relativism (REU) AVE = 0.892 AVE = 0.880 
REU1 0.942 21.657 0.001 0.958 18.394 0.001 
REU2 0.948 56.029 0.001 0.917 10.892 0.001 
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Egoism (EGU) AVE = 0.484 AVE = 0.538 
EGU1R 0.982 4.687 0.001 0.520 1.886 0.10 
EGU2 0.068 0.253 Not sig. 0.898 3.931 0.001 
Utilitarian (UTU) AVE = 0.586 AVE = 0.610 
UTU1 0.767 6.089 0.001 0.720 5.050 0.001 
UTU2R 0.764 5.239 0.001 0.838 10.320 0.001 
Contractualism 
(COU) 
AVE = 0.963 AVE = 0.971 
COU1R 0.981 113.185 0.001 0.988 199.130 0.001 
COU2R 0.981 140.636 0.001 0.983 91.144 0.001 
 
6.1.1.2 Internal consistency (Composite reliability)  
As mentioned in section 4.7.8.3 of Chapter 4, once the indicators’ reliability 
are satisfied, the next step is to test the overall internal consistency of the constructs 
by examining the composite reliability of the constructs. Fornell and Larcker 
(1981) suggest a threshold value of 0.70 for a construct to be included in the model. 
However, a value of 0.60 is considered as acceptable if the study involves newly 
developed measure, such as this study (Henseler et al., 2009; Hair et al., 2012). The 
results in Table 6.5 present the composite reliability for all constructs in both 
scenarios in Malaysia and New Zealand. The results indicate that majority of the 
constructs have high composite reliability, except for PD, UAV, PBO, PBU, which 
have marginally lower composite reliability than 0.60. However, to preserve the 
content validity, all constructs are retained.  
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Table 6.5  Composite reliability of the constructs 
Construct 
Overstating tax expense 
scenario 
Understating income 
scenario 
Malaysia 
New 
Zealand Malaysia New Zealand 
Power Distance (PD) 0.782 0.818 0.807 0.589 
Individualism (IND) 0.639 0.831 0.639 0.815 
Masculinity (MAS) 0.755 0.772 0.757 0.772 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAV) 0.690 0.746 0.639 0.594 
Intention (INO/INU) 0.929 0.866 0.885 0.857 
Attitudes (ATO/ATU) 0.936 0.868 0.890 0.780 
Subjective norms (SNO/SNU) 0.766 0.816 0.773 0.816 
Perceived Behavioural Control 
(PBO/PBU) 
0.673 0.503 0.757 0.552 
Moral Equity (MEO/MEU) 0.937 0.910 0.941 0.889 
Relativism (REO/REU) 0.948 0.964 0.943 0.936 
Egoism (EGO/EGU) 0.680 0.637 0.516 0.685 
Utilitarian (UTO/UTU) 0.762 0.776 0.739 0.757 
Contractualism (COO/COU) 0.988 0.974 0.981 0.985 
 
6.1.2 Validity of constructs  
As discussed in section 4.7.8.3 of Chapter 4, PLS applies a confirmatory 
factor analysis technique to confirm the strength of the measures by examining the 
convergent validity and discriminant validity. 
6.1.2.1 Convergent validity (AVE)  
The convergent validity is examined by observing the AVE values of all 
constructs. The convergent validity examines whether or not a set of measures 
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represent the same concept (unidimensionality). The AVEs for the study are 
presented in Table 6.2 for the overstating tax expenses and Table 6.4 for 
understating income. A majority of the AVEs met the threshold values of 0.50 
except for a few constructs. While the acceptable value for AVE is 0.50, however, 
for studies which involved newly developed measures, a value of around 0.50 is 
still acceptable, as indicated in Duarte and Raposo (2010) and Smart (2012). 
Therefore, after considering the theoretical aspect of the study, all constructs are 
retained in the model. 
6.1.2.2 Discriminant validity  
The discriminant validity differentiates whether or not items are different 
among constructs. Two tests were used, the cross-loading and Fornell-Larcker 
(1981) criterion.  
(a) Item cross-loadings 
The cross-loadings approach test the existence of discriminant validity at 
the item level and in this test, all loadings for each measure should be higher than 
their cross-loadings. Table 6.6 to Table 6.9 present the loadings and cross-loadings 
of all measures in the overstating tax expense scenario and understating income 
scenario in Malaysia and New Zealand. The results indicate that all items loaded 
higher in their own measures compared to all their cross-loadings, except item 
perceived behavioural control (PBO) in overstating tax expense and items egoism 
(EGU2) and perceived behavioural control (PBU1) in understating income 
expense. However, since cross-loading is not the only test to examine discriminant 
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validity and is considered to be more liberal than the Fornell-Larcker (1981) test, 
all measures are retained.  
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Table 6.6 Item cross-loadings for overstating tax expenses scenario - Malaysia 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1R 0.91 -0.26 -0.22 0.36 0.85 -0.17 -0.77 -0.26 0.25 -0.45 0.60 -0.34 -0.47 
ATO2 0.90 -0.17 -0.21 0.21 0.75 -0.18 -0.69 -0.23 0.27 -0.40 0.63 -0.01 -0.51 
ATO3 0.91 -0.31 -0.27 0.23 0.75 -0.13 -0.73 -0.33 0.28 -0.47 0.59 -0.07 -0.57 
COO1R -0.27 0.98 0.17 -0.08 -0.32 0.15 0.40 0.14 -0.16 0.10 -0.30 0.17 0.39 
COO2R -0.27 0.98 0.15 -0.10 -0.31 0.20 0.41 0.16 -0.16 0.10 -0.30 0.17 0.43 
EGO1R -0.15 0.24 0.63 -0.00 -0.17 -0.11 0.13 -0.07 -0.25 -0.02 -0.13 -0.06 0.15 
EGO2 -0.18 0.02 0.79 0.18 -0.21 0.00 0.24 0.20 -0.05 0.28 -0.15 0.10 0.31 
IND1R 0.20 0.01 -0.02 0.65 0.17 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 0.12 -0.00 -0.33 -0.02 
IND3 0.20 -0.14 0.21 0.71 0.18 -0.31 -0.23 0.03 0.12 -0.14 0.22 -0.14 0.01 
INO1R 0.79 -0.29 -0.31 0.27 0.90 -0.23 -0.67 -0.16 0.23 -0.40 0.57 -0.16 -0.43 
INO2 0.77 -0.24 -0.18 0.13 0.89 -0.19 -0.70 -0.25 0.22 -0.46 0.65 -0.04 -0.39 
INO3R 0.77 -0.32 -0.24 0.29 0.90 -0.23 -0.72 -0.25 0.28 -0.48 0.59 -0.29 -0.43 
MAS2 -0.13 0.17 -0.16 -0.40 -0.17 0.72 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.27 0.13 0.03 
MAS4 -0.14 0.10 0.04 -0.10 -0.21 0.82 0.19 -0.13 0.11 0.14 -0.18 0.21 0.01 
MEO1 -0.76 0.38 0.26 -0.19 -0.72 0.16 0.92 0.37 -0.36 0.54 -0.57 0.14 0.53 
MEO2 -0.74 0.39 0.30 -0.18 -0.72 0.22 0.91 0.38 -0.30 0.53 -0.61 0.17 0.54 
MEO3 -0.71 0.41 0.15 -0.22 -0.67 0.25 0.90 0.31 -0.35 0.47 -0.56 0.14 0.54 
MEO4 -0.62 0.26 0.23 -0.20 -0.62 0.14 0.80 0.20 -0.21 0.66 -0.55 0.09 0.50 
PBO1 -0.30 0.14 0.13 0.05 -0.24 -0.08 0.29 0.94 -0.16 0.26 -0.25 -0.00 0.23 
PBO2 -0.09 0.09 -0.04 0.10 -0.08 -0.01 0.30 0.43 -0.18 0.38 -0.25 0.09 0.17 
PD1 0.11 -0.16 -0.02 -0.12 0.09 -0.11 -0.14 0.10 0.54 -0.06 0.27 -0.05 -0.11 
PD2 0.14 -0.21 -0.05 -0.00 0.17 0.07 -0.17 -0.13 0.78 -0.07 0.24 -0.03 -0.16 
PD3 0.32 -0.06 -0.26 0.12 0.27 0.12 -0.38 -0.27 0.86 -0.11 0.29 -0.04 -0.23 
REO1 -0.46 0.09 0.21 -0.03 -0.47 0.26 0.60 0.34 -0.04 0.95 -0.52 0.02 0.44 
REO2 -0.45 0.10 0.16 -0.00 -0.46 0.12 0.57 0.35 -0.19 0.94 -0.54 -0.09 0.46 
SNO1R 0.68 -0.19 -0.18 0.21 0.67 -0.31 -0.61 -0.31 0.38 -0.58 0.93 -0.05 -0.41 
SNO2 0.28 -0.38 -0.12 -0.02 0.30 -0.08 -0.39 -0.14 0.08 -0.23 0.62 0.04 -0.29 
UAV1 -0.11 0.12 -0.02 -0.23 -0.12 0.31 0.11 -0.08 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.68 0.10 
UAV3 -0.12 0.13 0.07 -0.26 -0.14 0.03 0.11 0.11 -0.08 -0.11 0.01 0.76 -0.07 
UTO1 -0.45 0.13 0.35 0.09 -0.38 0.08 0.45 0.21 -0.09 0.53 -0.36 0.07 0.80 
UTO2R -0.44 0.53 0.15 -0.10 -0.35 -0.04 0.49 0.20 -0.29 0.20 -0.34 -0.06 0.76 
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Table 6.7 Item cross-loadings for overstating tax expenses scenario – New 
Zealand 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS  MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1R 0.84 -0.29 0.12 0.29 0.75 -0.21 -0.74 -0.26 0.24  - 0.47 0.60 0.02 -0.28 
ATO2 0.79 -0.12 0.01 0.14 0.52 -0.19 -0.49   -0.30 -0.02 -0.45 0.49 -0.04 -0.32 
ATO3 0.86 -0.21 0.11 0.36 0.73 -0.37 -0.68 -0.17 0.19 -0.42 0.49 -0.24 -0.41 
COO1R -0.27 0.97 -0.07 -0.15 -0.25 0.11 0.31 0.17 -0.12 0.21 -0.27 0.02 0.16 
COO2R -0.23 0.97 -0.05 -0.15 -0.22 0.13 0.25 0.13 -0.02 0.25 -0.21 0.13 0.16 
EGO1R 0.09 -0.04 0.48 0.11 0.09 0.01 -0.14 0.00 -0.07 -0.30 0.17 -0.21 -0.02 
EGO2 0.06 -0.05 0.85 0.09 0.16 -0.16 -0.09 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.04 -0.12 0.23 
IND1R 0.22 -0.17 0.00 0.75 0.19 -0.10 -0.18 -0.20 -0.00 -0.21 0.33 -0.05   -0.25 
IND3 0.31 -0.11 0.18 0.92 0.34 -0.34 -0.27 -0.07 0.06 -0.20 0.18 -0.27 -0.22 
INO1R 0.75 -0.21 0.21 0.35 0.90 -0.35 -0.72 -0.16 0.27 -0.36 0.50 -0.21 -0.27 
INO2 0.56 -0.27 0.12 0.17 0.75 -0.30 -0.48 -0.12 0.10 -0.39 0.52 0.00 -0.24 
INO3R 0.74 -0.15 0.14 0.30 0.87 -0.23 -0.72 -0.17 0.13 -0.43 0.53 -0.26 -0.31 
MAS2 -0.06 0.15 -0.11 -0.23 -0.11 0.59 0.05 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 
MAS4 -0.34 0.09 -0.11 -0.27 -0.36 0.96 0.26 0.07 -0.07 0.18 -0.16 0.07 0.25 
MEO1 -0.73 0.26 -0.18 -0.31 -0.75 0.30 0.89 0.11 -0.26 0.36 -0.51 0.27 0.33 
MEO2 -0.79 0.28 -0.12 -0.20 -0.75 0.24 0.94 0.18 -0.26 0.50 -0.60 0.13 0.37 
MEO3 -0.52 0.25 -0.21 -0.28 -0.52 0.16 0.79 0.14 -0.08 0.30 -0.43 0.24 0.29 
MEO4 -0.56 0.19 -0.02 -0.15 -0.54 0.05 0.74 0.13 -0.11 0.46 -0.57 0.01 0.25 
PBO1 -0.28 0.14 0.16 -0.10 -0.16 0.03 0.14 0.97 0.13 0.23 -0.26 0.02 0.19 
PBO2 -0.02 -0.04 0.26 0.10 0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.16 
PD1 0.10 0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.14 -0.06 -0.17 0.21 0.76 0.18 -0.01 0.10 -0.18 
PD2 0.19 -0.14 0.05 0.12 0.19 -0.14 -0.17 0.00 0.73 -0.11 0.18 0.07 -0.11 
PD3 0.12 -0.00 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.02 -0.17 0.13 0.82 0.05 0.08 0.18 -0.20 
REO1 -0.54 0.24 -0.05 -0.28 -0.44 0.18 0.47 0.19 0.01 0.96 -0.51 0.15 0.31 
REO2 -0.49 0.21 -0.05 -0.17 -0.44 0.15 0.46 0.24 0.04 0.96 -0.53 0.10 0.27 
SNO1R 0.58 -0.18 0.10 0.30 0.54 -0.18 -0.49 -0.29 0.11 -0.51 0.86 0.00 -0.30 
SNO2 0.47 -0.22 0.10 0.14 0.46 -0.04 -0.55 -0.13 0.09 -0.37 0.79 0.06 -0.12 
UAV1 -0.09 -0.02 -0.16 -0.21 -0.16 0.05 0.15 -0.03 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.81 0.06 
UAV3 -0.08 0.16 -0.16 -0.12 -0.14 0.056 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.09 -0.02 0.72 0.07 
UTO1 -0.31 0.05 0.33 -0.11 -0.26 0.11 0.26 0.12 -0.20 0.31 -0.20 -0.00 0.80 
UTO2R -0.34 0.22 -0.03 -0.32 -0.25 0.25 0.33 0.14 -0.13 0.17 -0.23 0.14 0.78 
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Table 6.8 Item cross-loadings for understating income scenario – Malaysia 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.82 -0.38 -0.24 0.27 0.78 -0.26 -0.81 -0.12 0.27 -0.58 0.57 -0.27 -0.49 
ATU2 0.87 -0.39 -0.13 0.09 0.61 -0.16 -0.50 -0.32 0.21 -0.30 0.43 -0.13 -0.53 
ATU3 0.85 -0.40 -0.22 0.15 0.60 -0.23 -0.51 -0.27 0.13 -0.26 0.52 -0.11 -0.51 
COU1R -0.46 0.98 0.30 -0.12 -0.39 0.14 0.48 0.09 -0.06 0.21 -0.36 0.24 0.29 
COU2R -0.43 0.98 0.26 -0.19 -0.38 0.12 0.43 0.04 -0.07 0.20 -0.30 0.28 0.21 
EGU1R -0.22 0.32 0.98 -0.21 -0.24 -0.07 0.23 -0.21 -0.15 -0.04 -0.18 -0.075 0.22 
EGU2 -0.11 -0.18 0.06 0.19 -0.04 -0.02 0.27 0.10 -0.02 0.29 -0.10 -0.03 0.17 
IND1R 0.11 -0.12 -0.28 0.68 0.15 -0.08 -0.11 0.16 -0.03 0.07 0.00 -0.29 -0.04 
IND3 0.17 -0.10 0.03 0.68 0.15 -0.3 -0.18 0.17 0.16 -0.19 0.03 -0.15 -0.02 
INU1R 0.75 -0.27 -0.23 0.16 0.90 -0.15 -0.69 -0.26 0.29 -0.3 0.56 -0.23 -0.47 
INU2 0.64 -0.46 -0.33 0.18 0.78 -0.17 -0.54 -0.06 0.11 -0.27 0.45 -0.10 -0.38 
INU3R 0.62 -0.29 -0.08 0.24 0.85 -0.21 -0.62 -0.16 0.32 -0.34 0.47 -0.23 -0.42 
MAS2 -0.16 0.11 -0.06 -0.38 -0.16 0.77 0.17 -0.07 -0.00 0.18 -0.24 0.05 0.08 
MAS4 -0.23 0.09 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16 0.78 0.15 -0.01 0.17 0.11 -0.07 0.16 0.15 
MEU1 -0.70 0.39 0.32 -0.13 -0.70 0.20 0.92 0.15 -0.40 0.47 -0.52 0.02 0.53 
MEU2 -0.73 0.44 0.34 -0.20 -0.73 0.26 0.95 0.12 -0.32 0.49 -0.60 0.10 0.58 
MEU3 -0.66 0.48 0.17 -0.24 -0.64 0.20 0.87 0.07 -0.35 0.52 -0.49 0.15 0.33 
MEU4 -0.51 0.34 0.13 -0.17 -0.51 0.06 0.81 0.02 -0.24 0.74 -0.58 0.17 0.34 
PBU1 -0.27 0.065 -0.20 0.24 -0.20 -0.06 0.10 0.99 -0.03 0.11 -0.23 -0.08 0.31 
PBU3 -0.04 -0.33 -0.26 0.18 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.51 0.02 0.09 -0.13 -0.09 0.16 
PD2 0.14 -0.20 -0.09 -0.00 0.11 0.06 -0.18 -0.08 0.66 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 -0.14 
PD3 0.24 -0.01 -0.16 0.11 0.31 0.11 -0.38 -0.01 0.96 -0.18 0.20 0.04 -0.14 
REU1 -0.40 0.17 -0.03 -0.03 -0.36 0.22 0.53 0.09 -0.13 0.94 -0.53 0.10 0.29 
REU2 -0.48 0.22 0.05 -0.12 -0.38 0.14 0.61 0.12 -0.24 0.94 -0.59 -0.00 0.39 
SNU1R 0.47 -0.24 -0.01 0.01 0.49 -0.14 -0.58 -0.18 0.28 -0.63 0.82 -0.14 -0.31 
SNU2 0.48 -0.30 -0.33 0.02 0.43 -0.18 -0.37 -0.17 0.02 -0.28 0.76 -0.03 -0.46 
UAV1 -0.12 0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.19 0.30 0.11 -0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.10 0.84 0.03 
UAV4R -0.20 0.15 0.22 -0.24 -0.11 -0.22 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.50 -0.04 
UTU1 -0.50 -0.0 0.10 -0.02 -0.38 0.19 0.47 0.24 -0.17 0.46 -0.43 -0.04 0.76 
UTU2R -0.42 0.40 0.29 -0.05 -0.38 0.03 0.31 0.23 -0.07 0.09 -0.31 0.05 0.76 
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Table 6.9 Item cross loadings for understating income scenario – New Zealand 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.79 -0.32 -0.01 0.23 0.59 -0.08 -0.53 0.18 0.05 -0.29 0.32 -0.04 -0.23 
ATU2 0.63 -0.05 -0.19 0.03 0.20 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 0.12 -0.25 0.38 0.13 -0.33 
ATU3 0.78 -0.06 0.02 0.18 0.53 -0.26 -0.32 0.13 0.06 -0.18 0.23 -0.15 -0.48 
COU1R -0.25 0.98 0.04 -0.14 -0.32 0.00 0.33 -0.27 -0.18 0.24 -0.23 -0.02 0.13 
COU2R -0.20 0.98 0.04 -0.12 -0.27 -0.00 0.29 -0.26 -0.19 0.23 -0.23 0.00 0.11 
EGU1R 0.01 0.06 0.51 0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.19 -0.00 0.13 -0.15 0.13 0.00 0.09 
EGU2 -0.05 0.02 0.89 0.10 0.15 -0.20 -0.13 0.00 0.04 0.12 -0.03 -0.13 0.15 
IND1R 0.05 -0.13 0.04 0.68 0.13 -0.10 -0.13 0.05 0.15 -0.26 0.23 -0.08 -0.21 
IND3 0.27 -0.11 0.12 0.96 0.35 -0.34 -0.31 0.15 0.08 -0.21 0.24 -0.25 -0.19 
INU1R 0.57 -0.18 0.25 0.36 0.84 -0.32 -0.58 0.30 0.09 -0.13 0.12 -0.37 -0.26 
INU2 0.49 -0.37 0.09 0.17 0.77 -0.19 -0.40 0.20 0.16 -0.17 0.24 -0.10 -0.36 
INU3R 0.56 -0.21 0.02 0.25 0.82 -0.15 -0.49 0.24 0.12 -0.28 0.25 -0.12 -0.27 
MAS2 0.01 0.06 -0.25 -0.24 -0.09 0.59 0.12 0.12 -0.17 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.11 
MAS4 -0.25 -0.02 -0.14 -0.28 -0.29 0.96 0.19 -0.16 -0.12 0.25 -0.25 -0.00 0.32 
MEU1 -0.40 0.23 -0.29 -0.34 -0.65 0.24 0.85 -0.16 -0.21 0.23 -0.12 0.28 0.20 
MEU2 -0.33 0.26 -0.04 -0.15 -0.37 0.05 0.81 -0.03 -0.25 0.32 -0.16 0.04 0.11 
MEU3 -0.51 0.31 -0.19 -0.25 -0.57 0.22 0.90 -0.08 -0.32 0.36 -0.25 0.09 0.18 
MEU4 -0.33 0.25 0.01 -0.12 -0.27 0.02 0.67 -0.03 -0.19 0.34 -0.30 -0.12 0.16 
PBU1 -0.22 0.02 0.065 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.133 -0.14 -0.11 0.05 
PBU3 0.16 -0.27 0.00 0.14 0.31 -0.10 -0.11 0.99 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.21 -0.05 
PD2 0.10 -0.17 0.08 0.12 0.14 -0.14 -0.29 0.03 0.99 -0.12 0.12 -0.03 -0.17 
PD3 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.027 -0.02 -0.09 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.08 -0.09 
REU1 -0.35 0.23 0.04 -0.27 -0.25 0.22 0.35 -0.08 -0.13 0.95 -0.28 0.07 0.23 
REU2 -0.24 0.22 0.02 -0.21 -0.18 0.19 0.33 -0.04 -0.12 0.91 -0.32 0.06 0.19 
SNU1R 0.23 -0.11 0.00 0.19 0.15 -0.20 -0.14 0.02 0.01 -0.24 0.74 0.14 -0.31 
SNU2 0.38 -0.25 0.03 0.25 0.24 -0.17 -0.23 0.07 0.15 -0.29 0.90 0.09 -0.28 
UAV1 -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.22 -0.26 0.05 0.12 -0.19 -0.01 0.09 0.14 0.97 0.08 
UAV4R -0.06 0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.18 0.06 -0.09 -0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.23 -0.04 
UTU1 -0.37 -0.04 0.32 -0.02 -0.24 0.13 0.10 -0.05 -0.16 0.14 -0.20 -0.00 0.71 
UTU2R -0.35 0.20 0.00 -0.29 -0.31 0.33 0.20 -0.03 -0.10 0.21 -0.33 0.10 0.83 
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(b) Fornell-Larcker Criterion (Square root of AVE) 
The Fornell-Larcker criterion is another test for discriminant validity which 
is considered as more systematic and reliable (Chin, 2010).  In this test, the square 
root of the AVE for each construct should be higher than its correlations with other 
construct to achieve discriminant validity. Table 6.10 to Table 6.13 present the 
results from the Fornell-Larcker criterion tests for both scenarios of overstating tax 
expenses and understating tax income for Malaysia and New Zealand. The results 
indicate that the square roots for each construct are greater than their correlations 
with other construct suggesting discriminant validity have been achieved.  
Table 6.10 Fornell- Lacker test for overstating tax expense scenario - Malaysia 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO 0.91                
COO -0.27 0.98              
EGO -0.23 0.16 0.71            
IND 0.30 -0.09 0.13 0.68          
INO 0.86 -0.32 -0.27 0.25 0.90            
MAS -0.18 0.17 -0.06 -0.30 -0.24 0.77          
MEO -0.80 0.41 0.27 -0.22 -0.77 0.22 0.88        
PBO -0.30 0.15 0.10 0.08 -0.25 -0.08 0.36 0.73      
PD 0.29 -0.16 -0.20 0.04 0.27 0.08 -0.35 -0.20 0.74        
REO -0.48 0.10 0.20 -0.02 -0.49 0.20 0.62 0.36 -0.12 0.94      
SNO 0.66 -0.30 -0.20 0.16 0.67 -0.28 -0.64 -0.31 0.34 -0.56 0.74    
UAV -0.16 0.17 0.04 -0.34 -0.18 0.23 0.15 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.72  
UTO -0.57 0.41 0.33 -0.01 -0.46 0.02 0.60 0.26 -0.23 0.48 -0.45 0.01 0.78 
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Table 6.11 Fornell-Larkcer test for overstating expense scenario – New 
Zealand 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO 0.82                        
COO -0.26 0.97                      
EGO 0.10 -0.07 0.69                    
IND 0.33 -0.15 0.13 0.84                  
INO 0.82 -0.24 0.19 0.33 0.85                
MAS -0.31 0.12 -0.13 -0.30 -0.35 0.80              
MEO -0.78 0.29 -0.16 -0.28 -0.77 0.24 0.84            
PBO -0.28 0.15 0.10 -0.13 -0.18 0.05 0.16 0.68          
PD 0.18 -0.07 0.09 0.04 0.20 -0.09 -0.22 0.13 0.77        
REO -0.53 0.24 -0.05 -0.23 -0.46 0.17 0.48 0.22 0.03 0.96      
SNO 0.64 -0.24 0.12 0.27 0.61 -0.14 -0.62 -0.26 0.12 -0.54 0.83    
UAV -0.11 0.07 -0.21 -0.23 -0.19 0.07 0.20 0.03 0.15 0.13 0.03 0.77  
UTO -0.41 0.17 0.19 -0.26 -0.32 0.22 0.37 0.16 -0.21 0.30 -0.27 0.08 0.79 
 
Table 6.12 Fornell-Larcker test for understating income scenario - Malaysia 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU 0.85                         
COU -0.46 0.98                       
EGU -0.24 0.28 0.69                     
IND 0.21 -0.16 -0.18 0.68                   
INU 0.79 -0.39 -0.25 0.23 0.84                 
MAS -0.26 0.13 -0.07 -0.31 -0.20 0.78               
MEU -0.74 0.46 0.28 -0.21 -0.73 0.21 0.89             
PBU -0.27 0.07 -0.19 0.24 -0.20 -0.05 0.11 0.79           
PD 0.25 -0.06 -0.16 0.09 0.29 0.11 -0.37 -0.03 0.82         
REU -0.47 0.21 0.01 -0.08 -0.39 0.19 0.60 0.11 -0.20 0.94       
SNU 0.60 -0.34 -0.20 0.02 0.59 -0.20 -0.61 -0.23 0.20 -0.59 0.79     
UAV -0.21 0.27 -0.08 -0.33 -0.23 0.14 0.12 -0.08 0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.69   
UTU -0.60 0.26 0.26 -0.05 -0.50 0.15 0.51 0.31 -0.16 0.36 -0.48 0.00 0.76 
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Table 6.13 Fornell–Larcker test for understating income scenario – New 
Zealand 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU   0.73                         
COU -0.23 0.98                       
EGU -0.03 0.05 0.73                     
IND 0.24 -0.13 0.11 0.83                   
INU 0.66 -0.30 0.16 0.33 0.81                 
MAS -0.21 -0.00 -0.19 -0.31 -0.28 0.80               
MEU -0.49 0.32 -0.20 -0.29 -0.61 0.20 0.81             
PBU 0.17 -0.27 0.00 0.14 0.31 -0.10 -0.11 0.71           
PD 0.09 -0.19 0.09 0.12 0.15 -0.15 -0.30 0.05 0.71         
REU -0.32 0.24 0.03 -0.26 -0.23 0.22 0.36 -0.07 -0.13 0.93       
SNU 0.39 -0.23 0.03 0.27 0.24 -0.22 -0.23 0.06 0.12 -0.32 0.83     
UAV -0.08 -0.00 -0.11 -0.23 -0.26 0.01 0.13 -0.20 -0.04 0.07 0.13 0.71   
UTU -0.46 0.12 0.17 -0.22 -0.36 0.30 0.20 -0.05 -0.16 0.23 -0.35 0.07 0.78 
 
6.2 Second order factor model   
At this stage, the reliability and validity of measures in the measurement 
first order model have been adequately satisfied. Since two constructs, namely 
ethical sensitivity and culture, are developed as a second order factor model, there 
is a need to test the second order factor model. In this study, the repeated indicator 
approach, suggested by Chin (2010) and Hair et al. (2013), was used to perform the 
second order factor test. As indicated in Table 6.14, all constructs for culture are 
significant for both Malaysia and New Zealand in the overstating tax expense 
scenario with individualism (IND) indicating the most significant construct. 
Likewise, all constructs in ethical sensitivity are significant in the overstating tax 
expense scenario for both Malaysia and New Zealand.  
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Table 6.14 Second order factor model for overstating tax expense scenario 
Malaysia New Zealand 
Construct 
Path 
estimate 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
Construct 
Path 
estimate 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
Culture (CUL) : R2 = 0.99 Culture (CUL): R2 = 0.99 
PD 0.638 2.711 0.01 PD 0.388 1.818 0.10 
IND -0.328 3.417 0.001 IND 0.548 3.790 0.001 
MAS 0.392 2.863 0.005 MAS 0.490 4.245 0.001 
UAV 0.302 3.221 0.005 UAV 0.186 1.854 0.10 
Ethical sensitivity (ES) : R2 = 0.99 Ethical sensitivity (ES) : R2= 0.99 
MEO 0.596 11.538 0.001 MEO 0.654 14.350 0.001 
REO 0.245 8.075 0.001 REO 0.300 9.615 0.001 
EGO 0.075 2.785 0.01 EGO 0.050 2.016 0.05 
UTO 0.167 7.379 0.001 UTO 0.142 5.005 0.001 
COO 0.190 4.063 0.001 COO 0.194 4.188 0.001 
 
In the case of understating income scenario, the findings in Table 6.15 
indicate that Power Distance, PD, is not a significant construct for culture in 
Malaysia and Egoism, EGU, is not significant in forming ethical sensitivity 
construct in New Zealand. However, since formative constructs are not determined 
only based on their significance level, all constructs are retained to ensure content 
validity.  
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Table 6.15 Second order factor model for understating income scenario 
Malaysia New Zealand 
Construct 
Path 
estimate 
t-values 
Level 
of sig. 
Construct 
Path 
estimate 
 t-values 
Level 
of  sig. 
Culture (CUL) : R2 = 0.99 Culture (CUL): R2 = 0.99 
PD -0.286 1.440 
Not 
sig. 
PD 
0.192 2.030 0.05 
IND 0.408 4.375 0.001 IND 0.599 6.205 0.001 
MAS 0.546 4.541 0.001 MAS -0.503 5.814 0.001 
UAV 0.329 3.476 0.001 UAV -0.212 2.456 0.05 
Ethical sensitivity (ES) : R2 = 1.00 Ethical sensitivity (ES) : R2= 0.99 
MEU 0.609 15.578 0.001 MEU 0.663 12.290 0.001 
REU 0.221 6.351 0.001 REU 0.281 7.614 0.001 
EGU 0.065 2.369 0.05 EGU 0.054 1.454 Not sig. 
UTU 0.151 5.269 0.001 UTU 0.141 4.086 0.001 
COU 0.227 5.430 0.001 COU 0.295 6.240 0.001 
 
To test multicollinearity for formative constructs, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF), condition index and tolerance values, which were generated from 
SPSS, are observed. From Table 6.16 and Table 6.17, it can be concluded that 
multicollinearity is not a threat to the model for the overstating tax expense 
scenario for both Malaysia and New Zealand. This is based on the values of 
variance inflation factor which are less than 10 (Gefen et al, 2010; Hair et al., 
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2010), condition index of less than 30 (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006; Hair et 
al., 2012), and tolerance value of higher than 0.20 (Hair et al., 2013).   
Table 6.16 Multicollinearity for overstating tax expense scenario - Malaysia 
Item 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics  
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
Condition 
Index 
Constant .050 .411  .122 .914   1.000 
CUL 1.853 1.336 .856 1.387 .300 .586 1.707 3.788 
ES -.487 1.521 -.198 -.320 .779 .586 1.707 5.094 
 
Table 6.17 Multicollinearity for overstating tax expense scenario – New 
Zealand 
Item 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
Condition 
Index 
Constant -.198 .230  -.862 .480   1.000 
CUL 1.741 .538 .845 3.236 .084 .970 1.031 3.012 
ES .543 .522 .272 1.040 .407 .970 1.031 4.247 
 
Similar to the first model for the overstating tax expense scenario, the VIF, 
condition index and tolerance values are checked to ensure there is no 
multicollinearity among the constructs in the second scenario. The findings from 
Table 6.18 and Table 6.19 for Malaysia and New Zealand suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a serious issue in this model. This is based on the VIF 
values of less than 10, condition index of less than 30, and tolerance values of 
higher than 0.20. At this stage it can be concluded that culture and ethical 
sensitivity are perceived as multidimensional constructs by tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand. 
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Therefore, Hypothesis 7 which states “Tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand perceive ethical sensitivity as a multidimensional concept” is accepted.  
Likewise, Hypothesis 9 which states “Tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand perceive culture as a multidimensional concept” is also accepted.  
Table 6.18 Multicollinearity for understating income scenario – Malaysia 
Item 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
Condition 
Index 
Constant -.441 .389  -1.133 .375   1.000 
CUL 1.846 .797 .799 2.317 .146 .945 1.058 2.707 
ES 1.336 .764 .602 1.748 .228 .945 1.058 5.584 
 
Table 6.19 Multicollinearity for understating income scenario – New Zealand 
Item 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
Condition 
Index 
Constant -.359 .347  -1.036 .409   1.000 
CUL 1.692 .648 .890 2.612 .121 .879 1.137 2.290 
ES 1.248 .681 .624 1.832 .208 .879 1.137 5.140 
 
6.3 Structural model  
Since the measurement models at the first and second order have been 
successfully evaluated, the evaluation of the structural models can now be proceed. 
As discussed earlier in section 4.7.8.3 of Chapter 4, the evaluation of structural 
models for the study are based on the R2, effect size and path coefficient. Figure 6.1 
to Figure 6.4 illustrates the structural models for overstating tax expenses and 
understating income expenses for Malaysia and New Zealand.  
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Figure 6.1 Structural model for overstating tax expenses scenario - Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
1. INO – Intention  
2. ATO – Attitude  
3. SNO – Subjective norms 
4. PBO – Perceived behavioural control 
5. CUL – Culture 
6. ES – Ethical sensitivity 
a Significant at 0.10 level 
b Significant at 0.001 level 
INO  
R2 = 0.78 
ES 
CUL 
ATO 
SNO 
PBO 
-0.164a 
0.024 
0.664b   
 
0.125 
0.056 
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Figure 6.2 Structural model for overstating tax expense scenario – New 
Zealand 
 
Note:  
1. INO – Intention  
2. ATO – Attitude  
3. SNO – Subjective norms 
4. PBO – Perceived behavioural control 
5. CUL – Culture 
6. ES – Ethical sensitivity 
a Significant at 0.10 level 
b Significant at 0.05 level 
c Significant at 0.001 level 
 
INO  
R2 = 0.72 
ES 
CUL 
ATO 
SNO 
PBO 
-0.192b 
0.117a 
0.576c   
 
0.097 
0.059 
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Figure 6.3 Structural model for understating income scenario – Malaysia 
 
Note:  
1. INU – Intention  
2. ATU – Attitude  
3. SNU – Subjective norms 
4. PBU – Perceived behavioural control 
5. CUL – Culture 
6. ES – Ethical sensitivity 
a Significant at 0.001 level 
 
INU  
R2 =0.67 
ATU 
SNU 
PBU 
ES 
CUL 
0.054 
-0.189 
0.573a 
-0.004 
0.102 
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Figure 6.4 Structural model for understating income scenario – New Zealand 
  
Note:  
1. INU – Intention  
2. ATU – Attitude  
3. SNU – Subjective norms 
4. PBU – Perceived behavioural control 
5. CUL – Culture 
6. ES – Ethical sensitivity 
a Significant at 0.01 level 
b Significant at 0.001 level 
c Significant at 0.001 level 
d Significant at 0.10 level 
 
6.3.1 R-squares  
R-squares are considered as the primary analysis to test the structural model 
which indicates the degree of coefficient determination. There is no threshold of R-
squares (Hair et al., 2012) but higher is better (Gotz et al., 2010). In this study the 
R-squares of overstating scenarios and understating income for both Malaysia and 
New Zealand indicate substantial values, since they are around 0.60 (Urbach and 
Ahlemann, 2010). The findings indicate that the model can explain around 58 
INU  
R2 =0.58 
ATU 
SNU 
PBU 
ES 
CUL 
0.161a 
-0.283b 
0.485c 
0.162d 
-0.095 
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percent to 78 percent of variance in the intention of tax agents to comply with the 
tax law in overstating expenses and understating income. The R-squares are 
comparable to Saad (2011), who documented around 52 to 74 percent of variance 
in tax compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers in New Zealand.  
Table 6.20 R-squares for the study 
 R- squares 
Scenarios Malaysia New Zealand 
Overstating tax expenses 0.777 0.717 
Understating income 0.670 0.582 
 
6.3.2 Effect size  
The R-squares are also useful to determine the effect size of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. Based on the recommendations by 
Cohen (1988) as discussed in section 4.7.8.3 of Chapter 4, it can be concluded that 
attitude has large effect on intention to comply in overstating tax expense in 
Malaysia based on the ƒ2 of 0.75 presented in Table 6.21Table 6.21Table 6.21. 
However, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, culture and ethical 
sensitivity only indicate small effects on intention. Similar to Malaysia, only 
attitude has large effect on intention to comply in overstating tax expense scenario 
in New Zealand, based on the results in Table 6.22. 
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Table 6.21 Effect size for overstating tax expense – Malaysia 
Construct excluded R2 excluded ƒ2 Level of effect 
Attitude 0.615 0.75 Large 
Subjective norms 0.769 0.05 Small 
Perceived behavioural control 0.774 0.03 Small 
Culture 0.776 0.05 Small 
Ethical sensitivity 0.767 0.06 Small 
 
Table 6.22 Effect size for overstating expenses - New Zealand 
Construct excluded R2 excluded ƒ2 Level of effect 
Attitude 0.605 0.41 Large 
Subjective norms 0.713 0.03 Small 
Perceived behavioural control 0.714 0.02 Small 
Culture 0.706 0.05 Small 
Ethical sensitivity 0.705 0.05 Small 
 
Similar to the overstating expense scenario, the effect size for understating 
income scenario is also examined for Malaysia and New Zealand. The findings 
from Malaysia indicate that only attitude has a large effect on intention, while 
subjective norms and ethical sensitivity, only indicate small effects on intention. 
Interestingly, perceived behavioural control, and culture have no effect on intention 
in understating income in Malaysia. In New Zealand, only attitude has a large 
effect on intention in understating income scenario with small effect from other 
independent variables.  
298 
 
 
Table 6.23 Effect size for understating income - Malaysia 
Construct excluded R2 excluded ƒ2 Level of effect 
Attitude 0.550 0.36 Large 
Subjective norms 0.665 0.02 Small 
Perceived behavioural control 0.670 0.00 No effect 
Culture 0.668 0.00 No effect 
Ethical sensitivity 0.659 0.03 Small 
 
Table 6.24 Effect size for understating income - New Zealand 
Construct excluded R2 excluded ƒ2 Level of effect 
Attitude 0.425 0.38 Large 
Subjective norms 0.573 0.02 Small 
Perceived behavioural control 0.556 0.06 Small 
Culture 0.557 0.06 Small 
Ethical sensitivity 0.535 0.11 Small 
 
6.3.3 Path coefficient and hypotheses testing 
Path coefficient in PLS is used to examine the relationship between 
construct and the strength of the relationship is assessed using bootstrapping as 
discussed in section 4.7.8.3 of Chapter 4. The strength of the relationship, 
according to Urbach and Ahlemann (2010), should be at least 0.10. Table 6.25 
presents the results for overstating tax expense in Malaysia and New Zealand. For 
Malaysia, only attitude is highly significant at p < 0.001 with path coefficient of 
0.664 followed by Ethical sensitivity which is only significant at p < 0.10. For New 
Zealand, attitude is significant at p < 0.001, ethical sensitivity at p < 0.05 and 
culture at p < 0.10.  
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Based on the findings, Hypothesis H4 stating “Attitude towards behaviour 
significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with 
the tax law” was accepted for both Malaysia and New Zealand in overstating tax 
expenses scenario.   
Likewise, the Hypothesis H8 on ethical sensitivity, stating “Ethical 
sensitivity significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law” was accepted for both Malaysia and New Zealand in 
overstating tax expense scenario.  
Hypothesis H5 which states “Subjective norms significantly influence tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax law” was rejected 
for both countries in overstating tax expense scenario.  
Equally, Hypothesis H6 suggesting that “Perceived behavioural control 
significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with 
the tax law” was also rejected for Malaysia and New Zealand in the scenario of 
overstating tax expense.  
Hypothesis H10 which proposes “Culture significantly influences tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax law” in overstating 
tax expense scenario, was rejected for Malaysia but accepted in New Zealand with 
a weak relationship between culture and intention.  
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Table 6.25 Path coefficient for overstating tax expenses 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
Relationship Path 
coefficient 
(ß) 
t- values Sig. 
level 
Path 
coefficient 
(ß) 
t-values Sig. 
level 
Attitude - Intention 0.664 7.765 0.001 0.576 6.276 0.001 
Subjective norms – 
Intention 
0.125 1.580 Not sig. 0.097 1.555 Not 
sig. 
Perceived behavioural 
control – Intention 
0.056 1.306 Not sig. 0.059 1.522 Not 
sig. 
Culture - Intention 0.024 0.548 Not sig. 0.117 1.712 0.10 
Ethical sensitivity – 
Intention 
-0.164 1.945 0.10 -0.192 2.079 0.05 
 
Similar hypotheses used in overstating tax expense scenario were then 
tested in understating income scenario. For understating income scenario, attitude 
is the only significant variable in Malaysia at p < 0.001. In New Zealand, 
interestingly, attitude and ethical sensitivity are significant at p < 0.001, perceived 
behavioural control at p < 0.10 and culture at p < 0.01.  
Consequently, Hypothesis H4 stating “Attitude towards behavior 
significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with 
the tax law” was accepted for both Malaysia and New Zealand in understating 
income scenario.  
Hypothesis H5 which proposes “Subjective norms significantly influence 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax law” was 
rejected in both countries for understating income scenario.  
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Hypothesis H6 on “Perceived behavioural control significantly influences 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax law” was 
rejected in Malaysia but accepted with weak influence in New Zealand in 
understating income scenario.  
A similar finding is documented for Hypothesis H10 which sates “Culture 
significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with 
the tax law” in understating income scenario, was rejected in Malaysia but 
accepted with moderate influence in New Zealand.  
The influence of ethical sensitivity on intention was tested based on 
Hypothesis H8 “Ethical sensitivity significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand in complying with the tax law” was rejected in Malaysia but 
accepted with a strong influence in New Zealand in understating income scenario.  
Table 6.26 Path coefficient for under stating tax income 
 Malaysia New Zealand 
Relationship Path 
coefficient 
(ß) 
t- values Sig. 
level 
Path 
coefficient 
(ß) 
t- 
values 
Sig. 
level 
Attitude - Intention 0.573 4.704 0.001 0.485 5.906 0.001 
Subjective norms - 
Intention 
0.102 1.264 Not sig. -0.095 1.620 Not 
sig. 
Perceived behavioural 
control - Intention 
-0.004 0.105 Not sig. 0.162 1.863 0.10 
Culture - Intention -0.054 0.891 Not sig. 0.161 2.748 0.01 
Ethical sensitivity - 
Intention 
-0.189 1.657 Not sig. -0.283 3.581 0.001 
 
The following Table 6.27Table 6.27Table 6.27 summarizes the results from 
the hypotheses testing for overstating tax expense scenario in Malaysia and New 
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Zealand. The results from the hypotheses testing for understating income scenario 
are also summarized in Table 6.28.  
Table 6.27 Summary of hypotheses testing for overstating tax expenses 
scenario in Malaysia and New Zealand 
Research Questions Hypotheses 
Findings 
Malaysia New 
Zealand 
4. Does attitude towards tax 
compliance significantly 
influence the tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law? 
H4: Attitude towards tax 
compliance significantly 
influences the tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law.  
Accepted Accepted 
5. Does subjective norm 
significantly influence tax 
agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the 
tax law? 
H5: Subjective norm 
significantly influences tax 
agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the 
tax law. 
Rejected Rejected 
6. Does perceived behavioural 
control significantly influence 
the tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law? 
H6: Perceived behavioural 
control significantly influences 
tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law. 
Rejected Rejected 
7. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand perceive 
ethical sensitivity as a 
multidimensional concept? 
H7. Tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand perceive ethical 
sensitivity as a 
multidimensional concept. 
Accepted Accepted 
8. Does ethical sensitivity 
significantly influence tax agent 
in Malaysia and New Zealand 
in complying with the tax law? 
H8: Ethical sensitivity 
significantly influences tax 
agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the 
tax law. 
Accepted Accepted 
9. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand perceive 
culture as a multidimensional 
concept? 
H9: Tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand perceive culture 
as a multidimensional concept. 
Accepted Accepted 
10. Does culture significantly 
influence tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law? 
Culture significantly influences 
tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law.  
Rejected Accepted 
Note: Summary of results for research questions 1 to 3 are presented in Table 5.30 of 
Chapter 5. 
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Table 6.28 Summary of hypotheses testing for understating income scenario in 
Malaysia and New Zealand 
Research Questions Hypotheses 
Findings 
Malaysia New 
Zealand 
4. Does attitude towards tax 
compliance significantly 
influence the tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law? 
H4: Attitude towards tax 
compliance significantly 
influences the tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law.  
Accepted Accepted 
5. Does subjective norm 
significantly influence tax 
agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the 
tax law? 
H5: Subjective norm 
significantly influences tax 
agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the 
tax law. 
Rejected Rejected 
6. Does perceived behavioural 
control significantly influence 
the tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law? 
H6: Perceived behavioural 
control significantly influences 
tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law. 
Rejected Accepted 
7. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand perceive 
ethical sensitivity as a 
multidimensional concept? 
H7. Tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand perceive ethical 
sensitivity as a 
multidimensional concept. 
Accepted Accepted 
8. Does ethical sensitivity 
significantly influence tax agent 
in Malaysia and New Zealand 
in complying with the tax law? 
H8: Ethical sensitivity 
significantly influences tax 
agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand in complying with the 
tax law. 
Rejected Accepted 
9. Do tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand perceive 
culture as a multidimensional 
concept? 
H9: Tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand perceive culture 
as a multidimensional concept. 
Accepted Accepted 
10. Does culture significantly 
influence tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in 
complying with the tax law? 
Culture significantly influences 
tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law.  
Rejected Accepted 
Note: Summary of results for research questions 1 to 3 are presented in Table 5.30 of 
Chapter 5. 
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6.4 Summary   
In this chapter the evaluation of the measurement model at the first order, 
second order and structural model, was performed using PLS-SEM technique by 
applying the SmartPLS software (Ringle et al., 2005) before the hypotheses testing 
was done. The measures and constructs have been validated accordingly following 
suggestions from previous literature on PLS-SEM. The findings indicate that tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive ethical sensitivity and culture as 
multidimensional items based on the results from the second order factor model.  
The values of R-squares are within the range of 58 percent to 77 percent in 
the overstating expenses scenario and understating income scenario in Malaysia 
and New Zealand, suggesting that the model can explain 58 percent to 77 percent 
variance in intention to comply with the tax law by tax agents in the study. Overall, 
attitudes indicate a consistent result with large effect on intention in both scenarios 
in Malaysia and New Zealand. This is then translated with strong relationship 
between attitudes on intention in both scenarios in Malaysia and New Zealand from 
the path coefficient and significant level of p-value at 0.001.  
The findings also indicate inconsistencies between two tax environments of 
Malaysia and New Zealand. For instance, ethical sensitivity is highly and 
moderately significant in New Zealand for the overstating tax expenses scenario 
and understating income scenario, but only indicated a weak relationship for 
overstating tax expenses and is not significant in the understating income scenario 
in Malaysia. In summary, the findings contribute to the scarce literature in tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents.  
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CHAPTER 7  
INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
 
7.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the interview findings with some tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand. The findings are presented in two main parts: the first 
part consists of interviews with tax agents in Malaysia, followed by the second part 
on the findings from interviews with tax agents in New Zealand. Briefly, the 
discussions focused on the perceptions of tax agents with regard to tax compliance 
behaviour, the influence of ethical sensitivity, and culture in their decision making 
while performing their engagement roles. The chapter ends with a brief summary.  
7.1 Malaysia 
As explained earlier in section 4.7.4.1 of Chapter 4, the author sent 1,500 
invitations to participate in interviews to potential survey respondents. Initially 21 
survey respondents indicated their interest to participate in the interview; however, 
4 of them were not available despite two attempts of calling to confirm their 
participation. Ultimately, 17 interview participants from various positions, type of 
firms and years of experience, voluntarily took part in the interview. The telephone 
interviews were conducted between November 2011 and January 2012. 
The demographic profiles for all participants are illustrated in Table 7.1, 
comprising 6 males and 11 females. With regard to position in the firm, the 
interview participants came from various positions as follows: 
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(1) Three tax consultants 
(2) One principal 
(3) Two managers 
(4) Two senior tax executives 
(5) Three tax directors 
(6) One partner 
(7) Five tax executives 
In terms of working experience in tax practice, the interview participants 
ranged from those with less than five years of tax experience to those who have 
more than twenty one years of tax experience, as indicated below: 
(1) Less than five years of tax experience – 5 participants 
(2) Between five to ten years of tax experience – 2 participants 
(3) Between eleven to fifteen years of tax experience – 2 participants 
(4) Between sixteen to twenty years of tax experience – 6 participants 
(5) Twenty one years of tax experience and more – 2 participants  
The interview participants also came from different types and sizes of firms 
in public practice, ranging from sole practitioners, tax consulting firms and public 
accounting firms. Their background firms are as follows: 
(1) Sole practitioner – 2 participants 
(2) Small tax consulting firms – 3 participants 
(3) Medium sized public accounting firm – 6 participants 
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(4) Small size public accounting firm – 6 participants  
The demographic profiles for interview participants from Malaysia suggest 
that those tax agents who participated in this interview study came from a mixed 
background of positions, gender, years of working experience in tax practice and 
types of firm. The differences in their social and professional background are 
expected to provide rich information and views from diverse perspectives which 
could be helpful to further understand the factors that influence tax agents in their 
ethical decision making while performing their roles.  
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Table 7.1 Demographic Profiles of Interview Participants – Malaysia 
Position Gender 
Years of 
experience 
in tax 
practice 
Type of firms 
Reference in 
the thesis 
Tax Consultant Male 16 Sole practitioner Participant 1 
Principal Female 16 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 2 
Manager Male 16 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 3 
Senior Tax 
Executive 
Male  6 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 4 
Senior Tax 
Executive 
Female  7 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 5 
Tax Director Female 22 Small tax 
consulting firm 
Participant 6 
Tax Consultant Male 21 Sole practitioner Participant 7 
Tax Consultant Male         13 Small tax 
consulting firm 
Participant 8 
Tax Director Female 16 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 9 
Tax Director Female 12 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 10 
Tax Executive Female  4 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 11 
Partner Male 20 Small tax 
consulting firm 
Participant 12 
Tax Executive Female  4 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 13 
Tax Executive Female  4 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 14 
Tax Executive Female  4 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 15 
Tax Executive Female  3 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 16 
Manager Female 16 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant 17 
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7.1.1 Data analysis and interview findings  
7.1.1.1 Tax compliance behaviour  
In explaining their understanding about tax compliance behaviour, 
generally all interview participants associated tax compliance with complying with 
the Income Tax Act, standards, rules and regulations by the MIRB. Their 
understanding is translated by meeting the deadlines for filing of tax returns, and 
payment owed to the MIRB, having proper documentation, possessing knowledge, 
and declaring the income that taxpayers earned. The following comments are some 
examples of how tax agents in this interview understand tax compliance:  
“Tax compliance means…tax agent has to comply with all standards 
and public rulings, rule and regulations set by the Income Tax Act…” 
(Participant 2, principal, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Basically if you say about tax compliance, it can be from two 
areas…one is the computation [and] the other is from the timing…for 
example [the] submission deadline, payment deadline, filing deadline. 
At the end of the day, it is the question of effectiveness…if you do not 
meet the deadlines, then you are not efficient”. 
(Participant 3, manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
“In my opinion, tax compliance is following the rule, it means we follow 
what is required by the Income Tax Act or [any] regulations, 
legislations determined by the IRB”. 
(Participant 4, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
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 “For tax compliance, we have to ensure that our client follow the 
IRB’s document, ensure that the record is correct, advise them with 
their responsibility and follow the IRB’s requirement. Clients do not 
have the knowledge. We have to make sure that under the SAS client is 
more aware of the requirements by the IRB”. 
(Participant 12, partner, small tax consulting firm) 
“We have to be detailed in analysing the information, understand the 
clients’ business, [so] we have to be well versed with the tax laws, we 
have to equip ourselves with sound technical knowledge. The tax laws 
and case laws are important sources in making decisions”. 
(Participant 17, tax manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
There is also a suggestion that tax compliance means exercising justice, on 
the side of taxpayers and tax authority. This could be achieved by ensuring that 
taxpayers do not overpay or underpay the amount of tax.  
“It is wrong to under declared the income…it should be a win-win 
situation. Taxpayers will not pay more or less even by a cent, we just 
pay what we are supposed to pay”. 
(Participant 8, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
Interestingly, as commented by an interview participant, complying with 
the tax law to a certain extent is situation specific. In the cases of natural disaster 
for instance, it becomes very challenging and requires tax agent to be more flexible 
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with their clients in their approach to obtain the appropriate documents for tax 
filing purposes:  
“The taxpayers know the things that they can claim and those that they 
cannot claim…it depends on situation. Let’s say…in 2006, we had 
severe flooding in our town. The bills were drifted away…so how are 
we going to prepare the computation? I think in this case we have to 
tolerate. We had to collect as much evidence as we could, found 
whatever documents which were still available…and referred to 
previous records as well. I think we have to consider our client situation 
as well in this kind of circumstances”. 
 (Participant 6, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
When probed further, the interview participants also explained that their 
attitudes to a certain extent guide them to comply with the tax law. For instance, in 
addition to their awareness on the importance of complying with the tax laws, as 
professionals, there is a concern that their attitude has to be aligned with the 
professional ethics while performing their roles: 
“As a tax agent, we are given the trust, and I am afraid of the tax law. 
We should not go against the law. As an accountant we have to follow 
the ethical conduct” 
(Participant 7, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“As tax professionals we have to follow our [tax professional] ethics” 
(Participant 8, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
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“Because we have the [tax] laws, then we have to follow. I will try to 
comply whatever is required by the Act”  
(Participant 12, partner, small tax consulting firm) 
“For me it is our attitude. In the context of complying with the tax law, 
it starts from before we do the tax…becoming a tax professional is a 
professional responsibility” 
(Participant 13, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“It is our own self…have to follow the tax regulation. My intention also 
influences me but I also want to help my client, so it’s combination” 
(Participant 16, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
There are also suggestions that their attitudes towards the possibility of 
being penalised for non-compliance, the risk of losing credibility as a tax agent and 
the feeling of guilt for non-compliance, influence them to comply with the tax law. 
Some tax agents commented, for instance: 
“Personally I think the factors that can influence…is the individual 
himself/herself, mainly…the people that I met, is all depends on that 
individual person. It is one’s upbringing. I don’t want any problem, for 
example I prepare a client’s tax, there is something that I do not 
properly check, the client relies on me, I do the work for the sake of 
doing, so I feel guilty. The other thing is, if I don’t do the work properly, 
later the IRB audits the client, the blame is on me, it’s not nice if being 
penalised, professionally it is not nice”  
(Participant 5, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
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 “Any decisions which are against the tax law will have effect on the 
taxpayers. It will damage our credibility as tax agents. As a tax 
professional I have to understand this and be ethical. The Code of 
Ethics by the Malaysian Institute of Accountants becomes my guideline. 
Membership in professional accounting bodies is indeed helpful” 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
 “…depends on that particular person whether or not to comply with 
the tax laws, sometimes…we want to be ethical but others like our 
clients they refused…but if [I] don’t comply with the tax law, I’ll feel 
guilty” 
(Participant 15, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
In addition to attitudes, the discussion during the interviews also centred on 
the influence of social pressure imposed by referent or important others in the 
decision making of tax agents. The interview participants unanimously agreed that 
subjective norms affect their decision making to a degree. The influence of 
subjective norms comes from peers, superiors and friends who are in the same 
profession, in the form of exchanging different experiences and opinions especially 
in complicated tax cases. This could be due to the different level of expertise in 
interpreting tax laws. Interestingly, perceptions of people around them and clients 
can also influence their decision making.  For example: 
“Yes, my colleagues. Their influence may come from their experience 
and knowledge”. 
(Participant 1, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
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“If there is something that I do not know, then I’ll refer to my 
supervisor, then my supervisor will come out with her opinions, 
supported by the Act”. 
(Participant 4, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
“I think it depends on the boss as well, if my boss is not like that [strict 
with clients], maybe there are times that I surrender with the client. 
There is positive and negative influence from the colleagues”. 
(Participant 5, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
“I share with my friends who are in the same profession to get their 
opinion. Yes, I consider the opinions of my friends who are in the same 
profession. Normally, I refer to senior partners about the final decision. 
If it is a simple case, I don’t refer. It’s only for complicated or big 
companies”. 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“I do refer to my superior and colleagues. Maybe they have different 
experience. So if they have similar experience then I use their advice on 
my clients. Sometimes they have similar cases, so we exchange ideas”.  
(Participant 11, tax executive, small size public accounting firm)  
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“If there are cases that require high level of technical knowledge I will 
ensure that I discuss first with my colleagues, we do our own research, 
especially in isolated cases. Not for all issues, only certain issues”. 
(Participant 12, partner, small tax consulting firm) 
“For me the perceptions of others around me are important in 
complying with the tax law…influence by colleagues is an important 
factor for me”. 
(Participant 13, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“Influence from peers. We will ask around among ourselves, if we still 
cannot find the answer, then we will ask our supervisor”. 
(Participant 14, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“In cases where I am not familiar then I have to refer to someone else 
but in cases that I am quite familiar then I do my own research. I also 
seek clarification from friends working in other firms, I always ask 
around”. 
(Participant 17, manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
It is also postulated that compliance behaviour with tax laws is influenced 
by the perceived behavioural control that tax agents possessed, which is the ability 
of an individual to have control and the perceived ease or difficulty in performing a 
behaviour. This can be influenced by personal and environmental factors such as 
having the skills and opportunities to engage in a particular behaviour (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010).  
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When asked to comment on the influence of perceived behavioural control 
in complying with the tax laws, there are mixed opinions provided by the interview 
participants. Some interview participants agree that they have control in their 
decision making of whether or not to comply with the tax law, yet some interview 
participants disagreed, stating that they only have control at the initial stage of 
preparing documents for tax compliance purposes. One possible reason for the 
mixed of opinion is because tax agents perceived themselves as advocates who 
assist their clients, and eventually it is the clients who decide themselves. This 
could possibly lessen the influence of perceived behavioural control in complying 
with the tax laws. Some of the comments are presented here: 
“Yes, I always have full control. Maybe because I understand how the 
tax laws work. My clients typically have little knowledge. Rather than 
arguing the amount of tax payable, they normally need my advice”. 
(Participant 1, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“Not necessarily, let’s say I am preparing a file for my client then 
finally there is something that I am not sure, so I refer to my superior. 
Things that I am sure, I will make my own decision”. 
(Participant 5, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
 “…I’ll ask the client. We will prepare the tax computation then we will 
see what the Act says, we discuss any other transactions, so the decision 
of how much tax the clients have to pay is not only based on me, it 
depends on the client as well”. 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
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“Normally, it’s the client who makes the decision, we advise the client. 
We only advise about their tax needs, what is compulsory for those with 
income reaching the tax limit.  
(Participant 10, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“If possible the client does not want to pay much tax. The client will 
come for advice…how to reduce tax. So, we will advise the client to 
reduce the amount of tax according to the law, such as through 
claiming incentives. The decision is based on our discussion with the 
client and not against the Income Tax Act”. 
(Participant 12, partner, small tax consulting firm) 
“At the end of the day, the superior made the final decision. At the 
beginning, yes I have control but eventually I do not have the control. 
Sometimes, I do not have the confidence to support my argument. 
Maybe because I think, my superior has more experience than me, more 
expert”. 
(Participant 14, tax executive, small size public accounting) 
“My boss will make the decision. Initially, yes I’ll make the decision but 
final decision is always my boss”. 
(Participant 16, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
7.1.1.2 Ethical sensitivity and tax compliance 
The issue of ethical sensitivity was also discussed during the interviews to 
elicit tax agents’ opinions as to whether ethical sensitivity helps tax agents in this 
study to comply with the tax laws.  Generally, tax agents who participated in the 
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interview agreed that ethical sensitivity is beneficial in complying with the tax laws 
especially after spending some time working in tax environment. They suggested 
that their experience in tax practice and their observation skills help to develop 
their ethical sensitivity. Some of the comments obtained from the interviews are 
presented here:  
“Yes…[I] can see the clients try to play around with the figure…try to 
reduce the tax…sometimes the client thought they are good enough to 
hide from us, but after sometime as a tax professional, yes, we can 
detect”. 
(Participant 2, principal, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Well, if we look at the clients’ file, normally, we could know that the 
clients try to evade tax”. 
(Participant 6, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
“Based on my experience, during the discussion, we can detect how 
much tax the clients want to pay”. 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Normally, when the clients come to us, they will inform us that they 
only have this amount of income…but …sometimes, they actually have 
other extra income. Sometimes they want to tell us, but half of the 
clients do not want to declare. When our clients bring their documents 
to us, we will see whether the documents are enough. Once we prepare 
their computation, and there is not enough information or it is 
suspicious, then…we will ask them. You could detect if you have been 
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doing tax work for years. Even when we look at their documents, they 
could be guidelines as well”. 
(Participant 10, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“It is helpful. Normally, the client will bring their documents and they 
will ask us to prepare the tax computation. Then…they will see whether 
there is anything which is against their wish. Sometimes we can detect, 
if there is something suspicious”. 
(Participant 12, partner, small tax consulting firm) 
There were some interview participants, especially the junior tax agents, 
who appeared to be confused with the term ‘ethical sensitivity’ itself, possibly 
because as junior tax staff they only deal with less complicated tax cases. This 
perhaps explains the different point of view offered by the more junior interview 
participants with regard to the importance of ethical sensitivity. For instance: 
“As a tax agent I will prepare based on the documents provided by the 
client, what they declare. I will not ask more than that. Basically…I 
could say that I still do not have the sensitivity…to detect if the client 
has the intention to evade tax based on the documents provided to me” 
(Participant 13, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“So far, I don’t think I have the ethical sensitivity” 
(Participant 14, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
Interestingly, an interview participant commented that ethical sensitivity 
does not only help in detecting the intention to evade tax, but also in identifying 
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any potential amount of tax that could be saved by the client according to the tax 
law,. The participant commented:  
 “Based on my experience, I can sense if there is ‘something’ with the 
information provided by the client. But that does not mean that 
‘something’ always lead to unethical conduct. It could be after a 
thorough review, the client can actually claim certain expenses which 
have been previously overlooked” 
(Participant 4, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
7.1.1.3 Culture and tax compliance behaviour 
To understand the influence of culture in tax compliance behaviour, the 
interviews discussed how tax agents in the study make their decision. For instance, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2, it is a common practice in high a Power Distance 
society for decision making to be centralized with the senior staff due to the large 
gap between senior staff and other staff. 
The findings from the interviews indicate there are mixed of opinions 
amongst the Malaysian interview participants with regard to how decisions are 
being made in complying with the tax laws. Generally, while the subordinates are 
allowed to give their opinions on clients’ tax matters, the final decisions before 
advising the clients are always determined by the senior staff. However, an 
interview participant commented that, it is not the position as “superior” that 
persuades her to follow her superior’s decision, but rather because the decision 
itself is correct. Some of the comments are provided here: 
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“My superior does not mind if I want to give my opinions. If I don’t 
understand then she will explain, so if I accept her decision, it is not 
because she is my boss but because what she says is correct”. 
(Participant 5, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
“The [staff] play important roles. I accept the opinions of the staff, 
depends on situations. We will discuss, then we come to a decision but 
normally, I determine the final decision”. 
(Participant 6, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
“The opinions from lower staff are also important. For every job, I’ll 
review and discuss. I will consider the opinions by lower level staffs if it 
is appropriate then I will apply”. 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“[My] staff will deal with the client first, if there is any problem then 
only I will meet the client. The [staff] are given the opportunity to 
express their opinion but the final decision is from me”. 
(Participant 10, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“Superior is important. In my opinion, whatever decision that I take, I 
will refer to my superior. I do not have much experience in tax work, so 
anything I will refer to my superior. I am afraid if I simply based on my 
decision, there will be problems later on, so it is better to refer to 
someone who is experienced”. 
(Participant 11, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
322 
 
 
“My superior allows me to speak up. If I do my work, I will depend 
solely on my superior…because a junior should not go against the 
superior. I depend a lot on my superior. As a junior staff…I have to 
follow my superior…I never liaise with the IRB, my superior will handle 
it”. 
(Participant 14, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“I still do not have the courage to come out with my own decision…so I 
rely on my superior to comply with the tax law”. 
(Participant 15, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“Yes, I have discussions with my superior, and I can give my opinions 
since I am the one who knows about the case”. 
(Participant 16, manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
To further understand the influence of culture in tax compliance behaviour, 
the interviews also discussed the willingness of interview participants to be in 
uncertain situations, for instance, whether or not they are willing to undertake risks 
in performing their roles as tax agents. Mixed opinions regarding risks and tax 
compliance were recorded from Malaysian tax agents in the interviews. Some of 
the opinions provided by the interview participants indicate that depending on 
situations, tax agents are willing to tolerate a certain level of risk in complying with 
the tax laws. On the other hand, there was agreement that dealing with risks in 
complying with the tax laws should be avoided due to the high cost of penalty and 
probability of being audited: 
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“No, I do not feel afraid to take risks. My clients are generally made up 
of small businesses which are not normally on the tax authority’s 
sight”. 
(Participant 1, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“I will go for a win-win situation, comply with the tax law and 
safeguard my client’s interest. I always use the tax knowledge that I 
have to make my clients aware of their responsibility. The challenging 
part is to have the confidence to inform the client and of course there is 
also risk involved”. 
(Participant 3, manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
“We have to take around 80-90 percent risks in our decision 
making…have to be brave enough to take risk depending on the facts 
and effects of previous amount of tax that we pay”. 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“[T]hat’s why we prepare a letter of undertaking because we don’t feel 
comfortable to take risk”. 
(Participant 10, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“[W]e prepared an undertaking letter, stating the extent of our 
responsibility in preparing the tax return, so if there is any audit the 
client cannot blame us because we prepared the tax computation based 
on the information provided to us…the client has to sign the letter of 
undertaking. I don’t feel comfortable to prepare based on estimation 
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because the risk is high. As a tax professional we have to be ethical in 
our dealings so that there is no risk in the future”. 
(Participant 11, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
“It depends, yes or no. Whatever it is, my superior always reminds me 
to reduce the risks”. 
(Participant 16, manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Basically when I assist my client, I want them to fully comply with the 
tax law because I do not [want] any problems with the IRB. For me, I 
do not want any problems with the IRB, being subject to audit in the 
future. I make it clear to my clients, whatever type of job, whatever 
documents provided to me, I will rely on the audited accounts, at the 
end it depends on the client, as to my knowledge, what is being said by 
the client is correct and of course the audited accounts…those things 
which are sensitive to the IRB, I’ll ask for breakdown, like management 
fees, professional fees, but if the client still cannot provide the proof, it 
is simple, no deduction. Once a client is being audited, then tax agents 
cannot simply ‘wash their hands’, the tax agent is in trouble because 
the clients can always say they have tax agent and we, tax agent should 
know”. 
(Participant 5, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
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 “We want to minimise our tax risks. We do research on grey areas…we 
look at the relevant tax laws and what has been decided in the court. 
The non-compliance with the tax laws results in high penalty, so we 
cannot take risks on behalf of our client”. 
(Participant 17, manager, medium size public accounting firm) 
To probe further the influence of culture in tax compliance behaviour, the 
issue of whether or not tax agents consider the effect of decision making in tax 
compliance benefits or harms society was also raised. While there was agreement 
among tax agents to consider the effect of complying with the tax law to the society 
and country, a majority of the interview participants did not consider the effect on 
society in complying with the tax laws. To many of the interview participants, they 
held the opinion that their duty is to assist their clients and safeguard the interests 
of their clients. Therefore, they are less concerned with the effect of their decision 
making to society or country as a whole. Some of their comments are presented 
here:  
“Yes, I consider the mutual benefits or effects that may be gained or 
suffered by both the society and also the taxpayers [client] who also 
form part of the society”. 
(Participant 1, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“As a tax professional, I never think about the effect to society or 
country, but if the client has to pay then I always say…’you contribute 
to the development of the country”. 
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(Participant 4, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
“[N]ever think about the effect to the society…maybe because I have 
very little knowledge about how the money from tax is being spent in 
black and white”. 
(Participant 5, senior tax executive, medium size public accounting firm) 
“[T]think about the effect to the society, the wealthy people try to 
escape tax, that’s not fair”. 
(Participant 7, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“I don’t reach that level…to think about the effect to the society and 
country. In assisting my client, I will think about my responsibility as 
tax professionals and try to put myself in client’s situation so that I 
know whether the amount of tax paid is reasonable or appropriate with 
the income”. 
(Participant 9, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“The income from tax contributes significantly to our country. The tax 
is being used for many things, if there is less income, then, there are 
fewer benefits that can be enjoyed. So the effect is to the society and 
country”. 
(Participant 10, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“As an individual, what are the risks involved. I think as well the effect 
to the society, but more to the effect to individual taxpayers”. 
(Participant 11, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
327 
 
“Me and my client…I have to take care of my client because they pay 
me. But I’ll make sure that the client complies with the tax laws. 
Normally the clients listen to me”. 
(Participant 12, partner, small tax consulting firm) 
“I never think about the effect to the society or country. I only think 
about the benefit to the clients”. 
(Participant 15, tax executive, small size public accounting firm) 
7.2 New Zealand  
In New Zealand, the researcher sent out 1,500 invitations to participate in 
interviews, together with the survey. At the beginning of the interview process, 17 
survey respondents indicated their interest to participate in the interview. However, 
3 of them did not answer the telephone calls seeking their involvement, resulting in 
a final number of 14 participants for the interview study. The interview participants 
came from various positions, types of firm, and generally are experienced tax 
agents based on the years of service in tax practice. The interviews were conducted 
between November 2011 and February 2012.  
The demographic profiles of the New Zealand interview participants 
indicate that 11 males and 3 females participated in the interviews. In terms of 
positions in the firms, the interview participants are regarded to be at the middle 
and high levels of positions as indicated below.  
(1) One tax accountant  
(2)  One tax associate 
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(3) Four tax directors 
(4) Seven tax consultants 
(5) One partner 
The middle and high level positions held by the interview participants from 
New Zealand could possibly be related to the number of years they have been 
involved in tax practice. In this study, the interview participants ranged from those 
with more than five years of tax experience to those who have more than twenty 
one years of tax experience. Half of the interview participants from New Zealand 
have more than 20 years of tax working experience as indicated below: 
1. Between five to ten years of tax experience – 2 participants 
2. Between sixteen to twenty years of tax experience – 5 participants 
3. Twenty one years of tax experience and more – 7 participants  
Similar to Malaysia, the interview participants also came from different 
types and sizes of firms in public practices, ranging from sole practitioners, tax 
consulting firms and public accounting firms. The background of their firms is as 
follows: 
(1) Sole practitioner – 3 participants 
(2) Small tax consulting firms – 4 participants 
(3) Medium sized tax consulting firm – 1 participant 
(4) Medium sized public accounting firm – 3 participants 
(5) Small size public accounting firm – 3 participants  
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The demographic backgrounds of the interview participants are expected to 
provide an interesting insight into tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in New 
Zealand. Furthermore, most of the tax agents in this interview have a high level of 
experience, based on the period spent in a tax working environment. The following 
Table 7.2 presents the demographic background of the interview participants from 
New Zealand.  
Table 7.2 Demographic Profiles of Interview Participants – New Zealand 
 
Position 
 
Gender 
Years of 
experience in 
tax practice 
Type of firms 
 
Reference in 
the thesis 
Tax 
Associates 
Male 10 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant A 
Tax Director Male 21 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant B 
Tax Director Male 16 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant C 
Tax 
Consultant 
Male 28 Small size tax 
consulting firm 
Participant D 
Tax 
Consultant  
Female 27 Sole practitioner Participant E 
Tax 
Accountant 
Male   5 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant F 
Tax Director Male 20 Small size public 
accounting firm 
Participant G 
Tax 
Consultant 
Female       26 Sole practitioner Participant H 
Tax 
Consultant 
Male 24 Small size tax 
consulting firm 
Participant I 
Tax 
Consultant 
Male 31 Small tax 
consulting firm 
Participant J 
Tax 
Consultant 
Male 16 Sole practitioner Participant K 
Tax 
Consultant 
Male 30 Medium size tax 
consulting firm 
Participant L 
Partner Male 20 Medium size public 
accounting firm 
Participant M 
Tax Director Female 20 Small tax 
consulting firm 
Participant N 
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7.2.1 Data analysis and interview findings   
7.2.1.1 Tax compliance behaviour  
In explaining their understanding about tax compliance behaviour, the 
general understanding of the tax agents who participated in the interviews 
described tax compliance as following the tax laws, legislation, complying with the 
NZIRD requirements, meeting the deadlines for filing the tax returns and paying 
the amount of tax due accordingly. Some of the comments are reproduced here: 
“Tax compliance means comply with the tax legislation. Taxpayers 
complete the file for their tax return, declare their income in 
accordance with the tax legislation, pay the tax due accordingly”. 
(Participant M, partner, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Complying with the requirements from the tax department… I mean it 
includes filing the tax returns on time, paying the tax on time, you 
know…making sure it is correct to the best of your ability. Filing the tax 
return on time, that includes paying on time. You are complying with 
ethics in mind”. 
(Participant N, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
“[T]ax compliance would basically mean meeting all the legislation, 
laws set by the government and following any sort of process that the 
IRD may have in following those tax laws”. 
(Participant F, tax accountant, small size public accounting firm) 
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“Tax compliance is to adhere to all the tax law, applicable to the 
particular tax types we are dealing with…and most of the taxation 
system is strict in compliance and require taxpayers to completely meet 
the filing of tax return and in compliant with the time frame to make 
payment”. 
(Participant L, tax consultant, medium size tax consulting firm)  
There is also an opinion that tax compliance is not only about fulfilling the 
tax obligations set out by the tax laws, rules and legislation. As commented by an 
interview participant, tax compliance also means avoiding over paying or under 
paying the correct amount of tax, and as a tax agent, assisting their clients in 
interpreting the tax law especially in grey areas: 
“I guess for me, tax compliance is about…compliance, ensuring your 
clients meet the obligations under the New Zealand tax legislation 
without paying too little tax or too much tax…and also tax compliance 
is resolving for clients, you know, grey areas around the interpretation 
of legislation and the likes…” 
(Participant A, tax associate, small size public accounting firm) 
An interview participant also commented that, since tax compliance means meeting 
tax obligations, the most important thing in tax compliance is to understand the tax 
rules and therefore, tax law should be easy to understand:  
“It’s about meeting tax obligations. I suppose the first thing is the 
ability to understand what the tax rules are. For instance in the case of 
Penny and Hooper, it has been undefined for years and the IRD has not 
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clearly determined what is acceptable and what is not acceptable…how 
ethics is defined is very subjective, there is no clear guidance. In a 
voluntary compliance, people have to be good on their own, manage 
their resources, complying with the tax law, those who don’t, rely on tax 
professional. It reflects the tax regime should be easy to understand”. 
(Participant C, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
Another point to be considered in complying with the tax, law as noted by 
an interview participant, is that, being ethical in a tax context is situational. For 
instance, to an extent complying with the tax law is influenced by the amount of 
tax involved:  
“Tax compliance…is following the tax rules, GST rules…the level of 
IRD investigation in New Zealand involves extremely large 
amount…tax audits for small business are very rare. It is interesting 
that you just put a small amount of dollars in your survey, if you put 
larger amount, the responses would be different”. 
(Participant I, tax consultant, small size tax consulting firm) 
The interview also delved into the tax agents’ perceptions towards the 
influence of their attitude in complying with the tax laws. The interview responses 
indicate that generally they agree their attitude to an extent influences their 
decision making to comply with the tax law. They associated attitudes with moral 
obligation as NZICA members, fairness, ethics, reputation, trade-off between costs 
and benefits, and also the complexity of the tax legislation, which can be evidenced 
from the following comments: 
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“We are…engaged by the client and my job is basically engaged by the 
client to work for them…I would say that we would not always take the 
most conservative approach on behalf of our clients but neither we are 
likely to overtake the legislation. The moral obligation under the NZICA 
rules, obviously we are not allowed to file a tax return which we know 
is definitely incorrect…for me it’s a way of doing it. I guess it’s a little 
bit of fairness issues and moral issue. That becomes the foundation for 
me”. 
(Participant A, tax associate, small size public accounting firm) 
“I want to make sure I do comply with the tax law when I try to keep up 
to date and that is my policy. I want to make sure that I apply what I 
know, to my client’s case. Maybe it means that…attitude. It’s quite a 
grey area in tax. It depends on where you want to be. You can’t be seen 
dishonest. I don’t want that reputation. My reputation is very 
important”. 
(Participant E, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“Generally my decision making is based on what I think is correctly 
following the legal position…it’s often legal position that keeps on 
going, but generally I am interested only to see it from a legal 
position”. 
(Participant H, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“Well…I think personally I try to get it right by the book. I do know 
there are tax professionals who do not mind and quite happy with it. 
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Firstly, I want to put it right. I mean there are some situations that you 
might…the other philosophy I have is the cost and benefit. For example, 
I am doing a tax file for a few years and I know there are mistakes in 
the previous years…so what is the quantum of the mistakes, whether is 
it worth an assessment this year. Normally, what I do is I will see if it is 
something minor and take a lot of time to detect and re-do, and the cost 
is minimal…then I don’t bother a minor mistake”. 
(Participant N, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
 “I know that tax practice is part of professional service. My attitude 
is…sometimes there are too many things need to comply which could be 
costly to businesses and time consuming, and demanding…so it 
becomes too complex and demanding…at the end of the day, the 
government has to provide services and someone has to pay for it. It 
doesn’t however to be complicated…as a member of NZICA, you are 
bound by the Institute’s rules, you have less flexibility, you have to be 
more strict in following the rules”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
“[T]he individuals’ interpretation of what is right and what is wrong. 
My own personal attitude towards tax compliance is a strong 
motivation that influences my approach in advising client…the rules are 
here for everyone”. 
(Participant L, tax consultant, medium size tax consulting firm) 
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“To me fear on behalf of the client is far more important than some 
other factors. It’s fear towards the IRD. When the client comes to us, 
they may not say it but one of the reasons why the client used Certified 
Accountant is they do not want to override the law and being imposed 
penalty…the penalty is very expensive”. 
(Participant I, tax consultant, small size tax consulting firm) 
The fear towards the NZIRD is also supported by other tax agents who 
commented on the aggressive approach by the NZIRD in ‘ensuring’ tax compliance 
in New Zealand. 
“…I wouldn’t want to take risks…when it comes to tax laws. Do you see 
the IRD is doing a lot more audit?” 
(Participant F, tax accountant, small size public accounting firm) 
“The approach of the IRD is becoming more aggressive. They are 
looking at every loophole”. 
(Participant H, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“The Revenue [authority] is extremely aggressive towards taxpayers. 
Their approach is extremely aggressive”. 
(Participant G, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
The interviews also asked whether or not the social pressure from important 
others, or people around tax agents, influence them in their compliance behaviour. 
There was agreement that the social pressure from people around tax agents, to a 
certain extent, influences them in complying with the tax laws while performing 
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their engagement roles. Depending on the complexity of the tax cases and their 
level of expertise, tax agents in the interviews also sought opinions from other tax 
experts, either internally or externally. For instance, there are interview participants 
who sought the opinion of tax experts in the ‘Big Four’ public accounting firms 
and the tax advisory services managed by the NZICA: 
“I go to the specialist, for certain specific issues…like those from the 
Big Four”. 
(Participant C, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“In situation where you are not clear about something, you will ask 
your colleagues, other tax practitioner, that’s done before you address 
the case to your client”. 
(Participant I, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
 “Yes, different tax professionals have different views. We always 
discuss our views. In a way they influence me”. 
(Participant M, partner, medium size public accounting firm) 
“…I would look at the Master tax guide. I would also look at the IRD’s 
website, if there is something unclear about it. I talk to my tax 
practitioners friends or if I still could not figure it out, I ask the Institute 
of Chartered Accountant because they run a tax advisory service. I 
don’t like to ask them too much. I don’t like to always on asking them. I 
don’t like sending them emails every week, so I try to find out on my 
own and sometimes I look for courses. Often when there is something 
new, there are courses…and yes, they do, my friends in tax profession, 
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because if I have sort of questions, I ask them, and we talk about it and 
in that way they influence me”. 
(Participant E, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“Yes, sometimes…because I am living in Hawkes Bay, I have far less 
day to day contact then I would have if I stay in Auckland or 
Wellington”. 
(Participant H, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“Yes, people around me, I take advice both from my colleagues and 
external tax professionals”. 
(Participant G, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“The complexity of the clients’ cases determines whether or not I have 
sufficient knowledge to be able to advise my clients. Sometimes…me 
and a number of I know…if it is too complicated, I invite other tax 
experts…it is way beyond my understanding…I have sufficient 
knowledge but there are things which need high level of 
expertise…because I am in small to medium size…not all the time 
complexity arises but time and again they just pop up…I will go to other 
experts…probably the Big Four because they are dealing with a lot of 
complexity…not often but when it is too complicated…that’s of course 
before you go to client. Again, what is complex to me may not be the 
same to you or anyone else”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
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“Certainly, my friends in the tax profession in a way influence me. Any 
particular situation is subject to degree of interpretation and it is useful 
to have an outside view”. 
(Participant C, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“…I do refer if it’s a very complicated case, to KPMG or some 
specialist”. 
(Participant D, tax consultant, small tax consulting)  
In discussing the influence of subjective norms in tax compliance, there are 
also suggestions that perceptions of people around tax agents are important in their 
decision making. For instance:  
“We looked at the fact of the case, we come down with those who have 
more experience, like the senior accountants and the tax partner, we 
look at it…not only from the dollar and cents, but the risks as well, not 
only the risk to the client but also, the risk to the firm. The kind of 
people that I deal on the tax work, the whole team are senior employees 
or senior tax professional, they provide a more matured approach in 
decision making. I regularly socialise at various courses and meet some 
other tax professionals around where we do talk about development in 
tax issues…I guess you know you do not want to be seen among your 
peers as being overly aggressive with the tax planning, but you do not 
want to be seen to be conservative as well”. 
(Participant A, tax associate, small size public accounting firm) 
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“I would say my family and friends could influence me. Some of them 
have the accounting background. I would like to clarify, when I say my 
family, they influence me on the attitude of complying with the tax 
law…other motivation, I guess reputation within the organization, my 
friends and colleagues within the accounting industry and also 
reputation of the firm, because we do not want bad publicity”. 
(Participant F, tax accountant, small size public accounting firm) 
The discussions in the interviews also focused on the influence of perceived 
behavioural control in complying with the tax law. Generally, there are mixed 
opinions with regard to the influence of perceived behavioural control by the 
interview participants. Some agree that they have the control, yet there are tax 
agents who suggest that, as tax agents, they can only advise their clients, but the 
final decision is the responsibility of the taxpayers:  
“We will outline an interpretation for the client but at the end of the 
day, we will probably outline a number of options for them, a number of 
outcomes, some may be more conservative for the client but some may 
be more aggressive for the client, but at the end of the day we leave the 
decision up to the client based on all the facts, to have the final say, 
which I guess it comes down to the particular client’s risk profile”. 
(Participant A, tax associate, small size public accounting firm) 
“The final decision is upon me, initially I will discuss with the manager 
and the accountants”. 
(Participant M, partner, medium size public accounting firm) 
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“…when you are at your level, you’ll have the control. People who do 
not have the control might be the juniors”. 
(Participant N, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
“Client always…the decision is always with the client…might be based 
on our recommendations but what we do we always put forward the 
recommendation. We would have…there are a few options available, 
we are not in the position to provide all recommendations because some 
of them might not be relevant…and I think we have some control 
because we would probably put more emphasis on one particular 
options than the others. At the end of the day, it’s the clients’ decision” 
(Participant G, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“So far yes, as a professional I would have control, which options…to 
give to clients…you are very much in control, it determines that you 
have done a good job but you can only recommend to the client. At the 
end of the day, it’s the client who determines to accept or not to 
accept…it depends on the relationship with the client as well…if you 
have good relationship then most of the time, they will take your 
advice”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax consulting) 
7.2.1.2 Ethical sensitivity and tax compliance 
Generally, the interview participants in New Zealand agreed that ethical 
sensitivity helps them in complying with the tax law. Similar to Malaysian tax 
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agents, the interview participants in New Zealand also commented that their 
experience has helped them in developing their ethical sensitivity. For instance:  
“Over the years you can tell if someone tries to cross the law. The 
particular individual ethics are reflected in complying with the tax 
law”. 
(Participant C, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“…tax experience is the best teacher, which guides you when something 
does not seem right, something seems to be pushed to the boundary, 
something so good to be true and you at that time start to feel you want 
to look closer…but you have to be mindful not to look at something 
which is not necessary”. 
(Participant L, tax consultant, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Yes, I think I would…if I look at the documents. It took sometime”. 
(Participant M, principal, medium size public accounting firm) 
As commented by an interview participant, it is also interesting to note that 
ethical sensitivity could be useful for tax agents to determine the type of advice 
given to their clients. Based on the risk profiles of their clients, there is a 
suggestion here that tax agents use their ethical sensitivity to determine whether or 
not an aggressive approach is suitable for a particular client in the process of 
complying with the tax law. The findings are consistent with Tan (2011) who 
found that the type of advice given by tax agents to their clients to a certain extent 
is influenced by the clients’ risk propensities:  
342 
 
“In [the] real world, some clients are more aggressive and some other 
clients are less aggressive, the ethical sensitivity becomes a 
boundary…what type of advice to give to the clients. Sometimes, we 
probably would detect clients who try to evade, sometimes we wouldn’t. 
For clients, they really want to get through some deductions that they 
know is 100 percent correct…they will hide in their accounting system, 
something which is incorrect”. 
(Participant A, tax associate, medium size public accounting firm) 
During the interviews, there were also tax agents who indicated that they 
use their ethical sensitivity to assist them in their consideration of accepting an 
appointment as tax agent or to retain a client. For instance: 
“Actually, we did have a person who tried to be our client but we do not 
accept people who have the intention to act unethically with the New 
Zealand tax law…”. 
(Participant F, tax accountant, small size public accounting firm) 
“We should be encouraging our clients, recommending our clients to 
comply with the tax law. Yes, we have turned down clients who are 
aggressive, that they are looking at transaction which are basically tax 
evasion”. 
(Participant G, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
Notwithstanding ethical sensitivity is useful to help tax agents in complying 
with the tax law, having ethical sensitivity on the part of tax agents does not 
necessarily result in complying with the tax laws on the part of their clients. This is 
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most likely because tax agents’ roles are restricted to advising their clients based on 
the information given and ultimately it is the clients themselves who make the 
decision whether or not to comply with the tax laws. Some of the comments are 
presented here: 
“[W]e provide the clients with the correct information, so they make 
their own decision, so…our responsibility ends as providing the 
information and they make the decision and sign off the tax return at the 
end of the day. If someone comes to me with dodgy 
information…well…I would really be sceptical about the 
information…and be very aggressive in making sure the right amount of 
income was true”. 
(Participant B, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“Yes, to some extent. We are all aware that my clients who are dealing 
with cash do not declare all their income. We encourage our client to 
comply with the tax law. If the money goes back to the bank account, 
then we know but if the money goes to their back pocket, we do not 
know. We know the ratio but we do not know how much”. 
(Participant I, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“You can determine that…most of the time the client themselves, they 
want to follow the law…so it could be, someone else who has the 
technical knowledge, doing that for them. It could be a dodgy 
accountant. But, we can always argue that we do on the basis of 
information provided to us. There is a disclaimer on that. The 
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disclaimer is a protection and we cannot prepare anything without the 
disclaimer. The ethics here is a broad issue. If you want to be honest, 
maintain your reputation, then you have to follow the ethics. So there 
are two ways looking at it, that you are not aware and rely on the 
information provided to you or you are aware but choose not to, there 
is where ethics come in”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax accounting firm) 
7.2.1.3 Culture in tax compliance behaviour  
The influence of culture in the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents was 
also brought up during the interviews. Similar to Malaysian tax agents, the 
discussion was initially focused on how the New Zealand interview participants 
make decisions before advising their clients. Generally, the tax agents in the study 
suggested that the more junior staff have the opportunity to express their opinion, 
and as commented by an interview participant, while the final decision is always 
determined by the more senior staff, the decision making itself is based on a 
consultative approach. Some of the comments are presented here:  
“I guess in terms of colleagues, being the tax made at my 
firm…probably more from the senior accountant and the partner…and 
the expectation that I advise appropriately a client regarding tax 
matters…and the other partner relies on my expertise to advise client, 
prepare the most recent opinion or other advisory engagement to make 
sure the advice is well researched, well structured”. 
(Participant A, tax associate, small size public accounting firm) 
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“I let them to express their opinion. Tax is so complex, sometimes I miss 
something and they always change my decision. They know much of the 
case from the beginning”. 
(Participant M, partner, medium size public accounting firm) 
“They, the staff, will discuss with me, then if it is too technical or not 
clear, we might discuss with another tax lady who is much senior…”. 
(Participant N, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
“I look at the particular case, look at what the facts are, important 
factors of the case, make sure understand all the background, so I need 
to understand the background to find options…discuss the facts with 
people in the office and external tax expert”.  
(Participant G, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“I do invite them to give opinion with the knowledge that they have. The 
simple things…but others much more complicated I take upon myself”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax consulting) 
“Generally, it comes down to the individual responsibility to make the 
final decision, but it’s a consultative approach”. 
(Participant L, tax consultant, medium size tax consulting firm) 
“Yes, staff under me have the opportunity to give [an] opinion but the 
final decision is me and the client”. 
(Participant D, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
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“The staff deals with client on more general issues, the partners deal 
with more technical issues. The staff will prepare the GST return for 
instance but the amount of tax will be decided by one of the directors”. 
(Participant B, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
Another topic brought up during the interviews was how comfortable tax 
agents may be in uncertain situations. For that purpose, the interviews discussed 
whether or not tax agents feel comfortable to take risks while performing their 
engagement roles. There was agreement by some tax agents that they felt 
comfortable with risks, while on the other hand, some tax agents indicated their 
preference not to be in risky situations while complying with the tax laws. Some of 
the opinions are stated below: 
“I am very in the middle with risks. If the client is asking me to do 
something, I’ll look at it, depending on the situation”. 
(Participant M, partner, medium size public accounting firm) 
“I am very conservative. In terms of grey areas, no…no…I am pretty 
conservative. I do not want to be investigated by the IRD and what if 
later proven I am wrong, the client would blame me. I would rather 
comply absolutely with the tax law”. 
(Participant E, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“…I wouldn’t want to take risks…when it comes to tax laws. Do you see 
the IRD is doing a lot more audit? …and also being the member of the 
Institute (NZICA), if you take risks like that you can be quite in 
trouble…and also if we create a very bad culture in our firm…we take 
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big risks for our client. We try to avoid risks, at all cost and we 
really…even if our client asks us to take risks, we will analyse whether 
it is highly unethical or just maybe marginal”. 
(Participant F, tax accountant, small size public accounting firm) 
“I think…as a sole practitioner it is one of the big risks not having 2 or 
3 people around, sometimes I do this and I can do that, but it’s not 
without big cost…that’s always a reluctant. I would be really nervous to 
giving wrong answer. When I look at it carefully and allowed time, I am 
confident with my answer, but if the time is not allowable, then I’ll 
nervous. It’s not so much about taking risk, I don’t mind taking risk, but 
being a sole practitioner it is easier to make mistake…but having said 
that, you find people working  in firms with many partners also always 
make mistake”. 
(Participant H, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“…in terms of taking risks, if I believe something is a way beyond of my 
knowledge, I would probably not to take risks at all. As a professional, I 
am liable to be sued by my clients. I do take risks, but not often”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
“If there is $200 in the account from interest then you don’t want to 
declare…yes, there are risks but the $200 is not worth to do it, it’s not 
economical to chase it, yes you may get caught doing it…we look at 
acceptable risks…another thing is risks around to determine how tax 
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law should be applied to situation…look we can do that, but the cost is 
a lot more, no adding values to that”. 
(Participant C, tax director, medium size public accounting firm) 
“It depends on the situations and depends on the type of the clients is 
interested in. Some clients maybe, are more conservative or aggressive. 
I am doing my family’s tax as well. I would take a middle road. Tax law 
is a grey area. It’s how you interpret it. One of the difficulties of a tax 
practitioner is there is a lot of grey areas in law. It’s so upset…even 
though I didn’t have clients like the Penny and Hooper type”. 
(Participant D, tax consultant, small tax consulting firm) 
“Calculated risk I suppose. I wouldn’t want to push someone to an 
extreme position and might end up what we advise them is not based on 
rules. Again, this is an area where there is grey area and that the client 
pushes to the boundaries”. 
(Participant B, tax director, medium size public accounting firm)  
The influence of culture in tax compliance behaviour of tax agents was also 
described from their perceptions towards benefits or harm to society as a result of 
their decision making. Based on the comments provided by the interview 
participants, a majority of them do not consider the benefits to society when 
making tax decisions. Most likely because, they regard themselves as advocates for 
their clients and thus, priority should be to the economic benefits of the clients. 
Some of the comments are presented here:  
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“[W]e are looking for the benefits of the client, we are engaged by the 
client. We produce the work for them…we are paid to give the best 
outcome to them…”. 
(Participant A, tax associate, small size public accounting firm) 
“I suppose the benefit of the society…what I mean there’s a law which 
make people to comply. I am thinking more of maintaining a system to 
make people comply”. 
(Participant E, tax consultant, sole practitioner) 
“I advise the client to comply with the tax law, for instance advising on 
the long term investment. I only agree to reduce tax within the tax 
legislation. Reducing the tax liability of my client legally, I am sitting 
on the bench of my client”. 
(Participant M, partner, medium size public accounting firm) 
“Benefits to the clients are the priority, no…I don’t think about the 
benefit to the society”. 
(Participant G, tax director, small size public accounting firm) 
“Yes, I do consider…but not to the extent we see people eligible for 
benefits from other people”. 
(Participant N, tax director, small tax consulting firm) 
“I look at myself as a good citizen, following the NZ standard in terms 
of practising as a professional. My professional status is important to 
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me. I don’t want to be seen as lousy accountant, manipulating the book, 
it takes a while to build up reputation”. 
(Participant J, tax consultant, small tax consulting) 
“When it comes to…when dealing with our clients, not only we advise 
our clients about tax compliance law but we also do consulting, we help 
them minimise their tax liability according to NZ law. So, just making 
sure the actions are legal and making sure they are not overpaying tax. 
You can say we want to have a better relationship with our client and 
that means more fees for us…it will be more on the client rather than 
the society at large”. 
(Participant F, tax accountant, small size public accounting firm) 
“Certainly, cost of the client…the fees cost, obviously I have to take 
into account the law and I’ve got to take into account the client’s risk 
tolerance”. 
(Participant I, tax consultant, small size tax consulting) 
7.3 Discussions of the interview findings: Malaysia and New Zealand  
The earlier sections in this chapter have demonstrated the perceptions of 
Malaysian and New Zealand tax agents with regard to their tax compliance 
behaviour in general, the influence of attitudes, social pressure from important or 
referent others, perceived control, ethical sensitivity and culture in complying with 
the tax laws. To further understand their tax compliance behaviour, the findings 
from the interviews are summarised to find any similarities or differences in the 
opinions.   
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Overall, based on their interview responses, both Malaysian and New 
Zealand interview participants have similar understanding with regard to tax 
compliance. Interestingly, when delving into each concept from the interview the 
findings indicate some differences on how tax agents interpret the concepts. 
Generally, interview participants from Malaysia and New Zealand understand tax 
compliance as complying with the tax act, rules, regulations and the requirement by 
the tax authorities. Their understanding is translated by meeting the deadlines for 
filing tax return, settling any amount of tax due within the stipulated period, 
preparing proper documentation and declaring their income and expenses 
accordingly.  
There is also agreement by interview participants from both countries that 
tax compliance is also understood as upholding justice on the sides of taxpayers 
and tax authority. This could be achieved by ensuring that taxpayers do not 
overpay or underpay tax. Overpayment of tax for instance could mean taxpayers 
are over-compliance whilst underpayment of tax could result into less income for 
tax authorities. When probed further, there was also agreement by interview 
participants from Malaysia and New Zealand that tax compliance could be 
achieved if taxpayers understand the tax rules. As commented by an interview 
participant from Malaysia, since the roles of tax agents are to assist their clients, 
tax agents have to ensure that they have sound technical knowledge. In New 
Zealand, there is agreement that since understanding tax rules is important to 
motivate tax compliance, tax laws should be easy to understand and not 
complicated. In addition, interview participants in New Zealand argued that being 
ethical in complying with the tax law connotes a subjective interpretation based on 
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the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in the case of Penny & 
Hooper v CIR (Elliffe, 2011).  
Interestingly, there is agreement by interview participants in both countries 
that complying with the tax law to a certain extent is situation specific. In 
Malaysia, for instance, a tax agent commented on the need to be flexible when 
dealing with their clients in extraordinary cases and cited natural disasters as an 
example. In New Zealand, on the other hand, situation specific refers more to the 
amount of tax involved. For instance, there is a suggestion that their level of 
compliance to an extent depends on the amount of tax and risks involved in the 
transaction. Consistent with Jones (1991), this perhaps indicates that being ethical 
in tax compliance depends on the intensity of the moral issue, which is situation 
specific. There is a possibility that if the amount of tax or risk is minimal, then tax 
agents would regard the intensity of the moral issue as low and would response 
differently to tax compliance. 
The discussion in the interviews also attempted to understand the influence 
of attitudes of tax agents in complying with the tax law. Generally, the interview 
participants in both countries concur that their attitude could influence their tax 
compliance behaviour. For instance, there is agreement by some interview 
participants that as tax agents they perceived themselves as professionals who are 
obligated to abide the professional ethical rules. As members of professional 
bodies, such as NZICA and MIA, they are bound by the Institutes’ rules in their 
professional judgment. In addition, some interview participants in both countries 
addressed their fear that if they as tax agents do not comply with the tax laws in 
assisting their clients, the repercussions will be felt by their clients, such as 
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becoming the subject of tax audit or being penalised by the tax authority. As a 
result, they will lose their credibility or will be perceived as being dishonest by 
their clients, which could damage their reputation as tax agents. There is also 
agreement by New Zealand tax agents that the tax authority is becoming more 
aggressive in their approach and to an extent, their fear towards NZIRD influences 
their compliance behaviour to abide tax laws.  
The influence of attitude in complying with the tax law is also translated by 
the feeling of guilt for non-compliance, as commented by an interview participant 
from Malaysia. In New Zealand, the influence of attitudes is also described as 
ensuring fairness by the relevant tax players in the tax system. For instance, in 
some circumstances, tax agents may take an aggressive tax approach on behalf of 
their clients but that does not mean overriding the tax laws. Interestingly, there is 
also an opinion that tax agents’ attitude to tax compliance to some extent is 
influenced by the trade-off between costs and benefits. As commented by an 
interview participant, mistakes made in previous years’ tax returns are only worth 
re-assessment if it would be cost effective. Again, the complexity of the tax laws in 
New Zealand was raised during the discussion. Arguably, the complexity of the tax 
law results in high cost for businesses, and is time consuming, since tax agents 
have to comply with ‘too many’ tax requirements.  
The interview participants from Malaysia and New Zealand also 
unanimously agree that to an extent, that there is influence from referent or 
important others (subjective norms) in their decision making. Peers, superiors and 
friends in the same profession, could influence the decision making of the tax 
agents in this interview study. The influence could come from exchanging opinions 
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and experiences especially in complicated tax situations. As commented by some 
interview participants, in many cases the complexity of the tax law and the level of 
knowledge that they possess will determine whether or not this influence exists.  
Interestingly, in New Zealand, some interview participants also sought the 
help from tax specialists from the ‘Big Four’ public accounting firms and NZCIA’s 
tax advisory services. This in a way indicates the dominant influence of ‘Big Four’ 
public accounting firms in the tax profession and the importance of tax agents in 
the ‘Big Four’ public accounting firms to be more ethical, since they are not only 
providing their expert opinions to their taxpayer clients, but to other tax agents, 
especially from smaller firms or sole practitioners. In addition, the interview 
findings also suggest the importance of NZICA, as a resource centre in assisting 
their members. The assistance of NZICA through the tax advisory services to its 
members could also be translated as providing indirect training to members with 
regard to being ethical in their decision making. In New Zealand, the perception of 
peers is also considered as an important factor in decision making. There are 
suggestions that tax agents do not want to be seen as too conservative or too 
aggressive in their tax approach while assisting their clients or be perceived as not 
being capable, despite requesting help from other tax specialists. During the 
interviews, there is also a suggestion from New Zealand tax agents that another 
concern in complying with the tax laws is the bad reputation to the firm from the 
decision making of tax agents, which is something they try to avoid.  
The discussion in the interviews also delved into the importance of 
perceived control in the decision making of tax agents. The findings suggest that 
Malaysian and New Zealand interview participants had similar views on the 
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influence of perceived control in their decision making. Some interview 
participants believe that they have control, whilst some disagree. In Malaysia, some 
interview participants suggest that they only have control at the initial stage of 
decision making. This is most likely because they may not have reached a certain 
level of expertise that is required in the decision making process. When probed 
further, those tax agents who believe that they have control, explained that they 
have the control in providing the type of advice to their clients, but not necessarily 
in the final decision making. This is because their role is to assist their clients and 
the final decision making is made by the clients based on the recommendations of 
tax agents. They also commented that, to a degree, having a good relationship with 
clients becomes another factor which determines whether or not clients will make 
decisions based on their recommendation.  
With regard to ethical sensitivity, the interview participants from Malaysia 
and New Zealand had similar views that ethical sensitivity is helpful in complying 
with the tax laws. When inquiring further, interview participants from Malaysia 
responded that ethical sensitivity is useful to avoid unethical conduct in tax practice 
and at the same time this may have a positive influence, such as in identifying 
potential tax claims for the clients which may have been initially overlooked. In 
New Zealand, ethical sensitivity is considered as helpful in assisting tax agents to 
provide the type of advice to their clients based on the risks profile of the clients. 
For instance, tax agents use their ethical sensitivity to decide whether or not an 
aggressive tax approach is suitable for a particular client. Some interview 
participants from New Zealand also suggested that their ethical sensitivity to a 
certain extent helps them to understand their client and serves as a guideline to 
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either to accept or decline appointment as a tax agent. The interview participants 
from both countries also agreed that their ethical sensitivity is developed through 
experience. Despite the support for ethical sensitivity, some interview participants 
have different opinions. More junior interview participants from Malaysia, for 
instance, indicate that they have yet to reach the level of having ethical sensitivity 
in complying with the tax law, possibly because junior staff does not handle 
complicated tax cases. In New Zealand, as commented by an interview participant, 
having ethical sensitivity does not necessarily mean complying with the tax law 
since it also depends on the ethical belief of the tax agents.  
The study also recorded mixed opinions amongst interview participants 
from both countries with regard to the influence of culture in complying with the 
tax laws. The influence of culture in this interview study is predominantly explored 
from three aspects: the gap in decision making whether or not more junior staff are 
given the opportunity to contribute to the decision making before advising the 
client; willingness to be in uncertain situations such as taking risk; and their 
consideration for the benefit of society in their decision making while performing 
their roles as tax agents. Apart from those three abovementioned aspects, in 
interpreting the influence of culture, the researcher also examined the existence of 
cultural traits in all of their interview responses. Similar to the approach used in a 
series of interviews with SME operators, tax agents and business experts in New 
Zealand by Yong (2011), the interplay of cultures based on Hofstede’s (1980) 
National Cultural Dimensions were used as a basis to explain the influence of 
culture in tax compliance behaviour of tax agents. 
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When discussing the gap in decision making between the more junior and 
senior staff, interview participants from both countries concurred that more junior 
staff have the opportunity to contribute ideas in the decision making before 
advising their clients. However, the final decision to suggest the type of advice 
given to the client was always in the hands of the senior staff. As commented by an 
interview participant from New Zealand, while the final decision is always based 
on senior staff’s decision, the approach to arrive at the decision is more 
consultative than autocratic. This is also supported by a comment from an 
interview participant in Malaysia that it is not the position of senior staff that 
makes their decisions accepted, but it is because the senior staff’s opinions are 
more accurate. Based on the comments from more junior staff from Malaysia, 
indicate that more junior staff feel more comfortable to rely on their superior in 
making decisions. As commented by an interview participant from Malaysia, the 
lack of experience to a certain extent limits their courage to come out with their 
own decision in assisting their clients.  
The interviews also tackled how comfortable tax agents are with 
uncertainties in their tax practices. Based on their comments, there are mixed 
opinions with respect to their willingness to undertake risks in complying with the 
tax laws. There is agreement by some Malaysian interview participants to consider 
undertaking risks of certain amount in performing their roles. However, they do not 
elaborate on the basis to determine the amount of risks they considered acceptable. 
Similar to the Malaysian interview participants, the New Zealand tax agents in the 
interview study indicate their willingness to undertake risks. When probed further, 
they mentioned cost and benefits as the basis to determine the level of risks that 
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they would tolerate in complying with the tax laws. On the other hand, there are 
interview participants in Malaysia and New Zealand who avoid taking any risks, 
and cited high penalties and the possibility of being audited by the tax authority as 
reasons for not undertaking risks in complying with the tax laws. 
In an attempt to understand the influence of culture in tax compliance, the 
interview participants were also asked to comment whether or not they consider the 
benefits to society in their decision making while performing their roles. The 
interview analysis indicates that tax agents in the interview study from both 
countries have mixed opinions on this matter of benefits to society. There is 
agreement by some tax agents from Malaysia that they consider the benefits of the 
society in their decision making while performing their engagement roles. An 
interview participant for instance commented that since Malaysia relies heavily on 
tax collection to build up the country, thus less income from taxation could 
possibly affect the benefits that society could enjoy. Similar opinions on the 
importance of benefits to society in decision making of tax agents are also recorded 
from New Zealand tax agents in the interview study. They translate the benefits to 
the society in the form of maintaining a good tax system in the country which 
eventually benefits the society at large. Different opinions from interview 
participants in Malaysia and New Zealand were also documented, stating that they 
consider their clients’ economic interest more than the benefits to the society. 
There are also interview participants who only care about their clients’ economic 
benefits in their decision making. Some tax agents commented that their role as tax 
agents is to assist their clients, thus their priority is to safeguard their clients’ 
interest.  
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The interplay of cultural traits such as low Power Distance, high 
Individualism, and moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, could be evidenced in the 
responses of interview participants from Malaysia and New Zealand. To a certain 
extent the evidence supports the influence of culture in the decision making of tax 
agents in the study. The findings reveal that junior staff have the opportunity to 
give their opinions in decision making, and do not merely follow their senior staff’s 
decisions, which imply low Power Distance cultural characteristic. A high 
Individualism trait is also noticeable among the interview participants. For 
instance, the decision making is eventually centred on an individual’s decision 
making which is consistent with the argument by Hofstede (1980), that in an 
individualistic society, decision making is always made by an individual rather 
than collective. In addition, their priority towards clients’ economic interest, 
consideration about the amount of fees paid by client for their services, the trade-
off between cost and benefit in complying with the tax laws imply preference 
towards performance and materialistic, which are all traits of an individualistic 
society. Their unwillingness to undertake risks and uneasiness with the complexity 
of the tax law in part translate their moderate Uncertainty Avoidance cultural 
characteristic. 
The interview findings are meant to provide further understanding of the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents in this study. Drawing from the discussion with 
17 tax agents from Malaysia and 14 tax agents from New Zealand, the findings 
indicate that the interview participants generally had similar views in most issues. 
The key concepts from the interview findings are simplified in Table 7.3.  
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Table 7.3 Summary of interview findings 
Scope of discussions Malaysia New Zealand 
Tax compliance 
(a) Tax compliance in 
general 
(1) Complying with the 
Income Tax Act, rules, 
regulation, MIRB’s 
requirement 
 Meeting deadlines for 
filing tax return and 
payment 
 Declare accordingly 
(1) Complying with the tax Act, 
rules, regulations, NZIRD’s 
requirement 
 Meeting deadlines for filing 
tax return and payment 
 Declare accordingly 
 (2) Justice on both sides of 
taxpayers and tax 
authority 
 Ensuring no over 
payment or 
underpayment of tax 
(2) Justice on both sides of 
taxpayers and tax authority 
 Ensuring no over payment 
or underpayment of tax 
 (3) Understanding the tax 
rules 
 Sound technical 
knowledge 
(3) Understanding the tax rules 
 Tax law should be easy to 
understand 
 Being ethical is a subjective 
interpretation 
 (4) Situation specific (4) Situation specific 
  Flexibility in natural 
disaster  
 Depending on the amount of 
tax involved 
(b) Attitudes toward 
tax compliance 
(1) Attitude as a professional  
 Complying with the 
professional ethics 
(1) Attitude as a professional  
 Complying with the 
professional ethics 
 
 (2) Fear towards tax 
authority 
 Client being penalised, 
tax audit 
(2) Fear towards tax authority  
 Client being penalised, tax 
audit 
 Aggressive approach by the 
NZIRD 
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 (3) Reputation 
 Losing credibility as tax 
agents 
(3) Reputation 
 Perceived as dishonest 
 (4) Feeling guilty for not 
complying 
(4) Fairness 
  (5) Trade –off between costs 
and benefits 
  (6) Complexity of the tax law 
(c) Influence of 
referent or 
important others 
(1) Peers, superiors, friends 
in the profession  
 Exchanging opinions and 
experience especially in 
complicated tax 
situations 
(1) Peers, superiors, friends in 
the profession, tax specialist 
especially from ‘Big Four’ 
public accounting firms, 
NZICA tax advisory 
services 
 Exchanging opinions and 
experiences especially in 
complicated tax situations 
 Perceptions of peers 
  (2) Reputation to the firm 
(d) Perceived control  (1) Mixed opinions  (1) Mixed opinions  
  Control at the initial 
stage of decision making 
 Control in providing the 
advice but not 
necessarily in the final 
decision making 
 Control in providing the 
advice to clients but not 
necessarily in the final 
decision making 
Ethical sensitivity (1) Helpful in complying 
with the tax law 
(1) Helpful in complying with 
the tax law 
  Avoid unethical conduct 
 Identify potential tax 
claims 
 Guideline to provide type of 
advice to clients based on 
their risk profiles 
 Guidelines to accept or 
decline appointment as tax 
agent 
 (2) Less support from junior 
staff 
(2) Awareness does not 
necessarily mean comply 
with the tax law 
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 (3) Developed through 
experience and 
observation 
(3) Developed through 
experience 
Culture 
(a) Gap in decision 
making 
(1) Mixed opinions 
 More junior staff are 
allowed to contribute 
ideas but final decisions 
before advising clients 
are made by more senior 
staff 
 Junior staff prone to rely 
on more senior staff in 
decision making 
(1) Mixed opinions 
 More junior staff are 
allowed to give ideas but 
final decisions before 
advising clients are made by 
more senior staff 
 Consultative approach 
(b) Willingness to be 
in uncertain 
situations 
(example: taking 
risks) 
(1) Mixed opinions 
 Willing to take risk of 
certain amount 
 Avoid risks due to high 
penalty and probability 
being audited 
(1) Mixed opinions 
 Willing to take risks 
depending on situation (cost 
and benefits consideration ) 
 Avoid risks due to high cost 
(penalty and audit) 
(c) Consideration for 
society 
(1) Mixed opinion 
 Consider the benefits to 
society from tax 
collected 
 Safeguard clients’ 
economic interest 
(1) Mixed opinions  
 Maintaining a good tax 
system in the society 
 Safeguard clients’ economic 
interest 
 
 
 
7.4 Summary  
In this chapter, the analysis and findings from the interviews with tax agents 
from Malaysia and New Zealand are presented. The findings are then summarized 
and compared to find out if the tax agents differ in their opinions. As mentioned in 
section 4.8.6 of Chapter 4 Research Method the researcher started the analysis 
process by transcribing the recording into written text, coding the data and putting 
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this into the respective themes. While the themes in this interview study were 
determined a priori, which are basically related to the topics under study, some 
new concepts also emerged from the interview responses.  
Essentially, tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand shared similar views 
on the factors that could influence them in their decision making while performing 
their roles. Some differences in interpreting the concepts discussed in the 
interviews are also documented. With regard to their understanding about tax 
compliance behaviour, generally, interview participants perceived tax compliance 
as following the tax laws, exercising justice, understanding the tax rules and 
situation specific. They also agreed that to a certain extent, attitudes towards 
compliance influence them when complying with the tax laws. While there are 
some consistencies between interview participants from Malaysia and New 
Zealand in interpreting attitudes in tax compliance, their opinions also differ in a 
few areas. 
Another factor considered as important by interview participants in the 
study is the influence of referent or important others. Peers, superiors and friends in 
the same profession, are the common important others who influenced tax agents in 
this study. The findings indicate some agreement and disagreement by interview 
participants in relation to the influence of perceived control, ethical sensitivity and 
culture in the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents. In interpreting the concepts 
discussed in the study, it was also discovered that complexity of the tax laws, 
economic factors such as penalties, probability of being audited, trade-off between 
cost and benefits, risks and aggressiveness of tax authority, could be among the 
reasons for complying with the tax laws. 
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The findings from the interview, to an extent, support the argument by 
Roberts (1998) and Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) that economic and non-
economic factors influence individuals in complying with the tax law. The next 
chapter presents a synopsis of the study, discussions of the key findings of the 
study, conclusions, contributions of the study, limitations of the study, and future 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 8  
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUDING STATEMENTS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a synopsis of the study before discussing the findings 
from the survey and interviews from Malaysia and New Zealand. In addition, this 
chapter also presents the contributions of the study, its limitations and 
recommendations for future research.  
8.1 The study – A Synopsis 
The purpose of this study is to understand the tax compliance behaviour of 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand while performing their engagement roles. 
Prior studies, such as Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and Sawyer 
(2001), suggest various factors that can influence an individual’s tax compliance 
behaviour. Given the wide scope of tax compliance studies, based on the prior 
literature, this study selected several factors that could potentially contribute to the 
ethical decision making of tax agents in complying with the tax laws by extending 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) by Ajzen (1991) with ethical sensitivity 
and culture.  
The abovementioned theoretical suggestion is conceptually illustrated in a 
framework in Chapter 3 and tested in two scenarios: overstating tax expenses and 
understating tax income. Considering that this study is comparative in nature, it is 
essential to examine whether or not tax agents in this study have similar 
perceptions towards the TPB elements, ethical sensitivity and culture in complying 
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with the tax laws. This study used Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) to 
measure ethical sensitivity and Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions to 
measure culture, and prior studies (eg. Cruz et al., 2000; Yeoh, 1999) suggest that 
both are conceptually multidimensional. Therefore, it is also necessary to examine 
whether or not tax agents in the study perceive ethical sensitivity and culture in this 
study as a multidimensional construct.  
Drawing from the conceptual framework, ten research questions, which 
were later translated into hypotheses, were developed to achieve the objective of 
the study. To answer the research questions and test the hypotheses, a mixed-
method approach was employed in the study, adopting a partially sequential 
explanatory and partially concurrent mixed-method research design with survey 
and semi-structured telephone interviews as the data collection instruments.  
The first three research questions, which also represent the preliminary 
hypotheses on the overall perceptions of tax agents with regards to the TPB 
elements, ethical sensitivity and culture, were analysed by performing t-test 
analysis. To answer the remaining research questions, their respective hypotheses 
were tested using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), particularly through 
operationalizing the partial least squares (PLS) approach using the SmartPLS 2.0 
(M3) Beta software developed by Ringle et al. (2005). 
The interview findings from the study are useful for explaining further the 
survey responses. In a mixed method study, the interview findings could be used to 
either support or challenge the findings in the survey (Creswell, 2009; Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011). In this study, the data from the 
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interview was analysed following approaches suggested by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) and Braun and Clarke (2006).  The next section discusses the main findings 
of the study from the survey and interviews. 
8.2 Key findings of the study 
In this section, the integration of findings from the survey and interviews 
are presented for each variable of the study.  
8.2.1 Culture and tax compliance 
In this study, culture is measured using Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural 
Dimensions. Since this is a comparative study, there is a need to examine whether 
or not tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same perceptions with 
regard to Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions, which is captured in the 
first research question,  
“Do tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same level of 
perceptions with regard to Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions in 
complying with the tax laws?”  
The t-test results from Chapter 5 indicate that tax agents in Malaysia and 
New Zealand do not differ significantly with regard to their perceptions towards 
the cultural traits of Power Distance, Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance in 
complying with the tax laws. They do, however, differ in their perceptions towards 
Masculinity in complying with the tax law.  
Therefore, the hypothesis stating “There is no significant difference 
between tax agents from Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the Hofstede’s 
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(1980) National Cultural Dimensions in complying with the tax laws” is not fully 
supported.  
The findings contradict with Hofstede’s (1980) propositions on the cultural 
dimensions of Malaysia and New Zealand. On the contrary, the findings are similar 
to Saad (2011) who found that in general, individual taxpayers in Malaysia and 
New Zealand have similar perceptions towards tax compliance. One possible 
explanation is that, while the cultural dimensions of Malaysia and New Zealand are 
different according to Hofstede (1980), both suggest some similarities in their 
accounting practices which were developed based on the British system (Gernon & 
Meek, 2001). The different results recorded for Masculinity and tax compliance in 
this study is possibly because tax agents in New Zealand and Malaysia have 
different perceptions with regard to how to deal with the tax authorities in their 
countries.  
Since Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions are perceived to be 
multidimensional (Hofstede, 1980), the validity and reliability of cultural measures 
in this study were tested in the first order factor model, and later as a second order 
factor model using the repeated indicator approach, suggested by Chin (2010), and 
Hair et al. (2013) on the overstating tax expenses scenario and understating income 
scenario. The results of the second order factor models and multicollinearity test of 
the constructs, as presented in Tables 6.14, 6.16 and 6.17 for the overstating tax 
expense scenario and in Tables 6.15, 6.18 and 6.19 for the understating income 
scenario in Chapter 6, support the Hypothesis 9 “Tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand perceive culture as a multidimensional concept”.  
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To test the strength of the relationship between culture and intention to 
comply with the tax law in the proposed model, the path coefficient and the t- 
values from the bootstrapping were observed. In the case of overstating tax 
expenses, culture was not a significant factor in Malaysia and suggested only a 
weak relationship with intention in New Zealand. In the understating income 
scenario, culture was also found not to be significant in explaining the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents from Malaysia but suggested a moderate 
relationship with intention in New Zealand.  
Given the above mentioned findings Hypothesis 10 “Culture significantly 
influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax law” 
was rejected for Malaysia but accepted in New Zealand for both scenarios of 
overstating tax expenses and understating income. The results imply that there are 
differences with regard to tax culture between Malaysian and New Zealand 
respondents. As suggested by Alm and Torgler (2006), tax culture differs across 
countries, which is possibly related to trust in the government policies. Nerré 
(2008) also commented that tax culture is a subset of national culture and this tax 
culture is determined by the cultural norms and historically developed legal 
institutions in every country. 
Based on the guidelines provided by Cohen (1988), effect size which 
explains the impact of independent variable on dependent variable (Henseler et al., 
2009; Hair et al., 2012) for culture in overstating tax expenses scenario in Malaysia 
and New Zealand, suggests that culture has only a small effect on intention. In the 
understating income scenario, culture does not have any effect on intention in 
Malaysia and reported only a small effect on intention in New Zealand.  
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The interview findings indicate further the interplay of cultural traits in the 
responses of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand. Overall, the findings from 
the interviews indicate that tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have mixed 
opinions on the influence of culture in complying with the tax laws. While the 
overall findings from the interviews and the survey may be inconsistent, scholars 
such as Creswell (2009), Bryman and Bell (2011), and Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011), argue that inconsistencies in findings between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in mixed-method-based studies are common and indeed, these 
inconsistencies are one of the challenges in conducting mixed-method studies.  
The interview results revealed that tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand 
in the study allowed junior staff to participate in the decision-making process 
before advising their clients, but the final decisions were always made by the senior 
staff member suggesting low Power Distance and high Individualism cultural traits. 
Tax agents in the study from both countries also have mixed opinions on their 
willingness to take risks. There was agreement between tax agents from both 
countries that certain amount of risks were tolerable in complying with the tax laws 
but some tax agents from Malaysia and New Zealand avoided taking any risks 
citing reasons such as high penalty and possibilities of being audited, indicating 
overall a moderate Uncertainty Avoidance cultural trait. Furthermore, tax agents’ 
priority for clients’ economic benefits, consideration of the amount of fees paid by 
clients, and the trade-off between costs and benefits of complying with the tax 
laws, reinforce the cultural traits of Individualism and Masculinity.  
The findings on the influence of culture in complying with the tax law in 
this study are inconclusive and add to the literature on the mixed findings of the 
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influence of culture in tax compliance behaviour. While the findings on the 
influence of culture on tax compliance behaviour for New Zealand are consistent 
with prior studies (eg. Bobek et al., 2007b), contradictory results are recorded for 
Malaysia. It is interesting to note that while tax agents from Malaysia and New 
Zealand in the study have some similarities in their perceptions towards Hofstede’s 
(1980) National Cultural Dimensions in complying with the tax law (as evidenced 
from the t-test results and their interview responses) both agreed that culture in this 
study is a multidimensional concept.  This is shown in the results of the second 
order factor models, where the influence of culture in their decision making is 
slightly different.  
One possible reason is that, while the interview responses related to taking 
risks, consideration of economic benefits and cost imply the existence of cultural 
traits, they also imply the concern of tax agents on other contextual factors. This 
includes economic factors in complying with the tax laws, which result in lack of 
support for the influence of culture in explaining tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in the study.  
Another possible reason is that, notwithstanding New Zealand tax agents in 
this study are members of NZICA, the accounting profession in New Zealand relies 
on a self-regulatory approach, which differs to Malaysia where the accounting 
profession is statutorily governed by the MIA. As suggested by Cohen et al. 
(1996), the close monitoring of the professional body, in this case the MIA, as a 
statutory body, could possibly reduce the impact of culture in the ethical decision 
making of tax agents in this study.   
372 
 
8.2.2 TPB items and tax compliance behaviour  
The second research question, “Do tax agents in Malaysia and New 
Zealand have the same level of perceptions in relation to the TPB elements in 
complying with the tax law while performing their roles?”, examined whether or 
not tax agents in this study have similar perceptions towards the TPB items in 
complying with the tax law in overstating tax expense and understating income 
scenarios. The results from the t-test analyses suggest that tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand differed significantly in their perceptions towards attitudes, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control in overstating tax expense and 
understating income.  
Thus, this led to rejecting Hypothesis 2a “There is no significant difference 
in the perceptions in relation to the intention to comply, attitudes towards 
behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control between tax agents 
in Malaysia and New Zealand in overstating tax expense scenario” and likewise 
rejecting Hypothesis 2b  “There is no significant difference in the perceptions in 
relation to the intention to comply, attitudes towards behaviour, subjective norms 
and perceived behavioural control in understating income scenario”.  
Overall, the means in the overstating tax expenses scenario and understating 
income scenario suggest that in this study, tax agents from New Zealand were more 
likely to act ethically compared to tax agents from Malaysia.  
8.2.2.1 Attitudes and tax compliance behaviour 
The path coefficient and p-values for attitudes in the overstating tax 
expenses scenario indicate that attitude has a strong relationship with intention to 
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comply with the tax laws for tax agents from Malaysia. Equally, attitude towards 
complying with the tax laws is also significant in New Zealand in the overstating 
tax expenses scenario. When the conceptual model is tested on the understating 
income scenario, attitude towards complying with the tax law is also found to be a 
significant variable in explaining the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand.  
In view of the foregoing, the Hypothesis 4 “Attitude towards behaviour 
significantly influences the tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying 
with the tax law” is accepted in both Malaysia and New Zealand for the overstating 
tax expenses and understating income scenarios. The effect size of attitude on the 
intention is also large in the overstating tax expenses’ scenario in Malaysia and a 
consistent result is also recorded in New Zealand. Similarly, the effect size of 
attitude on the intention is large in understating income scenario in Malaysia and 
New Zealand.  
The interview findings explain further the influence of attitude in the tax 
compliance behaviour of tax agents. Essentially, tax agents in the study understand 
attitudes as their professional attitude in complying with the professional ethics, 
fear towards being penalised by the tax authority and safeguarding their reputation. 
In Malaysia, attitudes are also perceived as the feeling of guilt for not complying, 
while in New Zealand, attitudes are also associated with fairness, a trade-off 
between costs and benefits, and complexity of the tax law.  
The significant influence of attitudes in explaining the tax compliance 
behaviour of tax agents in this study supports the findings of prior studies such as 
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Bobek and Hatfield (2003), Buchan (2005), Trivedi et al. (2005), Saad (2011), 
Langham et al. (2012) and Smart (2012). Interestingly, the interview findings 
provide more understanding on how tax agents in this study understand attitudes in 
complying with the tax law. The interview findings for instance, raised the concern 
over whether complying with the tax law is a public relations exercise as argued by 
Doyle et al. (2009), since tax agents fear their reputation would be tarnished if they 
do not comply. Support is also present for the argument by Blanthorne and Kaplan 
(2008) that complying with the law to a certain extent involves economic factors.  
8.2.2.2 Subjective norms and tax compliance behaviour  
The findings from the survey on the path coefficient and p-values for 
subjective norms, in the case of overstating tax expenses for Malaysia and New 
Zealand, suggest that subjective norms are not significant in explaining the 
behaviour of tax agents in complying with the tax law. Equally, when the same 
model was tested on understating income scenario, the results from the path 
coefficient and p-values also suggest that subjective norms are not able to explain 
the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in complying with the tax laws.  
The findings result into the rejection of the Hypothesis 5 “Subjective norms 
significantly influences tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with 
the tax laws” in both tax scenarios in this study. This is further supported by the 
small effect size of subjective norms on intention in overstating tax expense and 
understating income scenarios in this study for both countries.  
It is, however, interesting to find that the interview findings on the 
influence of subjective norms in complying with the tax laws by tax agents, 
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recorded inconsistent results to the survey. Essentially, tax agents in the interviews 
in Malaysia and New Zealand concurred that the influence of referent or important 
others (subjective norms) exists in their decision making as to whether or not to 
comply with the tax laws. One possible explanation on the inconsistencies of the 
findings between the survey and the interviews could be due to the complexity of 
the tax scenarios presented in the study. There is a possibility that the survey 
respondents in the study did not perceive the moral issues in the tax scenarios 
presented in the study as complicated which required them to ask for tax opinions 
from important others. This is supported by comments in the interview, where the 
participants agreed that the influence of referent or important others is important in 
especially complicated tax scenarios.  
It is also interesting to note that New Zealand tax agents raised their 
concern on the perceptions of peers and reputation of the firm in explaining the 
influence of subjective norms in their decision making. Again, this raises the 
question of whether complying with the tax law by public accounting practitioners 
is associated more with exercising a public relations activity rather than complying 
with the tax law itself (Doyle et al., 2009). The survey findings of the study are 
consistent with Buchan (2005) who found that subjective norms are not significant 
in explaining public accounting practitioners’ ethical intention. The findings of the 
interview also support the survey results of Smart (2012) who found that important 
referent’s expectations and threat of losing respect from important referents (which 
can be translated in this study as perception of peers), as an important factor for 
complying with the tax law.  
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8.2.2.3 Perceived behavioural control and tax compliance behaviour  
Perceived behavioural control, (PBC), is another variable examined in the 
study. The hypothesis H6, “Perceived behavioural control significantly influences 
tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with the tax laws” was 
tested twice, on the overstating tax expense scenario and understating income 
scenario.  
The path coefficients and p-values for PBC in overstating tax expense 
scenario for Malaysia and New Zealand suggest that PBC has no significant 
influence on intention. A similar finding was recorded for Malaysia in the case of 
understating income but a contradictory result suggests that PBC has moderate 
influence on intention in New Zealand for the same case. The findings from the 
survey led to the rejection of hypothesis H6 in Malaysia and New Zealand for the 
overstating tax expenses scenario. Likewise, H6 was also rejected for Malaysia in 
understating income scenario but was accepted in New Zealand.  
The results were supported further with the examination on the effect of 
PBC on intention. It was found that PBC has small effect on intention in the 
overstating tax expenses scenario in Malaysia and New Zealand. A small effect 
size was also reported for New Zealand in the understating income scenario with 
no effect between PBC and intention recorded in Malaysia for the same tax 
scenario. It is interesting to note that while PBC was not significant for both tax 
scenarios in Malaysia, a different result was found for New Zealand. One 
possibility for the different finding in New Zealand between the two tax scenarios 
is that, the understating income scenario involved a cash sale with no records and 
thus, the probability of the cash transaction being detected by the tax authority is 
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low. As commented by some interview participants, while the NZIRD is actively 
doing audits, their focus has been more on large amounts of money and tax audits 
for small businesses are rare. Therefore, there is a possibility that tax agents in the 
survey in New Zealand found that they have more control in understating cash 
income compared to overstating tax expenses. The survey findings from this study 
supported the unfavourable findings of the influence of PBC in complying with the 
tax law documented in prior tax research.  Bobek and Hatfield (2003), Buchan 
(2005), Trivedi et al. (2005), Bobek et al. (2007a), Saad (2011), Langham et al. 
(2012) and Smart (2012)  all found non-significant influence of PBC on intention 
in their studies. 
The unfavourable results of the survey on the influence of PBC in tax 
compliance in this study could perhaps be explained further by the interview 
findings. The interview participants in Malaysia and New Zealand had a common 
agreement on the influence of PBC in their decision making. Essentially, they 
agreed that they have control in providing advice to their clients but they do not 
necessarily have control in the final decision making in complying with the tax 
laws. Some interview participants from New Zealand commented that, to a certain 
extent, having a good relationship with their clients would help to determine 
whether or not they have control in the final decision making. The interview 
findings suggest the tax agents’ roles include acting as advocates for their clients.  
8.2.3 Ethical sensitivity and tax compliance  
Similar to culture and the TPB items, since this study is comparative in 
nature, the researcher performed a t-test to answer the third research question of 
whether or not tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand have the same level of 
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perceptions with regard to the dimensions in MES which was used to measure 
ethical sensitivity. The results from the t-test indicate that tax agents in Malaysia 
and New Zealand differed in perceiving moral equity, relativism and egoism 
dimensions, but had similar views on utilitarianism and contractualism in 
overstating tax expense scenario.  
Given these results, the hypothesis H3a “There is no significance difference 
in the perceptions between tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to 
the dimensions of MES in overstating tax expense scenario” was not fully 
supported.  
When tested on understating income scenario, the t-test results suggest that 
the hypothesis H3b stating “There is no significance difference in the perceptions 
between tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand with regard to the dimensions of 
MES in understating income scenario” was rejected.  
In the understating income scenario, the results revealed that tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand had different perceptions towards MES dimensions. 
Overall, the mean values in both scenarios suggest that tax agents in New Zealand 
have higher ethical sensitivity compared to tax agents in Malaysia. One possible 
reason is because recent tax court decisions in New Zealand seem to favour the 
NZIRD (Elliffe, 2011). This is supported by responses from the interview 
participants in New Zealand that the aggressiveness of NZIRD in ensuring tax 
compliance to a certain extent influences them to comply with the tax laws.  
Prior studies using MES suggest that MES is multidimensional. Similar to 
culture, in this study MES was also subject to first order factor model assessment 
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and later, as a second order factor model, using repeated indicator approach for 
both tax scenarios applied in the study. The results from the second order factor 
model confirmed that MES was formed by multidimensional constructs in 
Malaysia and New Zealand for both tax scenarios in the study. Thus, this enabled 
acceptance of hypothesis H7 “Tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand perceive 
ethical sensitivity as a multidimensional concept”.  
The relationship between ethical sensitivity and intention was examined 
from the strength of the path coefficient and the p-values. The results from the 
structural model in the overstating tax expenses scenario show that ethical 
sensitivity was significant, but indicated a weak relationship in Malaysia but a 
significant  moderate relationship between ethical sensitivity and intention in New 
Zealand. In the understating income scenario, ethical sensitivity was not significant 
in Malaysia but had a strong relationship with intention in New Zealand. 
As a result, it could be suggested that hypothesis H8, “Ethical sensitivity 
significantly influences tax agent in Malaysia and New Zealand in complying with 
the tax law” was accepted for Malaysia and New Zealand in the case of overstating 
tax expenses, and also accepted in New Zealand for the understating income 
scenario (but rejected in Malaysia). When examined further, ethical sensitivity had 
only small effect on intention in both tax scenarios in the study for both countries. 
The inconsistent findings in Malaysia between overstating tax expenses and 
understating income scenarios support the argument in prior accounting studies 
such as Cohen et al. (1993) and Buchan (2005), that MES is situation specific. 
While ethical sensitivity is significant for both scenarios in New Zealand, the levels 
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of significance (p-values of 0.001 for understating income and 0.05 for overstating 
expenses) are different, indicating that the results from applying MES depend on 
the type of situations. The findings from the survey support the argument by 
Collins (2000) on the influence of ethical sensitivity on accountants in situations 
involving violation of laws. The survey findings, however, are not consistent with 
Buchan (2005) who found no support for ethical sensitivity on public accountants’ 
ethical intention.  
The interview findings to a certain extent clarify the survey findings of the 
study on the influence of ethical sensitivity in tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents. Interview participants in Malaysia and New Zealand indicated common 
agreement that ethical sensitivity is helpful in tax agents’ compliance behaviour 
with the tax laws. They also concurred that experience is an important factor to 
develop ethical sensitivity. When probed further, interview participants in Malaysia 
explained that ethical sensitivity is helpful in avoiding unethical conduct in their 
tax practices and helpful in identifying any potential allowable tax claims. In New 
Zealand, ethical sensitivity is beneficial in guiding tax agents on the type of advice 
given to their clients based on the clients risk profiles. Interestingly, ethical 
sensitivity does not necessarily lead to ethical behaviour, as commented by some 
interview participants in New Zealand.  
8.2.4 Tax compliance behaviour of tax agents – Some selected factors 
The tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in this study was examined 
using the conceptual model developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, and tested on two 
tax scenarios of overstating tax expenses and understating income in Malaysia and 
New Zealand. The R–squares of the structural model for overstating tax expenses 
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scenario in Malaysia of 0.78 and 0.72 in New Zealand, as well as 0.67 in Malaysia 
and 0.58 in New Zealand for the understating income scenario, suggest that the 
proposed models have the potential to explain the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in the study in both Malaysia and New Zealand.   
In the overstating tax expenses scenario in Malaysia, it was found that 
attitude was a significant factor in explaining the tax agents’ compliance behaviour 
with tax laws, followed by ethical sensitivity. The study, however, found no 
support for subjective norms and perceived behavioural control in tax agents’ 
compliance behaviour in Malaysia. In New Zealand, similar to Malaysia, attitude 
was found to be the most significant factor influencing tax agents’ tax compliance 
behaviour, followed by ethical sensitivity and culture.  
With regard to understating income, attitude was found to be the only 
significant factor in explaining tax agents’ compliance behaviour with tax laws and 
no support for subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, ethical sensitivity 
and culture was recorded in Malaysia. In New Zealand, attitude and ethical 
sensitivity were the most significant factors in influencing the tax agents’ ethical 
decision making, followed by culture and perceived behavioural control. Similar to 
Malaysia, no support was recorded for subjective norms in New Zealand for the 
second scenario.  
Interestingly, while there are some differences between tax agents in 
Malaysia and New Zealand in explaining the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in the study, there are also similarities. Regardless of countries and tax 
scenarios presented in the study, it is interesting to note that attitude has recorded 
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consistent significant results in explaining the tax agents’ tax compliance 
behaviour. Likewise, subjective norms were not significant in both countries for 
both scenarios. The inconsistent results on ethical sensitivity between tax scenarios 
within Malaysia, and between Malaysia and New Zealand in the understating 
income scenario, support the argument by Jones (1991) that being ethical is 
situation specific.  
The tax compliance behaviour of tax agents was further explained in the 
interviews with some tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand which produced 
more interesting findings. For instance, while attitude was found to be important 
from the survey, the interview clarified further the meaning of attitude as 
understood by the tax agents in the interview. The attitude, for instance, was 
translated as complying with the professional ethics, their fear towards being 
penalised and audited, and their fear towards their reputation being tarnished as a 
result of non-compliance. While the survey findings indicate that behavioural 
factors could explain the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in the study, the 
interview findings further suggest that economic factors were also relevant in 
understanding tax agents’ ethical decision making. Overall, the findings support the 
suggestions by Alley and James (2006), Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) and Smart 
(2012), that economic and non-economic factors are relevant in influencing the 
ethical decision making of individuals whether or not to comply with the tax laws.  
8.3 Contributions of the study  
This study has attempted to understand the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents in Malaysia and New Zealand using selected factors. The study extends the 
TPB with ethical sensitivity and culture. The researcher is of the view that this 
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study has contributed to tax compliance studies as well as the accounting 
professions in a number of ways.  
8.3.1 Contribution to tax literature  
First, notwithstanding the calls for more cross-cultural studies in tax 
settings (Richardson and Sawyer, 2001; Singh, 2003; Yong, 2011), tax studies in 
cross-cultural settings especially in Asia-Pacific region remain scarce. One recent 
example is a study by Saad (2011) which compared the individual taxpayers in 
Malaysia and New Zealand. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is 
the first to compare tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand, and it assists with 
providing some insights into the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents between 
two countries which share some similarities but have several differences. It is 
interesting to observe that the findings from the study reveal some similarities and 
differences in the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in these two tax 
jurisdictions.  
Second, prior studies such as Richardson and Sawyer (2001) suggest there 
are various factors which are important in understanding tax compliance behaviour. 
Some factors were selected for this study on the following basis: 
(1) The TPB has been proven to explain individual behaviour in social science 
research. However, the application of the TPB in tax studies is still limited. The 
researcher believes this study adds to the scarce literature on the TPB in tax 
studies which in this study, is not fully supported.  
(2) The use of Hofstede’s (1980) National Cultural Dimensions, as suggested by 
Tsakumis et al. (2007) and Yong (2011), is still largely absent in tax studies. As 
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a response to this suggestion, this study employed Hofstede’s (1980) National 
Cultural Dimensions to examine whether culture has any influence on the 
ethical decision making of tax agents in this study. The findings, overall, are 
inconclusive and add to the literature on the mixed findings of the influence of 
culture in tax compliance behaviour.  
(3) While ethical sensitivity is important, only few studies have attempted to 
address the issue of ethical sensitivity of tax agents (Tan & Sawyer, 2003; Tan, 
2006). At the same time, Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Richardson and 
Sawyer (2001) raised the concern of how to measure ethics in tax studies. This 
study attempts to address these issues by incorporating the ethical sensitivity of 
tax agents into the model to understand their tax compliance behaviour and 
measured this ethical sensitivity using a tool, MES, which has been widely 
accepted in marketing studies but is still limitedly applied in accounting (and 
tax) context. To the knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first to 
examine ethical sensitivity of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand using 
MES in tax context. The findings support the MES to explain ethical sensitivity 
of tax agents in the study and provide some support on the influence of ethical 
sensitivity and tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in the study.   
Third, with regard to the research methods applied in the study, the 
researcher is of the opinion that this study has the potential to contribute in several 
ways explained as follows:  
(1) To ensure tax studies contribute to the body of knowledge, Oats (2012) suggest 
tax researchers should venture into other research paradigms and do not be 
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dogmatic about the positivist research paradigm. While a mixed-method 
approach has been widely implemented in other social science research areas of 
study (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011), the mixed-method approach is still not 
widely explored in tax studies (McKerchar, 2010). Thus, applying pragmatism 
as the research paradigm, the researcher used the quantitative (survey) and 
qualitative (interview) methods to answer the research questions of the study. It 
is interesting to note that the interview findings have contributed to richer 
understandings on the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents in the study. 
Furthermore, the adoption of a mixed-method approach in this study could 
provide another example of how to apply mixed-method approach in a tax 
study, other than studies by Saad (2011), Mohd Isa (2012) and Mohd Ali (2013).  
(2) The use of structural equation modelling (SEM) has been widely supported in 
other social science research areas of study such as marketing and information 
systems. However, the use of SEM in tax studies is still limitedly explored, 
notwithstanding its potential to explain complex relationships among variables 
which frequently exist in tax studies. The application of SEM in this study, 
namely Partial Least Squares (PLS), allows for a single, comprehensive and 
systematic analysis to be performed on all variables simultaneously. The use of 
SEM also allows for two variables, culture and ethical sensitivity, to be tested as 
a second order factor model to confirm their multidimensionality 
simultaneously.  
(3) Common method bias is a potential threat in behavioural-type studies which 
employ self-reported survey (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Hair et al. (2011), Chin et 
al. (2012) and Hair et al. (2012) also suggest the importance of checking for 
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common method bias in studies applying SEM. This study provides an example 
of how to check for common method bias in tax studies which has been ignored 
or only lightly mentioned in prior tax studies. While common method bias is not 
a serious threat in this study, it is not fully guaranteed that the survey findings 
are free from any bias. Likewise, for studies using surveys and involving the 
assessment of ethical behaviour as frequently seen in tax studies, it is important 
to check for social desirability bias since social desirability bias can become a 
threat to the robustness of the findings. Notwithstanding its importance, prior 
tax studies using surveys and involving the decision of whether or not to comply 
with the tax laws are likely to ignore the examination of social desirability bias. 
This study provides an example of how to check for social desirability bias by 
using the measures adopted from Cruz et al. (2000). The findings suggest that 
social desirability bias exists in both scenarios tested in the study for Malaysia 
and New Zealand. The presence of social desirability bias is consistent with 
findings from prior studies in accounting and tax context such as by Cruz et al. 
(2000) and Buchan (2005), thus underlying the importance of including social 
desirability bias measures in accounting and tax studies.  
8.3.2 Contribution to the accounting profession  
Based on the findings of the study, the researcher has the opinion that the 
findings could contribute to further understanding of the tax compliance behaviour 
of accounting practitioners, in this case the tax agents in public accounting services 
while they perform their roles. The findings indicate that the tax compliance 
behaviour of tax agents in this study in Malaysia and New Zealand was based on 
the moral intensity of the tax issues. Therefore, the compliant behaviour of tax 
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agents in this study was motivated in part by the economic factors such as the 
amount of tax involved, trade-off between cost and benefits, and the amount of 
risks considered as acceptable by the tax agents and their clients.  
In addition, their concern on their reputation and the complexity of the tax 
laws also contributes to their decision-making. It is interesting also to note that 
attitude towards intention was found to be the most significant factor in both 
scenarios presented in the study for tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand. The 
findings from the second order factor model in ethical sensitivity also revealed that 
tax agents’ ethical intention was motivated the most by the perception of moral 
equity of an action. This suggests that tax agents in this study put high 
consideration of what was perceived as morally right, fairness and justice in their 
ethical decision making.  
For professional bodies in Malaysia and New Zealand, the findings also 
provide some insights into the ethical behaviour of their members. The findings 
from this study and other prior tax studies involving tax agents, collectively, could 
be useful in promoting ethical behaviour among their members. Training provided 
by professional bodies to their members is essentially focused on the technical 
aspect of accounting issues. One way is to incorporate the non-technical accounting 
elements in the training of their members, such as emphasizing what is morally 
right, the concept of fairness and justice, in their decision making.  
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8.4 Limitations of the study  
Notwithstanding the potential contributions of this study, it also has some 
limitations which need to be considered in interpreting its findings. It is important 
to note that the study recorded low response rates in both countries. However, the 
number of useable responses was adequate for the researcher to perform the 
relevant statistical analysis. The low response rates could possibly be due to the 
method of distributing the questionnaire. In Malaysia, the researcher requested the 
addressee to distribute another two sets of the questionnaire survey to their 
colleagues. However, using this method does not allow the researcher to trace the 
true number of questionnaires being distributed. In New Zealand, the higher 
internet security practised by organizations may result into some emails that were 
sent to tax agents considered to be spam emails. In addition, tax agents are busy 
people and may not have the time to participate in the study. These factors could 
possibly contribute to the understated low response rates for the study. 
There is a concern that the observed samples do not truly represent the 
population of tax agents in the country as explained earlier in sub-section 5.1.3. For 
instance, the respondents came mainly from small size public accounting firms and 
only a small number came from ‘Big Four’ public accounting firms. Pierce and 
Sweeney (2009) for example suggest that firm size has significant influence on the 
ethical decision making of accountants. One possible reason could be due to the 
presence of selection bias as a result from using a cross between systematic random 
sampling and snowballing in Malaysia, and systematic random sampling in New 
Zealand. In view of this, generalisations of the findings from this study need to be 
performed with caution. However, given the limited studies on the ethical decision 
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making of tax agents in Malaysia and New Zealand, the findings from this study 
are still useful in understanding their compliance behaviour while performing their 
engagement roles.  
Notwithstanding that potential nonresponse bias and common method bias 
are not serious threats to the study, it cannot be fully guaranteed that this study is 
free from any bias, considering that this study had low response rates. It is also 
noteworthy to mention that the presence of social desirability bias in this study 
suggests that the findings need to be interpreted with caution since tax agents in the 
study have the tendency to perceive themselves as being more ethical compared to 
their peers.  
Some of the loadings for the measures used in this study from the PLS 
analysis were marginally below the suggested threshold values. However, 
considering that this study involved some newly developed measures, it is 
acceptable to retain the low loadings measure for content validity purpose and to 
avoid using a single measure for the constructs which could create more bias in the 
PLS results.  
8.5 Future research  
The explanatory power shown by the model proposed in this study indicates 
the potential of the model to explain the tax compliance behaviour of tax agents. 
Thus, testing the model in other tax jurisdictions could be a worthwhile effort to 
test the stability of the model and allow for comparisons with other countries to be 
made. In addition, the use of a mixed-method approach in this study and cross-
cultural based type of research, has the potential to offer a better understanding of 
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tax compliance behaviour of tax agents. For instance, the qualitative findings from 
the interviews revealed some other interesting factors such as the possibility of 
economic factors influencing tax agents’ decision making. The comparison 
between Malaysia and New Zealand offers some similarities and differences of 
factors that influence tax agents in complying with the tax laws. As a result, future 
tax studies should be encouraged to adopt a mixed-method approach and venture 
into cross-cultural research.  
In this study, the proposed model was tested on two tax scenarios involving 
overstating tax expense and understating income, which, according to Elliffe 
(2011), represent the core aspects of the tax gap in a tax system. The findings, 
however, suggest that being ethical is situation specific. Therefore, to add more to 
our understanding on tax compliance behaviour of tax agents, future studies should 
test the proposed model on other tax scenarios. Bobek and Robin (2007), for 
instance, have identified some tax scenarios which could potentially cause an 
ethical dilemma to tax agents, which would be worthwhile to be tested further 
using the proposed model of this study. The complexity of the ethical dilemma 
could possibly provide different responses to the tax compliance behaviour of tax 
agents. As evidenced in this study, the survey results indicate that subjective norms 
were not significant for both scenarios in both countries. The interview findings, 
however, suggest that tax agents only refer to important others or referent others in 
complicated tax issues.  
Since attitude was found to be the most significant factor in influencing tax 
agents in their decision making, future studies could examine the antecedents of 
attitude. The interview findings, for instance, revealed that tax agents in the study 
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associated their attitudes with economic factors, such as the fear of being penalised, 
the probability of being audited, the consideration for cost and benefits, and the 
amount of tax involved. In addition, attitudes towards ensuring their reputation 
among peers, the public and accounting profession were also addressed during the 
interviews. Combining economic and non-economic factors could possibly reveal 
more interesting information on the compliance behaviour of tax agents which 
could be explored further in future studies.  
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Associate Prof. Andrew Maples.   
 
This study aims to solicit the views of the members of the Chartered Tax Institute of Malaysia 
(CTIM). Thus I am inviting all CTIM members to participate in this research. The research has been 
reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury and the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU), Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia. All responses are 
confidential and will only be used for the purpose of this PhD study. Since a PhD is a public 
document via the University of Canterbury database, the information provided would be available to 
the public. However, the only personal details published would be the key demographic background 
of the participants. 
 
The online questionnaire survey 
 
It is important for me to receive as many completed questionnaires as possible to ensure the findings 
to be meaningful. It will take no longer than 30 minutes for you to complete the questionnaire. 
Please send your responses by 31 July 2011, however, if you are unable to meet the deadline I still 
appreciate a late response. Please click on the following link to start the survey: 
http://canterbury.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_5oGmgJtHHIQhmJu.  
 
For Malay version of the survey please click the following link: 
http://canterbury.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_dgaDerjh75HlakI. 
 
 
The telephone interview 
  
The interview is important to provide further understanding into the issue being studied. You could 
still participate in the interview even if you do not participate in the survey. It will take no longer 
than 30 minutes and will be recorded. Please click on the following link to participate in the 
telephone interview: http://canterbury.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_2gU1hztHpfbdZQw. 
 
Your contribution is very much appreciated and important to the completion of my research study. 
The findings could contribute to enriching our knowledge on tax professionals’ decision making 
and could be useful in assisting the accounting profession as well as the accounting educators to 
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Appendix D: Sample of survey questionnaire 
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College of Business and Economics 
 
 
A SURVEY OF TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX AGENTS 
 
 
 
Suhaila Abdul Hamid 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
University of Canterbury 
Christchurch, New Zealand 
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
  
1. I would like to invite you to share your views by participating in this study. It should 
take no longer than 15 minutes for you to complete the questionnaire. There is no right 
or wrong answer.  
 
2. In addition to completing the questionnaire, I would also like to invite you to participate 
in a telephone interview later. If you agree, please complete the consent form attached. 
 
3. Please send your responses and the consent form to participate in the telephone 
interview (if agreed) within four week time from the date of received in the two 
separate self-addressed stamped envelopes enclosed to ensure anonymity and 
confidentiality. However, I still appreciate late response. 
 
4. If you would like to answer the Malay version of the questionnaire you could log on to 
this link: http://canterbury.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6L7IauyR9LWAwBe   
 
5. This study had been approved by the Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury. Should you have any enquiries, please do not hesitate to contact myself at 
sba108@uclive.ac.nz or my Senior Supervisor, Professor Dr. Adrian Sawyer at 
adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz. 
 
Thank you very much for participating. I look forward to receiving your responses. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
  
Suhaila Abdul Hamid Professor Dr. Adrian Sawyer 
Phd Student Professor of Taxation 
ACIS Department ACIS Department 
University of Canterbury University of Canterbury 
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SECTION 1 
Below are statements concerning tax compliance behaviour. Please tick (√) 
ONE answer that best describes your opinion. 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
1. A junior staff should follow the 
instructions from his/her superior in 
complying with the tax law 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The benefits that we as a society could 
enjoy from the amount of tax 
collected is very important to me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I would rather challenge the tax 
authority than negotiate with them in 
a tax lawsuit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The more precise the tax law the 
better 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. A junior staff should feel afraid to 
disagree with his/her superior in 
complying with the tax law 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. When complying with the tax law, I 
only consider the effect to my client 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I always feel confident with the 
decision that I make when complying 
with the tax law 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I do not mind to have differences in 
tax judgment with the tax authority 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Most of the time a superior is 
expected to tell his/her junior staff on 
what to do in complying with the tax 
law 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I do not care whether or not the 
society would benefit from the 
amount of tax collected as long as I 
could enjoy the tax benefit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I prefer to challenge the tax 
authority’s decision rather than 
negotiate with them 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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12. When complying with the tax law, I 
avoid taking any tax risk since a tax 
risk could cause unfavourable effect 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. A junior staff should always be 
involved in the decision making when 
dealing with client’s tax matters 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I would consider the long term effect 
to the society when complying with the 
tax law 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I always feel confident to make my 
own tax decision while dealing with 
my client’s tax matters 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. When complying with the tax law, a 
tax risk is an opportunity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
SECTION 2 
In this section you are provided with two (2) hypothetical tax scenarios. Please read 
carefully all scenarios and answer the questions that follow. For each question, please 
tick (√) only ONE answer that best describes your opinion. 
Scenario A 
Rose is a sole proprietor who runs a small catering business and calculates that 50 
percent of her travelling expenses are for business purposes. However, she notices that 
if she overstates her claim to 55 percent, the deduction claimed will increase by 
RM500 and her tax will drop to a lower tax bracket. Since her current business is not 
doing well, she wants to introduce additional menus in her catering business. For that 
purpose, she wants to participate in a cooking course and use the money from the tax 
saved to pay for her enrolment fees. Rose is certain that it is very unlikely for the tax 
authority to detect the overstated claim.   
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For that year, Rose claims 55 percent of her travelling expenses are for business 
purposes. What would you do if you face a similar situation? 
           
1. If I had the opportunity I would 
overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return 
Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unlikely 
2. For me to overstate the business 
travelling expenses claimed in the 
tax return is 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad 
3. Most of people important to me 
think I should overstate the 
business travelling expenses 
claimed in the tax return 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
4. For me to overstate the business 
travelling expenses in the tax return 
is 
Easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Difficult 
5. I would never overstate the 
business travelling expenses 
claimed in the tax return 
True 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 False 
6. For me to overstate the business 
travelling expenses in the tax return 
is 
Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Useful 
7. Most people who are important to 
me will look down at me if I 
overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return 
Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unlikely 
8. With my expertise, I could easily 
overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return if I 
wanted to 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
9. In the future, I may overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the 
tax return 
True 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 False 
10. For me to overstate the business 
travelling expenses in the tax return 
is 
Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial 
11. No one who is important to me 
thinks it is OK to overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the 
tax return 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
 
12. How much control do you have 
over overstating the business 
travelling expenses in the tax 
return? 
Complete 
control 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Absolutely 
no control 
 
Please refer to the following statement to answer questions 13 to 24. 
          
In your opinion, Rose’s decision to overstate the business travelling expenses is: 
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13. Just 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unjust 
14. Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfair 
15. Morally right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not morally right 
16. Acceptable to my family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not acceptable to my family 
17. Traditionally acceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Traditionally unacceptable 
18. Culturally acceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Culturally unacceptable 
19. Not self-promoting for 
Rose 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Self-promoting for Rose 
20. Personally satisfying for 
Rose 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not personally satisfying for 
Rose 
21. Produces greatest utility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Produces the least utility 
22. Minimizing benefits 
while maximizing harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Maximizing benefits while 
minimizing harm 
23. Violating an unwritten 
contract 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not violating an unwritten 
contract 
24. Violating an unspoken 
promise 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not violating an unspoken 
promise 
 
25. The probability that my peers will take the same action is  
High          1   2   3    4  5   6   7   Low 
26. The probability that I will take the same action is  
High          1   2   3    4  5   6   7   Low 
 
 
 
Scenario B 
Adam is a sole proprietor who receives cheques and cash for his business. In the 
current year, he received a cash sale of RM2,000 from one of his friends. He is 
certain that the tax authority will not know the income is not reported and will 
not detect the income since there is no record about the cash sale. He notices that 
he will fall under a higher tax bracket if he declares the RM2,000 cash sale. At 
the same time, he wants to renovate is shop and intends to use the RM2,000 cash 
sale for that purpose.  
For that year, Adam omits the RM2,000 cash sale from his current year tax 
computation. If you are in a similar situation, what would you do? 
 
 
1. If I had the opportunity I would 
omit the RM2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation 
Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unlikely 
2. For me to omit the RM2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation is 
Good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bad 
3. Most of people important to me 
think I should omit the RM2,000 
cash sale from the tax computation 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
4. For me to omit the RM2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation is 
Easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Difficult 
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5. I would never omit the RM2,000 
cash sale from the tax computation 
True 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 False 
6. For me to omit the RM2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation is 
Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Useful 
7. Most people who are important to 
me will look down at me if I omit 
the RM2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation 
Likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unlikely 
8. With my expertise, I could easily 
omit the RM2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation if I wanted to 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
9. In the future, I may omit the 
RM2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation 
True 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 False 
10. For me to omit the RM2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation is 
Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Beneficial 
11. No one who is important to me 
thinks it is OK to omit the 
RM2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation 
Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Disagree 
12. 
 
How much control do you have 
over omitting the RM2,000 cash 
sale from the tax computation 
Complete 
control 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Absolutely 
no control 
 
Please refer to the following statement to answer questions 13 to 24. 
          
In your opinion, Adam’s decision to omit the RM2,000 cash sale is: 
          
13. Just 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unjust 
14. Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfair 
15. Morally right 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not morally right 
16. Acceptable to my family 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not acceptable to my family 
17. Traditionally acceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Traditionally unacceptable 
18. Culturally acceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Culturally unacceptable 
19. Not self-promoting for 
Adam 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Self-promoting for Adam 
20. Personally satisfying for 
Adam 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not personally satisfying for 
Adam 
21. Produces greatest utility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Produces the least utility 
22. Minimizing benefits 
while maximizing harm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Maximizing benefits while 
minimizing harm 
23. Violating an unwritten 
contract 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not violating an unwritten 
contract 
24. Violating an unspoken 
promise 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Not violating an unspoken 
promise 
 
25. The probability that my peers will take the same action is  
High          1   2   3    4  5   6   7   Low 
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26. The probability that I will take the same action is  
High          1   2   3    4  5   6   7   Low 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3 
 
In this section you are provided with questions related to your background. For 
each question, please tick (√) the answer that represents you. 
1. Please indicate your gender 
 Male  Female  
     
2. Please indicate your age 
 25 years or below  26-30 years old  31-35 years 
old 
 
       
 36-40 years old  41-45 years old  46-50 years 
old 
 
        
 51-55 years old  56-60 years old  Over 60 years 
old 
 
       
  
3. Please indicate your ethnicity 
 Malay  Chinese  Indian  Others (Please 
state): 
 __________ 
 
4. Please indicate your years of experience as a tax professional 
 Less than 5 
years 
 5-10 years  11-20 years  More than 20 years  
         
5. What type of firm are you currently working in? 
 Big Four public accounting 
firm 
 Medium size public accounting 
firm 
  
      
 Small size public 
accounting firm 
 O  Others (Please state):  ________ 
      
6. Please state your current position in the firm (for example: Junior, Senior, Assistant 
Manager, Manager, Partner, etc.) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Thank you very much for your participation. Please return the completed 
questionnaire in the enclosed self-addressed envelope. 
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Appendix E: Sample of invitation email promoted by NZICA  
 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems 
College of Business and Economics 
Suhaila Abdul Hamid  Email: sba108@uclive.ac.nz 
Phone: +64 3 3642613 Fax: +64 3 3642727 
 
 
A SURVEY AND INTERVIEW OF TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX PROFESSIONALS IN 
SELF-ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (SAS) 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Suhaila Abdul Hamid and I am currently pursuing the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
(PhD) in the Department of Accounting and Information Systems (ACIS), at the University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. As a requirement for the degree, I am conducting a study 
on the decision making of tax professionals in complying with the tax law under the supervision of 
Professor Adrian Sawyer and Associate Prof. Andrew Maples.  The research has been reviewed and 
approved by the Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury. 
 
The success of this project depends greatly on your participation. Therefore, I would like to invite 
you to participate in the study by completing the questionnaire survey and take part in the telephone 
interview later. With your support, it is hoped the study would be of great utility to enriching our 
knowledge on tax professionals’ decision making and could be useful in assisting the accounting 
profession, the professional bodies and the accounting educators to shape the future generation of 
accounting professionals.  
 
This questionnaire is anonymous and you will not be identified as a participant. By completing the 
questionnaire it is understood that you have provided your consent to the publication of the 
collective results of the study with the understanding that your anonymity will be preserved. You 
may withdraw from the project until your questionnaire has been posted. Please click the following 
link to answer the survey http://canterbury.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0keNFtrysbiNXfu. 
 
In addition to completing the questionnaire, I would like to invite you to share more of your views 
and experience regarding the issue under study in a telephone interview later. It will take no longer 
than an hour and will be recorded by audiotape for the purpose of ensuring that the researcher 
understands correctly the information provided. You will be offered to check the transcript of the 
interview to confirm the correctness of the information provided. If you agree to participate, please 
complete the following link http://canterbury.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_07hFAfpkz3eoZi4. 
 
All responses and information provided for this study will be treated with strict confidential and will 
only be used for the purpose of this PhD study. All information provided will be securely stored and 
subsequently destroyed upon completion of my PhD study. Since a PhD is a public document via 
the University of Canterbury database, the information provided would be available to the public. 
However, only collective results or information will be published without referring to any particular 
individual.  
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Should you have any enquiries, please do not hesitate to contact myself at sba108@uclive.ac.nz or 
my Senior Supervisor: Professor Adrian Sawyer at adrian.sawyer@canterbury.ac.nz. 
 
 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
  
Suhaila Abdul Hamid  
PhD Candidate  
ACIS Department   
University of Canterbury  
Christchurch, New Zealand  
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Appendix F: Survey measures or indicators 
Measures or indicators used in the survey 
Measures Code 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
 Strongly  
Agree 
Power Distance PD        
A junior staff should follow the instructions from 
his/her superior in complying with the tax law 
PD1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A junior staff should feel afraid to disagree with 
his/her superior in complying with the tax law 
PD2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most of the time, a superior is expected to tell 
his/her junior staff on what to do in complying 
with the tax law 
PD3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A junior staff should always be involved in the 
decision making when dealing with client’s tax 
matters * 
PD4R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Individualism IND        
The benefits that we as a society could enjoy 
from the amount of tax collected is very 
important to me * 
IND1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When complying with the tax law, I only 
consider the effect to my client 
IND2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not care whether or not the society would 
benefit from the amount of tax collected as long 
as I could enjoy the tax benefit 
IND3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would consider the long term effect to the 
society when complying with the tax law* 
IND4R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Masculinity MAS        
I would rather challenge the tax authority than 
negotiate with them in a tax lawsuit 
MAS1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I always feel confident with the decision that I 
make when complying with the tax law 
MAS2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I prefer to challenge the tax authority’s decision 
rather than negotiate with them 
MAS3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I always feel confident to make my own 
decisions while dealing with my client’s tax 
matter 
MAS4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Uncertainty Avoidance UAV        
The more precise the tax law, the better UAV1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not mind having differences in tax 
judgments with the tax authority. * 
UAV2R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When complying with the tax law, I avoid taking 
any tax risk since a tax risk could cause 
unfavourable effect 
UAV3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When complying with the tax law, a tax risk is an 
opportunity. * 
UAV4R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Measures Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intention INO        
If I had the opportunity, I would overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the tax return* 
(Likely…Unlikely) 
INO1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would never overstate the business travelling 
expenses claimed in the tax return (True…False) 
INO2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In the future, I may overstate the business travelling 
expenses in the tax return (True…False) 
INO3R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Attitude ATO        
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
claimed in the tax return is* (Good…Bad) 
ATO1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return is (Worthless…Useful) 
ATO2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return is (Harmful…Beneficial) 
ATO3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Subjective norms SNO        
Most of people important to me think that I should 
overstate the business travelling expenses* 
(Agree…Disagree) 
SNO1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most of people important to me will look down at me 
if I overstate the business travelling expenses in the 
tax return (Likely…Unlikely) 
SNO2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No one who is important to me thinks it is OK to 
overstate the business travelling expenses in the tax 
return (Agree…Disagree) 
SNO3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perceived Behavioural Control PBO        
For me to overstate the business travelling expenses 
in the tax return is (Easy…Difficult) 
PBO1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
With my expertise, I could easily overstate the 
business travelling expenses in the tax return if I 
wanted to (Agree…Disagree) 
PBO2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much control do you have over overstating the 
business travelling expenses in the tax return 
(Complete control…Absolutely no control) 
PBO3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Measures Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intention INU        
If I had the opportunity I would omit the $2,000 
cash sale from the tax computation.* 
(Likely…Unlikely) 
INU1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would never omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation (True…False) 
INU2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In the future, I may omit the $2,000 cash sale 
from the tax computation* (True…False) 
INU3R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Attitude ATU        
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the 
tax computation is (Good…Bad) 
ATU1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the 
tax computation is (Worthless…Useful) 
ATU2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the 
tax computation is (Harmful…Beneficial) 
ATU3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Subjective norms SNU        
Most of people important to me think I should 
omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation* (Agree….Disagree) 
SNU1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Most people who are important to me will look 
down at me if I omit the $2,000 cash sale from 
the tax computation (Likely…Unlikely) 
SNU2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No one who is important to me thinks it is OK 
to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the tax 
computation (Agree…Disagree) 
SNU3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Perceived Behavioural Control PBU        
For me to omit the $2,000 cash sale from the 
tax computation is (Easy…Difficult) 
PBU1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
With my expertise, I could easily omit the 
$2,000 cash sale from the tax computation if I 
wanted to (Agree…Disagree) 
PBU2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How much control do you have over omitting 
the $2,000 cash sale from the tax computation? 
(Complete control…Absolutely no control) 
PBU3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Measures Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In your opinion, Rose’s decision to overstate the business travelling expenses is:   
Moral Equity MEO        
Just…….Unjust MEO1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fair…….Unfair MEO2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Morally right …….Not morally right MEO3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Acceptable to my family…….Not acceptable to 
my family 
MEO4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relativism REO        
Traditionally acceptable…….Traditionally 
unacceptable 
REO1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Culturally acceptable…….Culturally 
unacceptable 
REO2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Egoism EGO        
Not self-promoting for Rose…….Self-
promoting for Rose* 
EGO1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Personally satisfying for Rose…….Not 
personally satisfying for Rose 
EGO2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Utilitarian UTO        
Produces greatest utility……..Produces the 
least utility 
UTO1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Minimizing benefits while maximizing 
harm……Maximizing benefits while 
minimizing harm* 
UTO2R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contractualism COO        
Violating an unwritten contract…….Not 
violating an unwritten contract* 
COO1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Violating an unspoken promise…….Not 
violating an unspoken promise 
COO2R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Measures Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In your opinion, Adam’s decision to omit the $2,000 cash sale is:   
Moral Equity MEU        
Just…….Unjust MEU1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Fair…….Unfair MEU2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Morally right …….Not morally right MEU3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Acceptable to my family…….Not acceptable to 
my family 
MEU4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Relativism REU        
Traditionally acceptable…….Traditionally 
unacceptable 
REU1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Culturally acceptable…….Culturally 
unacceptable 
REU2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Egoism EGU        
Not self-promoting for Adam…….Self-
promoting for Adam* 
EGU1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Personally satisfying for Adam…….Not 
personally satisfying for Adam 
EGU2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Utilitarian UTU        
Produces greatest utility……..Produces the 
least utility 
UTU1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Minimizing benefits while maximizing 
harm……Maximizing benefits while 
minimizing harm* 
UTU2R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Contractualism COU        
Violating an unwritten contract…….Not 
violating an unwritten contract* 
COU1R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Violating an unspoken promise…….Not 
violating an unspoken promise 
COU2R 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix G: Interview guide 
 
Introduction 
Thank you very much for your kind cooperation. Before we start our interview, I would like to 
inform you the purpose and procedures for the interview today. 
Purpose 
The purpose of the interview is to delve into the factors that contribute to ethical decision making 
by tax professionals in complying with the tax laws.  
Procedure 
The telephone interview should take no longer than 60 minutes each. 
 All interviews are recorded using audio to ensure the researcher understands the information given 
during the interview. 
The data would be kept securely and published only for the purposes of this research without 
identifying you as a participant.  
Participants will be referred by numbers in any publication to maintain confidentiality. For instance 
(participant no 1. no. 2 etc). 
 The questions are related to your opinions and experience as tax professionals in complying with 
the tax laws. Thus, I would be grateful if you could provide examples in your answers for better 
understanding.  
Section 1: Demographic details 
Could you please tell me a little bit of your background 
Gender 
Age 
Years of experience in doing tax job 
Position in the firm 
Type of firm currently working 
Ethnicity 
Section 2: General tax compliance  
Could you please explain the term ‘tax compliance’? 
Could you please explain how do you make decisions before advising your clients? 
Section 3: Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Could you please explain whether or not your own attitude towards tax compliance influences your 
intention to comply with the tax laws?  
Could you please explain whether the people close to you (for example: family, friends, colleagues) 
have any influence in your decision making when complying with the tax law? 
Do you always have control in deciding whether or not to comply with the tax laws? Please explain.  
Section 3: Ethics and tax compliance 
What do you understand by the term ‘ethics’? 
What do you understand about ethical sensitivity or ethical awareness in complying with tax law? 
Please explain. 
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Do you think your ethical sensitivity helps you in complying with the tax law? If yes, please 
explain. 
Section 4: Culture and tax compliance 
How do you perceive yourself (apart from as a tax professional) while assisting your clients to 
comply with tax laws? (for example: as an individual, a member of a society, a citizen of a nation) 
In complying with the tax law, how important is your superior or your staffs to you? Please explain. 
(For instance, do you consider their opinion, consult with them or discuss with them before making 
decision?) 
In complying with the tax law, do you consider the effect to the society? Please explain. 
In complying with the tax law, do you feel afraid or uncomfortable to take risk? Please explain. 
Wrap up section 
What is the most important motivation that drives you to comply with the tax law? 
Do you have any questions? 
Thank you very much. I appreciate very much your contribution in this study.  
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Appendix H: Interview consent form  
CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEW 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX PROFESSIONALS IN SELF-ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
The aim of the interview is to gather an in-depth understanding of the underlying factors that 
motivate the compliance behaviour of tax professionals while performing their duties. The interview 
will take around 60 minutes to complete. All interview conversations will be recorded for research 
purposes only and subsequently will be destroyed. All participants in the interview will be referred 
according to numbers in any publications, for instance, “participant no. 1” to maintain 
confidentiality.  The procedures for the interview, data storage and questions asked, had fulfilled the 
requirements and had been approved by the Human Ethics Committee Office, University of 
Canterbury. If you are willing to be interviewed, please complete the following section. The 
researcher will contact you to arrange for an interview later. 
 
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to 
participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to publication of the results of the project with 
the understanding that confidentiality will be preserved. I am also aware that the information 
provided in the interview could be accessed collectively by the public since a PhD is a public 
document via the University of Canterbury Library database. 
 
I understand also that  if I have agreed to participate in an interview I may up until the time I have 
agreed with the transcript of my interview, I may withdraw my interview comments from the 
project. 
 
I note that the project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee Office. 
 
Name (please print): ________________________ 
 
Telephone number: _______________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your support. 
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Appendix I: Nonresponse bias test - Malaysia 
 
Independent Samples Test for Non-response Bias : Malaysia 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
PD1 Equal variances assumed .001 .980 -.696 90 .488 -.254 .365 -.978 .470 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.697 89.997 .488 -.254 .364 -.978 .470 
PD2 Equal variances assumed .703 .404 -1.574 90 .119 -.606 .385 -1.372 .159 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.581 87.025 .117 -.606 .383 -1.369 .156 
PD3 Equal variances assumed .480 .490 -1.288 90 .201 -.471 .366 -1.198 .256 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.284 87.820 .202 -.471 .367 -1.200 .258 
PD4R Equal variances assumed .000 .985 -.461 90 .646 -.126 .274 -.670 .418 
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Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.462 89.928 .646 -.126 .274 -.670 .417 
IND1R Equal variances assumed .791 .376 -1.244 90 .217 -.390 .314 -1.013 .233 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.241 88.088 .218 -.390 .314 -1.015 .234 
IND2 Equal variances assumed .982 .324 1.205 90 .231 .383 .318 -.249 1.015 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.208 89.515 .230 .383 .317 -.247 1.013 
IND3 Equal variances assumed 15.692 .000 1.181 90 .241 .429 .363 -.293 1.151 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.191 79.896 .237 .429 .360 -.288 1.146 
IND4R Equal variances assumed 1.995 .161 .871 90 .386 .235 .270 -.301 .771 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.874 89.369 .385 .235 .269 -.299 .769 
MAS1 Equal variances assumed 1.751 .189 -.548 90 .585 -.188 .342 -.867 .492 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.551 88.533 .583 -.188 .341 -.865 .490 
MAS2 Equal variances assumed .006 .936 -.911 90 .365 -.246 .270 -.783 .291 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.913 89.822 .364 -.246 .270 -.782 .290 
MAS3 Equal variances assumed .010 .920 -1.126 90 .263 -.369 .327 -1.019 .282 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.124 88.509 .264 -.369 .328 -1.021 .283 
MAS4 Equal variances assumed .318 .574 2.001 90 .048 .548 .274 .004 1.092 
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Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
2.001 89.934 .048 .548 .274 .004 1.092 
UAV1 Equal variances assumed 10.566 .002 2.713 90 .008 .624 .230 .167 1.081 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
2.695 80.209 .009 .624 .231 .163 1.085 
UAV2R Equal variances assumed 2.710 .103 -.976 90 .332 -.335 .343 -1.018 .347 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.980 88.535 .330 -.335 .342 -1.015 .345 
UAV3 Equal variances assumed 1.140 .289 1.360 90 .177 .401 .295 -.185 .987 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.355 86.216 .179 .401 .296 -.187 .989 
UAV4R Equal variances assumed 1.025 .314 -.458 90 .648 -.146 .319 -.780 .488 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.459 89.895 .648 -.146 .319 -.779 .487 
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Appendix J: Nonresponse bias test - New Zealand 
 
Independent Samples Test for Non-response Bias : New Zealand 
 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
PD1 Equal variances assumed 1.615 .206 -.961 117 .339 -.281 .293 -.860 .298 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.947 91.279 .346 -.281 .297 -.871 .308 
PD2 Equal variances assumed 4.549 .035 -2.383 117 .019 -.582 .244 -1.067 -.098 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-2.288 83.220 .025 -.582 .255 -1.089 -.076 
PD3 Equal variances assumed 3.490 .064 -.457 117 .648 -.136 .298 -.725 .453 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.442 84.910 .660 -.136 .308 -.749 .477 
PD4R Equal variances assumed 2.842 .094 .748 117 .456 .202 .270 -.332 .736 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.730 87.917 .468 .202 .277 -.348 .752 
IND1R Equal variances assumed 2.600 .110 .582 117 .562 .108 .186 -.260 .476 
444 
 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.619 113.108 .537 .108 .175 -.238 .454 
IND2 Equal variances assumed 4.059 .046 .044 117 .965 .015 .332 -.643 .672 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.042 84.570 .966 .015 .344 -.670 .700 
IND3 Equal variances assumed .255 .615 -.511 117 .610 -.137 .268 -.669 .394 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.507 92.855 .614 -.137 .271 -.675 .401 
IND4R Equal variances assumed 2.699 .103 -.308 117 .758 -.092 .300 -.687 .502 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.298 85.543 .766 -.092 .310 -.709 .524 
MAS1 Equal variances assumed .888 .348 .267 117 .790 .087 .325 -.557 .730 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.263 91.993 .793 .087 .329 -.567 .740 
MAS2 Equal variances assumed 4.824 .030 1.828 117 .070 .412 .225 -.034 .859 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.683 71.720 .097 .412 .245 -.076 .900 
MAS3 Equal variances assumed 3.377 .069 -.274 117 .784 -.058 .212 -.477 .361 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.261 80.725 .795 -.058 .222 -.500 .384 
MAS4 Equal variances assumed .507 .478 .034 117 .973 .009 .255 -.495 .513 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
.034 92.236 .973 .009 .257 -.503 .520 
UAV1 Equal variances assumed .102 .750 -.856 117 .394 -.189 .221 -.627 .249 
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Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.856 95.838 .394 -.189 .221 -.628 .250 
UAV2R Equal variances assumed 1.778 .185 1.069 117 .287 .346 .324 -.295 .988 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.097 103.752 .275 .346 .316 -.280 .972 
UAV3 Equal variances assumed .187 .666 1.028 117 .306 .298 .290 -.276 .873 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.035 98.035 .303 .298 .288 -.274 .870 
UAV4R Equal variances assumed .644 .424 -.398 117 .692 -.100 .251 -.596 .397 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-.390 89.318 .698 -.100 .256 -.608 .409 
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Appendix K: Descriptive statistics - Malaysia 
 
N Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic Std. Error 
PD1 92 1 7 -.920 .251 .140 .498 
PD2 92 1 7 1.077 .251 3.301 .498 
PD3 92 1 7 .052 .251 -.189 .498 
PD4R 92 1 7 .652 .251 .159 .498 
IND1R 92 1 7 1.165 .251 1.110 .498 
IND2 92 1 7 -.130 .251 -.218 .498 
IND3 92 1 7 .550 .251 -.630 .498 
IND4R 92 1 7 .398 .251 .070 .498 
MAS1 92 1 7 .017 .251 -.677 .498 
MAS2 92 2 7 -.155 .251 -.720 .498 
MAS3 92 1 7 .258 .251 -.401 .498 
MAS4 92 1 7 -.469 .251 .385 .498 
UAV1 92 3 7 -.510 .251 -.682 .498 
UAV2R 92 1 7 .149 .251 -.728 .498 
UAV3 92 1 7 -.522 .251 .103 .498 
UAV4R 92 1 7 -.080 .251 -.448 .498 
INO1R 92 1 7 .321 .251 -1.073 .498 
INO2 92 1 7 .291 .251 -.982 .498 
INO3R 92 1 7 .418 .251 -1.014 .498 
ATO1R 92 1 7 .314 .251 -.760 .498 
ATO2 92 1 7 -.148 .251 -1.071 .498 
ATO3 92 1 7 .345 .251 -.654 .498 
SNO1R 92 1 7 .095 .251 -.943 .498 
SNO2 92 1 7 -.171 .251 -.617 .498 
SNO3 92 1 7 .126 .251 -.473 .498 
PBO1 92 1 7 -.103 .251 -.842 .498 
PBO2 92 1 7 .288 .251 -.980 .498 
PBO3 92 1 7 .557 .251 -.113 .498 
MEO1 92 1 7 -.055 .251 -.902 .498 
MEO2 92 1 7 -.496 .251 -.179 .498 
MEO3 92 2 7 -.325 .251 -.703 .498 
MEO4 92 1 7 -.218 .251 -.860 .498 
REO1 92 1 7 .046 .251 -.646 .498 
REO2 92 1 7 -.104 .251 -.798 .498 
EGO1R 92 1 7 .096 .251 -.402 .498 
      
447 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
EGO2 92 1 7 .138 .251 -.853 .498 
UTO2R 92 1 7 .025 .251 -.520 .498 
COO1R 92 1 7 .003 .251 -.225 .498 
COO2R 92 1 7 -.016 .251 -.156 .498 
PEERO 92 1 7 .113 .251 -.752 .498 
SELFO 92 1 7 -.187 .251 -.764 .498 
INU1R 92 1 7 .414 .251 -.845 .498 
INU2 92 1 7 .150 .251 -.881 .498 
INU3R 92 1 7 .441 .251 -.661 .498 
ATU1R 92 1 6 .364 .251 -.603 .498 
ATU2 92 1 7 -.103 .251 -.606 .498 
ATU3 92 1 7 .222 .251 -.248 .498 
SNU1R 92 1 7 .266 .251 -.748 .498 
SNU2 92 1 7 .047 .251 -.835 .498 
SNU3 92 1 7 .178 .251 -.349 .498 
PBU1 92 1 7 .357 .251 -.716 .498 
PBU2 92 1 7 .774 .251 -.046 .498 
PBU3 92 1 7 .296 .251 -.432 .498 
MEU1 92 1 7 -.432 .251 -.294 .498 
MEU2 92 1 7 -.468 .251 -.045 .498 
MEU3 92 1 7 -.588 .251 -.016 .498 
MEU4 92 1 7 -.097 .251 -.780 .498 
REU1 92 1 7 .030 .251 -.615 .498 
REU2 92 1 7 -.012 .251 -.831 .498 
EGU1R 92 1 7 .056 .251 -.024 .498 
EGU2 92 1 7 .061 .251 -.441 .498 
UTU1 92 1 7 .123 .251 -.339 .498 
UTU2R 92 1 7 .071 .251 -.454 .498 
COU1R 92 1 7 .120 .251 -.736 .498 
COU2R 92 1 7 .062 .251 -.446 .498 
PEERU 92 1 7 -.018 .251 -.811 .498 
SELFU 92 1 7 -.457 .251 -.560 .498 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
92 
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Appendix L: Descriptive statistics – New Zealand 
 
N Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
PD1 119 1 7 -.646 .222 -.110 .440 
PD2 119 1 6 .695 .222 .005 .440 
PD3 119 1 7 -.148 .222 -.562 .440 
PD4R 119 1 7 .088 .222 -.232 .440 
IND1R 119 1 6 .957 .222 1.658 .440 
IND2 119 1 7 -.240 .222 -1.149 .440 
IND3 119 1 7 1.175 .222 1.112 .440 
IND4R 119 1 7 -.222 .222 -.911 .440 
MAS1 119 1 7 .371 .222 -.938 .440 
MAS2 119 1 7 -1.298 .222 1.534 .440 
MAS3 119 1 5 .421 .222 -.575 .440 
MAS4 119 2 7 -.751 .222 -.515 .440 
UAV1 119 2 7 -1.400 .222 1.737 .440 
UAV2R 119 1 7 .206 .222 -1.284 .440 
UAV3 119 1 7 -.045 .222 -.968 .440 
UAV4R 119 2 7 -.138 .222 -1.026 .440 
INO1R 119 1 7 1.705 .222 1.806 .440 
INO2 119 1 7 .996 .222 -.236 .440 
INO3R 119 1 7 1.658 .222 2.062 .440 
ATO1R 119 1 7 1.999 .222 4.454 .440 
ATO2 119 1 7 .630 .222 -.595 .440 
ATO3 119 1 7 .948 .222 .122 .440 
SNO1R 119 1 6 1.229 .222 .463 .440 
SNO2 119 1 7 .487 .222 -1.023 .440 
SNO3 119 1 7 .569 .222 -.915 .440 
PBO1 119 1 7 -.273 .222 -1.558 .440 
PBO2 119 1 7 1.349 .222 .708 .440 
PBO3 119 1 7 1.336 .222 1.652 .440 
MEO1 119 1 7 -1.463 .222 2.014 .440 
MEO2 119 1 7 -1.191 .222 .872 .440 
MEO3 119 1 7 -2.033 .222 5.638 .440 
MEO4 119 2 7 -1.145 .222 .335 .440 
REO1 119 1 7 -.423 .222 -1.049 .440 
REO2 119 1 7 -.229 .222 -1.105 .440 
EGO1R 119 1 7 .901 .222 -.285 .440 
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 N Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
EGO2 119 1 7 .518 .222 -.930 .440 
UTO1 119 1 7 -.077 .222 -.510 .440 
UTO2R 119 1 7 -.258 .222 -.507 .440 
COO1R 119 1 7 -.705 .222 -.427 .440 
COO2R 119 1 7 -.637 .222 -.183 .440 
PEERO 119 1 7 -.118 .222 -1.189 .440 
SELFO 119 1 7 -.943 .222 -.567 .440 
INU1R 119 1 7 3.383 .222 12.265 .440 
INU2 119 1 7 1.797 .222 2.034 .440 
INU3R 119 1 7 2.032 .222 3.637 .440 
ATU1R 119 1 5 2.441 .222 7.643 .440 
ATU2 119 1 7 .619 .222 -1.030 .440 
ATU3 119 1 7 1.234 .222 .413 .440 
SNU1R 119 1 7 1.605 .222 1.919 .440 
SNU2 119 1 7 .905 .222 -.392 .440 
SNU3 119 1 7 .998 .222 -.309 .440 
PBU1 119 1 7 -.230 .222 -1.743 .440 
PBU2 119 1 7 1.685 .222 2.234 .440 
PBU3 119 1 7 1.658 .222 2.479 .440 
MEU1 119 1 7 -3.407 .222 11.916 .440 
MEU2 119 1 7 -3.426 .222 13.448 .440 
MEU3 119 4 7 -3.481 .222 11.597 .440 
MEU4 119 2 7 -2.532 .222 6.331 .440 
REU1 119 2 7 -1.012 .222 -.477 .440 
REU2 119 2 7 -.774 .222 -.673 .440 
EGU1R 119 1 7 1.395 .222 .724 .440 
EGU2 119 1 7 .630 .222 -.846 .440 
UTU1 119 1 7 -.353 .222 -.155 .440 
UTU2R 119 1 7 -.234 .222 -.911 .440 
COU1R 119 1 7 -1.023 .222 .167 .440 
COU2R 119 1 7 -.953 .222 .190 .440 
PEERU 119 1 7 -.637 .222 -.840 .440 
SELFU 119 1 7 -1.561 .222 1.094 .440 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
119 
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Appendix M: Common method bias - Malaysia 
 
Common Method Bias Test - Total Variance Explained  
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
 
1 18.183 26.740 26.740 18.183 26.740 26.740 
2 5.226 7.685 34.425    
3 3.600 5.294 39.719    
4 3.386 4.979 44.698    
5 2.928 4.306 49.004    
6 2.517 3.701 52.705    
7 2.408 3.542 56.247    
8 2.146 3.156 59.403    
9 2.019 2.969 62.373    
10 1.770 2.603 64.976    
11 1.659 2.440 67.416    
12 1.548 2.276 69.692    
13 1.466 2.155 71.847    
14 1.303 1.916 73.763    
15 1.252 1.841 75.604    
16 1.165 1.713 77.317    
17 1.150 1.691 79.008    
18 1.036 1.523 80.532    
19 .972 1.429 81.960    
20 .858 1.261 83.222    
21 .827 1.216 84.437    
22 .763 1.123 85.560    
23 .707 1.039 86.599    
24 .676 .994 87.593    
25 .648 .953 88.546    
26 .537 .790 89.336    
27 .531 .781 90.117    
28 .495 .727 90.845    
29 .457 .672 91.517    
30 .444 .653 92.170    
31 .423 .622 92.792    
32 .389 .572 93.364    
33 .351 .517 93.881    
34 .343 .505 94.385    
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35 .334 .491 94.876    
36 .310 .455 95.332    
37 .252 .370 95.702    
38 .237 .349 96.051    
39 .227 .335 96.386    
40 .216 .318 96.703    
41 .207 .305 97.008    
42 .203 .299 97.307    
43 .188 .276 97.583    
44 .166 .245 97.828    
45 .157 .231 98.060    
46 .145 .214 98.273    
47 .132 .194 98.467    
48 .128 .188 98.655    
49 .112 .164 98.820    
50 .105 .155 98.974    
51 .097 .142 99.117    
52 .088 .130 99.247    
53 .075 .111 99.358    
54 .072 .106 99.463    
55 .059 .086 99.550    
56 .053 .079 99.628    
57 .048 .071 99.699    
58 .039 .058 99.756    
59 .034 .050 99.807    
60 .029 .043 99.849    
61 .026 .038 99.887    
62 .021 .031 99.919    
63 .018 .026 99.945    
64 .011 .016 99.961    
65 .010 .014 99.975    
66 .008 .011 99.986    
67 .005 .008 99.994    
68 .004 .006 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Appendix N: Common method bias – New Zealand 
 
Common Method Bias Test - Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
 
1 13.919 20.468 20.468 13.919 20.468 20.468 
2 4.493 6.608 27.076    
3 3.767 5.540 32.616    
4 3.077 4.525 37.141    
5 2.864 4.212 41.353    
6 2.551 3.752 45.105    
7 2.501 3.678 48.783    
8 2.293 3.373 52.155    
9 2.224 3.271 55.426    
10 2.108 3.100 58.526    
11 1.724 2.535 61.061    
12 1.599 2.352 63.413    
13 1.526 2.244 65.657    
14 1.448 2.129 67.786    
15 1.343 1.975 69.761    
16 1.226 1.803 71.564    
17 1.175 1.728 73.292    
18 1.128 1.658 74.950    
19 1.086 1.598 76.548    
20 1.012 1.488 78.036    
21 .960 1.412 79.448    
22 .917 1.349 80.797    
23 .869 1.277 82.074    
24 .856 1.259 83.333    
25 .732 1.076 84.409    
26 .692 1.017 85.426    
27 .666 .980 86.405    
28 .626 .920 87.326    
29 .615 .905 88.230    
30 .541 .796 89.027    
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31 .519 .763 89.790    
32 .489 .719 90.509    
33 .475 .699 91.208    
34 .449 .660 91.868    
35 .413 .607 92.475    
36 .354 .520 92.995    
37 .349 .514 93.509    
38 .338 .497 94.006    
39 .326 .479 94.485    
40 .307 .451 94.936    
41 .277 .407 95.343    
42 .247 .364 95.707    
43 .243 .358 96.064    
44 .233 .342 96.407    
45 .229 .337 96.744    
46 .213 .313 97.057    
47 .198 .292 97.349    
48 .183 .269 97.617    
49 .171 .251 97.869    
50 .165 .243 98.111    
51 .147 .215 98.327    
52 .140 .205 98.532    
53 .127 .187 98.720    
54 .109 .160 98.880    
55 .103 .151 99.031    
56 .099 .145 99.176    
57 .088 .129 99.305    
58 .083 .122 99.427    
59 .073 .108 99.536    
60 .062 .092 99.627    
61 .055 .081 99.708    
62 .052 .076 99.784    
63 .042 .061 99.845    
64 .031 .046 99.891    
65 .027 .040 99.931    
66 .022 .032 99.963    
67 .017 .025 99.988    
68 .008 .012 100.000    
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Appendix O: Social desirability bias tests - Malaysia  
 
 
Paired Samples Test (Overstating tax expenses) – Malaysia 
 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 PEERO - SELFO -.848 1.575 .164 -1.174 -.522 -5.162 91 .000 
 
 
Paired Samples Test (Understating income scenario) – Malaysia 
 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 PEERU - SELFU -.761 1.550 .162 -1.082 -.440 -4.707 91 .000 
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Appendix P: Social desirability bias tests – New Zealand 
 
 
Paired Samples Test (Overstating tax expenses) – New Zealand 
 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 PEERO - SELFO -.983 1.647 .151 -1.282 -.684 -6.513 118 .000 
 
 
 
 
Paired Samples Test (Understating income expenses) – New Zealand 
 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 PEERU - SELFU -.899 1.607 .147 -1.191 -.607 -6.103 118 .000 
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Appendix Q: Independent samples test for overall perceptions between Malaysia and New Zealand tax agents 
 
Independent Samples Test – Comparison between Tax Agents from Malaysia and New Zealand on Culture, Theory of Planned Behaviour 
and Ethical Sensitivity 
 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
PD Equal variances assumed .368 .545 -.390 209 .697 -.054 .139 -.328 .220 
Equal variances not assumed   -.388 191.812 .698 -.054 .140 -.329 .221 
IND Equal variances assumed 2.566 .111 .971 209 .333 .121 .125 -.125 .367 
Equal variances not assumed   .990 206.461 .323 .121 .122 -.120 .362 
MAS Equal variances assumed .011 .916 -3.536 209 .000 -.401 .113 -.625 -.178 
Equal variances not assumed   -3.529 194.169 .001 -.401 .114 -.626 -.177 
UAV Equal variances assumed 3.219 .074 1.373 209 .171 .165 .120 -.072 .403 
Equal variances not assumed   1.393 204.877 .165 .165 .119 -.069 .399 
INO Equal variances assumed 8.312 .004 -4.566 209 .000 -.925 .202 -1.324 -.525 
Equal variances not assumed   -4.475 178.739 .000 -.925 .207 -1.332 -.517 
ATO Equal variances assumed 4.496 .035 -4.812 209 .000 -.908 .189 -1.280 -.536 
Equal variances not assumed   -4.687 173.006 .000 -.908 .194 -1.291 -.526 
SNO Equal variances assumed 11.478 .001 -5.939 209 .000 -1.067 .180 -1.421 -.713 
Equal variances not assumed   -6.092 208.319 .000 -1.067 .175 -1.412 -.722 
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PBO Equal variances assumed 1.906 .169 -4.607 209 .000 -.785 .170 -1.121 -.449 
Equal variances not assumed   -4.679 205.137 .000 -.785 .168 -1.116 -.454 
MEO Equal variances assumed 6.220 .013 6.464 209 .000 1.126 .174 .782 1.469 
Equal variances not assumed   6.272 169.132 .000 1.126 .179 .771 1.480 
REO Equal variances assumed 2.955 .087 2.630 209 .009 .602 .229 .151 1.053 
Equal variances not assumed   2.646 200.043 .009 .602 .227 .153 1.050 
EGO Equal variances assumed 5.798 .017 -4.658 209 .000 -.833 .179 -1.186 -.480 
Equal variances not assumed   -4.658 202.866 .000 -.133 .177 -1.182 -.484 
UTO Equal variances assumed 1.045 .308 1.735 209 .084 .319 .184 -.044 .682 
Equal variances not assumed   1.749 201.418 .082 .319 .183 -.041 .679 
COO Equal variances assumed 4.351 .038 1.576 209 .116 .360 .228 -.090 .810 
Equal variances not assumed   1.614 207.935 .108 .360 .223 -.080 .799 
INU Equal variances assumed 12.345 .001 -7.944 209 .000 -1.434 .181 -1.790 -1.078 
Equal variances not assumed   -7.694 167.501 .000 -1.434 .186 -1.802 -1.066 
ATU Equal variances assumed .027 .870 -5.285 209 .000 -.907 .172 -1.245 -.569 
Equal variances not assumed   -5.258 191.811 .000 -.907 .172 -1.247 -.567 
SNU Equal variances assumed 13.976 .000 -7.249 209 .000 -1.324 .183 -1.684 -.964 
Equal variances not assumed   -7.436 208.289 .000 -1.324 .178 -1.675 -.973 
PBU Equal variances assumed .005 .942 -2.017 209 .045 -.391 .194 -.774 -.009 
Equal variances not assumed   -1.994 186.411 .048 -.391 .196 -.779 -.004 
MEU Equal variances assumed 51.304 .000 10.455 209 .000 1.524 .146 1.237 1.812 
Equal variances not assumed   9.780 134.816 .000 1.524 .156 1.216 1.832 
REU Equal variances assumed 1.832 .177 5.162 209 .000 1.107 .214 .684 1.530 
Equal variances not assumed   5.184 198.814 .000 1.107 .214 .686 1.528 
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EGU Equal variances assumed 35.676 .000 -7.348 209 .000 -1.326 .181 -1.682 -.971 
Equal variances not assumed   -7.643 208.337 .000 -1.326 .174 -1.669 -.984 
UTU Equal variances assumed 5.709 .018 3.013 209 .003 .550 .183 .190 .910 
Equal variances not assumed   3.061 205.312 .002 .550 .180 .196 .904 
COU Equal variances assumed 3.392 .067 2.932 209 .004 .665 .227 .218 1.112 
Equal variances not assumed   2.997 207.404 .003 .665 .222 .227 1.102 
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Appendix R: Extracts of SmartPLS results   
1. PLS algorithm for overstating tax expense scenario (revised model) – 
Malaysia 
2. Bootstrapping for overstating tax expense scenario (revised model)  – 
Malaysia 
3. PLS algorithm for overstating tax expense scenario (revised model) – New 
Zealand 
4. Bootstrapping for overstating tax expense scenario (revised model)  – New 
Zealand 
5. PLS algorithm for understating income scenario (revised model) – Malaysia 
6. Bootstrapping for understating income scenario (revised model) – Malaysia 
7. PLS algorithm for understating income scenario (revised model) – New 
Zealand 
8. Bootstrapping for understating income scenario (revised model) – New 
Zealand 
9. PLS algorithm for second order factor and structural models for overstating 
tax expense scenario – Malaysia 
10. Bootstrapping for second order factor and structural models for overstating 
tax expense scenario – Malaysia 
11. PLS algorithm for second order factor and structural models for overstating 
tax expense scenario – New Zealand 
12. Bootstrapping for second order factor and structural models for overstating 
tax expense scenario – New Zealand 
13. PLS algorithm for second order factor and structural models for 
understating income scenario – Malaysia 
14. Bootstrapping for second order factor and structural models for understating 
income scenario – Malaysia 
15. PLS algorithm for second order factor and structural models for 
understating income scenario – New Zealand 
16. Bootstrapping for second order factor and structural models for understating 
income scenario – New Zealand  
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
 
AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATO 0.831852 0.936874   0.899142 0.831852   
COO 0.977573 0.988659   0.977064 0.977573   
EGO 0.518203 0.680212   0.071925 0.518203   
IND 0.469939 0.639064   -0.128288 0.469939   
INO 0.814119 0.929273 0.797143 0.885818 0.814119 0.584440 
MAS 0.608104 0.755497   0.359538 0.608104   
MEO 0.789087 0.937197   0.909926 0.789087   
PBO 0.539955 0.673440   0.203867 0.539955   
PD 0.554380 0.782706   0.628208 0.554380   
REO 0.901219 0.948043   0.890406 0.901219   
SNO 0.630956 0.766831   0.466314 0.630956   
UAV 0.528282 0.690551   0.107917 0.528282   
UTO 0.616493 0.762631   0.378590 0.616493   
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Latent Variable Correlations  
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO 1.000000                         
COO -0.276721 1.000000                       
EGO -0.238661 0.166970 1.000000                     
IND 0.301539 -0.094764 0.138585 1.000000                   
INO 0.865590 -0.322379 -0.275835 0.259234 1.000000                 
MAS -0.181255 0.179226 -0.063334 -0.301364 -0.249162 1.000000               
MEO -0.806090 0.413296 0.272274 -0.225227 -0.775977 0.221933 1.000000             
PBO -0.304107 0.158895 0.107383 0.086630 -0.250828 -0.082570 0.366329 1.000000           
PD 0.295825 -0.165822 -0.200692 0.046991 0.274015 0.080267 -0.351399 -0.208647 1.000000         
REO -0.489186 0.104688 0.200750 -0.020287 -0.498893 0.202641 0.620882 0.369404 -0.120217 1.000000       
SNO 0.669349 -0.306927 -0.200770 0.165731 0.673164 -0.289296 -0.647403 -0.311092 0.349611 -0.565837 1.000000     
UAV -0.165336 0.177104 0.041411 -0.344042 -0.184592 0.230442 0.159848 0.024873 -0.054330 -0.035387 -0.029688 1.000000   
UTO -0.572225 0.416395 0.331365 -0.006047 -0.467756 0.027089 0.600605 0.267793 -0.238907 0.480846 -0.452872 0.010908 1.000000 
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Cross Loadings 
Loadings 
  
 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1R 0.912703 -0.267367 -0.221351 0.362247 0.851415 -0.175044 -0.772481 -0.264083 0.254403 -0.456167 0.602745 -0.340046 -0.474921 
ATO2 0.907171 -0.176580 -0.217096 0.214911 0.758504 -0.184554 -0.692581 -0.236994 0.272157 -0.405329 0.633415 -0.014961 -0.517298 
ATO3 0.916281 -0.312010 -0.214087 0.236822 0.750499 -0.134835 -0.735995 -0.333235 0.284920 -0.476100 0.596103 -0.073385 -0.579864 
COO1
R 
-0.275110 0.989074 0.174188 -0.086473 -0.323606 0.150843 0.405254 0.147371 -0.162140 0.100141 -0.304477 0.170786 0.391611 
COO2
R 
-0.272047 0.988371 0.155700 -0.101147 -0.313731 0.204397 0.412127 0.167144 -0.165822 0.106982 -0.302426 0.179565 0.432425 
EGO1
R 
-0.159755 0.242204 0.639701 -0.007799 -0.174662 -0.112591 0.131879 -0.078034 -0.257408 -0.026014 -0.137873 -0.068646 0.150065 
EGO2 -0.183381 0.024678 0.791953 0.186372 -0.219870 0.007098 0.249226 0.201600 -0.056443 0.281664 -0.151501 0.108371 0.311605 
IND1R 0.208165 0.019948 -0.029860 0.658874 0.171599 -0.085900 -0.068417 0.085461 -0.070662 0.126853 -0.005699 -0.332309 -0.023419 
IND3 0.205578 -0.144387 0.211797 0.711170 0.183616 -0.319609 -0.234920 0.035084 0.128391 -0.145470 0.225237 -0.145957 0.013863 
INO1R 0.792906 -0.295774 -0.318184 0.270623 0.909299 -0.239792 -0.675973 -0.166766 0.231840 -0.403583 0.570925 -0.160307 -0.439635 
INO2 0.776137 -0.248751 -0.184753 0.138159 0.896134 -0.198098 -0.702207 -0.254326 0.224225 -0.466792 0.654534 -0.046252 -0.394351 
INO3R 0.773928 -0.327841 -0.243108 0.292238 0.901376 -0.236349 -0.722374 -0.258220 0.285566 -0.480308 0.597103 -0.292399 -0.431946 
MAS2 -0.136338 0.178384 -0.169394 -0.401517 -0.173240 0.726757 0.143816 0.016266 0.003998 0.174328 -0.276336 0.136634 0.033974 
MAS4 -0.146598 0.109527 0.047779 -0.101578 -0.213049 0.829477 0.198298 -0.130512 0.110762 0.146085 -0.186226 0.216225 0.010852 
MEO1 -0.763383 0.382121 0.266578 -0.190911 -0.729026 0.168654 0.925407 0.377399 -0.366801 0.542102 -0.577313 0.142819 0.538463 
MEO2 -0.749887 0.399775 0.300522 -0.182863 -0.724116 0.221090 0.910487 0.385693 -0.304442 0.533848 -0.610167 0.178143 0.547240 
MEO3 -0.717080 0.415082 0.155883 -0.226651 -0.672773 0.251308 0.906246 0.313718 -0.350192 0.474928 -0.560222 0.142438 0.544606 
MEO4 -0.625405 0.262720 0.239258 -0.203431 -0.625111 0.145673 0.806041 0.209743 -0.218510 0.669193 -0.551765 0.099637 0.503541 
PBO1 -0.300199 0.140038 0.132896 0.058154 -0.244192 -0.085153 0.291984 0.944853 -0.162031 0.266128 -0.250211 -0.008460 0.230956 
PBO2 -0.096154 0.096532 -0.040080 0.102720 -0.088702 -0.016077 0.307536 0.432622 -0.186921 0.388045 -0.254959 0.098748 0.176605 
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PD1 0.114220 -0.165487 -0.026122 -0.126605 0.099636 -0.116244 -0.149250 0.100875 0.540008 -0.061868 0.272957 -0.050589 -0.114731 
PD2 0.147674 -0.213110 -0.059473 -0.004866 0.178310 0.070369 -0.177868 -0.130564 0.788459 -0.078719 0.245879 -0.035841 -0.160048 
PD3 0.327192 -0.063748 -0.266382 0.121841 0.278706 0.122027 -0.382237 -0.278736 0.865946 -0.115471 0.291706 -0.043927 -0.230104 
REO1 -0.468935 0.091513 0.218634 -0.036062 -0.478924 0.261259 0.600748 0.346177 -0.041573 0.950504 -0.529107 0.029503 0.449753 
REO2 -0.459767 0.107437 0.161882 -0.002072 -0.468192 0.121911 0.577846 0.355306 -0.188343 0.948146 -0.545419 -0.098138 0.463373 
SNO1R 0.684970 -0.197945 -0.189135 0.211654 0.679140 -0.313162 -0.610265 -0.312842 0.387733 -0.581483 0.934282 -0.058698 -0.417962 
SNO2 0.286803 -0.386143 -0.121805 -0.021187 0.309776 -0.086438 -0.391943 -0.145378 0.084113 -0.237099 0.623721 0.049360 -0.293753 
UAV1 -0.112064 0.125720 -0.026454 -0.233966 -0.124713 0.316133 0.114787 -0.087759 0.011061 0.070962 -0.060776 0.681305 0.107734 
UAV3 -0.127759 0.131899 0.079554 -0.265174 -0.142990 0.038570 0.117900 0.110467 -0.083748 -0.110156 0.012517 0.769667 -0.079087 
UTO1 -0.450705 0.133363 0.356425 0.090623 -0.382265 0.081796 0.452938 0.215535 -0.090164 0.534521 -0.367670 0.077623 0.805330 
UTO2R -0.448465 0.537954 0.155926 -0.108463 -0.351536 -0.044515 0.492585 0.204859 -0.293812 0.207442 -0.342994 -0.066516 0.764480 
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Outer Loadings 
 
AT
O 
COO EGO IND INO MAS ME
O 
PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO
1R 
0.91
270
3 
                        
ATO
2 
0.90
717
1 
                        
ATO
3 
0.91
628
1 
                        
COO
1R 
  0.989
074 
                      
COO
2R 
  0.988
371 
                      
EGO
1R 
    0.639
701 
                    
EGO
2 
    0.791
953 
                    
IND1
R 
      0.658
874 
                  
IND3       0.711
170 
                  
INO1
R 
        0.909
299 
                
INO2         0.896
134 
                
INO3
R 
        0.901
376 
                
MAS
2 
          0.726
757 
              
MAS
4 
          0.829
477 
              
MEO
1 
            0.925
407 
            
MEO
2 
            0.910
487 
            
MEO
3 
            0.906
246 
            
MEO
4 
            0.806
041 
            
PBO
1 
              0.944
853 
          
PBO
2 
              0.432
622 
          
PD1                 0.540
008 
        
PD2                 0.788
459 
        
PD3                 0.865
946 
        
REO
1 
                  0.950
504 
      
REO
2 
                  0.948
146 
      
SNO
1R 
                    0.934
282 
    
SNO
2 
                    0.623
721 
    
UAV
1 
                      0.681
305 
  
UAV
3 
                      0.769
667 
  
UTO
1 
                        0.805
330 UTO
2R 
                        
 
466 
 
 
Outer Model (Weights or Loadings) 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO
1R 
0.91
2703 
                        
ATO
2 
0.90
7171 
                        
ATO
3 
0.91
6281 
                        
COO
1R 
  0.9890
74 
                      
COO
2R 
  0.9883
71 
                      
EGO
1R 
    0.63
9701 
                    
EGO
2 
    0.79
1953 
                    
IND1
R 
      0.65
8874 
                  
IND3       0.71
1170 
                  
INO1
R 
        0.90
9299 
                
INO2         0.89
6134 
                
INO3
R 
        0.90
1376 
                
MAS
2 
          0.72
6757 
              
MAS
4 
          0.82
9477 
              
MEO
1 
            0.9254
07 
            
MEO
2 
            0.9104
87 
            
MEO
3 
            0.9062
46 
            
MEO
4 
            0.8060
41 
            
PBO1               0.94
4853 
          
PBO2               0.43
2622 
          
PD1                 0.54
0008 
        
PD2                 0.78
8459 
        
PD3                 0.86
5946 
        
REO
1 
                  0.95
0504 
      
REO
2 
                  0.94
8146 
      
SNO1
R 
                    0.93
4282 
    
SNO2                     0.62
3721 
    
UAV
1 
                      0.68
1305 
  
UAV
3 
                      0.76
9667 
  
UTO
1 
                        0.80
5330 
UTO
2R 
                        0.76
4480 
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Outer Model T-
Statistic 
         
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1
R 
46.46
3277 
               
ATO2 34.41
2794 
               
ATO3 32.54
0838 
               
COO
1R 
  211.1
5510
0 
             
COO
2R 
  222.2
9199
1 
             
EGO1
R 
    2.371
267 
           
EGO2     3.350
298 
           
IND1
R 
      2.346
458 
         
IND3       2.597
531 
         
INO1
R 
        35.7
953
52 
        
INO2         36.7
665
27 
        
INO3
R 
        40.7
107
89 
        
MAS2          3.72
667 
       
MAS4          4.26
2341 
       
MEO
1 
          42.90
1335 
      
MEO
2 
          26.05
1300 
      
MEO
3 
          39.98
5792 
      
MEO
4 
          12.87
2314 
      
PBO1            5.28
8199 
     
PBO2            1.66
3227 
     
PD1             2.45
7614 
    
PD2             4.70
6874 
    
PD3             6.79
7728 
    
REO1              46.53
7923 
   
REO2              59.32
9492 
   
SNO1
R 
              28.66
8461 
  
SNO2               4.276
856 
  
UAV1                2.39
6103 
 
UAV3                2.76
7635 
 
UTO1                 6.87
5372 UTO2
R 
                5.16
4239  
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PLS Quality  Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATO 0.687059 0.868043   0.775300 0.687059   
COO 0.949898 0.974305   0.947444 0.949898   
EGO 0.485432 0.636767   -0.069556 0.485432   
IND 0.713614 0.831379   0.622944 0.713614   
INO 0.722758 0.886044 0.745807 0.807445 0.722757 0.417913 
MAS 0.641250 0.771578   0.532766 0.641250   
MEO 0.718726 0.910133   0.867695 0.718726   
PBO 0.475977 0.503133   0.438183 0.475978   
PD 0.600182 0.817993   0.675866 0.600182   
REO 0.931223 0.964387   0.926143 0.931223   
SNO 0.689191 0.815797   0.551445 0.689191   
UAV 0.595052 0.745583   0.321737 0.595052   
UTO 0.634283 0.776187   0.423647 0.634283   
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Latent Variable 
Correlations  
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO 1.000000                         
COO -0.261291 1.000000                       
EGO 0.103854 -0.070961 1.000000                     
IND 0.331547 -0.158583 0.139925 1.000000                   
INO 0.821721 -0.246851 0.195719 0.339258 1.000000                 
MAS -0.317956 0.124552 -0.133332 -0.300321 -0.350056 1.000000               
MEO -0.785257 0.295974 -0.163958 -0.282416 -0.774739 0.242410 1.000000             
PBO -0.288226 0.157849 0.106515 -0.139295 -0.182779 0.056011 0.168400 1.000000           
PD 0.189749 -0.076693 0.095832 0.041301 0.208951 -0.093231 -0.228329 0.136153 1.000000         
REO -0.539641 0.241380 -0.052805 -0.239093 -0.463534 0.175257 0.486479 0.228944 0.032050 1.000000       
SNO 0.645428 -0.249835 0.124355 0.279511 0.610603 -0.145762 -0.626207 -0.265631 0.124721 -0.541913 1.000000     
UAV -0.116196 0.078260 -0.219022 -0.230497 -0.199649 0.071085 0.200516 0.033824 0.150365 0.134348 0.039977 1.000000   
UTO -0.411622 0.172597 0.197273 -0.269917 -0.328961 0.227664 0.376534 0.169136 -0.210673 0.309956 -0.270702 0.089242 1.000000 
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Cross Loadings 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1R 0.835452 -0.292826 0.122363 0.288390 0.747731 -0.209934 -0.739177 -0.257092 0.244638 -0.473050 0.604521 0.019063 -0.281874 
ATO2 0.789482 -0.116791 0.006518 0.139771 0.521199 -0.188297 -0.490150 -0.300153 -0.017164 -0.447632 0.495464 -0.047402 -0.326350 
ATO3 0.860184 -0.212399 0.106639 0.360094 0.734986 -0.374649 -0.682934 -0.179866 0.194014 -0.426286 0.498750 -0.249541 -0.416182 
COO1R -0.271941 0.977701 -0.077337 -0.150174 -0.254179 0.112228 0.315096 0.173283 -0.121808 0.214396 -0.270194 0.022213 0.167483 
COO2R -0.235272 0.971543 -0.059964 -0.159565 -0.225352 0.131775 0.258538 0.131979 -0.021696 0.258876 -0.213478 0.137282 0.169113 
EGO1R 0.091741 -0.041283 0.486118 0.117092 0.097927 0.017192 -0.149763 0.001054 -0.076645 -0.302855 0.172947 -0.210583 -0.023408 
EGO2 0.064686 -0.056816 0.857062 0.090993 0.166102 -0.162622 -0.099218 0.121196 0.154787 0.118161 0.040256 -0.126335 0.239413 
IND1R 0.228362 -0.171612 0.000877 0.753005 0.197498 -0.105970 -0.186034 -0.207945 -0.008430 -0.214999 0.335478 -0.058720 -0.250352 
IND3 0.319602 -0.117423 0.189146 0.927476 0.347589 -0.346822 -0.277063 -0.070637 0.060766 -0.201888 0.188213 -0.279035 -0.223578 
INO1R 0.757749 -0.219232 0.215059 0.353292 0.907754 -0.358680 -0.727305 -0.164378 0.276780 -0.361140 0.509464 -0.210128 -0.275530 
INO2 0.567714 -0.278373 0.127257 0.178889 0.757576 -0.301581 -0.489571 -0.127107 0.105549 -0.399906 0.528290 0.005487 -0.246664 
INO3R 0.749628 -0.153958 0.148811 0.308931 0.877686 -0.238110 -0.727344 -0.170429 0.132705 -0.432184 0.533414 -0.261580 -0.314407 
MAS2 -0.068448 0.155626 -0.119943 -0.236520 -0.116838 0.590390 0.053262 -0.019911 -0.096537 0.043979 -0.021736 0.011427 0.031354 
MAS4 -0.345256 0.094226 -0.115725 -0.271375 -0.366902 0.966406 0.262880 0.071001 -0.076886 0.188314 -0.161347 0.078422 0.252834 
MEO1 -0.738289 0.260260 -0.188111 -0.310298 -0.752152 0.308819 0.899985 0.117660 -0.260336 0.368615 -0.512266 0.272942 0.332070 
MEO2 -0.791712 0.288532 -0.125374 -0.205090 -0.759190 0.241793 0.941281 0.181123 -0.263067 0.502116 -0.603489 0.137749 0.378586 
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MEO3 -0.520029 0.257189 -0.218431 -0.282359 -0.525412 0.169510 0.797749 0.142267 -0.085330 0.308042 -0.436052 0.242586 0.293658 
MEO4 -0.564112 0.192147 -0.020162 -0.159920 -0.542334 0.056888 0.736557 0.131716 -0.118520 0.469975 -0.574249 0.010768 0.259464 
PBO1 -0.282402 0.141084 0.161800 -0.109199 -0.167132 0.034986 0.146759 0.974067 0.135580 0.232181 -0.260329 0.025894 0.199701 
PBO2 -0.023460 -0.047060 0.262120 0.109046 0.037875 -0.083228 -0.066773 0.056110 0.020690 0.053327 -0.021905 -0.029223 0.163722 
PD1 0.105493 0.010038 0.063513 -0.073339 0.143209 -0.064574 -0.177747 0.219713 0.762299 0.186860 -0.007863 0.104958 -0.184623 
PD2 0.191933 -0.149919 0.051695 0.127864 0.192784 -0.145509 -0.171694 0.000402 0.738277 -0.114143 0.182587 0.074963 -0.118284 
PD3 0.122855 -0.001548 0.116566 0.005664 0.133096 0.027513 -0.179011 0.132095 0.821214 0.051156 0.082086 0.186096 -0.201111 
REO1 -0.543322 0.249143 -0.050375 -0.287050 -0.446409 0.180248 0.472395 0.194975 0.013646 0.964856 -0.514746 0.157154 0.318349 
REO2 -0.498275 0.216786 -0.051536 -0.174624 -0.448208 0.158043 0.466521 0.246782 0.048142 0.965142 -0.531111 0.102248 0.279943 
SNO1R 0.586981 -0.189773 0.103835 0.305315 0.546195 -0.189209 -0.491904 -0.293043 0.110876 -0.518285 0.860218 0.003355 -0.308682 
SNO2 0.478233 -0.229265 0.103060 0.146828 0.463177 -0.041202 -0.555495 -0.136129 0.095422 -0.371527 0.799005 0.068539 -0.126883 
UAV1 -0.091563 -0.024470 -0.169264 -0.219810 -0.165567 0.053739 0.153519 -0.039213 0.035908 0.110990 0.081084 0.811428 0.061873 
UAV3 -0.087914 0.160072 -0.169606 -0.129691 -0.141401 0.056448 0.156966 0.102713 0.210459 0.095650 -0.027808 0.729170 0.077413 
UTO1 -0.310360 0.057491 0.339624 -0.114978 -0.268311 0.114364 0.265820 0.129525 -0.203085 0.313889 -0.200185 -0.001759 0.807578 
UTO2R -0.346329 0.221512 -0.034483 -0.320084 -0.255485 0.251721 0.335798 0.140209 -0.130795 0.176579 -0.231882 0.147599 0.785101 
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Outer Loadings 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1R 0.835452                         
ATO2 0.789482                         
ATO3 0.860184                         
COO1R   0.977701                       
COO2R   0.971543                       
EGO1R     0.486118                     
EGO2     0.857062                     
IND1R       0.753005                   
IND3       0.927476                   
INO1R         0.907754                 
INO2         0.757576                 
INO3R         0.877686                 
MAS2           0.966390               
MAS4           0.811406               
MEO1             0.899985             
MEO2             0.941281             
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MEO3             0.797749             
MEO4             0.736557             
PBO1               0.974067           
PBO2               0.056110           
PD1                 0.762299         
PD2                 0.738277         
PD3                 0.821214         
REO1                   0.964856       
REO2                   0.965142       
SNO1R                     0.860218     
SNO2                     0.799005     
UAV1                       0.808428   
UAV3                       0.785170   
UTO1                         0.807578 
UTO2R                         0.785101 
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Outer Model T-Statistic 
  ATO COO EGO IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO1R 32.254885                         
ATO2 14.536983                         
ATO3 30.081746                         
COO1R   19.572455                       
COO2R   15.270520                       
EGO1R     1.710375                     
EGO2     3.518439                     
IND1R       4.66881
4 
                  
IND3       15.0466
4 
                  
INO1R         45.414151                 
INO2         12.108791                 
INO3R         26.640641                 
MAS2           17.50946               
MAS4           2.825574               
MEO1             26.594639             
MEO2             70.899124             
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MEO3             8.754612             
MEO4             10.09949             
PBO1               3.94922
5 
          
PBO2               0.24010
4 
          
PD1                 3.346791         
PD2                 3.201792         
PD3                 4.158887         
REO1                   104.287784       
REO2                   89.637769       
SNO1R                     22.455078     
SNO2                     13.244797     
UAV1                       2.825480   
UAV3                       2.535100   
UTO1                         7.223108 
UTO2R                         5.9158116
2 
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATU 0.729590 0.889980   0.816972 0.729590   
COU 0.962519 0.980902   0.961063 0.962519   
EGU 0.484000 0.516315   -0.283484 0.483999   
IND 0.469862 0.639325   -0.128288 0.469862   
INU 0.720635 0.885254 0.709067 0.805195 0.720635 0.390329 
MAS 0.609574 0.757430   0.359538 0.609574   
MEU 0.800757 0.941245   0.916439 0.800757   
PBU 0.631755 0.756700   0.691391 0.631757   
PD 0.683169 0.806533   0.608215 0.683169   
REU 0.892317 0.943094   0.879404 0.892317   
SNU 0.629776 0.772610   0.413586 0.629776   
UAV 0.484997 0.639180   -0.069912 0.484997   
UTU 0.585830 0.738830   0.293022 0.585830   
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Latent Variable Correlations 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU 1.000000                         
COU -0.461510 1.000000                       
EGU -0.243433 0.286914 1.000000                     
IND 0.217161 -0.165112 -0.181376 1.000000                   
INU 0.797732 -0.397198 -0.255522 0.230136 1.000000                 
MAS -0.261785 0.138264 -0.079206 -0.313585 -0.208268 1.000000               
MEU -0.740645 0.468519 0.285010 -0.213411 -0.734277 0.216081 1.000000             
PBU -0.272096 0.073303 -0.198858 0.246927 -0.206115 -0.058608 0.111856 1.000000           
PD 0.250370 -0.068157 -0.163231 0.094468 0.293829 0.112188 -0.376721 -0.036919 1.000000         
REU -0.471411 0.210965 0.014114 -0.087248 -0.399590 0.193965 0.608355 0.117268 -0.201734 1.000000       
SNU 0.607057 -0.342362 -0.207046 0.028073 0.591191 -0.208416 -0.614173 -0.231483 0.204743 -0.597056 1.000000     
UAV -0.215107 0.270056 -0.081879 -0.334922 -0.230460 0.144794 0.125184 -0.087795 0.031638 0.051214 -0.118032 1.000000   
UTU -0.608015 0.262189 0.263666 -0.050375 -0.505756 0.153405 0.513200 0.311312 -0.166309 0.365656 -0.489082 0.004323 1.000000 
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Cross Loadings 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.826647 -0.383718 -0.245420 0.278065 0.785722 -0.262642 -0.814789 -0.128998 0.276726 -0.585445 0.577146 -0.272925 -0.499259 
ATU2 0.878655 -0.390228 -0.137173 0.096824 0.615152 -0.160621 -0.506207 -0.321707 0.210736 -0.303648 0.430405 -0.136318 -0.539296 
ATU3 0.856383 -0.407859 -0.229040 0.153634 0.606584 -0.234674 -0.518533 -0.273482 0.133436 -0.262264 0.526747 -0.114451 -0.519906 
COU1R -0.465723 0.981450 0.300821 -0.126171 -0.393415 0.147875 0.485794 0.096716 -0.060944 0.213028 -0.363368 0.241349 0.293996 
COU2R -0.439584 0.980711 0.261776 -0.198506 -0.385882 0.123184 0.433009 0.046632 -0.072907 0.200802 -0.307867 0.289008 0.219745 
EGU1R -0.220305 0.321440 0.981512 -0.217239 -0.245113 -0.073098 0.230082 -0.217258 -0.157516 -0.041633 -0.185121 -0.075474 0.227754 
EGU2 -0.113670 -0.188088 0.068070 0.192067 -0.047025 -0.029601 0.278250 0.101536 -0.025171 0.290182 -0.108423 -0.031071 0.179731 
IND1R 0.119013 -0.125719 -0.284627 0.688189 0.158306 -0.084372 -0.110180 0.161638 -0.039477 0.077496 0.002374 -0.298778 -0.042803 
IND3 0.178913 -0.100551 0.037107 0.682730 0.157193 -0.346459 -0.182649 0.176938 0.169725 -0.198080 0.036231 -0.159888 -0.026199 
INU1R 0.758569 -0.270030 -0.235344 0.168117 0.902602 -0.150006 -0.692155 -0.269233 0.296980 -0.394166 0.562189 -0.236240 -0.477848 
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INU2 0.642098 -0.468915 -0.338407 0.181605 0.787798 -0.170093 -0.541836 -0.065811 0.114814 -0.270903 0.456770 -0.103506 -0.381292 
INU3R 0.621960 -0.297083 -0.084389 0.242443 0.852402 -0.216560 -0.625505 -0.167961 0.321927 -0.342176 0.478703 -0.236062 -0.421995 
MAS2 -0.169582 0.116425 -0.061591 -0.389928 -0.161200 0.776437 0.178625 -0.076819 -0.003051 0.184819 -0.247715 0.058362 0.082265 
MAS4 -0.238616 0.099626 -0.062090 -0.102228 -0.163998 0.785043 0.158966 -0.015230 0.176692 0.118637 -0.079188 0.166808 0.156646 
MEU1 -0.701091 0.395122 0.324884 -0.138188 -0.701545 0.203938 0.926539 0.150967 -0.402609 0.479335 -0.526194 0.029145 0.533400 
MEU2 -0.735945 0.445846 0.349946 -0.207497 -0.733758 0.268514 0.954301 0.126273 -0.329309 0.497623 -0.606661 0.108206 0.587629 
MEU3 -0.669371 0.486409 0.170772 -0.244594 -0.648381 0.204803 0.877247 0.079942 -0.352659 0.523283 -0.492504 0.156154 0.332661 
MEU4 -0.517601 0.342031 0.138630 -0.177326 -0.517580 0.063628 0.815047 0.022111 -0.249464 0.740731 -0.587504 0.177653 0.348288 
PBU1 -0.270164 0.065775 -0.202012 0.248077 -0.203874 -0.060498 0.109694 0.999851 -0.036095 0.118031 -0.231676 -0.088785 0.311339 
PBU3 -0.045620 -0.336394 -0.260516 0.185851 0.004096 -0.124564 -0.049314 0.513622 0.021795 0.099037 -0.130208 -0.095048 0.163536 
PD2 0.144460 -0.205300 -0.091915 -0.009482 0.111627 0.067609 -0.180234 -0.085940 0.661791 -0.147036 0.109364 -0.011922 -0.147544 
PD3 0.248816 -0.008481 -0.163028 0.116726 0.312679 0.110465 -0.387638 -0.013614 0.963519 -0.189545 0.206604 0.042215 -0.146861 
REU1 -0.407548 0.170903 -0.030677 -0.039574 -0.367317 0.228226 0.533207 0.097608 -0.132150 0.941626 -0.530165 0.101100 0.296590 
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REU2 -0.481198 0.226239 0.055089 -0.123077 -0.387146 0.140555 0.614093 0.123284 -0.246014 0.947614 -0.596177 -0.001637 0.391778 
SNU1R 0.479438 -0.243058 -0.013147 0.018763 0.496897 -0.144308 -0.588648 -0.189055 0.282200 -0.638315 0.821651 -0.147815 -0.318240 
SNU2 0.485973 -0.304984 -0.335813 0.026328 0.439356 -0.189796 -0.374512 -0.178260 0.027626 -0.289350 0.764488 -0.032742 -0.468463 
UAV1 -0.124810 0.216309 -0.233536 -0.236414 -0.192937 0.309518 0.118662 -0.089417 0.024223 0.109130 -0.105668 0.845221 0.035134 
UAV4R -0.200779 0.155820 0.223906 -0.244668 -0.119504 -0.228918 0.042537 -0.019828 0.020061 -0.080408 -0.050138 0.505564 -0.048639 
UTU1 -0.508104 -0.001438 0.106762 -0.020839 -0.388136 0.199774 0.472336 0.245837 -0.176729 0.462947 -0.436488 -0.044245 0.766839 
UTU2R -0.422413 0.403879 0.297365 -0.056369 -0.386067 0.034617 0.312843 0.230678 -0.077592 0.095817 -0.311864 0.051117 0.763949 
 
485 
 
Outer Loadings 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.826647                         
ATU2 0.878655                         
ATU3 0.856383                         
COU1R   0.981450                       
COU2R   0.980711                       
EGU1R     0.981512                     
EGU2     0.068070                     
IND1R       0.688189                   
IND3       0.682730                   
INU1R         0.902602                 
INU2         0.787798                 
INU3R         0.852402                 
MAS2           0.776437               
MAS4           0.785043               
MEU1             0.926539             
MEU2             0.954301             
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MEU3             0.877247             
MEU4             0.815047             
PBU1               0.999851           
PBU3               0.513622           
PD2                 0.661791         
PD3                 0.963519         
REU1                   0.941626       
REU2                   0.947614       
SNU1R                     0.821651     
SNU2                     0.764488     
UAV1                       0.845221   
UAV4R                       0.505564   
UTU1                         0.766839 
UTU2R                         0.763949 
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Outer Model (Weights or Loadings) 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.826647                         
ATU2 0.878655                         
ATU3 0.856383                         
COU1R   0.981450                       
COU2R   0.980711                       
EGU1R     0.981512                     
EGU2     0.068070                     
IND1R       0.688189                   
IND3       0.682730                   
INU1R         0.902602                 
INU2         0.787798                 
INU3R         0.852402                 
MAS2           0.776437               
MAS4           0.785043               
MEU1             0.926539             
MEU2             0.954301             
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MEU3             0.877247             
MEU4             0.815047             
PBU1               0.999851           
PBU3               0.513622           
PD2                 0.661791         
PD3                 0.963519         
REU1                   0.941626       
REU2                   0.947614       
SNU1R                     0.821651     
SNU2                     0.764488     
UAV1                       0.845221   
UAV4R                       0.505564   
UTU1                         0.766839 
UTU2R                         0.763949 
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Outer Model T-Statistic 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 26.5382                         
ATU2 23.9935                         
ATU3 18.3863                         
COU1R   113.1856                       
COU2R   140.6366                       
EGU1R     4.6876                     
EGU2     0.2536                     
IND1R       2.4109                   
IND3       2.3998                   
INU1R         53.3002                 
INU2         10.4425                 
INU3R         15.6706                 
MAS2           3.4162               
MAS4           3.1964               
MEU1             36.57690             
MEU2             82.51710             
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MEU3             19.8692             
MEU4             13.9111             
PBU1               3.8861           
PBU3               1.9079           
PD2                 3.4968         
PD3                 11.2228         
REU1                   21.6578       
REU2                   56.0294       
SNU1R                     8.78972     
SNU2                     7.1000     
UAV1                       3.4197   
UAV4R                       1.7482   
UTU1                         5.9934 
UTU2R                         5.3213 
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATU 0.544719 0.780392   0.620449 0.544719   
COU 0.970744 0.985155   0.970035 0.970744   
EGU 0.538420 0.685323   0.167169 0.538420   
IND 0.694425 0.815471   0.622944 0.694425   
INU 0.666327 0.856814 0.651200 0.752795 0.666327 0.260471 
MAS 0.641588 0.771928   0.532766 0.641589   
MEU 0.669510 0.889060   0.840028 0.669510   
PBU 0.504910 0.551966   0.245333 0.504910   
PD 0.509211 0.588839   0.498284 0.509212   
REU 0.879828 0.936045   0.866886 0.879828   
SNU 0.690950 0.815819   0.570554 0.690950   
UAV 0.502826 0.594326   0.025466 0.502826   
UTU 0.610020 0.756727   0.366099 0.610020   
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Latent Variable Correlations 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU 1.000000                         
COU -0.233963 1.000000                       
EGU -0.038511 0.047230 1.000000                     
IND 0.243949 -0.137172 0.119422 1.000000                   
INU 0.669602 -0.308039 0.162876 0.336035 1.000000                 
MAS -0.211308 -0.002768 -0.198940 -0.317270 -0.285554 1.000000               
MEU -0.495845 0.320154 -0.203165 -0.296487 -0.618145 0.202915 1.000000             
PBU 0.175785 -0.276756 0.000550 0.146973 0.315702 -0.108624 -0.112267 1.000000           
PD 0.094708 -0.194443 0.093782 0.122286 0.153728 -0.155521 -0.304790 0.052940 1.000000         
REU -0.324339 0.246482 0.038799 -0.263058 -0.238297 0.222997 0.368142 -0.074280 -0.138232 1.000000       
SNU 0.390328 -0.238728 0.030420 0.276476 0.249277 -0.223369 -0.237366 0.064479 0.120397 -0.322523 1.000000     
UAV -0.082699 -0.007165 -0.110806 -0.235103 -0.269848 0.012944 0.139726 -0.208293 -0.045968 0.071202 0.137613 1.000000   
UTU -0.461483 0.126568 0.179856 -0.225794 -0.364343 0.308425 0.207235 -0.058496 -0.168346 0.233679 -0.351977 0.070823 1.000000 
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Cross Loadings 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.791230 -0.324334 -0.019369 0.238532 0.592331 -0.087138 -0.535300 0.185862 0.055965 -0.299112 0.326729 -0.046466 -0.237294 
ATU2 0.630332 -0.059935 -0.194138 0.036933 0.201494 -0.110506 -0.046094 -0.011114 0.127105 -0.255065 0.385404 0.133000 -0.332683 
ATU3 0.781532 -0.062162 0.021382 0.184293 0.537115 -0.261941 -0.329806 0.131533 0.069652 -0.187638 0.233042 -0.154998 -0.485973 
COU1R -0.253944 0.987504 0.048954 -0.145942 -0.324745 0.001608 0.330081 -0.277241 -0.189495 0.247378 -0.238623 -0.021655 0.136406 
COU2R -0.203318 0.983017 0.043734 -0.122635 -0.278871 -0.007776 0.298498 -0.267464 -0.194074 0.237666 -0.231322 0.009935 0.111121 
EGU1R 0.019695 0.063226 0.519778 0.073377 0.077253 -0.056292 -0.199079 -0.000445 0.131697 -0.150478 0.131661 0.009600 0.099816 
EGU2 -0.055028 0.022514 0.898148 0.101441 0.150099 -0.202926 -0.134361 0.000871 0.041537 0.122675 -0.032304 -0.134104 0.158279 
IND1R 0.057310 -0.133025 0.044621 0.683051 0.136694 -0.106015 -0.131610 0.057249 0.159180 -0.269791 0.234288 -0.085066 -0.214852 
IND3 0.276003 -0.116724 0.128792 0.960360 0.358147 -0.346944 -0.311797 0.157613 0.088564 -0.218239 0.248173 -0.254608 -0.193705 
INU1R 0.579826 -0.189762 0.250406 0.360160 0.843001 -0.324021 -0.588631 0.307098 0.097965 -0.137925 0.128243 -0.379914 -0.261268 
INU2 0.492875 -0.377314 0.090411 0.175427 0.777708 -0.192471 -0.407948 0.206950 0.162726 -0.174462 0.249989 -0.109016 -0.368455 
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INU3R 0.560157 -0.214547 0.022810 0.259820 0.826741 -0.156452 -0.492706 0.244600 0.127079 -0.288685 0.258781 -0.121595 -0.279893 
MAS2 0.018099 0.063678 -0.250442 -0.249220 -0.095933 0.591589 0.129153 0.126269 -0.170398 0.014925 -0.022629 0.056435 0.113605 
MAS4 -0.250004 -0.023612 -0.149624 -0.286767 -0.299252 0.966023 0.193100 -0.166012 -0.125106 0.252926 -0.250886 -0.003132 0.320019 
MEU1 -0.407936 0.236324 -0.291320 -0.342799 -0.653925 0.248085 0.858140 -0.161346 -0.218286 0.238807 -0.125392 0.283027 0.201632 
MEU2 -0.330322 0.260383 -0.048252 -0.159847 -0.372600 0.058254 0.819511 -0.035641 -0.253177 0.320237 -0.168111 0.047234 0.117938 
MEU3 -0.516568 0.316415 -0.197106 -0.256026 -0.571849 0.225658 0.903174 -0.084261 -0.329383 0.362854 -0.250595 0.091504 0.180160 
MEU4 -0.336053 0.252765 0.007841 -0.127511 -0.277801 0.020329 0.674028 -0.033524 -0.191349 0.342295 -0.305192 -0.128156 0.167698 
PBU1 -0.224971 0.025854 0.065985 0.094681 -0.011044 -0.033804 0.044475 0.105091 0.080380 0.133302 -0.147766 -0.116015 0.055763 
PBU3 0.167113 -0.274654 0.002869 0.149671 0.313953 -0.109345 -0.110219 0.999388 0.055540 -0.069271 0.059003 -0.211477 -0.056282 
PD2 0.100227 -0.176421 0.087239 0.120171 0.144886 -0.145649 -0.296198 0.037851 0.990029 -0.124574 0.121032 -0.032171 -0.175561 
PD3 0.063522 0.073934 -0.020697 0.017686 -0.020811 0.027509 -0.020964 -0.091018 0.195616 0.058448 0.036329 0.083876 -0.094847 
REU1 -0.351732 0.238206 0.042441 -0.273100 -0.254060 0.223398 0.352326 -0.084525 -0.132574 0.958116 -0.287305 0.070017 0.234769 
REU2 -0.240622 0.223284 0.028277 -0.212075 -0.182851 0.191049 0.338296 -0.049590 -0.126633 0.917426 -0.326055 0.062825 0.199271 
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SNU1R 0.236782 -0.116175 0.003374 0.193924 0.155023 -0.203949 -0.147112 0.026551 0.019859 -0.242179 0.746764 0.148147 -0.316100 
SNU2 0.388851 -0.255879 0.039810 0.258910 0.245934 -0.179378 -0.234501 0.072155 0.153461 -0.291974 0.907879 0.096329 -0.285983 
UAV1 -0.071344 -0.024722 -0.119802 -0.228245 -0.264011 0.053850 0.129004 -0.192332 -0.012922 0.093807 0.145293 0.975821 0.082807 
UAV4R -0.060756 0.077267 0.026359 -0.059566 -0.059311 -0.180483 0.064983 -0.096771 -0.152775 -0.091827 -0.017189 0.231140 -0.044599 
UTU1 -0.374015 -0.040683 0.320580 -0.025580 -0.248540 0.130130 0.106459 -0.057412 -0.167871 0.148163 -0.205633 -0.007866 0.719784 
UTU2R -0.353733 0.209682 0.000383 -0.296872 -0.316036 0.330656 0.207211 -0.036971 -0.104320 0.211539 -0.332419 0.105613 0.837825 
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Outer Loadings 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.791230                         
ATU2 0.630332                         
ATU3 0.781532                         
COU1R   0.987504                       
COU2R   0.983017                       
EGU1R     0.519778                     
EGU2     0.898148                     
IND1R       0.683051                   
IND3       0.960360                   
INU1R         0.843001                 
INU2         0.777708                 
INU3R         0.826741                 
MAS2           0.591589               
MAS4           0.966023               
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MEU1             0.858140             
MEU2             0.819511             
MEU3             0.903174             
MEU4             0.674028             
PBU1               0.105091           
PBU3               0.999388           
PD2                 0.990029         
PD3                 0.195616         
REU1                   0.958116       
REU2                   0.917426       
SNU1R                     0.746764     
SNU2                     0.907879     
UAV1                       0.975821   
UAV4R                       0.231140   
UTU1                         0.719784 
UTU2R                         0.837825 
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Outer weights or loadings 
  ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 0.791230                         
ATU2 0.630332                         
ATU3 0.781532                         
COU1R   0.987504                       
COU2R   0.983017                       
EGU1R     0.519778                     
EGU2     0.898148                     
IND1R       0.683051                   
IND3       0.960360                   
INU1R         0.843001                 
INU2         0.777708                 
INU3R         0.826741                 
MAS2           0.591589               
MAS4           0.966023               
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MEU1             0.858140             
MEU2             0.819511             
MEU3             0.903174             
MEU4             0.674028             
PBU1               0.105091           
PBU3               0.999388           
PD2                 0.990029         
PD3                 0.195616         
REU1                   0.958116       
REU2                   0.917426       
SNU1R                     0.746764     
SNU2                     0.907879     
UAV1                       0.975821   
UAV4R                       0.231140   
UTU1                         0.719784 
UTU2R                         0.837825 
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Outer Model T-Statistic 
 
ATU COU EGU IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU1R 13.765991                         
ATU2 6.726457                         
ATU3 12.741660                         
COU1R   199.130520                       
COU2R   91.144979                       
EGU1R     1.886234                     
EGU2     3.931943                     
IND1R       3.926299                   
IND3       24.225172                   
INU1R         17.580146                 
INU2         12.270185                 
INU3R         15.843830                 
MAS2           2.335924               
MAS4           9.285640               
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MEU1             16.585650             
MEU2             6.718003             
MEU3             18.368364             
MEU4             4.624730             
PBU1               0.547014           
PBU3               9.159642           
PD2                 4.048575         
PD3                 0.688607         
REU1                   18.394794       
REU2                   10.892945       
SNU1R                     4.792238     
SNU2                     12.982682     
UAV1                       6.805834   
UAV4R                       0.967578   
UTU1                         5.050600 
UTU2R                         10.320005 
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Path Coefficients 
  ATO COO CUL EGO ES IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO             0.664097                 
COO         0.189737                     
CUL             0.023597                 
EGO         0.074819                     
ES             -0.164381                 
IND     -0.328162                         
INO                               
MAS     0.392061                         
MEO         0.595538                     
PBO             0.056057                 
PD     0.638304                         
REO         0.245258                     
SNO             0.125282                 
UAV     0.302449                         
UTO         0.166836                     
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATO 0.831853 0.936874   0.899142 0.831853   
COO 0.977576 0.988661   0.977064 0.977576   
CUL 0.197347 0.051786 0.999467 0.087092 0.197347 0.056929 
EGO 0.515869 0.664739   0.071925 0.515869   
ES 0.434372 0.892911 0.999977 0.865132 0.434372 0.075433 
IND 0.486858 0.568023   -0.128288 0.486857   
INO 0.814119 0.929273 0.776502 0.885818 0.814119 0.576934 
MAS 0.601057 0.746006   0.359538 0.601058   
MEO 0.789085 0.937219   0.909926 0.789085   
PBO 0.539945 0.673414   0.203867 0.539945   
PD 0.576154 0.801994   0.628208 0.576154   
REO 0.901223 0.948045   0.890406 0.901223   
SNO 0.630961 0.766836   0.466314 0.630961   
UAV 0.527715 0.688147   0.107917 0.527715   
UTO 0.616747 0.762948   0.378590 0.616747   
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Inner Model T-Statistic 
  ATO COO CUL EGO ES IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO             7.76563
6 
                
COO         4.06358
2 
                    
CUL             0.54841
5 
                
EGO         2.78512
2 
                    
ES             1.94561
3 
                
IND     3.44
2030 
                        
INO                               
MAS     2.86
8103 
                        
MEO         11.5380
53 
                    
PBO             1.30682
8 
                
PD     2.70
7332 
                        
REO         8.07537
1 
                    
SNO             1.58059
4 
                
UAV     3.20
3052 
                        
UTO         7.37929
9 
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATO 0.687087 0.868060   0.775300 0.687087   
COO 0.950050 0.974385   0.947444 0.950050   
CUL 0.217225 0.058421 0.999376 0.267062 0.217225 0.115165 
EGO 0.497337 0.526870   -0.069556 0.497337   
ES 0.355294 0.823224 0.999704 0.766930 0.355294 0.056738 
IND 0.719415 0.836032   0.622944 0.719415   
INO 0.723221 0.886360 0.717101 0.807445 0.723221 0.441897 
MAS 0.681299 0.810393   0.532766 0.681299   
MEO 0.719773 0.910773   0.867695 0.719773   
PBO 0.474716 0.499807   0.438183 0.474716   
PD 0.586795 0.809523   0.675866 0.586793   
REO 0.931218 0.964384   0.926143 0.931218   
SNO 0.689192 0.815798   0.551445 0.689192   
UAV 0.557726 0.683405   0.321737 0.557728   
UTO 0.633905 0.775763   0.423647 0.633905   
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Path Coefficients 
  ATO COO CUL EGO ES IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO             0.575911                 
COO         0.194453                     
CUL             0.116854                 
EGO         0.050618                     
ES             -0.192223                 
IND     0.548065                         
INO                               
MAS     0.490442                         
MEO         0.654407                     
PBO             0.059367                 
PD     0.387585                         
REO         0.299555                     
SNO             0.097236                 
UAV     0.186410                         
UTO         0.142383                     
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Inner Model T- Statistic 
  ATO COO CUL EGO ES IND INO MAS MEO PBO PD REO SNO UAV UTO 
ATO             6.276476                 
COO         4.188292                     
CUL             1.712842                 
EGO         2.016393                     
ES             2.079796                 
IND     3.790446                         
INO                               
MAS     4.245451                         
MEO         14.350930                     
PBO             1.522954                 
PD     1.818727                         
REO         9.615902                     
SNO             1.552824                 
UAV     1.854711                         
UTO         5.005469                     
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATU 0.729693 0.890029   0.816972 0.729693   
COU 0.962459 0.980871   0.961063 0.962459   
CUL 0.214066 0.010426 0.999289 -0.050904 0.214066 0.089618 
EGU 0.438342 0.608487   -0.283484 0.438342   
ES 0.429436 0.890119 0.999819 0.858551 0.429436 0.094249 
IND 0.488850 0.557387   -0.128288 0.488850   
INU 0.720718 0.885354 0.670456 0.805195 0.720718 0.420447 
MAS 0.601373 0.746440   0.359538 0.601373   
MEU 0.801278 0.941491   0.916439 0.801278   
PBU 0.626581 0.751675   0.691391 0.626581   
PD 0.717715 0.835565   0.608215 0.717715   
REU 0.892029 0.942931   0.879404 0.892029   
SNU 0.629851 0.772695   0.413586 0.629851   
UAV 0.508717 0.322382   -0.069912 0.508717   
UTU 0.584244 0.736295   0.293022 0.584244   
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Path Coefficients 
  ATU COU CUL EG
U 
ES IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UA
V 
UTU 
ATU             0.572541                 
COU         0.227269                     
CUL             -0.053819                 
EGU         0.065310                     
ES             -0.189093                 
IND     0.408370                         
INU                               
MAS     0.545654                         
MEU         0.608988                     
PBU             -0.004306                 
PD     -0.285547                         
REU         0.221407                     
SNU             0.101959                 
UAV     0.329494                         
UTU         0.150929                     
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Inner Model T-Statistic 
  ATU COU CUL EGU ES IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU             4.704148                 
COU         5.430726                     
CUL             0.891708                 
EGU         2.369549                     
ES             1.657514                 
IND     4.375407                         
INU                               
MAS     4.454106                         
MEU         15.578184                     
PBU             0.105695                 
PD     1.440995                         
REU         6.351521                     
SNU             1.264282                 
UAV     3.476244                         
UTU         5.269384                     
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PLS Quality Criteria 
Overview  
  AVE 
Composite 
Reliability 
R 
Square 
Cronbachs 
Alpha 
Communality Redundancy 
ATU 0.545450 0.780986   0.620449 0.545450   
COU 0.970898 0.985234   0.970035 0.970898   
CUL 0.243222 0.012016 0.999432 -0.051085 0.243222 0.148981 
EGU 0.522270 0.629601   0.167169 0.522270   
ES 0.315250 0.794275 0.999273 0.736232 0.315250 0.084497 
IND 0.722184 0.838229   0.622944 0.722184   
INU 0.668122 0.857848 0.581743 0.752795 0.668122 0.274220 
MAS 0.681488 0.810564   0.532766 0.681488   
MEU 0.678645 0.893675   0.840028 0.678645   
PBU 0.503922 0.548182   0.245333 0.503922   
PD 0.600870 0.728466   0.498284 0.600868   
REU 0.882518 0.937593   0.866886 0.882518   
SNU 0.690833 0.815717   0.570554 0.690833   
UAV 0.497318 0.370471   0.025466 0.497318   
UTU 0.593477 0.734163   0.366099 0.593477   
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Path Coefficients 
 
  ATU COU CUL EGU ES IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU             0.484993                 
COU         0.295109                     
CUL             0.161393                 
EGU         0.053772                     
ES             -0.282935                 
IND     0.598517                         
INU                               
MAS     -0.502688                         
MEU         0.662647                     
PBU             0.162176                 
PD     0.191699                         
REU         0.261472                     
SNU             -0.094671                 
UAV     -0.211635                         
UTU         0.140640                     
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Inner Model T-Statistic 
  ATU COU CUL EGU ES IND INU MAS MEU PBU PD REU SNU UAV UTU 
ATU             5.906430                 
COU         6.240079                     
CUL             2.748569                 
EGU         1.454729                     
ES             3.581011                 
IND     6.205474                         
INU                               
MAS     5.814545                         
MEU         12.290886                     
PBU             1.863370                 
PD     2.030104                         
REU         7.614010                     
SNU       1.616854         
UAV   2.456804             
UTU     4.086740           
 
